The Solid & the Shifting: Darwinian Time, Evolutionary Form and the Greek Ideal 
in the Early Works of Virginia Woolf by Kreutziger, Joseph Monroe
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences
Summer 8-15-2017
The Solid & the Shifting: Darwinian Time,
Evolutionary Form and the Greek Ideal in the Early
Works of Virginia Woolf
Joseph Monroe Kreutziger
Washington University in St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Classical Literature and Philology Commons, Developmental Biology Commons,
Evolution Commons, and the Modern Literature Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For
more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kreutziger, Joseph Monroe, "The Solid & the Shifting: Darwinian Time, Evolutionary Form and the Greek Ideal in the Early Works of
Virginia Woolf " (2017). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1250.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1250
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 
Department of English & American Literature 
 
Dissertation Examination Committee: 
Vincent Sherry, Chair  
Steven Meyer 
Melanie Micir 
Robert Milder 
Zoe Stamatopoulou 
 
 
 
The Solid & the Shifting:  
Darwinian Time, Evolutionary Form and the Greek Ideal  
in the Early Works of Virginia Woolf 
by 
Joseph Kreutziger 
 
 
A dissertation presented to  
The Graduate School  
of Washington University in 
partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2017 
St. Louis, Missouri
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017, Joseph Kreutziger 
 ii 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................................................................................................................... IV	  
ABSTRACT	  OF	  THE	  DISSERTATION ............................................................................................................VII	  
CHAPTER	  ONE:	  AN	  OPENING .................................................................................................................. 2	  EVOLUTIONARY	  FORM	  AND	  DARWINIAN	  ORIGINS	  IN	  VIRGINIA	  WOOLF ........................................................................ 2	  1.1:	  THE	  SOLID	  AND	  THE	  SHIFTING.................................................................................................................................. 2	  1.2:	  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................................... 7	  1.3:	  THE	  TEMPORAL	  BARRIER ........................................................................................................................................11	  1.4:	  THE	  MYTH	  OF	  PROGRESS,	  THE	  MISS	  OF	  PROCESS ...............................................................................................15	  1.5:	  THE	  CRITICISM ...........................................................................................................................................................18	  1.6:	  THE	  CHAPTERS...........................................................................................................................................................22	  1.7:	  RICOEUR’S	  TIME	  AND	  NARRATIVE:	  PREFIGURING	  WOOLF ...........................................................................28	  1.8:	  RICOEUR’S	  FIGURATIONS:	  WOOLF’S	  “PRENARRATIVE”	  AS	  PREHISTORY .........................................................32	  
CHAPTER	  TWO ..........................................................................................................................................36	  
THE	  VOYAGE	  OUT	  AND	  NIGHT	  AND	  DAY:	  EARLY	  EVOLUTIONARY	  PLOTS	  AND	  NARRATIVE	  DESTINATIONS	  IN	  VIRGINIA	  WOOLF .....................................................................................................................................................................36	  2.1:	  VOYAGING....................................................................................................................................................................36	  2.2:	  RETURNS......................................................................................................................................................................38	  2.3:	  MELYMBROSIA’S	  CAMBRIDGIAN	  EXPLOSION.........................................................................................................40	  2.4:	  DESCENT	  AS	  DISAPPEARANCE,	  UNSELFCONSCIOUSNESS	  AS	  AWARENESS ......................................................43	  2.5:	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  ROMANCE ........................................................................................................................................45	  	  2.6:	  NIGHT	  AND	  DAY’S	  VISIONARY	  BIOLOGY ................................................................................................................48	  	  2.7:	  NIGHT	  AND	  DAY’S	  RESOLUTION	  AT	  KEW. .............................................................................................................52	  
CHAPTER	  THREE ......................................................................................................................................57	  TALES	  OF	  THE	  SNAIL:	  NATURALIST	  PERSPECTIVE	  AND	  EVOLUTIONARY	  FORM	  IN	  “KEW	  GARDENS”	  AND	  “THE	  MARK	  ON	  THE	  WALL” .............................................................................................................................................................57	  3.1:	  WOOLF’S	  NATURALIST	  VIEW	  OF	  KEW...................................................................................................................57	  3.2:	  THE	  KEW	  GARDENS	  OF	  NATURAL	  HISTORY .........................................................................................................61	  3.3:	  IMPERSONALITY	  OF	  THE	  NATURALIST ...................................................................................................................64	  3.4:	  TALE	  OF	  THE	  SNAIL ...................................................................................................................................................69	  3.5:	  TALES	  OF	  THE	  SNAIL..................................................................................................................................................80	  3.6:	  FROM	  EVOLUTIONS	  TO	  INVOLUTIONS	  OF	  TIME	  AND	  NARRATIVE ......................................................................84	  	  3.7:	  THE	  TREE	  OF	  LIFE ....................................................................................................................................................90	  	  3.8:	  TRANSITIONS—THE	  SOLIDITY	  OF	  TREES:	  NARRATIVE	  CONTINUITY	  AND	  INTERRUPTION .......................94	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR ...................................................................................................................................... 104	  PREFIGURING	  THE	  PAST	  BEFORE	  “READING”:	  THE	  ENTOMOLOGICAL	  SOCIETY	  AND	  THE	  ORIGINS	  OF	  EVOLUTIONARY	  FORM	  IN	  WOOLF’S	  NARRATIVE ............................................................................................................104	  4.1	  INTRODUCTORY	  “READING” ........................................................................................................................................104	  	  4.2	  “READING”	  THE	  PAST..............................................................................................................................................107	  	  4.3	  “READING”:	  DAY	  TWO............................................................................................................................................110	  	  4.4:	  THE	  INTERLUDE .....................................................................................................................................................111	  	  4.5:	  LARVA	  GROOM	  AND	  LANTERN	  BEARER.............................................................................................................115	  	  4.6:	  DARWIN	  AMONG	  THE	  MOTHS ..............................................................................................................................119	  4.7:	  LEPIDOPTERA	  WOOLFIANA ..................................................................................................................................124	  4.8:	  RE-­‐“READING”—THWARTED	  METAMORPHOSIS	  AND	  NARRATIVE	  RUPTURE..............................................132	  	  4.9:	  TRANSITIONS—	  HANG	  THERE	  LIKE	  FRUIT,	  MY	  SOUL,	  TIL	  THE	  TREE	  DIE.......................................................135	  
 iii 
	  4.10:	  SOLID	  SHIFTINGS	  AND	  SHIFTING	  SOLIDS—EVOLUTIONARY	  PLATONISM	  AND	  AESTHETIC	  DARWINISM..................................................................................................................................................................................................141	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE ........................................................................................................................................ 146	  THE	  VICTORIAN	  INHERITANCE	  OF	  THE	  GREEK	  IDEAL	  IN	  EARLY	  WOOLF:	  DIALOGUE	  AND	  GENDER	  	  IN	  “PENTELICUS”	  AND	  “PHYLLIS	  &	  ROSAMOND”.................................................................................................................146	  	  5.1:	  A	  GREEK	  OF	  HER	  OWN: ........................................................................................................................................146	  5.2:	  CAMBRIDGE	  SYMPOSIUMS—THE	  EARLIEST	  FICTIONS....................................................................................149	  5.3:	  A	  SYMPOSIUM	  OF	  HER	  OWN—CONVERSATIONS	  AND	  DIALOGUES ...............................................................157	  	  5.4:	  GREEK	  SOLIDS—MATTHEW	  ARNOLD	  AND	  THE	  MASCULINE	  LINEAGE	  IN	  WOOLF ....................................171	  	  5.5:	  STATUES	  OF	  STATUTES	  FROM	  LORD	  ELGIN	  TO	  THE	  DUKE	  OF	  WELLINGTON .............................................182	  	  5.6:	  FROM	  GREEK	  SOLIDS	  TO	  LIQUIDS—THE	  FEMININE	  LINEAGE	  IN	  WOOLF ....................................................191	  
CHAPTER	  SIX ........................................................................................................................................... 199	  THE	  MOMENT	  BEHIND	  VIRGINIA	  WOOLF’S	  BEING:	  A	  BRIEF	  STRETCH	  IN	  DARWINIAN	  TIME	  AND	  PLATONIC	  FORM	  FROM	  PATER	  TO	  WOOLF .....................................................................................................................................................199	  SOME	  VERSIONS	  OF	  THE	  TEMPORAL............................................................................................................................199	  	  6.	  2:	  EVOLUTIONARY	  HELLENISM—JANE	  ELLEN	  HARRISON'S	  GREEK	  DARWINIAN	  WOMEN........................201	  	  6.3:	  PATER’S	  CREATOR—HERACLITUS	  AS	  DARWIN ...............................................................................................214	  	  6.4:	  “ALREADY	  THE	  PAST”—MOMENTS	  LOST	  IN	  DARWIN’S	  ALMOST	  ETERNITY..............................................220	  	  6.5:	  DISCIPLINING	  THE	  MOMENT.................................................................................................................................223	  	  6.6:	  THE	  DISCIPLINED	  MOMENT	  AND	  THE	  PROCESSION	  OF	  PLATONIC	  FORM...................................................226	  	  6.7:	  THE	  USES	  AND	  DISADVANTAGES	  OF	  PREHISTORY	  IN	  NARRATIVE.................................................................229	  6.8:	  NIETZSCHE’S	  UNTIMELY	  INTERRUPTION	  OF	  THE	  PROCESSION.......................................................................233	  6.9:	  NIETZSCHE	  AND	  PATER—BECOMING	  ZARATHUSTRAN	  OR	  HERACLITEAN .................................................236	  6.10:	  NIETZSCHE’S	  DIONYSIS	  AND	  THE	  ANTI-­‐SOCRATIC	  TRAGIC...........................................................................238	  6.11:	  BERGSON,	  JAMES,	  RUSSELL,	  WOOLF ................................................................................................................242	  6.12:	  BERGSON’S	  NEBULOUS	  CLARITY—THE	  ANTI-­‐INTELLECTUALIST	  MOMENT...............................................244	  6.13:	  THE	  PRAGMATIC	  STREAM	  OF	  CONSCIOUSNESS ..............................................................................................250	  6.14:	  A	  BREACH	  IN	  CONSCIOUSNESS...........................................................................................................................254	  6.15:	  PRAGMATIC	  DARWINISTS ...................................................................................................................................256	  6.16	  RUSSELL’S	  REBUTTAL...........................................................................................................................................260	  
CHAPTER	  SEVEN:	  INCLUSIVE	  INCONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... 268	  7.1	  THE	  SUMMER	  OF	  1906...........................................................................................................................................268	  7.2	  THE	  FALL	  OF	  1918..................................................................................................................................................269	  7.3	  EARLY	  TIME	  PASSAGES ...........................................................................................................................................272	  7.4	  THE	  FALL	  OF	  1940..................................................................................................................................................274	  
CHAPTER	  EIGHT:	  CODA ....................................................................................................................... 278	  8.1	  RIP	  VAN	  WINKLES ...................................................................................................................................................278	  8.2	  FROM	  THE	  PRIMITIVE	  TO	  THE	  PRIMORDIAL .......................................................................................................282	  8.3	  WITHDRAWAL,	  EVASION,	  TAXONOMY,	  ECOFEMINISM......................................................................................294	  8.4	  VAGUENESS,	  THE	  LINGUISTIC	  TURN,	  PRAGMATISM,	  AND	  PROCESS ...............................................................303	  8.5	  AN	  ECOFEMINIST	  HELLENISM ...............................................................................................................................311	  
FOOTNOTES ...................................................................................................................................................... 317	  
LIST	  OF	  WORKS	  CITED .................................................................................................................................. 343	  
 
 iv 
Acknowledgments 
 
 First and foremost, I must thank the Washington University Department of English & 
American Literature, not merely for accepting me into their graduate program nearly a quarter 
century ago, but for then taking this chance in allowing a middle-aged man the opportunity to 
right a regret. A special thanks to the Graduate Committee members for reinstating me into the 
graduate program after all these years, acknowledging for me the idea that “It is human to 
complete a thing.”  
 Formative in that process early on was Naomi Lebowitz, the Insight Lady of St. Louis, 
whose classes, encouragement, friendship, mentorship, and above all correspondence as I began 
the dissertation process, even as I moved to New York, were abiding and cherished.  I’d also like 
to acknowledge and thank Bob Milder for really introducing me to Virginia Woolf in his seminar 
by insisting upon the primary significance of her diaries, letters, and other autobiographical 
writings. The germinating idea behind this thesis was first discovered in his seminar. Steven 
Meyer’s “rhythm of thought” and the focus upon modernism and science certainly made an 
impression. Also, special thanks to Vince Sherry for taking on the first reading of a completed 
draft when his schedule and own writing projects gave him every reason and incentive not to do 
so.  Then there are the many professors, librarians, academic coordinators and support staff at 
Washington University who contributed to the completion of this project in ways large and 
small, not least being Sarah Hennessey, Deborah Ehrstein, and Clara Fehrenbach. 
 Here in New York, a huge thanks to Frank Carnabuci, Guillermo Salgado, Lori Kennedy 
and the rest of the faculty and students at The Birch Wathen Lenox School. It was in a 
conversation about regret with Frank that he posed the question, “Why don’t you finish?” right 
after I mentioned that I’d always regretted not finishing. It seemed an absurd position at the time, 
 v 
and then he made it impossible not to try by offering me a summer sabbatical and the financial 
backing to do so. In my absence, Guillermo, Lori, Jackie, and many others at BWL more than 
kept the middle school afloat while I immersed myself once more in the life of a graduate 
student. 
 Then there is family—my parents, the Doctors Kreutziger, who always supported and 
encouraged my doctorate long after I’d given up any chance of its completion; Mim-Mim and 
Pops, who gave the great gifts not only of love but of time and space—their adoration of 
grandchildren (and of me) provided me indeed a room of one’s own when such accommodations 
are hard to come by in Manhattan! Not least, my daughters Clara and Ava—the need for 
solitude, to write and to think, can be a selfish act, and they’ve given up so much of their daddy 
time early and late, for this moment to happen.   
 Finally, Jana. No words to capture the gratitude. Two decades ago, we began a life 
together in St. Louis. You said yes then, and have said YES against any doubt and reason not to 
say yes. When so much is not, you are affirmation. I love you, love you, love you. 
Joseph Kreutziger 
Washington University in St. Louis 
August 2017
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In loving memory of Sam Stringfield 
Slovesk Forever 
 
 
 vii 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
“The Solid & the Shifting”: Evolutionary Form, Darwinian Time, and the Greek Ideal in the 
Early Works of Virginia Woolf 
By 
Joseph Kreutziger 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in English and American Literature 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Vincent Sherry, Chair  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Now is life very solid or very shifting?” Virginia Woolf asks in her diary of 1931, a question 
she claims haunts her in its contradictions. This dynamism between the solid and the shifting 
aspects of life and temporality is fundamental to an analysis of Woolf’s writing process.  It 
resonates throughout the narratives of her experimental writings, culminating in her later works 
but clearly present in Woolf’s earliest pieces and forays as a writer. Behind it, I argue, are two of 
Woolf’s earliest academic pursuits and scholarly interests—natural history and Greek literature, 
especially as she came to read and understand them through the works of Darwin and Plato. That 
these two male university courses of study were denied her via any formal educational training 
compel her to think through the questions each field poses for the uses and advantages of a 
Modernist, feminist literature. This dissertation traces in Woolf the most significant cultural 
assumptions concerning Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and then later “the Greek ideal” as she 
came to inherit them through a male and female lineage of thinkers and associations. As my 
argument backtracks through Woolf’s childhood against the intellectual backdrop of some other 
major thinkers, of particular emphasis will be some of Woolf’s crucial early essays and short 
stories where she begins to work out at the level of plot and allusion much of the intellectual 
difficulties necessary to ground the radical departures in narrative form that would characterize 
her mature fiction.  My analysis of how Woolf mediates this field of experience through her 
 viii 
earliest short stories, essays, novels, and the first experimental short stories—wherein Woolf 
tests many of the ideas derived from Darwin and Plato—establishes what might be described as 
an ontogeny and phylogeny of thought that prefigures the young Virginia Woolf’s ventures into a 
more radical narrative form.   That is, Woolf’s individual development as a writer shares the 
temporal anxieties of many other figures we have subsequently categorized as Modernists, but 
with crucial distinguishing characteristics, not the least being her emphasis upon gender. Woolf’s 
dual engagement with her Victorian childhood and the Modernist present operates by exposing 
the very process of transformation: the solid and the shifting, the Greek ideal against the 
Darwinian, the masculine and the feminine, exist in dynamic temporal oppositions. 
 In order to establish these early formations of the Darwinian and Platonic aspects of her 
writing, I begin by exploring her first two novels, The Voyage Out and Night & Day, that 
establish Woolf’s engagement with evolutionary principles at the level of plot and character. 
Woolf’s major breakthrough in the writing of her short stories “Kew Gardens” and “The Mark 
on the Wall” also have Darwin as a principle origin, and when these two works are paired with 
Woolf’s radically experimental essay “Reading,” Woolf’s childhood fascination with 
entomology and “bugging” can be read as an essential formative experience that merges the 
personal and the literary. This play with evolutionary form and a Darwinian understanding of 
time and temporality is then juxtaposed alongside her abiding, profound appreciation of 
Hellenism and Greek literature.  Woolf never fully abandons theVictorian inheritance of the 
“Greek ideal” as interpreted by Matthew Arnold and other Victorian luminaries. Complicating 
this understanding in ambivalent, contradictory ways is her personal association with Greek 
through her brother Thoby and all his Cambridge counterparts who become prominent figures of 
early Bloomsbury. The value Woolf derives from the Greek ideal never altogether disappears 
 ix 
from her work, and the struggle between the concepts of Darwinian process and temporality 
against Platonic stability and unity becomes the ruling dynamic of Woolf’s method.  They form 
the “solid and the shifting” aspects of Woolf’s writing, a tension that her fiction engages in, 
embodies, and structurally represents. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Oh, he has his dissertation to write,” said Mrs. Ramsay.  She knew all about that, said Mrs. 
Ramsay.  He talked of nothing else.  It was about the influence of somebody on something. 
—Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse 
 2 
Chapter One: An Opening  
Evolutionary Form and Darwinian Origins in Virginia Woolf 
 
 
1.1: THE SOLID AND THE SHIFTING 
“Now is life very solid, or very shifting?” Virginia Woolf asks in her diary, at about the 
time she began work on what would become The Waves (1931): 
I am haunted by the two contradictions.  This has gone on forever: will last 
forever; goes down to the bottom of the world—this moment I stand on.  Also, it 
is transitory, flying, diaphanous.  I shall pass like a cloud on the waves.  Perhaps it 
may be that though we change; one flying after another, so quick so quick, yet we 
are somehow successive, & continuous—we human beings; & show the light 
through.  But what is the light?  I am impressed by the transitoriness of human life 
to such an extent that I am often saying farewell—after dining with Roger for 
instance; or reckoning how many more times I shall see Nessa.1 
It is a characteristic progression of thoughts in Woolf.  The verb “haunted” does not exaggerate 
how some of the most basic questions of time and temporality are central preoccupations in her 
writing.  For though the subject here is ostensibly “life,” the responses are in relation to the 
temporal, as in the richly mixed metaphor of solidity figured as a “moment” she “stands on.”  It 
(the present) “goes down to the bottom of the world” and will last an eternity, but this platform 
disintegrates with her ensuing metaphors of the moment as “transitory, flying, diaphanous.”  If 
life is too short to be substantial, perhaps it can be interpreted as successive and collectively 
compensatory: the “I” becomes “we” and “we human beings…show the light through.”  That 
 3 
response only raises the question of what the light is; ontological speculation becomes 
epistemological.  As always in Woolf, the passage of time is a question of being, and conversely, 
the question of being a question of time.  But the questions remain open-ended.  Answers are put 
forth but immediately countered, the solid and the shifting unfolding rather than confirming a 
position. 
This dynamism between the solid and the shifting aspects of life and temporality is 
fundamental to an analysis of Woolf’s fiction.  It represents a rhythm of thought that resonates 
throughout the narratives of her early and middle periods,2 culminating in The Waves, but clearly 
present in Woolf’s earliest writings.  Ten years before she began work on The Waves, while 
writing her first experimental short stories and beginning Jacob’s Room, Woolf formally and 
publicly asked the same questions about life and temporality, but she posed the contradiction 
itself as a formal consideration that novelists must address.  Her essay “Modern Novels” (1919) 
is a manifesto for the kind of novel that would resist the idea that “life is like” the imminently 
solid structures created by her male “materialist” forebears, most notably H. G. Wells, John 
Galsworthy, and Arnold Bennett.3  Even if Bennett “can make a book so well constructed and 
solid” that there is “not so much as a draught between the frames of the windows, or a crack in 
the boards,” Woolf argues that life somehow escapes.  All of this “enormous labor” of proving 
“solidity” is in fact “labour misplaced to the extent of obscuring and blotting out the light of the 
conception.”  The “moment of importance” must include the ordinary mind on an ordinary day 
as it receives “an incessant shower of innumerable atoms,” some of them “evanescent,” some 
                                                           
1 January 4, 1929, The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vol. III, (1924-1930), ed. by Anne Olivier Bell, assisted by Andrew McNeillie 
(New York: HBJ, 1980) 218. 
2 In breaking Woolf’s writing career into three periods, I follow Carolyn Heilbrun and Molly Hite, but perhaps with different 
emphasis upon the periods.  The first period ranges from 1906-1917, which includes her earliest short stories up through the 
writing of Night and Day.  The middle period begins in 1917, with the writing of her first experimental short stories, Kew 
Gardens and Mark on the Wall, and concludes with The Waves in 1931.  The last period stretches from 1932-41, when Woolf, in 
Heilbrun’s estimation, began to deal more explicitly and directly with the social status of women, “to cross her self-drawn line 
between art and propaganda.” 
 4 
“engraved with the sharpness of steel” and “composing in their sum what we might venture to 
call life itself.”4  Woolf’s thesis, which would later become a central tenet of Modernist fiction, 
is grounded on the assertion that, given the shifting and the solid (the evanescent and the 
engraved), the novelist’s task is to “trace this pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in 
appearance, which each sight or incidence scores upon the consciousness.”  It follows one of the 
most quoted passages in Woolf’s critical writings, here taken from the more familiar revision of 
“Modern Novels” into “Modern Fiction,” which was included in The Common Reader (1925): 
“Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-
transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.”5   
A subtle shift occurs here.  The mind receives impressions from the external world, some 
engraved and some evanescent.  Woolf’s diary inquiry— “But what is the light?”—is a central 
concern of this essay as well.  For the novelist, the question is addressed by how the novel is lit.  
Woolf argues that the “light of the conception” is obscured or transformed by experiencing life 
as something contrived, or staged, the materialists and their gig lamps symmetrically arranged.  
Instead, the modern novelist begins from within; life is the light that emanates outward and 
envelops the living in a diaphanous halo.  Do we “show the light through,” as Woolf’s diary 
entry phrases it, or does life surround us, as “Modern Fiction” has it?  The distinction, if there is 
one, remains an inquiry central to experiencing her fiction, as does her location of self and 
meaning, life and light.  In “Modern Fiction,” Woolf adds that the novelist must convey this 
“uncircumscribed spirit,” picking up the figure of the envelope as “semi-transparent” rather than 
wholly transparent, a crucial difference.6  Character should never be fully circumscribed or fully 
irradiated by authorial omniscience.  The author instead traces what moves, consciousness, lit 
                                                           
3 The Essays of Virginia Woolf, Vol. 3: (1919-1924), ed. by Andrew McNeillie (HBJ: 1988) 33. 
4 The Common Reader: First Series, edited and introduced by Andrew McNeillie, (New York: HBJ, 1984) 32-33. 
 5 
from within and through this temporal procession, this vague nebulosity, “from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end.”  When Woolf asks the writer to “look within” rather than without 
(opposing the external constructs of the materialists), she insists that her idea of a new narrative 
form would retain this incessant procession of consciousness, a process unavailable to the 
conventional construction of “our two and thirty chapters after a design which more and more 
ceases to resemble the vision in our minds.”   
Put simply, the question of time becomes a question of narrative form for Virginia Woolf.  
The vantage point from which the narrator perceives her characters then becomes not just the 
configuration of plot and setting.  This directly relates to the basic spatial and temporal issues of 
where and when a story takes place, but Woolf’s emphasis is on the mediation of narrative.  
Gone in Woolf is not only omniscience, in the traditional sense, but the aerial perspective, the 
temporal distance from which a beginning, middle, and end may assure and be assured for the 
reader.  The narrative chronology of A to B to C might begin within the contours of B, Woolf 
suggests, and perhaps not even conclude with a C:  “if one were free and could set down what 
one chose, there would be no plot, little probability, and a vague general confusion in which the 
clear-cut features of the tragic, the comic, the passionate, and the lyrical were dissolved beyond 
the possibility of separate recognition.”7  Nothing is certain, above all the conventions that direct 
how a story will begin, develop and end.  In “Modern Fiction,” Woolf refers in particular to a 
short piece of Chekhov that remains “vague and inconclusive” by story’s end, suggesting that 
this may be the right course, because “there is perhaps no answer to the questions which it 
raises.”8   
                                                           
5 Ibid. 150. 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Modern Novels,” 33. 
8 “Modern Novels,” Essays of Virginia Woolf Vol. 3, 35; “Modern Fiction,” Common Reader, 153. 
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This is reminiscent of Henry James’s reference to the “arena” of action, the perspective 
“in the middest,” the present moment.  In her essays, Woolf ceaselessly examines how the 
narrative perspective presented within the novel is ineluctably interwoven with the author’s 
historical perspective.  The modern position, Woolf stipulates, is conditioned by an unsettled 
belief in the past and the lack of assurance in a future:  “We are sharply cut off from our 
predecessors,” writes Woolf.  “A shift in the scale—the sudden slip of masses held in position 
for ages—has shaken the fabric from top to bottom, alienated us from the past and made us 
perhaps too vividly conscious of the present.”9   The relations between past and future are 
formative.   In “How It Strikes a Contemporary,” Woolf looks back at Austen, Wordsworth, and 
Scott’s ease in creating “that complete statement which is literature,” an ability that she posits as 
possible because of  “the power of their belief,” what she goes on to construe as the more solid 
“relations of human beings towards each other and towards the universe.”10   But did human 
character actually change on or about December, 1910, as Woolf famously declared?   Or was it 
her perception of forms in the arts and power relations in society that allowed for a new vision of 
such character?11  The times and our relationship to the temporal had changed, she insisted, and 
so should the form of the novel and the methods of the novelists. The author who most strives to 
represent the multiform shapes and the incessant temporal shifts consciousness takes moment to 
moment on any given day would best represent modern human character.  These “solid” and 
“shifting” perspectives are essential strategies of Woolf’s own narrative form.  From the earliest 
                                                           
9 “How it Strikes a Contemporary” (1923), Common Reader, 236. 
10 Ibid. 238-9. 
11 I refer of course to Woolf’’s essay, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” and the line “On or about December 1910, human 
character changed.”  The tone in Woolf is jocular and the assigning of the date obscure.  But her dating, I believe, is cumulative, 
based on multiple events in 1910: the Post-Impressionist exhibit put together by Roger Fry, the ascension of George V, the death 
of Florence Nightingale, the Conciliatory Bill put before Parliament for the enfranchisement of women, and the elections of 
December 1910 that gave Asquith’s Liberal Party the power to create the January 1911 Parliamentary Act that could severely 
curtail the power of the House of Lords. 
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short stories to Between the Acts and the uncompleted memoir “A Sketch of the Past,” there are 
moments of stability set in conflict and scattered by the passage of time. 
 
 1.2: BACKGROUND 
Such a general summation, naturally, draws a circle of inclusion around at least two 
generations of notable writers who find the question of time a particularly modern dilemma.  In 
addition to Virginia Woolf’s refinement of this tendency in her thought and work—what she 
succinctly describes as “moments of being” in her posthumously published memoir—there are a 
host of other phrases inaugurated to mediate the temporal difficulties of Modernity:  Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s “eternal return,” William James’s “stream of consciousness,” Henri Bergson’s “real 
duration,” Edmund Husserl’s “internal time-consciousness,” Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad’s 
separate “moments of vision,” Joyce’s “epiphany,” Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis’s “Vortex,” 
T. S. Eliot’s “still point,” Heidegger’s “Dasein,” among others. These comprise only a handful of 
the most pronounced variations upon a theme.  Rescuing the moment from time becomes the 
substance of philosophical and literary works that ubiquitously announce a modern sensibility, 
often perplexed by an increasingly troubled, but nuanced, vision of temporality. 
But why?  While the philosophical questions of time and temporality are as ancient as 
philosophy itself, certainly present in Greek pre-Socratic philosophers like Thales and 
Heraclitus, these specific questions, explorations and preoccupations define Modernity to such 
an extent that they create a fault-line between Modern and Victorian sensibilities.  A seminal 
essay like T.E. Hulme’s “Romanticism and Classicism”(1912) must address the contemporary 
anxiety over time to prophecy a new kind of Classicism for the twentieth century that would be 
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antithetical to the lingering nineteenth century Romanticism.12  Wyndham Lewis, the staunchest 
polemicist against what he viewed as the “time-cult” of his era, nevertheless identified the time 
obsession of his contemporaries as the prevailing, predominant zeitgeist that he needed to expose 
if only to contradict and conquer.13  Indeed, the basic notions of time and space are scrutinized 
and revised so thoroughly that Stephen Kern is not being hyperbolic when he defines a major 
subtext of Modernism’s intellectual milieu as The Culture of Time and Space.14  Kern’s seminal 
work revisits the years 1880-1918, which allows him to convey the broad range of interests and 
anxieties conceptions of time elicited and emerging technology altered.  There was the Prime 
Meridian Conference of 1884 that proposed the global standardization of uniform time and 
almost thirty years later the proposal was put into practice when the first time signal was 
transmitted around the world in the summer of 1913. Never before had time become so 
uniformly public.15  This “mean time” coincides with the newfound need to “regulate” time, from 
the precise measurements necessary to administer modern railroads and modern warfare to the 
capitalistic demand for efficiency in the factory so exacting, that time indeed became money.  
Randall Stevenson’s thorough-going analysis of “temporal autonomy” in Modernist Fiction 
deftly elucidates the consequences of the new perception of time in political and economic terms, 
even down to the gold standard of business reduced to the dutiful, superannuated laborer’s 
reception of a gold watch upon retirement, a paltry symbol indeed of human reification through 
time.16  Electricity lighting the night and then coursing through telegraphs and telephones 
instantaneously altered mental associations of time and distance. Chronophotography and 
                                                           
12 In Hulme.  Speculations: Essays on Humanism and  the Philosophy of Art.  ed. Herbert Read.  (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner, 1936) 113-40. 
13 This position is evident throughout Lewis’s entire oeuvre, but the position is most explicitly laid out in Time and Western Man 
(1927). 
14 The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918, (Harvard UP, 1983). 
15 See Kern’s The Culture of Time and Space, Ch. 1: “The Nature of Time”. 
16 See Stevenson’s chapter “Time” in Modernist Fiction: An Introduction, (University of Kentucky Press, 1992), specifically 
113-153. 
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cinematography, the still series put in motion with greater and greater precision and speed, 
inspired new metaphors (indeed new theories) for the temporal, and consequently for fictional 
techniques.17  Then the invention of electric clocks in 1916 simulated for the first time since the 
sun-dial the flux of time, rather than the interval of the ‘tick-tock’.  The atomized nature of time, 
in praxis since the introduction of mechanized clocks, all of a sudden let time be conceived in 
terms of electric currents.  
In the meantime, the new physics brought about a stellar revolution. Minkowski’s Space-
Time Continuum (1905) and Einstein’s Special and General Theories of Relativity (1905-1907) 
ruptured the universalism of Newton’s theories on absolute space and time.  If time is relative to 
the motion between an observer and the thing observed, a “plurality of local times” replaces the 
fixed measurements of Newton’s theories.18  The stability of all spatial forms is then modified by 
the accelerating rate of gravitational force, with the size and shape of any body susceptible to 
change.  Minkowski’s bold address delivered at the 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists 
and Physicians famously announces a new reality to discern:  
The views of space and time that I wish to lay before you have sprung from the 
soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They are radical. 
Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere 
shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent 
reality.19 
The fourth dimension was that new reality.  The Classic distinctions that separated space from 
time, solidified for the arts in the eighteenth century by Gotthold Lessing’s clear delineation of 
                                                           
17 Kern, “The Nature of Time.”  Henri Bergson’s famous metaphor of the intellect’s apprehension of time as approximate to the 
cinematograph occurs first in Creative Evolution, 1910. 
18 Ibid. 15-19. 
19 September 21, 1908 
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the plastic arts as space-bound and the narrative arts as time-bound in form, were blurred and 
challenged.20 
 Fiction, the narrative art seemingly most time-bound in its conventions, begins to 
register this temporal plurality in its very structure.  Paul Ricoeur chooses three Modern novels, 
including Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, as the analytical testing grounds for his theoretical 
application of narrative reconciliations to the aporias of time.  If the novel genre is “an immense 
laboratory for experiments in which…every received convention has been set aside,” the modern 
novel, in particular, questions the very nature of narrative constructions by the authors’ 
“awareness of every artifice” that binds time to narrative.21 Much has been made of Modernism 
as a time of social upheaval and instability, but a major contribution to the interpretation of 
fictional technique was the newfound instability of time itself.   By 1908, the British philosophers 
F. H. Bradley and J. M. McTaggart had gone as far as to come to the conclusions that time was 
unreal, which instigated an ardent debate that included, among others, the Cambridge 
philosophers G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, with whom Woolf was well-acquainted.22  
Wyndham Lewis’s account of his era’s time-obsession in Time and Western Man (1927) is in a 
large sense “unexceptionable,” Frederic Jameson argues, “because contemporary 
consciousness…also modern art and the modern sensibility in all its manifestations, are saturated 
                                                           
20 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. trans. Edward Allen McCormick.  (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962). See also Joseph Frank’s “Spatial Form in Modern Literature,” reprinted in The 
Widening Gyre; Crisis and Mastery in Modern Literature, (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963) for his 
discussion of Lessing’s influence on viewing the arts spatially or temporally in criticism, particularly its influence on the pictorial 
arts. 
21 Time and Narrative, Vol. 2, trans. By Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 
8-9. 
22 Woolf knew both Moore and Russell personally through the Cambridge group introduced to her by her brother Thoby.  Their 
influence was significant on Woolf and all early Bloomsbury writers.  Ann Banfield discusses the content of this debate and its 
relation to Woolf thoroughly in her book The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism (New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2000) as well as in other essays, including “Tragic Time: The Problem of the Future in Cambridge 
Philosophy and To the Lighthouse,” Modernism/Modernity 7.1 (2000) 43-75.  Some issues raised by Banfield will be discussed in 
the ensuing chapters. 
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by an original and historically new sense of temporality.”23  Virginia Woolf, like many of her 
contemporaries, was haunted by the contradictions between the solid and the shifting.  It was a 
part of the social and intellectual atmosphere of the early twentieth century. 
 
1.3: THE TEMPORAL BARRIER 
What distinguishes Woolf is not simply that she was aware of the new aporias of time, or 
even that she and Marcel Proust were the writers of the era most preoccupied with them. The 
new temporalities introduced by modern physics and technology are evident in Woolf, but what 
seems to me altogether more significant, is an older and more profound preoccupation with time.  
It is Victorian, as is Woolf’s childhood, and it is an inherited dilemma so momentous that Paul 
Ricoeur describes it as the breaking of the “temporal barrier.”24  When the great revolutions in 
the sciences of the nineteenth century—culminating in Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory—
subjected the earth and all it inhabitants to a natural history, it imposed “a progressive extension 
of the scale of time beyond the barrier of six thousand years, assigned by a petrified Judeo-
Christian tradition.”25  Perception of the earth’s age shifted from thousands to many millions of 
years, and so the history of humanity shrank to what Kern, via Joyce, describes as “a parenthesis 
of infinitesimal brevity.”26  This parenthesis, I will argue, haunts Woolf.  It most famously 
brackets the human time of the Ramsays in the “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse, but 
it also brackets, in some manner, all of her characters.  Woolf’s narrator in “The Mark on the 
Wall” muses that if life is to be compared to anything, “one must liken it to being blown through 
                                                           
23 Qtd. in Randall Stevenson’s Modernist Fiction (112)  from Frederic Jameson’s Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the 
Modernist as Fascist (London: University of California Press, 1979) 123-124. 
24 Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) 89-
90. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Culture of Time and Space, 38.  Kern borrows the phrase from Joyce’s Ulysses. 
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the Tube at fifty miles an hour.”27   The time of living might approximate the railway time of 
modernity, but the speed of technological innovation evokes in Woolf’s fiction the vast stretch of 
evolutionary time. Outside of this parenthetical brevity—“one flying after another, so quick, so 
quick”—is Darwin’s imposition of an expanse of time and change upon human life, in fact, upon 
all life.  With the remorselessness of such a process, the instant becomes increasingly existential, 
the moment a metonym for life. 
 It raises an even greater difficulty that Woolf does not shy away from.  If evolution is a 
given, and understood without temporal misprisions, the moment is not metaphysical.  That is, 
the moments Woolf seizes upon seem as if they will last an eternity, but that delusion is 
subverted by the mutability of humanity through a finite time and a transitory existence.  Darwin 
muses in The Origin of Species that the thought of evolution impresses his mind almost “as does 
the vain endeavour to grapple with the idea of eternity,”28 but it is an eternity without the 
consolation of eternal forms: the ascent uncertain and accidental, the descent long and 
disappearing.  Darwin’s famous quotation from his notebooks, “He who understands the baboon 
would do more towards metaphysics than Locke,”29 carries in its bravado the strong assertion 
that the metaphysics in the future need to be grounded in a natural history, not supernatural 
belief.  A Darwinian perspective temporalizes, and the question of eternity is not merely vain 
endeavor—eternity becomes a metaphor, a mathematical abstraction, a temporal question treated 
as if it were eternal, as it were.    
 Darwin, in other words, creates of the moment a super-transitory state.  Gillian Beer notes 
that even such thoroughgoing evolutionary writers as Freud, Marx, and Thomas Huxley 
misinterpret Darwin’s theory for a culmination of the present moment: “It is a theory which does 
                                                           
27 Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, Second Edition, ed. by Susan Dick (New York: HBJ, 1985) 84 
28 The Origin of Species, Ed. with an Introduction and Notes by Gillian Beer (New York: Oxford UP, 1998) 231. 
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not privilege the present, which sees it as a moving instant in an endless process of change.  Yet 
it has persistently been recast to make it seem that all the past has been yearning towards the 
present moment and is satisfied now.”30  As much as the feeling of permanence is there in 
Woolf, she does not gather her characters or their moments up into an artifice of eternity.   There 
are multiple momentary stays, but those moments pass and are laid to account through Darwin’s 
long perspective of a natural history.  Mrs. Ramsay’s dinner party in To the Lighthouse “partook, 
she felt…of eternity….Of such moments, she thought, the thing is made that endures.”31  Yet 
Woolf’s narrative carefully qualifies such moments of transcendence—the feeling and thought 
here are only Mrs. Ramsay’s, and even she later recognizes their impermanence. The moment 
that was an eternity “had become, she knew, giving one last look at it over her shoulder, already 
the past.”32  The present is precarious in Woolf, an effect she achieves even through the narrative 
grammar that locates the present in the past.  “We can’t all be Titians, we can’t all be Darwins,” 
the botanist William Bankes tells the amateur artist Lily Briscoe, a commentary not only of 
genius, but on what endures.33  Mr. Ramsay’s own melancholic reflections on time have him 
measuring the endurance of his philosophical work.  Fame of this sort “lasts perhaps two 
thousand years.  And what are two thousand years?…The very stone one kicks with one’s boot 
will outlast Shakespeare."34  Woolf borrows Darwin’s vision of time, and it is from this vantage 
that she measures the scale of human existence and endurance in her narratives. 
The first premise of my thesis, then, is that the major influence behind Virginia Woolf’s 
temporal experimentations in her narratives, a process that is there from the very beginning, is 
                                                           
29 M Notebook  (1838),  #84 
30 Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth Century Fiction, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2000) 10. Her emphasis. 
31 (New York: HBJ, 1981) 105. 
32 Ibid. 111. 
33 Ibid. 72. 
34 To the Lighthouse, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927), p. 35. 
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Darwinian.  Taken baldly as a statement, this does not seem a position that merits further 
exploration.  Not everyone will agree with Daniel Dennett in proclaiming that Darwin’s theory 
of evolution was “the best idea anyone has ever had,” and that “in a single stroke, the idea of 
evolution by natural selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of 
space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law.”35  But it is an idea that impacted 
all of the arts and sciences so thoroughly, that it is worthwhile to examine how it developed in 
the writing of one of the most preeminent writers of the Modernist literary movement. 
Moreover, what I will explore here is how that affinity to Darwin is more direct, more 
immediate, more conscious and significant than simply the Darwinian air that all writers of 
modernity breathed.  Where other writers sought an answer or compensation to evolution, Woolf 
finds a possibility, even a metaphor for life and writing through which she establishes a 
methodology for her narrative technique.  Her most Darwinian novel is also her first, The Voyage 
Out (1915), and her early experimental short stories have evolutionary roots as well, with 
Darwinian imagery deeply rooted in the narrative, early signs of Woolf’s future narrative 
direction. The technique evolves from novel to novel, but Woolf’s abiding methodology in some 
shape or form remains Darwinian.  Woolf’s redress of conventional narrative primarily struggles 
against the unity of time and identity represented by the Victorian resistance to Darwin’s notion 
of change through time. Inherent in that Victorian unity were the aspects of time and identity she 
found repressive, sexist, stagnant, patriarchal, and domineering.  Outwardly, Darwin may have 
fit the stereotype of the eminent Victorian that Woolf’s friend Lytton Strachey satirizes, but the 
formative years that occupy both the beginning of Woolf’s fictional career and the Great 
European war afford her a deeper insight into the literary possibilities of evolutionary theory.  
                                                           
35 Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 21. 
 15 
Woolf shares Darwin’s long perspective, and it mediates the aspects of time and identity that she 
attempts to register in the experimental structures of her work. 
 
1.4: THE MYTH OF PROGRESS, THE MISS OF PROCESS 
Woolf’s cultivation of both evolutionary principles and a Darwinian temporality are also 
at the root of her feminism.  This second premise might at first seem antithetical, since much of 
Woolf’s social, political, and feminist criticism argues against the many varieties of social 
Darwinism that reared their ugly, imperialistic heads.  Elizabeth G. Lambert alludes to this from 
an excised line in Woolf’s Melymbrosia, the working title of The Voyage Out, where Rachel 
Vinrace thinks despondently, “Women too, she remembered, are more common than men; and 
Darwin says they are nearer the cow.”36   What is telling, in one respect, is that Darwin does not 
say this; it is a misrepresentation that the impressionable and naïve Rachel believes after hearing 
it. Such sentiments were common enough and well disseminated.  What is telling is that Rachel 
feels this to be true precisely when she meets Mr. and Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf’s exemplars of a 
self-assured, egotistical, superficial, patriarchal power couple. While Lambert does acknowledge 
that Darwin provided Woolf an “imaginative creativity that delights in variety,” she reads the 
evolutionary discourse in Woolf as primarily a parody of or an invective against social 
Darwinism and misogyny, characterized by Woolf’s doctors, priests, and professors who 
“advocate Social Darwinism to exclude women and the ‘unfit’ from positions of power, while 
equating masculinity with militaristic nationalism.”37 
Key to my argument is the separation of Darwin’s writing, which inspired Woolf’s early 
aesthetic, primarily The Voyage of the Beagle and Origin of Species, from the misconceptions of 
                                                           
36 “And Darwin Says They Are Nearer the Cow”: Evolutionary Discourse in Melymbrosia and The Voyage Out,” Twentieth 
Century Literature, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (Spring, 1991) 1-21, p. 1. 
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Social Darwinism that through misinterpretation foresee a direction of evolutionary principles 
and proffer a Darwinian basis for slavery, colonialism, eugenics, totalitarianism, and just about 
every other abuse of power and position anathema to Woolf’s feminism and pacifism. Though 
Darwin does take the phrase “survival of the fittest” (perhaps unfortunately) from Spencer, he 
thankfully does not take Spencer’s methodology or leaps of deduction into a sociology that has 
more to do with the rise of Social Darwinism and Eugenics than anything Darwin ever 
advocated.38 A Room of One’s Own caricatures characters such as Professor von X, the men who 
write scholarly articles on the colonized races or the “Mental, Moral, and Physical Inferiority of 
the Female Sex.”   These characters do employ Darwinian discourse, but it is a misrepresentation 
of Darwin, who after all was an abolitionist and anti-imperialist.39  Lambert writes that Darwin’s 
Origin and Descent “encourage the belief that European men are the apex of evolution,”40  but he 
does so in the same manner that some might argue Einstein’s theories encourage the creation and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and moral relativism, or that the Wright brothers were 
responsible for the building of bombers.  It is mostly ignorant of what at most should only be 
perceived a consequence. Darwin, of course, is in one sense a typical Victorian patriarch whose 
writing contains vestiges of common cultural assumptions, but he transgresses and dismantles 
many of those cultural assumptions through his research and writing.  Both Gillian Beer and 
George Levine have well established how Darwin the Victorian is both a precursor and a major 
                                                           
37 “Ibid, p. 21. 
38 Spencer’s influence on Social Darwinism will be discussed in Part II. 
39 A Room of One’s Own (New York: HBJ, 1981) 31.  See, Janet Browne, Charles Darwin Voyaging (New Jersey: Princeton UP) 
191-210.  One anecdote in particular is illustrative: It has been argued that the voyage of the HMS Beagle transformed Darwin 
from a gifted observer and collector of nature into an analytical thinker of theoretical brilliance, but it almost ended for Darwin 
well before he landed upon evolutionary theory.  When the young Darwin refused to agree with Captain Fitzroy that slaves seen 
in Brazil were well-treated and happy, Fitzroy went into a tirade so ugly that only a consequent apology prevented Darwin from 
abandoning ship.  Browne’s biography navigates exceptionally well between Darwin’s Victorian cultural assumptions as a land-
owning gentleman and his extreme revulsion of slavery and the undercurrents of empire-building. 
40 Darwin himself, it is well documented, was deeply troubled by some of the social and political implications possible from his 
theory by means of natural selection. 
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progenitor of Modernism.41 Lambert is more astute when dealing with Darwin when she 
distinguishes the sexual ambiguities in his writing from the evolutionary discourse that Woolf 
appropriates “to criticize the narrow empiricism of sexual science while expressing expanses of 
time and space and the complexity of relations particularly evident in Darwin’s writing.”42 
Against the misconceptions that are Social Darwinism, Woolf develops a narrative 
technique that finds in the procession of evolution the missing narrative link that breaks the chain 
of progression.  It undoes the structural scaffolding of patriarchal literature, at least as she 
envisions it, the rigidly structured forms of “materialist” writing.  Some of the feminist, 
postmodernist, and even post-colonial readings of Woolf should be read in relation to this origin.  
Critics such as Julia Kristeva, Jane Marcus, Pamela Caughie, and Bonnie Kime Scott all argue 
that Woolf values process over conclusion, openings over enclosures, oscillation and 
permeability over the fixed and static, webs and lateral movements over linear and logical forms 
of most conventional patriarchal writing.43  It is essential to understanding her feminist aesthetic 
and her narrative technique, and it is evident in many ways that Woolf inherited the idea for this 
process from Darwin.  Gillian Beer observes, “Because of its preoccupation with time and with 
change, evolutionary theory has inherent affinities with the problems and processes of 
narrative.”44  Those affinities are not only inherent but also selected by Woolf.  Linking her 
narrative process to Darwinian principles, in fact, can shed light on its kinship to many post-
modern and feminist readings, and why Woolf’s writing has not only adapted and survived, but 
                                                           
41 See Beer’s introduction to The Origin of Species as well as Darwin’s Plots, both cited above.  See also George Levine, Darwin 
and the Novelists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1988). 
42 Lambert, Twentieth Century Literature, p. 3. 
43 For example Julia Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language, translated by Margaret Waller, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984;  Pamela Caughie’s “Introduction” to Woolf in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, (New York: Routledge, 2000); 
Jane Marcus’s Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy, (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987); and Bonnie Kime Scott’s 
Refiguring Modernism. Vols. 1-2 (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995) 
44 Darwin’s Plots, 5. 
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positively thrived through the sea changes of critical thinking, when many of her male 
contemporaries have waned in prominence. 
For Woolf, the Great War of 1914 forever disturbed the evolutionary myth of progress 
from primitive man to Homo Britainicus, which Herbert Spencer and other positivists thought 
inevitable.  It disrupted the idea of a determined future and provided the possibility of a new 
future for women both personally and politically.  Woolf divorces the thought of evolution from 
the attempts to make it a justification for power through superiority.  Because the theory of 
evolution was so quickly appropriated by the philosophies of progress and will, so quickly used 
to justify the politics of colonialism and empire, it took Woolf some time to achieve this 
distinction between a narrative process inspired by Darwin and a vigorous rebuttal of all genus 
and species of Social Darwinism. 
 
1.5: THE CRITICISM 
 The temporality of Woolf’s writing and its relation to her feminism have been explored 
often.  Early studies of Woolf’s aesthetics frequently concentrate on either the “solid” or the 
“shifting” aspects of Woolf’s writing.  I have already mentioned Wyndham Lewis’s Time and 
Western Man (1927), but his chapter on Virginia Woolf in Men without Art (1934) specifically 
and characteristically attacks Woolf for (among other things) her “Bergsonism,” a catchword in 
Lewis for all things malevolent as a consequence of Henri Bergson’s influence upon the time 
consciousness of modern thought.  Bergson is Lewis’s devil, but Lewis imagines many 
archfiends and subordinates in Bergson’s sphere of malevolence. Lewis’s work anticipates 
Joseph Frank’s essay “The Idea of Spatial Form in Modern Literature” (1945), which introduces 
the broken temporal sequence of Modern literature as a “spatialization” of time and memory.  
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Frank’s essay made commonplace the critical paradigms of spatial or temporal readings for 
Modernist literature. The most forceful response to spatial form is from Frank Kermode, whose 
seminal work The Sense of an Ending (1965) finds too much myth-making and even ties to 
fascism (including Wyndham Lewis’s) in a ‘spatial’ concept of literature.  Instead of 
“Bergsonian attitudes” or democracy, “there is to be order as the modernist artist understands it: 
rigid, out of flux, the spatial order of the modern critic or the closed authoritarian society.”45  
This position reinforces Shiv Kumar’s Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel (1962), 
which goes as far as to claim that “Life, as Virginia Woolf conceives it, ….has no spatial 
symmetry or cohesion about it,” since its determining aspect is Henri Bergson’s “la durée.”46   
But opposing Kumar’s influential reading are many critics, including Tony Inglis, who argues 
that “Woolf’s novels are better read as weapons against flux than as inert surrenders to it.”47  
Ann Banfield comes to a similar conclusion from a wholly different school of philosophical 
thought in her study of the temporal aspects of Woolf’s fiction influenced by Cambridge 
philosophy hostile to Bergson’s sense of time.48   
Though these studies tend to situate Woolf in either the spatial or the temporal camp, 
there is the larger body of criticism begun in the 1970s that perceives in Woolf a dualism at 
work, particularly the feminist criticism that invokes Woolf’s famous use of Coleridge’s 
“androgynous mind” as a synthesis of the male and female intellect.49  Molly Hite’s more recent 
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exploration of the “visionary” and the “physical bodies” of Woolf’s characters most 
convincingly answers the studies that have criticized the perceived “disembodied” feminism of 
Woolf’s writing, while bridging Woolf’s dual “affinities between her feminist and modernist 
projects.”50  Studies concentrating on the influence of visual aesthetics on Woolf, particularly by 
Roger Fry and her sister Vanessa Bell, have also followed Allen McLaurin in attempting to 
bridge the spatial concepts of painting with the temporal framework of Woolf’s novels.51  In 
doing so, these studies have been ideologically tied to Woolf’s feminism and the correlating 
aspects of her pacifism.  
There is a tendency to dismiss the discourse of science or male philosophers in light of 
Woolf’s invective against “materialist” fiction and the sterile products of patriarchal culture, but 
the exceptions are notable and significant.52 Harvena Richter’s The Inward Voyage (1970) is the 
first in a series of studies on the philosophical and scientific importance of Woolf’s fiction, 
including Hussey’s The Singing of the Real World (1986), Lucio Ruotolo’s The Interrupted 
Moment (1988), and Gillian Beer’s influential essays on Woolf collected in The Common 
Ground (1996), to which I am particularly indebted for their insights into many of Woolf’s 
philosophical and scientific interests, including Charles Darwin, reviewed in a manner that does 
not curtail the importance of Woolf’s feminism or her use of Darwin in developing her 
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aesthetics.53   Paul Ricoeur’s monumental three-volume study of Time and Narrative offers a 
critical analysis of Mrs. Dalloway, elucidating and explicating his thesis on the aporias of time in 
fiction and history; Ricoeur’s sense of a dialectic at work between a “cosmic” and “lived” time 
helps us shed light on the techniques in Woolf’s writing that create a plurality of times her 
narrators mediate and her characters inhabit.54  More recently, Ann Banfield has written an 
exhaustive, meticulous account of Woolf’s relationship to both the aesthetics of Roger Fry and 
the Cambridge philosophers who together form, in her view, a significant share of the 
epistemology of Modernism.55 
The strength of these studies has also dramatically altered the pre-1970s version of 
Virginia Woolf, ushered in by Q. D. Leavis and others, as an ivory tower aesthete, easily 
dismissed next to her virile male contemporaries as a fashionable writer of quaint interests.  They 
have given large corroboration to Mark Hussey’s critical insistence in regard to Woolf—that her 
ethics, politics, and aesthetics are all interlinked.56  Indeed, what Hugh Kenner once described 
pejoratively as Woolf’s “domesticated modernism” now can be revisited as a virtue when 
compared to the aesthetic creeds of some of her male contemporaries who followed their 
masculine dogmas right into authoritarian or fascist ideologies.57  Bonnie Kime Scott in 
particular redefines the image of Woolf as an effete aesthete by distinguishing her from the 
aesthetics of the “men of 1914,” namely Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, T. S. Eliot, and the rest 
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of the “masculinists”58 associated with BLAST.  Lewis’s broadside attacks on Virginia Woolf 
are often in association with his abhorrence of the Bergsonian concept of time and the 
internalized, feminine gush that permeates her novels; there is also the caricature of Woolf as the 
prudish, snobby feminist Rhoda Hymen in The Roaring Queen (1936).  While some of this must 
be read in light of Lewis’s hatred of Roger Fry and all things Bloomsbury, Scott’s focus on “the 
women of 1928” in contrast to Lewis’s bombardiers of BLAST provides a useful and thorough 
reassessment of the war’s dramatically contrarian effects upon these two aesthetic movements.59  
Much, in short, has laid the groundwork for the explorations this thesis undertakes. 
 
1.6: THE CHAPTERS 
The plot of Woolf’s first novel, The Voyage Out, transports the English heroine Rachel 
Vinrace to South America, and is often read as a kind of Darwinian or Conradian voyage -- 
without the benefit of a return.  Gillian Beer’s excellent essay, “Virginia Woolf and Prehistory,” 
reveals just how early and carefully Woolf was reading Darwin, especially The Voyage of the 
Beagle, in which Beer finds many correspondences with Woolf’s own Voyage.60  But what 
remains to be discovered is how Woolf’s growing disturbance of conventional plot as a narrative 
structure, the kind of structure which sustained her first two novels, is also rooted in Darwinian 
principles.   In a diary passage, Woolf recalls the discovery of a technique in the writing of three 
short stories dating from 1917-1920.  “The Mark on the Wall,” “Kew Gardens,” and “An 
Unwritten Novel” were to come together for two hundred pages or so to develop what would 
become Woolf’s first experimental novel, Jacob’s Room.  These, I will argue, are Woolf’s first 
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attempts to apply some of the ideas she derives from Darwin and the writing of her first two 
novels to the actual form and feminist aesthetic of her later writing.  Darwinian plot is replaced 
by a Darwinian structure.  The next experimental breakthrough comes in the form of Woolf’s 
eminently suggestive piece “Reading,” impossible in both its content and structure to define as 
fiction or nonfiction, memoir or tale.  This is also, not coincidentally, when Woolf drafts the 
above-mentioned essay “Modern Novels” (1919), where she explicitly articulates a new form for 
the novel, her abiding image and metaphor for it: “a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope.” 
In order to fully explore the Darwinian dimension to Woolf’s feminine aesthetic and 
narrative form, it is necessary to juxtapose the figure of Darwin in Woolf’s development 
alongside the notions of the Greek ideal that she acquired through ancient Greek literature and 
her Victorian intellectual inheritance, particularly the philosophy of Plato, which Woolf 
cherished.  While Ricoeur emphasizes how evolution replaces the antiquated time frames of a 
narrow Christian theology, Darwin ultimately disturbs the Platonic notion of eidetic or ideal 
forms that are impervious to time and change.61 Darwin and the Greek ideal represent the 
broadest intellectual strokes that inform Woolf’s contradictory impulses to register the shifting 
and the solid aspects of life in her narratives.  They preoccupy Woolf because the substance of 
these two thinkers’ largest ideas embody the very dialogue and argument Woolf attempts to 
weave into her fiction—not only into the content and context of her work, but also its structure. 
Artistic unity, what Plato argued in Phaedrus as the internal coherence and structure of a work of 
art, often meets a Darwinian fate in Woolf’s fiction.  The idée fixe, intransitive states of mind, 
the centripetal force of Platonic ideals, are all subjected to time, process, transitive flights of 
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consciousness, and the centrifugal force of Darwin’s argument of mutability.  The Aristotelian 
unities, the assured chronological framework of the story and the conventions of the temporal 
narrative, are drastically challenged.  “They’ve changed everything now,” Thomas Hardy 
confided to Woolf on her visit to Max Gate.  “We used to think there was a beginning & a 
middle & an end [in fiction]. We believed in the Aristotelian theory.”62 At the time, Virginia 
Woolf was writing To the Lighthouse, envisioning how, “it might contain all characters boiled 
down; & childhood; & then the impersonal thing, which I'm dared to do by my friends, the flight 
of time, & the consequent break of unity in my design.”63 This impersonal thing becomes the 
“Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse, a complete rupture of the formal conventions Hardy 
and others adhered to; but narrative breaks and flights of time were already a signature of 
Woolf’s fiction, evident from her earliest sketches and short stories.  The value Woolf derives 
from the Greek ideal, however, never altogether disappears from her work, and the struggle 
between the concepts of Darwinian process and temporality against Platonic stability and unity 
becomes the ruling dynamic of Woolf’s method.  They form the “solid and the shifting” aspects 
of Woolf’s writing, a tension that her fiction engages in, embodies, and structurally represents. 
To this end, it is worth scrutinizing and foregrounding the parallel universes of Woolf’s 
personal history and some specific aspects of the intellectual history that she inherited.  Woolf’s 
childhood interests in Lepidoptera and ancient Greece, and the concurrent intellectual history of 
some prevalent ideas concerning Darwin and Plato, intersect in Woolf’s juvenilia. That Darwin 
and Plato are prominent figures in Virginia Woolf’s earliest fiction is a consequence of her 
adolescent enthusiasm for both Greek studies and natural history. Virginia Stephen shared these 
common Victorian schoolboy pursuits, often competitively, with her brother Thoby. From 
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Virginia Stephen’s early teens to those early years living in Bloomsbury before World War I, 
Hellenism and entomology, Greek literature and specimen collecting would coincide and 
converge often in her daily readings and activities, and have a tremendous impact on the 
development of her early writing.  Both preoccupied and stimulated her imagination in 
ambivalent, contradictory ways, and because both interests were shared with Thoby, they would 
resonate with his presence and remind her of his absence long after his sudden, unexpected death 
in 1906, the same year of Virginia Stephen’s earliest pieces of fiction.  
One cornerstone of Woolf’s fictional forays was laid by Woolf’s abiding relationships 
and discussions with her brother’s friends from Cambridge.  In the Platonic culture of the 
Apostles at Cambridge, a select company of learned students basked in the philosophical glow of 
Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, J. M. McTaggart, and G. E. Moore. Although 
Moore’s “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903) eclipsed the influence of both F. H. Bradley and 
McTaggart’s Hegelian idealism, the Platonic ideal of discovering truth through logical analysis 
was never wholly abandoned by Moore and greatly influenced Russell. All of them, save 
Whitehead, were philosophically opposed to both Henri Bergson and William James’s accounts 
of temporality, particularly its Darwinian association with truth as mutable as species.64  These 
central figures of the Apostles of Cambridge, most all of them classicists, would come to include 
Leonard Woolf, Roger Fry, John Maynard Keynes, Lytton Strachey and the rest of the now 
familiar list who became the principle male components of Bloomsbury; the Cambridge 
philosophers remained the greatest early influences upon them, particularly Moore.  His 
temperament and pedagogical presence, as is often the case, would have as much or more to do 
with the dissemination of his ideas among the Bloomsbury males as his actual writing.  In his 
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autobiography, Leonard Woolf describes Moore as the Socrates of their generation, his Principia 
Ethica and his very presence, the Symposium and its master transposed to England.65  Keynes’s 
Two Memoirs would describe the faith-like devotion they developed for Moore’s principles, a 
“religion” where “nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and other people’s of course, 
but chiefly our own.  These states of mind were not associated with action or achievement or 
with consequences.  They consisted in timeless, passionate states of contemplation and 
communion, largely unattached to ‘before’ and ‘after’…”66 
Such philosophical affectations of Bloomsbury after Cambridge have often been 
explored, particularly the strange effect they had on the early Bloomsbury gatherings that 
Virginia and Vanessa Stephen attended with Thoby, where the men remained awkwardly silent 
for long periods, would always respond to a comment with “It depends what you mean by …,” 
and only spoke to argue over issues like “good” and “beauty” and “reality” as if they were 
subjects as topical as the weather.67  If ancient Greece had indeed been transposed to Cambridge, 
the results, by Woolf’s account, were ambiguous and complicated.  It is the ‘Oxbridge’ of A 
Room of One’s Own that excludes women and strives to seal its traditions and privileges tighter 
than an aquarium; but it is also the Cambridge that produces her husband and very best male 
friends, who engaged her intellect and took her own philosophical thoughts and aesthetic pursuits 
seriously. 
That personal history, then, also relates to the corresponding cultural and intellectual 
histories.  Reviewing some of the debated issues specific to temporality will, I anticipate, offer a 
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more thorough backdrop to Woolf’s narrative form and aesthetics than the commonplace allusion 
to these texts usually allows. In short, before Darwin becomes Darwinian in a discussion of 
Woolf’s fiction, or any of the other names that might become adjectival, the ideas behind these 
figures of thought merit greater attention.  The dialectic Darwin and Grecian antiquity, Plato in 
particular, elicit from Walter Pater, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Henri Bergson, the debate William 
James ardently undertakes with Bertrand Russell over such a broad and all-encompassing notion 
as time, will be discussed in light of the implications temporality had for the participants.  
One figure who fused evolution and Greek studies is Jane Ellen Harrison, the innovative 
archeologist, lecturer, and scholar whom Woolf befriended and revered.  Other critics have 
explored Woolf’s use of Harrison in terms of matriarchal alternatives to patriarchy and the 
processes of feminine ritual68, but Harrison’s own use of Darwinian principles in her study of 
classical Greek culture and religion will be addressed here in relation to Woolf’s feminist and 
modernist objectives for fiction. The intellectual history informing Woolf’s early fiction creates a 
philosophical debate over the question of time and narrative form that Darwin’s temporal 
upheaval sets forth and Woolf’s fiction addresses.  The foundation will then have been laid for 
the brilliant complexity of Woolf’s absorption of this debate concerning Greek and evolutionary 
temporality, and its consequences on her early fictional experimentation. I include in this 
analysis the early draft and eventual published version of her first novel, The Voyage Out, and 
then pay special attention to the crucial developmental years preceeding it, particularly the 
summer of 1906 when Woolf first emerged as a writer living in Bloomsbury, and then 1917-
1921, which span Woolf’s writing of her second, most conventional novel, Night and Day, and 
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the radical experimentation in form and structure evident in Jacob’s Room. For Woolf, such 
dualism became freedom, a play of ideas that became a play of form. 
 
1.7: RICOEUR’S TIME AND NARRATIVE: PREFIGURING WOOLF  
 My reason for laying such stress upon Woolf’s personal history, and then upon a more 
collective and selected intellectual history of Darwin’s temporal impact, derives substantial 
impetus from Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of temporality and mimesis in Time and Narrative. A few 
foci of Paul Ricoeur’s become essential to this study.  My argument, in fact, takes for granted 
that a hyperconsciousness of time has everything to do with both the narrative forms Woolf 
employs and the political, philosophical, and ethical considerations of her aesthetics. All novels 
employ temporality by the narrative necessity of emplotment, but Woolf’s novels are obsessively 
about time, and this makes them all the more useful as a study of consciousness and narrative.  In 
Ricouer’s own words, “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative 
mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal 
experience.”69  Behind this is Ricoeur’s analysis of Augustine’s “distention-intention,” a human 
awareness of time passing that gives intimations of the eternal.  (Augustine’s chapter on time in 
the Confessions, by Ricoeur’s own account of it, is “for the most part, Platonic and 
Neoplatonic.”)70  To counter the sense of discordance that an Augustinian awareness of human 
temporality creates in relation to a cosmic eternity, there is Aristotle’s “muthos-mimesis,” the 
process of “emplotment” whereby narrative represents human time and gives it meaning. 
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Ricoeur’s “hermeneutic circle of narrative and time”71 circumscribes the very question of 
character and narrative in Woolf’s fiction.  His analysis of Mrs. Dalloway creates a useful 
paradigm for Woolf’s earliest narrative departures, from which she in turn diverges in later 
work.72  He writes that Woolf’s “narrative configuration serves as the basis for the experience 
that its characters have of time, and that the narrative voice of the novel wants to communicate to 
the reader.”73  The relative brevity of the narrative itself is “counterpoised” by the implied 
immensity of the time narrated.  This sets up Ricoeur’s categories of “monumental time” (the 
striking hours of Big Ben, measuring the history of English authority) and “lived time” (how the 
characters themselves not only respond differently to the striking of the hours but how they live 
within and outside of the elapsed hours of the day).  Ricoeur argues that this fissure between 
monumental and lived time—nearly indiscernible or wide as life depending upon the character—
is the discordance between a phenomenological time perceived internally and a cosmological 
time measured by clocks and calendars. 
Such categories are mutually dependent and inter-subjective in Ricoeur.  In fact, “human 
time,” as Ricoeur ultimately defines it, extraordinarily and complexly reconciles the two through 
the mimetic arts of narrative.  Woolf, after all, unifies the narrative of Mrs. Dalloway, whose 
working title was The Hours, by the disparate individual lives lived within a single day and 
registered by London’s public clocks.   But what Ricoeur’s analysis leaves out is an additional 
fissure that many of Woolf’s narratives explore.  What happens between a phenomenological 
time and a cosmological time when this internal, lived time is measured by, with, or through the 
natural world, not against it? 
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This is more apropos of what Ricoeur introduces in the third volume of Time and 
Narrative as the “incommensurability, between human time and the time of nature,” brought 
about by natural history’s breaking of the temporal barrier.  It is a paradox: “The length of time 
of a human life, compared to the range of cosmic time-spans, appears insignificant, whereas it is 
the very place from which every question of significance arises.”74  The Augustinian paradox 
between the instant of human time and the question of eternity applies here as well, but the “time 
of nature” does not duplicate eternity.  Augustine never doubts the Platonic ideal of eternity 
translated into a Christian theology—God’s time exists as a final and unfathomable measure—
but a geological and evolutionary timeframe dismisses the very question of eternity and 
simultaneously extends a human time scale, a scale that renders the individual life insignificant 
in such terms. 
Here is a paradox for fictive narrative to explore, except that Ricoeur draws an 
impassable line between “evolution” (and the other corresponding “notions of change”) and then 
“history”—on the grounds that evolution works through what isn’t present while narrative is the 
mimesis of action through human “testimony”: 
It is finally the concepts of action and narrative that cannot be transferred from the human 
sphere to the sphere of nature….Just as it seemed impossible to generate the time of 
nature on the basis of phenomenological time, so too it now seems impossible to proceed 
in the opposite direction and to include phenomenological time in the time of nature.75 
Ricoeur’s principle that narrative is ultimately the human testimony of the author or a cultural 
history, which contaminates the sense, however detached, of a cosmic scale existing outside of 
our apperception of it, is not to be disputed here.  But the exclusion of a narrative at least 
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attempting a phenomenology of human time that is the time of nature, ignores much of Woolf’s 
intentionality.  The diffusion of self so often noted in Woolf—the losing of personality, what 
Woolf also imagines as “the world seen without a self” and “anonymity”—76is the mimetic 
configuration of personal time in many of her narratives.  Perhaps Ricoeur suggests this when he 
comments that The Waves borders on an experimentation that leaves the mimetic arts entirely, 
but this aspect of Woolf’s fiction has many manifestations.77 The earlier, traditional novel, Night 
and Day, displays the intent.  When Katharine Hilbury strolls through Kew Gardens with Ralph 
Denham, Ralph begins to discuss botany.  Katharine wishes “he would go on forever, showing 
her how science felt not quite blindly for the law that ruled their endless variations,” an allusion 
to evolution that also perhaps more significantly allows Katharine contemplation “of that other 
part of life where thought constructs a destiny which is independent of human beings” (281).  
Natural history does significantly measure narrative perspective in Woolf, even as the narrative 
attempts to measure the span of natural history.  Woolf embeds Katherine’s deepest capacity for 
happiness in this contemplative region that “entirely lacked self-consciousness” (282).   
Katharine experiences time on a cosmic scale, and for her, this is phenomenological as well as 
cosmological.  Night and Day may be Woolf’s most conventional novel, but the ideas expressed 
therein are a prelude to Woolf’s future narrative experiments.  Woolf’s narrative constructs a 
destiny independent of human beings, even as it makes their awareness of that destiny central. 
Ricoeur’s sense of a dialectic at work between the “time of the world” and “lived time,” a 
cosmic time and a human time, helps us to better analyze and understand the methodology with 
which Woolf creates out of Darwin’s temporal expansion a plurality of times that her characters 
resist or acquiesce to, or both.  At crucial moments, cosmic time is lived time in Woolf. 
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1.8: RICOEUR’S FIGURATIONS: WOOLF’S “PRENARRATIVE” AS PREHISTORY 
 A second, interrelated aspect of Ricoeur’s analyses involves Woolf’s own resistance to 
Platonic unity or Aristotelian mimesis, the resistance itself a formal approach and artistic creed 
Woolf shares with Roger Fry that becomes synonymous with an early Bloomsbury aesthetic: 
“The rejection of mimesis and concentration on the play of abstract form.”78  Ricoeur pays 
particular attention to the advent of the modern novel, including Mrs. Dalloway, precisely 
because it “contests the very principle of order that is the root of the idea of plot.”79  Part of this 
resistance to plot occurs simply by a shift of focus from action to character in the modern novel.  
Ricoeur further acknowledges that what Woolf’s work suggests is “incompleteness of 
personality, the diversity of the levels of the conscious, the subconscious, and the unconscious, 
the stirring of unformulated desires, the inchoative and evanescent character of feelings.  The 
notion of plot here seems to be especially in trouble.”80  Ricoeur’s own rebuttal to this 
acknowledgement is simple but worth repeating: “Yet nothing in these successive expansions of 
character at the expense of the plot escapes the formal principle of configuration and therefore 
the concept of emplotment.”81  We forget that the rejection of mimesis represents a schism that 
Frank Kermode reminds us is “meaningless without reference to some prior condition; the 
absolutely new is simply unintelligible, even as a novelty.”82  If temporality is reimagined in 
Woolf, if it breaks with convention, it still cannot escape its own configuration.  A difficult 
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narration, conscious of and playful with every established rule of chronology and temporality, is 
still a strategy of representation.  What Woolf represents in her experimental narrative is itself 
telling. 
This component in Ricoeur’s analysis of modern fiction proves especially valuable in 
relation to Woolf because of her keen awareness of every narrative convention that she 
transgresses and the reasons she chooses to do so.  Woolf’s original ventures into Greek and 
natural history provide a corridor into some of the larger intellectual responses to Darwin and 
Plato from other seminal writers and thinkers, who in turn inform Woolf’s later modernist 
sensibility of time and narrative.  In Ricoeur’s terms, there is a “prenarrative structure of 
experience.”83 This he defines as a prefiguration that represents a cultural “competency” shared 
between a writer and an audience before any specific convention can be traversed. This 
“conceptual network” is a host of shared cultural assumptions, a practical understanding of the 
symbols, signs, semantics, rules, and norms that govern the given idea of textual order.  
Following the cultural anthropology of Clifford Geertz, particularly Geertz’s notion that “culture 
is public because meaning is,” Ricoeur establishes a semiotics to reading that acts mimetically as 
a prevision to narrative revision: “To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand what 
human acting is, in its semantics, its symbolic system, its temporality.  Upon this 
preunderstanding, common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with 
it, textual and literary mimetics.”84 
In Ricoeur’s threefold process to narrative representation—playfully dubbed mimesis1, 
mimesis2, and mimesis3—prefiguration becomes configuration through a literary or historical 
text, leading to the final step, refiguration through the phenomenological act of reading.  The 
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crucial level is the configuring power of mimesis2, what Ricoeur describes as the “kingdom of 
as-if,” the process whereby narrative mediates “between what precedes fiction and what follows 
it,” the intermediary step.85  This, in the more common vernacular, is the mode occupied by the 
fiction writer, the author’s organization or “emplotment” of the narrative and the multiform 
modes of temporalities employed.  It mediates our preconceptions of what narrative is and then is 
consequently fulfilled by the third function of mimesis, the very act of reading.  A narrative 
refigures the temporal world in all of its complexities and intersecting fields of reference and in 
the process provides new meaning through the hermeneutics and the phenomenological act of 
reading.  
I employ Ricoeur here, in short, to trace in Woolf the most significant cultural 
assumptions concerning Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and then later “the Greek ideal,” a 
process that will backtrack through the prefigurations of Woolf’s childhood against the 
intellectual backdrop of some other major thinkers. Of particular emphasis will be some of the 
crucial early essays and short stories where Woolf begins to work out at the level of plot and 
allusion much of the intellectual difficulties necessary to ground the radical departures in 
narrative form that would characterize her mature fiction.  My analysis of how Woolf mediates 
this prenarrative field of experience through her earliest short stories, novels, and the first 
experimental short stories—wherein Woolf tests many of the ideas derived from Darwin and 
Plato—establishes what might be described as an ontogeny and phylogeny of thought that 
prefigures the young Virginia Woolf’s ventures into a more radical narrative form.   That is, 
Woolf’s individual development as a writer shares the temporal anxieties of many other figures 
we have subsequently categorized as Modernists, but with crucial distinguishing characteristics, 
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not the least being her emphasis upon gender.  Her early experiments with narrative form 
mediate and transform the very cultural norms she represents, giving them new meaning.  
Woolf’s early fictional sketches and essays at once recapitulate and repudiate the cultural 
assumptions that inform the prenarrative to her narratives, the prehistory to her personal history, 
the classical past to her modern present.  What is most innovative in Woolf’s narrative technique 
might be the way she mediates the prefigurative understanding of mimesis by including the 
prefigurations in her narrative configurations rather than simply contesting and transforming 
them.  Woolf’s dual engagement with the Victorian past and the Modernist present operates by 
exposing the very process of transformation:  the solid and the shifting, the Greek ideal against 
the Darwinian, the masculine and the feminine, exist in dynamic temporal oppositions.   
What follows is the ontogeny—Virginia Woolf’s own embryonic personal history 
mediated by her experiences with natural history and Greek studies.   There is a personal lexicon 
to Virginia Woolf’s writing—she once mused whether “I …deal thus openly in autobiography & 
call it fiction?”86  At this point, she had just published Night and Day and settled upon the 
direction for her next novel, Jacob’s Room, the most Hellenic of her works but one narrated with 
an amateur naturalist’s perspective. A semantics and a rich semiotics of childhood experience 
resonate with these subjects. 
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Chapter Two  
The Voyage Out and Night and Day: Early Evolutionary Plots and Narrative 
Destinations in Virginia Woolf 
 
2.1: VOYAGING  
The evolutionary trope that charts civilization through its journey inward is well-traveled 
in Virginia Woolf’s writing from the very beginning.  The Voyage Out (1915) is, in large 
measure, the voyage in.  At the level of plot, the young Rachel Vinrace journeys to South 
America.  The narrative, at times, refashions some staples of the masculine expeditionary tale, 
including the ascent of a mountain and the boat-ride into the heart of a jungle.  What Rachel sees 
and takes in on these journeys clearly has an effect on the narrative, including the fever she 
contracts in the jungle, which allows Woolf to kill off her heiress of the ages just at the point 
when she should fulfill the conventions of the romance novel.  But as mere plot those journeys 
are about as epic as James, Cam, and Mr. Ramsay rowing their boat To the Lighthouse.  There, 
most of the dramatic action occurs within Lily Briscoe’s inner vision of the canvas before her.  
Like in Bruegel’s painting Landscape with the Fall of Icarus, the epic moment registers, but “its 
human position” is insignificantly rendered alongside the quotidian. This is in part the vision of 
humanity in The Voyage Out, Woolf’s first large canvas.  Rachel spends most of her time on this 
grand tour—to the terra incognita of South America—in the great indoors.  This brave new 
world, including the amusing array of British tourists representative of English society, could 
just as easily be London.  There is teatime, chaperoned public interactions among the sexes, even 
a quaint formal dance. Two of the great archetypal plots of romance literature—the adventure 
tale and the comedy of manners—salute and curtsy each other rather awkwardly. 
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Both Joseph Conrad and Henry James would have understood Woolf’s conception of her 
novel, as they had shown how problematic these two plotlines had become in the modern world.  
Kurtz in The Heart of Darkness fascinates the retrospective narrator Marlow because all of 
Europe has contributed to his making.  Conrad famously has Marlow suggest that Kurtz is 
capable of anything because everything is in him, including the dark horror of a primitive past.  
The mercantile mission from Europe to the prehistoric heart of savage Africa, ostensibly to find 
Kurtz, indeed finds Europe’s savagery at the heart of its historied trafficking in colonialism.  
Kurtz dies in this knowledge and Marlow lives to tell and bury the tale.  Conversely, Henry 
James’s Milly Theale takes the return route from the newfound land back to the old civilization 
in The Wings of the Dove.   She carries the “old flower” of the new world back into the heart of 
European civilization.87  The seed she plants works into the consciousness of the other 
characters, even as she dies.  Her legacy is not her progeny, but the memory of her alive in 
others.    
Woolf’s first novel, then, could be viewed as a Conradian voyage that establishes a 
Jamesian relation.  Rachel, in other words, fascinates because she is expected to carry so little, 
yet still she does.  Much of the story is about what others attempt to put in to her and how ill-
prepared she is for either the physical burden or the mental baggage.  This gives rise to many of 
Rachel’s alternating outbursts of exasperation and the ensuing silence.  The adventure tale and 
the marriage crisis are juxtaposed.  The two conventional vessels of narrative crash and sink each 
other’s prefigurative destinies: the adventure never returns home and the heroine dies well before 
reaching the altar. This is an early statement by Woolf on the status of promising but uneducated 
women in the modern world who attempt to escape the maladaptive conditions of the English 
patriarchy. It is also one important aspect of Woolf’s reconfiguration of evolutionary plot in 
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literature.  Foregrounding an expedition alongside marital conventions, in the midst of a 
primordial backdrop, exposes the origins and challenges the agency of both.  The English 
heroine as she had been conceived in the past could not function in the cultural present.  Woolf’s 
outing asserts that it is time for narrative fiction to explore why. 
 
2.2: RETURNS 
The voyage from evolutionary plot to what I will call evolutionary form is itself the 
exploration that Woolf undertakes in her narrative. Consider that after The Voyage Out, Woolf’s 
fiction stays close to home. It is uncanny how Darwin’s story, and not merely his findings, 
becomes in large part the shaping of the Modern novel’s.  Much has been made of the great gap 
of time between Darwin’s revelation of the theory of evolution and the quarter century that 
elapses before he publicly reveals it, a revelation forced only after Alfred Russell Wallace comes 
to nearly the same theory of evolution independently.88  But this aporia of time only emphasizes 
what Darwin’s biographer Janet Browne dubs “the power of place.”89  After the voyage of the 
H.M.S. Beagle, Darwin stays put.  The nautical adventurer, the pioneering naturalist returns 
home to settle into the domesticity of Victorian country life, and yet the work done at Downe 
subverts an entire tradition.  What makes Darwin’s character compelling is not simply that his 
scientific writing is so persuasive but that his life was so literary.  The Darwinian figure, taking 
in the great expanse and portent of time, becomes figurative of the internalization of Modernist 
fiction.  Perhaps Woolf’s pseudo-biography Orlando is the exception that proves the rule, but 
his/her gender-bending adventure is, in large measure, time-travel, which locates the epic 
adventures and colonial conquests both in the cultural past and within the inherited present.  By 
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the time that Orlando lands in the present, the aristocratic house and its entitlement stand for a 
cultural inheritance that resides within Orlando herself.90  The epic adventures come home to 
England through the human vessels who have kept the seeds and keepsakes, trinkets and trophies 
of conquest; “savage” countries, it seems, have been explored and perhaps glossed with the 
veneer of civilization, but the savage within had only just taken up residence.   
“This, too, has been a place of darkness,” murmurs Marlow on the waters of the River 
Thames, but its temporal location in the primitive past needs to be found in the uncharted river of 
the Conradian Congo.  The novel must go to those Darwinian landscapes to address what is 
primordial in the European present.  There is another adventure, another discovery to track on 
the heels of the scientific voyage of the nineteenth century naturalists.  Woolf abridges her 
narrative configuration of the natural world (and all of its spoils) by accessing its evolutionary 
dimensions within the confines of civility.  She replaces a Darwinian plot, as in her first novel, 
with a narrative form that is itself evolutionary.  A South American jungle can be a wooded acre 
behind a landed property.  The prehistorical may be excavated from the pastoral landscape of 
England; and vestiges of the past may be discerned in the quotidian.  Gillian Beer: “In the 
Voyage Out it is necessary to travel to remote countries to discover [the primeval].  The primitive 
is still figured as outside self.  But in the Waves, and even more in Between the Acts, the 
prehistoric is seen not simply as part of a remote past, but as contiguous, continuous, a part of 
ordinary present-day life.”91  There is a significant leap between Woolf’s earliest novel and the 
mature works of the ‘30s, both in the rendering of the primitive and in the actual narrative 
configurations.   What Beer does not explore is how Woolf’s contiguous, continuous reading of 
the prehistoric in the present informs her departure from more established structures of narrative. 
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In The Voyage Out (1915), Terence Hewet looks to the profusion of the rain forest and exclaims, 
“That’s where the Elizabethans got their style,” but in the writing that follows, Woolf looks to 
the structure of Elizabethan sentences themselves.  The essay “Reading” (1919), for example, 
never leaves the bookshelves of a manor house and yet it seeks to answer some of the same 
questions about evolutionary origins and cultural inheritances. In the short timeframe between 
these two works, Woolf learns a narrative economy, an evolutionary shorthand whereby 
narrative technique can carry what was in her more conventional novel-writing the story 
narrated. 
 
2.3: MELYMBROSIA’S CAMBRIDGIAN EXPLOSION 
When Woolf’s early heroines do voyage out of their civilized settings, the results are 
most telling.  Woolf’s more diminutive expeditions into the South American jungle occur for one 
of the principle reasons Conrad takes us there in the first place:  the shrinking scale of human 
beings in the natural world post-Darwin. This sensibility is intensified in Woolf’s fiction.   
Melymbrosia, the earlier narrative drafts of The Voyage Out, describes the river journey into the 
thick of the woods with complete omniscience, both temporal and spatial:  “Where from the top 
of the mountain they could see a dark cloud of green, there the river ran, further and further 
away, leaving civilization behind it, passing through unlit reaches…”  The sounds and lights of 
civilization disappear: “only birds cry, trees come down, and the fruit can be heard slipping and 
dropping on the ground.; and now and then some beast howls in agony or rage.  Wild creatures 
seeing you glitter their eyes at you from the branch, and the butterflies circle in your path.”92  
Woolf’s aerial perspective cuts its own path through the forest, but this is not a biblical Eden.  
Only after months of traversing the forest are Woolf’s readers given a hint of the source of 
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things:  “You are now encircled by the earth, in the very heart of stone and dust.  As leopard and 
birds have been born of the forest, so have human beings.  But after stepping a few hundred 
miles into this world, they have ceased as though on the verge of a precipice, or on the edge of 
the sea.”93 This is not the dark wood of Dante, or even Hawthorne’s wilderness, which his 
sinners approached to glimpse a world wilder and larger than the one made by their puritanical 
forefathers.  The search for human origins here is apparent, and the impenetrable forest serves as 
a frontier of awareness.  Physically to cross it is to enter the expanse of time and descent that 
evolutionary theory proposes.  Woolf’s woods are not a Christian tribulation or a spiritual 
journey.   The landscape is post-Christian because it is post-Darwin.  The time frame is 
evolutionary. 
  All of this occurs before Woolf even begins the “proposed voyage” of her characters. 
While the narrator makes these grand omniscient sweeps of space and time, the characters’ 
journey itself has not begun.  By the time Woolf revises The Voyage Out’s expedition up the 
South American river and into the woods, her narration now makes a sharper delineation 
between the prehistoric past and the English presence.  “Since the time of Elizabeth,” Woolf’s 
narrator tells us,  
very few people had seen the river, and nothing had been done to change its appearance 
from what it was to the eyes of the Elizabethan voyagers.  The time of Elizabeth was only 
distant from the present time by a moment of space compared with the ages which had 
passed since the water had run between those banks, and the green thickets swarmed 
there, and the small trees had grown to huge wrinkled trees in solitude.94   
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Woolf’s absorption of evolutionary theory has grown more sophisticated.  In Melymbrosia, 
Woolf slips into hyperbolic phrasing to describe these prehistoric forests.  Melymbrosia’s “trees 
… have stood since the beginning of the world,” for instance.95  Hints of origins are still there in 
The Voyage Out, but the temporal dimensions are more precise.  A geological time enters her 
conception of the present, the time of Elizabethan explorers, and the expansive past that records 
the river’s earliest tributaries, first thickets, and the ensuing centuries of flora growth.  At the 
same time, omniscience vanishes.  Though the narrator discourses upon evolutionary and 
geological surveys of the terrain, the aerial perspective is limited to the parameters of her plot.  
Now the grand view is recalled by the expedition party members who, a few weeks before, 
ascended a nearby mountain and took in the few miles of river visible. 
In revision, Woolf subtly transforms the descent through time and history to one that her 
characters share and experience.  When the boat churns up the river, “They seemed to be driving 
into the heart of the night, for the trees closed in front of them, and they could hear all round 
them the rustling of leaves.”96  The passengers grow less talkative while “clustered together” and 
take in the “same spot of deep gloom on the banks.”97  Terence and Rachel traverse the forest 
themselves, feel for themselves the thick fecundity of life within the woods:  “the light grew 
dimmer…The path narrowed and turned; it was hedged in by dense creepers which knotted tree 
to tree, and burst here and there into star-shaped crimson blossoms.”98  Gillian Beer pays specific 
attention to this particular passage due to its close rendering of a scene found in The Voyage of 
the Beagle, but it is also the “tangled bank” of The Origin of Species, the thought that has its first 
evolutionary implication in Darwin’s notebook of 1939 after he had landed upon his theory: “it is 
difficult to believe in the dreadful but quiet war going on in the peaceful woods and smiling 
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fields.”99  In The Voyage Out, “The trees and the undergrowth seemed to be strangling each other 
near the ground in a multitudinous wrestle.”100  The characters sense the implications of 
evolution by traversing the primeval forests of South America; by seeing, smelling, feeling, 
hearing, and touching the remote past that has become present.  They are located within rather 
than outside of the natural world.  The destination of this expedition is enveloped in the 
prehistorical past. 
 
2.4: DESCENT AS DISAPPEARANCE, UNSELFCONSCIOUSNESS AS AWARENESS 
The consequence of this confrontation with origins is at once self-discovery and 
abnegation.  On the boat in the dark, the characters feel vulnerable and exposed.  It becomes a 
“question of nakedness” in the jungle, where the Victorian garb is not only impractical but 
ridiculous in the heat.  Even in pitch darkness, where they are “almost invisible to one another,” 
it takes great persuasion on the part of two of the younger characters to convince Mrs. Flushing 
that “no one would notice if by chance some part of her which had been concealed for forty-five 
years was laid bare to the human eye.”101   The joke brings home the larger metaphor of 
nakedness, of being divested of all the accoutrements of human civilization that provide the 
illusion of safety and the security of social standing, not to mention separation from and 
superiority over the jungle’s inhabitants.   
Even more significant is how the narration suggests that such exposure divests the 
characters of outline and form; the parameters of the ego seem to soften and shrink, swallowed 
by the jungle.   Characters disappear, lose contact with one another, and grow silent.  “The great 
darkness had the usual effect of taking away all desire for communication by making their words 
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sound thin and small.”  In the light of day, Hewet attempts to read some poetry out loud, but the 
“number of moving things entirely vanquished his words” and the jungle’s response mocks his 
effort: “A bird gave a wild laugh, a monkey chuckled a malicious question, and, as fire fades in 
the hot sunshine, his words flickered and went out.”102  Words fail, as do constructs of stability 
and stasis; the life of sensations and feelings subsume the narrative, as Woolf attempts to 
represent a space antecedent to language and perhaps even consciousness.  At various stages of 
the expedition, the characters are “unable to frame any thoughts” and “their steps unconsciously 
quickened”; the ceaseless activity of the river below them seems a “senseless and cruel 
churning,” and the “jarring cry of animals” is heard overhead.  Hirst, the young Cambridge 
intellectual who at one point proclaims himself one of the five or so young men who will matter, 
finally ejaculates, “These trees get on one’s nerves—it’s all so crazy.  God’s undoubtedly mad.  
What sane person could have conceived a wilderness like this, and peopled it with apes and 
alligators?  I should go mad if I lived here—raving mad.”103  Hirst’s world, even its animals, is 
“peopled,” and his god is created in his own image, a rational being divorced from an organic 
world whom the narrative, in an evolutionary trope, once again returns to the wilderness and a 
temporal process.  
The cloistered virtue of the English public school education has not completely taken 
over the figure of Terence, and that he fails to finish Cambridge tellingly allows him not only 
access to Rachel’s feelings but contact with the “irresistible force of his own feelings.  He was 
drawn on and on away from all he knew, slipping over barriers and past landmarks into unknown 
waters…enveloped in deeper unconsciousness.”104  This is the other crucial aspect of the jungle, 
its stripping of self-consciousness that paradoxically raises awareness of a force greater than 
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themselves.  When Terence and Rachel “proposed to walk into the woods together,”105 Woolf 
proposes the most radical task of her novel—to move the romance of Terence and Rachel into an 
evolutionary landscape that grounds not only their relations but also the ideals upon which love 
is founded.  Their declaration of love occurs in the densest part of the jungle.  Terence picks up a 
red fruit and throws it as high as he can.  “When it dropped, he would speak.  They heard the 
flapping of great wings; they heard the fruit go pattering through the leaves and eventually fall 
with a thud.”106  By such an action, Woolf’s narrator means to suggest the ascent of feeling 
dropped into the origins of struggle and survival.  The forbidden fruit spills its secret. After 
declaring their love, they too “releasing themselves, dropped to the earth.”107 
 
2.5: EVOLUTION OF ROMANCE 
Successful or not, the attempt to return romance to its evolutionary origins is bold and in 
subtle ways original to Woolf’s fiction.  The obvious precursor once again is Heart of Darkness, 
where there is not Woolf’s company of tourists adventuring into the heart of the jungle but an 
imperial crew of merchants and mercenaries led by Marlow to retrieve Kurtz and return him to 
civilization.  No doubt, Woolf has this narrative in mind, as Conrad’s collection Youth that 
included it was the text she claimed a few years later to have appreciated more than any other by 
a living author.108  Her first novel is in some important aspects a parodist’s response to it.  
Conrad’s story is remarkably absent of women, but there are two powerfully evocative figures 
with whom Kurtz is romantically entangled: the fierce savage queen of the natives and “the 
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Intended” bride waiting for him in a European capital.  The savage woman, whose arresting 
presence Marlow describes as “wild-eyed and magnificent,” who comes to stand for the 
“colossal body of the fecund and mysterious life” at the heart of the wilderness, who is “an 
image of its own tenebrous and passionate soul,”109 disappears back into the jungle.  She remains 
as inscrutable as the final moral of Kurtz that Marlow never reveals to the Intended or the 
civilization she represents.  Marlow famously lies to the Intended, tells her that the last words 
Kurtz pronounced were her name rather than “The horror! The horror!”  It keeps the romance of 
Conrad’s Romance uncanny and divided, the dual presence of the savage woman and the 
Intended suggestive of each other, but situated in their proper, respective places. 
With sincerity, Woolf brings her intended to the jungle not only to find love and herself, 
but also to come face to face with the savage woman.  If the ultimate answers remain at best 
mysterious, at worst incommunicable, no lie will be told.  Rachel and Terence believe in their 
passion for each other and call it love, but they are quickly enveloped in the natural world and by 
the obfuscating inability to make sense of it.  Their feelings render them less communicative, 
their declarations of love less sure, and their very sense of selves unsettled in relation to each 
other and the procession of birds, beasts and humans.  In the thick haze of their emotions, Mrs. 
Flushing interrupts them with a little amateur reading of Darwin about love and life: “One reads 
a lot about love—that’s why poetry’s so dull.  But what happens in real life?” she coyly asks 
them.  “It ain’t love!”110 Such a dressing down of sexual discussion and marital convention 
renders Terence “unintelligible” and Mr. Flushing attempts to return a little urbanity to the 
conversation by explaining his wife’s position with her upbringing.  It was “very unnatural—
unusual, I should say.  They had no mother” and a father who cared only about racehorses and 
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Greek statues.  He bathed his children in the stable, even when a sheet of winter ice covered the 
bath: “We had to get in; if we didn’t, we were whipped.  The strong ones lived—the others died.  
What you call the survival of the fittest—a most excellent plan, I daresay, if you’ve thirteen 
children!”111  Mr. Flushing attempts to mollify the story by exclaiming, “And all this going on in 
the heart of England, in the nineteenth century!”  But his wife’s reduction of marriage and family 
to sex and survival is not dismissed by the developing narrative.   
The final destination of the journey is the native village in the heart of the jungle.  The 
tourists go to observe primitive man in his natural habitat, but the observed gazes back at them.  
“As they sauntered about, the stare followed them, passing over their legs, their bodies, their 
heads, curiously not without hostility, like the crawl of a winter fly.”  The stare comes from the 
villagers, not the English, the final eyes the most unsettling to Terence and Rachel: “As she drew 
apart her shawl and uncovered her breast to the lips of her baby, the eyes of a woman never left 
their faces, although they moved uneasily under her stare, and finally turned away, rather than 
stand there looking at her any longer.”112  Instead of a lovers’ embrace, or an affirmation of 
marital continuity from savage to homo Britainicus, you have the evolutionary purpose, the 
shawl of romance uncovered—the savage woman sits alone, nursing her baby, fully conscious of 
the foreign presence, but unashamed of the exposure.   Those exposed are the two newly 
engaged: “’Well,’ Terence sighed at length, ‘it makes us seem insignificant, doesn’t it?’  Rachel 
agreed.”  The social implications of Darwin in this passage are quite clear.  The whole 
convention of matrimony and the tradition of the romance novel, at its biological source, is the 
continuation of the species, and the consequence of erotic love, idealized or not, is the woman 
bearing and nursing progeny.  Rachel is ill equipped to either accept her engagement or to fight 
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off the jungle fever, yet she still experiences them both bodily.  Woolf’s novel does not buckle to 
the expectations of romantic convention, and the social consequences of her heroine’s 
acceptance of a marriage remain unfulfilled. 
 
 2.6: NIGHT AND DAY’S VISIONARY BIOLOGY 
Most of the conventions of novel writing, however, remain intact in The Voyage Out.  
There were several intermediary steps, none more important than how Woolf’s own record of 
narrative innovation begins with a “discovery of technique.”   Woolf recalls that unforgettable 
day in 1917, “…the day I wrote The Mark on the Wall—all in a flash, as if flying, after being 
kept stone breaking for months.”113  The quarry of her frustration was Night and Day, by 
Woolf’s own estimate her most conventional novel, useful to her as compositional exercise but 
possessing none of the immediacy or innovation of those first “little pieces”—the short stories 
eventually published in Monday or Tuesday (1921). Her diary describes this breakthrough as a 
“new form for a novel,” her three short stories—“The Mark on the Wall,” “Kew Gardens,” and 
“An Unwritten Novel”—taking hands and stretching to two hundred pages or so: “doesn’t that 
get closer & yet keep form & speed, & enclose everything, everything?”114  The result would be 
Woolf’s first experimental novel, Jacob’s Room; but the composition of Night and Day, 
concurrent with the writing of the short stories, was nevertheless essential in the process.  
Writing Night and Day provides Woolf the formal outline and the structural blueprint from 
which she departs in “Kew Gardens” and the stories that ensued.  It describes what her fiction 
might later accomplish. 
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Night and Day all transpires in England, but like The Voyage Out, the short excursions 
outdoors are crucial—these ventures are, at the furthest, to the English countryside, and most 
significantly to the city of London’s great repositories of wild nature: the zoological and 
botanical gardens. Towards the end of the novel, Woolf takes a quartet of lovers to the zoo to 
sort out the emotional attachments between Ralph and Katharine, on the one hand, and 
Cassandra and William on the other.  Instead of a “tea-tray” between them, Ralph sees Katharine 
against “a background of pale grottos and sleek hides.”115  No longer hostess to the eminent 
guests of the afternoons at the Hilbery residence, Katharine feeds a different relation that seems 
familiar enough: the giraffes observe her “from their melancholy eminence, and the pink-lined 
trunks of elephants cautiously abstracted buns from her outstretched hands.”116  The procession 
is impressive: pythons, camels, lizards, frogs, fish, alligators, caterpillars, snakes, a “lately 
emerged and semiconscious butterfly” and an array of flowers that together “produced an 
atmosphere in which human beings tended to look pale and to fall silent.”117  While not nearly 
the dangerous excursion undertaken in The Voyage Out, the consequences are the same.  
Communication is stifled and humanity feels less significant or self-assured, even in the 
artificially constructed and confined environs.  By the monkey cages, where William fails to 
attract them by rattling the bars and offering an apple, Katharine sees him as “a wretched 
misanthropical ape.”  The whole scene and the jealousy it induces in William “pulled her down 
into some horrible swamp of her nature where the primeval struggle between man and woman 
still rages.”118  Through this descent into evolutionary origins, the romance plot is settled—
Cassandra and William go their own way, leaving Katharine free and available to Ralph. 
                                                           
115 Night and Day 312 
116 .Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 312-313. 
118 314. 
 50 
In a large measure, what Woolf attempts to work through in Night and Day is how to 
allow her heroine the prospect of marriage without fettering her to the shackles of patriarchal 
society.   Rachel must die in The Voyage Out, but what about Katharine?  This is the first novel 
conceived after Woolf’s own marriage, and the adjustment by any biographical or biological 
account was neither smooth nor easy for either Leonard or Virginia.  Part of the resolution, 
brilliantly elucidated by Molly Hite, is Woolf’s construction of the “visionary body” in fiction 
that enables “Woolf to create passionate and sensuous female characters without embroiling 
them in the societal consequences of female eroticism that had shaped the romance plot.”119  An 
intimation of this comes in the impersonal, unconscious detachment that Rachel Vinrace exhibits 
when she plays the piano, or when Terence Hewet notices that “existence now went on in two 
different layers,” after he and Rachel declare their love in the jungle and rejoin the party. “Here 
were the Flushings talking, talking somewhere high up in the air above him, and he and Rachel 
had dropped to the bottom of the world together.”120  In Night and Day, the impersonal 
detachment of Rachel playing music is related directly to the rapturous, ecstatic feeling usually 
vouchsafed only for men and women in love.   
Katharine’s passion is mathematics, physics in particular, and her daydreams often 
wander to the signs and numbers enumerating celestial bodies visible in the night sky.  Molly 
Hite focuses upon a curious passage where Katharine’s attention is divided: 
She was feeling happier than she had felt in her life.  If Denham could have seen how 
visibly books of algebraic symbols, pages all speckled with dots and dashes and twisted 
bars, came before her eyes as they trod the Embankment, his secret joy in her attention 
might have been dispersed.  She went on, saying, ‘Yes, I see…but how would that help 
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you?… Your brother has passed his examination?’ so sensibly, that he had constantly to 
keep his brain in check; and all the time she was in fancy looking up through a telescope 
at white shadow-cleft disks which were other worlds, until she felt herself possessed of 
two bodies, one walking by the river with Denham, the other concentrated to a silver 
globe aloft in the fine blue space above the scum of vapours that was covering the visible 
world.121 
What interests Hite is that Katharine’s division here is not conceived in the classical tradition of 
mind-body or soul-body splits.  Instead, Katharine feels herself “possessed of two bodies,” the 
one engaging Ralph Denham in conversation just after he has professed to her that she is his 
ideal, and the other fully embodied in the acute sensations of her mental preoccupations with 
mathematics.  Hite calls these two bodies social and visionary: “The social body walks Katharine 
Hilbery through the comic version of the romance plot with its sanctioned euphoric conclusion.  
The visionary body is the site of her most acute sensations,” the one “opposing Victorian 
aesthetics with ‘vision’ and ‘aloofness,” the qualities of aesthetic detachment that became 
“hallmarks of her own modernist practice.”122 In this, the last of Woolf’s novels with a 
conventional plot, Woolf attempts a resolution of the romance by giving Katharine a visionary 
body that evades the obstructions and interruptions and subjugations that the social body 
nonetheless must experience.  Ralph in this sense is a suitable suitor because Katharine can at 
once be with him and be elsewhere, both present physically and physically absent amid the 
crowd of stars. 
 But part of this resolution does require some merging of the visionary and the social body 
that I read with different emphasis than Hite.  Ralph is not oblivious to the meandering feelings 
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of Katharine.  At their parting, he asks her to let him know the “decision.”  When Katharine 
hesitates, “He guessed her difficulties; he knew in a second that she heard nothing…”123  In other 
words, Ralph discovers that her mind (if not her body) was elsewhere, and he immediately 
proposes that they discuss things at Kew Gardens, a place where the social and visionary bodies, 
the male and female beings, may be properly aligned. 
 
 2.7: NIGHT AND DAY’S RESOLUTION AT KEW. 
 By any account of the novel, the Kew Gardens chapter in Night and Day is pivotal.   
Katharine and Ralph stroll through “these legendary gardens.”124  Ralph shows off a bit, 
prodding the flowers, Woolf writes, “with the particular touch of a botanist,” calling them by 
their Latin names.  He speaks to her of bulbs and seeds, of living things endowed with sex, “and 
susceptibilities which adapted themselves by all manners of ingenious devices to live and beget 
life…, by processes which might reveal the secrets of human existence.”  For Katharine, “No 
discourse could have worn a more welcome sound….  For weeks she had heard nothing that 
made such pleasant music in her mind.”  Katharine wishes “he would go on forever, showing her 
how science felt not quite blindly for the law that ruled their endless variations,” but also perhaps 
more significantly, how it allows her contemplation “of that other part of life where thought 
constructs a destiny which is independent of human beings.”  This moment is crucial.  
Katharine’s absorption in Ralph’s discussion on evolution transforms the trees into “symbols of 
the vast external world which recks so little of the happiness, of the marriages or deaths of 
individuals.”   Even as Katharine walks through the rock garden and orchid house with Ralph, 
her happiness ironically exists in a discussion that takes her outside of herself and the determined 
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course of her romance and marriage.  Woolf embeds Katharine’s deepest capacity for happiness 
in this contemplative region that “entirely lacked self-consciousness.”125 
 This scene certainly resonates with Woolf’s excursion in The Voyage Out, where its 
evolutionary landscape rather than evolutionary contemplation envelops the novels’ lovers, 
Rachel and Terence, in a less self-conscious and socially prescribed atmosphere.  A reconnection 
with and awareness of the primordial heightens their feelings and bodily sensations, but it 
paradoxically renders them less communicative, their thoughts “unintelligible.”  Rachel’s 
descent into the jungle, her disappearance and ultimately her death, does not fulfill the 
conventions of romance; Night and Day grapples with the same issue, but this time Woolf 
engenders a resolution. Hite reads Woolf’s extraction of the visionary body from the social body 
as a developed convention of representation to avoid the risk and exposure women are subjected 
to in the Edwardian or Victorian plot, where the woman is either married off or ruined, saved or 
exploited. “The social female body is a body at risk,” and the visionary body is “an inspired 
solution to the problem of women’s culturally sanctioned vulnerability.  It is the body sealed off 
from social consequences, secure from interruption or invasion: a corporeal correlative of the 
room of one’s own.”126   But the visionary capacities of Katharine also need to be explored in the 
context that Woolf’s setting suggests and the evolutionary discourse implies. Evolution engages 
both the social and the visionary bodies.  Bodies, as with formations of species, are never sealed 
off and enclosed.  Evolutionary biology, unlike astrophysics, is a science rooted in sex and 
reproduction. When Ralph discusses the manner in which the plants are “endowed with sex,” 
adapted “to live and beget life,” the thought wakens in Katharine “echoes in all those remote 
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fastnesses of her being where loneliness had brooded so long undisturbed.”127  Julia Briggs 
notices that it is here where the “abstract and the actual” are combined, and the discovery 
releases Katharine “from the loneliness of her mind to an awareness of her body.”128  The reader 
is meant to connect this scene to Katharine’s questioning, later, of why there should be “this 
perpetual disparity between the thought and the action, between the life of solitude and the life of 
society, this astonishing precipice on the one side of which the soul was active in broad daylight, 
on the other side of which it was contemplative and dark as night?  Was it not possible to step 
from one to the other, erect, and without essential change?  Was this not the chance he offered 
her…”129  This is the new ideal, which Woolf attempts to establish between the contemplative 
and the social life of women.  The rest of the novel is the struggle to marry the two prospects. 
Ralph plays his part here; he is occupied with topical questions while Katharine muses 
among the vegetation.  Katharine’s contemplation “of that other part of life where thought 
constructs a destiny which is independent of human beings” paradoxically opens her up to the 
prospect of entering into a relationship with Ralph.  It is certainly a peculiar courtship that Woolf 
establishes between these two lovers of shared solitude.  Ralph stimulates Katharine precisely 
because their personal interactions afford her the detachment necessary for intellectual reverie, a 
chance at impersonality rather than enforced intimacy (or worse, the engrossing trivialities of the 
conventional Hilbery social settings). He, too, is augmented by the relationship, in possession of 
his full faculties for the first time when with Katharine.  The romance plot will not be Edwardian 
or Victorian, however.  Ralph, in fact, is conscious of Katharine’s needs here in a way that no 
other character has been previously, least of all Katharine’s parents or her intended husband 
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William Rodney.  Ralph’s is the perspective that grants us insight into Katharine’s visionary 
states of mind and body: 
…he looked at her taking in one strange shape after another with the contemplative, 
considering gaze of a person who sees not exactly what is before him, but gropes in 
regions that lie beyond it.  The far-away look entirely lacked self-consciousness.  
Denham doubted whether she remembered his presence.  He could recall himself, of 
course, by a word or a movement––but why?  She was happier thus.130 
It is a small but significant courtesy that Ralph grants Katharine.   By recognizing that a moment 
of solitude, of scientific contemplation, might be desirable for Katharine as well as a male 
intellectual, Ralph becomes desirable to Katharine.  Still, she is so trained in the societal 
conventions of her feminine role that Ralph’s silence actually checks hers: “Katharine had an 
uneasy sense that silence on her part was selfishness.  It was selfish of her to continue, as she 
wished to do, a discussion of subjects not remotely connected with any human beings.”131   
Katharine is well aware that solitude, silence, a contemplation of one’s own, is selfish if you are 
a woman; to be unselfconscious in this sense is to be selfish according to the conventions of the 
Hilberys’ Victorian mores.  Unselfconsciousness, the disappearance of self, is precisely what all 
of Woolf’s evolutionary scenes provide: a relief from the I of Victorian authorities.  This is not to 
say that Ralph is a perfect mate, or that he doesn’t struggle with his selfish needs or 
preconceptions as opposed to Katharine’s. Both of them must work through what it would mean 
to found a marriage upon freer terms, a life of the mind and of the body for both woman and 
man.  Kew Gardens, a small cloistered patch of the natural world on display in the civilizing 
confines of the city, offers them this first glimpse of that possibility. 
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 This brief but essential discourse on evolution provides Katharine the grander view, the 
expanse of vision that might realign the Victorian plot for its female heroine.  In physics, 
Katharine had covertly cultivated faculties that went beyond her familial and societal role, but 
through contemplating evolution, the “vast external world” of sex and selection engages her in 
the “laws that ruled their endless variations.”  While natural selection governs with detachment 
on a cosmic scale  (just like her beloved mathematics), evolution physically as well as mentally 
liberates on the societal scale.  It stands in contrast to the Victorian teatime drama, the “part of 
life which is conspicuously without order,” full of moods and wishes, likes and dislikes, the 
fluttering emotions of the moment.  The long perspective that includes human beings, but that 
remains aloof and indifferent to human concerns as well, opens Katharine up to a past larger than 
the family drama and historical romance of the Hilberys. A future established on such terms 
could conceivably vary from what’s come before it.  This marriage plot evolves to marry the 
social and visionary body. 
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Chapter Three  
Tales of the Snail: Naturalist Perspective and Evolutionary Form in “Kew 
Gardens” and “The Mark on the Wall” 
 
3.1: WOOLF’S NATURALIST VIEW OF KEW 
How evolutionary history and setting pertain to Woolf’s breakthrough in narrative form 
and technique is incredibly involving.  To review, Woolf’s first two novels plot their 
evolutionary courses, with The Voyage Out expeditioning to the jungles of South America and 
Night and Day venturing at crucial moments to the repositories of nature and natural history in 
the city.  Sequentially, the two novels quite uncannily recapitulate the Darwinian narrative of 
voyaging naturalist come home to lengthy scientific contemplation, but with the severe 
limitations of women’s roles lived out under Victorian patriarchal structures.   
Taken together, you have the 19th century correlative of promising women whose 
intellectual pursuits are thwarted by social expectations, akin to what A Room of One’s Own 
famously gives as “Shakespeare’s Sister”: here, you might say, are Darwin’s figurative sisters.  
Woolf’s narrative has evolved from her heroine doing the Darwinian thing available to her—a 
chaperoned, escorted trip into the primitive time and space of an Amazon village—to the 
Darwinian course of study and contemplation available to her in the social environs of her 
parents’ Victorian London.  Victorian, because although both of these novels take place in the 
modern present of Virginia Woolf’s early twentieth century, they have not yet become Modern 
in narrative form or representation. Woolf retrospectively ascribes “that method of approach, 
Jacobs Room, Mrs. Dalloway etc,” which would define her as a Modernist, to the triptych of 
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“Kew Gardens,” “The Mark on the Wall,” and “An Unwritten Novel.”132  She gives special 
billing to “An Unwritten Novel,” a story pregnant with ideas, but it is the first two especially that 
mark a beginning because of their production one after the other in the summer of 1917, even as 
Night and Day was being written, and nearly three years before “An Unwritten Novel” was 
completed.133  “Kew” and “Mark” are radically different in structure from anything Woolf had 
previously attempted.  They are also radically Darwinian in their Modernity.   
“Kew Gardens” and “The Mark on the Wall” are Woolf’s first narrative movements from 
evolutionary plot to evolutionary form. To begin with, “Kew”:134 where Woolf’s protagonists 
had expressed their need to break free of conventions in Night and Day, “Kew Gardens” simply 
evades the conventions. It is useful,  essential, to realize that the Kew Gardens scene of Night 
and Day has been transposed to her short story, with the major difference being the emphasis 
upon the narration itself.   The novel’s descriptions of Katharine’s evolutionary contemplations 
while viewing Kew are now a direct narrative transcription in the short story.  In Night and Day, 
Katharine absorbs Ralph’s peroration on trees and flowers, “bulbs and seeds…which adapted 
themselves by all manner of ingenious devices to live and beget life, and could be fashioned 
squat or tapering, flame-coloured or pale, pure or spotted, by processes which might reveal the 
secrets of human existence.”135  The lesson on evolution sets in motion Katharine’s reverie, and 
we observe Ralph observing her, again, “taking in one strange shape after another with the 
contemplative, considering gaze of a person who sees not exactly what is before him, but gropes 
in regions that lie beyond it.”136  We are told that Katharine is attracted to a “law that might be 
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inscrutable but was certainly omnipotent…because she could find nothing like it in possession of 
human lives.”  Because she was a woman in the “flower of youth,” she had had to consider “all 
that part of life which is conspicuously without order,” which Woolf suggests are the 
conventions of Victorian courtship and manner that have been divorced from any basis upon the 
“real,” implied here as the natural world understood through Darwinian theory.  Katharine has 
been “forced to deny herself any contemplation of that other part of life,” the part that evolution 
reveals to her as a law not sanctioned by man or man’s divinities but by the processes that 
determine human existence.  All of this, we are told, registers for Katharine and explains her 
trance-like state.  In Woolf’s short story, Katharine’s exposition is already internalized, so that 
the narrative perspective embodies her meditative trance and projects it outward.  “Kew 
Gardens” takes the actual form of a reverie on evolution, as if it were experienced by Katharine’s 
“considering gaze.”  We read what a Katharine sees, even what a Katharine feels. What would it 
be to have the consciousness of a visionary body transposed as narrative? Woolf had been “stone 
breaking” for months, she remembered, but Kew Gardens is where her narrative broke ground. 
What’s innovative, new in Woolf’s fiction, is how this “thought that constructs a destiny 
independent of human beings” is mimetically configured rather than told.  Here, the setting itself 
partakes of, even at crucial moments replaces, the action of the narrative.  Rather than plot, there 
is a plot of land—a single oval-shaped flowerbed in Kew Gardens that Woolf’s narrator observes 
with an unrelenting focus, a kind of visionary embodiment of how her Katharine or even her 
Rachel might experience it first person.  We, the readers, are encamped in the narrative 
perspective of this outward gaze upon the flowers of Kew and the thoughts and sensations they 
induce.   It anticipates her famous call to narrative liberty two years later in “Modern Novels”: 
“if one were free and could set down what one chose, there would be no plot, little probability, 
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and a vague general confusion….”  A detached, observant perspective records what falls upon 
the eye, which “receives upon its surface a myriad impressions…”137 Woolf attempts to capture 
what she would two years later call the “chief task” of the novelist, “to convey this incessantly 
varying spirit with whatever stress or sudden deviation it may display.”138  The intriguing aspect 
of Woolf’s application of these principles is how provocatively the story suggests, “To what 
end?”  For the moderns in “Modern Novels,” “it becomes apparent that the emphasis is upon 
something hitherto ignored or unstressed in that relation, a feeling, a point of view, suggesting a 
different and obscure outline of form incomprehensible to our predecessors.”139  In its structure, 
“Kew Gardens” repudiates that “life is like” the conventional novel, but in doing so attempts to 
represent “what we might venture to call life itself.”140    Woolf’s narrative holds the mirror up to 
nature, but it is not what one would ordinarily think of as human nature as the novelist had 
commonly represented it.    
How, then, “Kew Gardens” is Darwinian in form begins with this shift from plot and 
character to the concerns of narrative perspective. It presents an outlook that might best be 
described as the naturalist’s perspective, or at the least an artistic rendering, as it were, of a 
naturalist’s perspective.   By centering the flowerbed and creating a resolute, fixed narrative 
point of view, the act of observation in essence replaces the action of plot.  There are no 
“characters,” in the literary sense of the term, acting out a predetermined course of events: rather, 
a human presence viewed by the narrator simply becomes part of a series of observations.    
This is not to say that the human lives transpiring in “Kew Gardens” are insignificant.  
Indeed, the four groupings of humans are a shuffled, swiftly moving representation of life’s 
phases.  Out of order, we see and hear a young couple at the onset of their sexual lives; a married 
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couple with children reminiscing about their past before each other and their progeny; a senile, 
old man speaking nonsense to the son who escorts and redirects him; and a pair of “elderly 
women of the lower class” grown old, one assumes, in service to the likes of these others.  If 
“Kew Gardens” is a narrative exercise in close, focused observation, it is also an exercise in 
perceiving human relations on natural terms, shifting emphasis from a human adventure tale or 
marriage plot to a detached view of all relevant relations.  This includes lover to lover, husband 
to wife, son to father, girlfriend to girlfriend; but not to the exclusion of sun to flower, flower to 
human, human to butterfly, or butterfly to flower.  Nature from this vantage, in fact, is not this 
antagonistic other, which must be overcome or subjugated by human nature.  The naturalist’s 
perspective, that this narrative creates, envisions the space of Kew Gardens as a locus of 
relatedness, where human thought and action are deeply interfused with the myriad interactions 
within this particular plot of land. 
 
3.2: THE KEW GARDENS OF NATURAL HISTORY 
And Kew signifies no ordinary plot of nature or botany.  It is not arbitrary that Woolf 
brings Katharine and Ralph to the naturalistic setting of The Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew at 
the pivotal juncture of Night and Day.  Nor is it happenstance that Woolf’s breakthrough short 
story shares the same space and bears the garden’s name as its title.  The history of the actual 
Kew Gardens is itself a microcosm of how the natural sciences found a home through the 
expansion of the British Empire.  Kew Gardens had become the repository of botanical 
specimens culled from most of the great British naval expeditions of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Joseph Banks, England’s first great botanist and voyaging naturalist, all but 
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created the scientific importance of the gardens when his friendship with King George III helped 
Banks transform Kew from the “pleasure gardens” of the monarchy to one of the most important 
botanical and research facilities in Europe.141  Banks had begun his vast botanical collection as 
the lead naturalist aboard the Endeavour expedition (1768-1771) to the South Seas under the 
legendary Captain James Cook.  Banks returned home to immediate fame and was soon 
thereafter named president of The Royal Society, a position he held for more than forty years. 
Banks only added to the collection on subsequent voyages and then solicited specimens from 
every major expedition thereafter.  Nobody did more to encourage and celebrate the blooming 
pastime of amateur botanists collecting and cultivating exotic specimens for their own gardens. 
Thirty new specimens of rhododendron from Asia, gathered on such an expedition, might spur 
the trend of planting them in the private gardens of England, but Banks was more interested in 
one of the great pastimes and pursuits of the century: Linnean classification and taxonomy.  
What was once a monarch’s retreat had become the most important botanical holding and 
research facility in the land. 
 This transition from royal garden to a research center open to the public for the study of 
botany should not be overlooked as a recurrent scene in Woolf’s fiction.  It is not simply that 
Kew Gardens is a natural setting whereby Woolf might allude to the fruits of evolution in the 
city of London.  When Woolf dubs the gardens “legendary” in Night and Day, she is evoking the 
playgrounds of princesses, the acquisitions of the British Empire, and one of the most historically 
important spaces of London, particularly its role in the evolution of evolutionary theory.142 
William Hooker became the first official director of Kew in 1841, when the gardens had fallen 
into disrepair and neglect after Banks’ death in 1820.  Hooker expanded the design, scope, and 
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influence of the gardens, including the accessibility of the gardens to the public. By the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Kew’s herbarium alone housed 150,000 species culled from across the 
globe.143   When Joseph Dalton Hooker (William’s son) took over Kew Gardens, the only rival in 
England for botanical prominence was the British Museum’s botanical collections, run by 
Richard Owens, a staunch opponent to Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Most of the important 
botanical specimens under the British sun eventually moved to Kew, in large part due to the 
growing prestige that Joseph Dalton Hooker and his botanical publications enjoyed. 
 Of both biographical and biological interest is the fact that the most celebrated curator of 
Kew Gardens, the same Joseph Dalton Hooker, was a close friend and colleague of Charles 
Darwin, and the man to whom Darwin first revealed in 1844 that he was “almost convinced 
(quite contrary to opinion I started with) that species are not (it is like confessing a murder) 
immutable…I think I have found out (here’s presumption!) the simple way by which species 
become exquisitely adapted to various ends.”144   Darwin honored Hooker and helped make his 
career by presenting Hooker with all his botanical specimens of the Galapagos Archipelago from 
the voyage of the Beagle, which are today still stored at Kew Gardens.  Hooker remained one of 
the three or four staunchest defenders of Darwin’s theory and maintained a close, lifelong 
friendship and correspondence with him.  Hooker timed his publication of The Botanical 
Specimens of the Himalayas (1859) to bolster Darwin’s treatise in Origin of Species and curtail 
some of the anticipated objections and rebuttals, making Hooker the first fellow scientist to 
publish a book-length study that offered support of Darwin’s theory.   He is one of the most 
referenced scientists in all of Darwin’s writings, and vice-versa.  This alliance alongside Kew’s 
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governance and expansion under Hooker meant that the study of evolutionary botany had a 
garden of its own.  By Joseph Hooker’s death in 1911, Kew had become inextricably linked with 
the Hookers and the triumph of Darwin’s theory. 
 Though Joseph Dalton Hooker was no fan of the sightseeing intrusion into the research 
done at Kew, its accessibility to the public made it one of the city’s great attractions.  Julia 
Briggs notes that ““The Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew were just visible from the back 
windows of Hogarth House, and they had quickly become a favourite walk for the Woolfs.”145  
There are multiple diary accounts of Woolf frequenting Kew Gardens while living nearby, 
including her strong desire to bring the orchid house and its “sinister reptiles that live in the 
tropical heat…into a novel.”146  Woolf, in essence, has her characters walk through the floral 
arrangements and botanical specimens culled from Darwin’s voyage, a living, if cloistered, 
testimony to evolutionary theory.  By the time of the Great War, when Woolf was frequenting 
Kew regularly and beginning to think of its implications for her fiction, Kew Gardens was much 
more than a pleasant destination.  On display before her and the British public were quite 
literally the seeds of the empire and perhaps the greatest resource and dedicated arrangement of 
evolutionary theory available in England. 
 
3.3: IMPERSONALITY OF THE NATURALIST 
Another significant evolutionary backdrop to “Kew Gardens” is drawn from the literary 
scene.  What I am calling the naturalist’s perspective of “Kew Gardens” should be enlarged for 
the moment by contrasting it to the other narrative departures of Woolf’s immediate predecessors 
and contemporaries. Certainly one way of generalizing Woolf’s narrative detachment from the 
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lives of her “Kew Gardens” subjects is to see the same Modernist trend, even fetish, for Gustave 
Flaubert’s “impersonality of the artist.”  Much as one principle of Modern literature derives from 
Flaubert’s ideal, Woolf is not Flaubert’s disciple. When Henry James read Flaubert’s 
posthumously published correspondence, James immediately saw the significance of Flaubert’s 
letter on “l’impersonnalité de l’oeuvre,” and translated it for the March, 1893 readers of 
Macmillan’s Magazine: “It’s one of my principles that one must never write down one’s self.  
The artist must be present in his work like God in creation, invisible and almighty, everywhere 
felt, but nowhere seen.”147  James Joyce later fastened on to this dictum and transplanted it to 
Stephen Dedalus’s aesthetic principle in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. One must refine 
oneself out of the text, Joyce writes:  “The mystery of esthetic like that of material creation is 
accomplished.  The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or 
above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails.”148   
Woolf does echo Joyce and Flaubert almost directly when she herself writes that “the ‘book 
itself’ is not a form which you see, but emotion which you feel.”149  Indeed, Woolf’s essay “On 
Rereading Novels”(1922) paraphrases Flaubert’s god of artistic creation who is “everywhere felt 
but nowhere seen” when she discusses his story “Un Coeur Simple.” She even compliments 
Flaubert by his own principle: “there is nothing to be seen; there is everything to be felt.”150  It is 
in the same contemporary spirit that T. S. Eliot concludes “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
(1922) with the statement that “The emotion of art is impersonal.” 
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This said, Flaubert’s principle and Joyce’s refinement of it (even Eliot’s) are not Woolf’s, 
and the difference rests upon the first side of their analogy.  At stake is the whole question of 
omniscience, which for the author of fiction is narrative point of view.  Instead of the God of 
creation as Woolf's methodological model, there is the evolutionary theory of Darwin.  It must be 
emphasized that Woolf does not replace Flaubert’s “god of creation” with Darwin.  Rather, it is 
the theory itself and the example Darwin establishes in removing God and human centrality from 
the questions asked of nature.  Woolf, on numerous occasions, criticizes Joyce for the “egotism” 
at the center of his formal accomplishment, so that the “impersonality” of the work of art 
paradoxically creates a deity out of the author to be worshipped at art’s alter.151  Joyce’s great 
ambition was indeed to replace scriptural authority with his own.  “The dissolution of self” in 
Woolf’s narrative experiments, beginning with “Kew Gardens,” is the loss of both the 
assumption of human centrality and the ascension of the author as his own surrogate divinity.  
Consider that a major coup Darwin orchestrates in The Origin of Species is the 
remarkable absence of humanity at the center of it.  By studying the artificial selection of dogs 
and cows and pigeons, a human enterprise to be sure, Darwin allows his audience to infer that 
given how little time it has taken a wolf to become a poodle, the rock pigeon a carrier pigeon, 
think about what natural selection might accomplish given a vastly more expansive timescale.  
The Copernican revolution of Darwin, as Freud pointed out, was to remove man from the center 
of the universe, which on a biological scale meant removing humanity from the pinnacle of the 
earth’s creation story.  Perhaps the most brilliant narrative strategy Darwin employs in the 
composition of The Origin of Species is one of omission: never directly discussed is the origin of 
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humans.  Knowing the impact of explicitly stating what was still nonetheless obvious through 
inference, Darwin left the full assault upon this most sacred of subjects to The Descent of Man 
some thirteen years later, when the premise of evolution itself had already found a large body of 
support.  Even there, the pointed focus upon the evolution of man proves that man is not the 
point of evolution.  Woolf’s first disruption of formal convention, unlike a Flaubert or a Joyce or 
even a James, was to attempt the Darwinian revolution of not only removing humanity from the 
center of the story but from the creation story. 
The strong, intervening narrative presence in “Kew” is neither omniscient nor first 
person—it is focused outward, upon the scene it observes and describes, but still retains the 
mediating authority to make inferences and even briefly enter or imagine the lives in observance.  
This includes human character, but in relation to and not in exclusion of the natural world and its 
other inhabitants.  Woolf reinforces this Darwinian perspective by suggesting a form of natural 
kinship through description and metaphor, the language itself used to inform this meditation on 
evolution.  The sketches and similes generate a near equivalence between the humans observed 
and the organic life observed.  Likened to the insects that share the same space and time of day 
with them, Woolf’s varied humans “straggled past the flower-bed with a curiously irregular 
movement not unlike that of the white and blue butterflies who crossed the turf in zig-zag flights 
from bed to bed.”152  They are merely a part of this natural procession, attracted like butterflies to 
the “heart-shaped and tongue-shaped leaves” and dappled flowers—the flowers, in fact, are quite 
explicitly described in their own reproductive phase of pollination: “from the red, blue, or yellow 
gloom of the throat there emerged a straight bar, rough with gold dust and slightly clubbed at the 
end.”153  Their “voluminous” colors move and stir in the summer breeze, at least as sexualized 
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and alive as the humans who are passing sensations, overheard voices, and peripheral figures 
that, once past the narrative’s spotlight upon the flowers, “diminished in size among the trees and 
looked half transparent.” 
It is with a sense of wonder that color forms upon the eyes of the observer and 
unconsciously draws in the humans who come to see the flowerings of July.  The insect presence 
grows uncanny.  The whole story resonates with a quivering, hovering manifestation of life’s 
ephemerals, and most ephemeral of all are the itinerant humans.  A married man remembers the 
fifteen years previous where a dragonfly circled around him and a former lover, whose refusal of 
him turned the unsettled presence of the dragonfly into a metaphor of love lost.  For the old, 
infirm man whose objects of thought no longer settle with order in time or space, his son has to 
catch him by the sleeve and touch “a flower with the tip of his walking-stick in order to divert 
the old man’s attention” from his flights of fancy.154  Least assured of their place in the natural 
world are the young man and woman who embody “that season which precedes the prime of 
youth, the season before the smooth pink folds of the flower have burst their gummy case, when 
the wings of the butterfly, though fully grown, are motionless in the sun.” Their conversation is  
“words with short wings for their heavy body of meaning, inadequate to carry them far and thus 
alighting awkwardly upon the very common objects that surrounded them.”155  If these human 
presences emerge only to flutter past the flowerbed with the rapidity of the butterfly, it is to 
modify their assumed position in nature; the narrative’s impersonal description and careful 
employment of metaphor suggest an approximate equivalence between various lives within the 
boundaries of natural law, including the reality of mortality and the rapidity of life.  Humanity’s 
swift entrances and departures from this narrative are a departure from humanity’s central 
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position in fiction; art imitates life considered from an evolutionary perspective, a butterfly’s 
flight past the evolutionary gardens of time. 
 
3.4: TALE OF THE SNAIL 
While what is said and done by humans in passing bears significance, it is no more 
significant than the more radical perspective created by Woolf’s depiction of the garden snail.  
Hidden below the oval-shaped flowerbed and its protrusion of stalks is the sight and sometimes 
even the point of view of a snail. In fact, while the four vignettes of human activity pass by, the 
singular snail’s presence remains central and centered in the flowerbed itself, returned to on three 
separate occasions. Interspersed between the quickened, flickering voices of the human beings 
who pass by with “with much the same irregular and aimless movement…” are these passages of 
the snail’s lapsed progress.  Unlike the humans, the snail “appeared to have a definite goal in 
front of it,” if only to trespass the “arched tent of a dead leaf.”156  At first sighting, “the shell of a 
snail with its brown, circular veins” is only seen in its natural setting settled below the flowers.   
Then it moves, “very slightly in its shell,” but with purpose over the “crumbs of loose earth.”157  
The narrator imagines what the snail sees and senses in its microcosmic universe: “Brown cliffs 
with deep green lakes in the hollows, flat, blade-like trees that waved from root to tip, round 
boulders of grey stone, vast crumpled surfaces of a thin crackling texture.”158  Here, reimagined 
from the sublime perspective of the snail, are soil, dewdrops, stalks of flowers, pebbles, and 
leaves.   
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Margot Norris has traced one aspect of Darwin’s influence in Modern literature through 
what she dubs a “biocentric art” that opposes the ubiquitous anthropomorphism of literature.159  
Woolf is not included in her study, but this story does make gestures away from anthropocentric 
comparisons of human to animal, where the animal edifies only on human terms.  While Woolf’s 
description of the snail is anthropocentric in the sense that it “humanizes” the perspective of the 
snail (by sharing its perspective with the reader’s), the opposing dimension of the human is in 
fact dehumanized.  Kew’s human visitors meander haphazardly past the flowers, but the snail 
embodies a directed, purposeful existence.  It must choose the right path before it, becoming 
aware of the obstacles to overcome (or underlie) in its naturalist pilgrimage through Kew 
Gardens.  
The garden indeed quivers with lifeforms that have decidedly and obliviously not evolved 
for human or divine purposes.  While the snail’s slow, deliberate movements are interludes of 
sorts between the human processions, the human pageantry to a larger degree revolves around 
the narrative focus on the snail. Woolf, after all, places the snail squarely in the middle of the 
flowerbed that is the focal point of the story.  Juxtaposing the snail and the humans–and in fact 
marginalizing human centrality through the story’s narrative perspective–creates a naturalism so 
unconventional that it feels unnatural—whereas nature is precisely the point.   This is how 
Katharine Hilbery’s thoughts become “Kew Gardens.”  The snail’s presence immediately 
registers her Kew Gardens contemplation in Night and Day of a destiny independent of human 
beings, that “recks so little of the happiness, of the marriages or deaths of individuals.”160  It 
tethers the “irregular, aimless” perambulations of the humans, who “dissolved in the green-blue 
atmosphere” of Kew.  It reimagines Katharine’s vision of how “The very trees and the green 
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merging into blue distance became symbols of the vast external world….”161  Here, the snail, the 
smallest and least conspicuous attendant of Kew Gardens, carries on its back the story’s intimate 
extension of evolutionary meaning. 
This becomes clear in the final, most curious movement of the story, when the narrative 
gradually lifts its perspective to see a world larger than the flowerbed.  The metaphors of nature, 
so carefully chosen and crafted to equate humans to the botanical and organic life of Kew 
Gardens, are inverted.  Now, natural movements seem humanly, even artificially constructed: 
How hot it was!  So hot that even the thrush chose to hop, like a mechanical bird, in the 
shadow of the flowers…; instead of rambling vaguely the white butterflies danced one 
above another, making with their white shifting flakes the outline of a shattered marble 
column…and in the drone of the aeroplane the voice of the summer sky murmured its 
fierce soul. (95) 
Of a sudden the scene grows composed; the heat producing more methodical, limited movement; 
the birds suggesting human mechanism; and the butterflies, not erratic in their movements like 
the human beings but linear, even architectural like the ruins of a Greek column.  The most 
uncanny metaphorical shift occurs when the drone of the bee we are expecting in the summer 
garden is instead the “drone of the aeroplane,” its sound and mechanisms surprisingly 
representative of the “fierce soul” of the summer sky.162  The terms of comparison have 
completely reversed courses, it seems, and a dehumanized scene from nature begins to sound like 
the intrusion of industrialized London.  As Woolf spirals out of the oval flowergarden, the city 
itself is seen and heard in its daily rotations. 
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These volutions, in fact, predominate:  
  All the time the motor omnibuses were turning their wheels and changing their gear; 
like a vast nest of Chinese boxes all of wrought steel turning ceaselessly one within 
another the city murmured; on the top of which the voices cried aloud and the petals of 
myriads of flowers flashed their colours into the air. (95) 
Nature at this remove appears not simply mechanical but mechanistic, a vision not unlike the 
introductory metaphor of the commonweal spun by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan: 
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of 
man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial 
animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move 
themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?163 
In Hobbes, regardless of how nasty, brutish, and short living is, capitalized Nature is still God-
made, and the art of man the imitation of this original universe of automata put in motion by the 
chief Artificier.  From the Hobbesian perspective, that artificial animal is indeed the springs and 
wheels of the commonwealth: 
For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the 
joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was 
intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most 
excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN 
called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS).164 
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No doubt, Woolf’s curious collection of concluding images conveys a mechanistic universe, 
replicated in the motions of birds and butterflies as in the mechanics of industrialization, but the 
associations pick up more than Hobbes, the divine watch of William Paley, or other philosophies 
of a mechanistic bent.  When Woolf’s wheels of London spiral out of Kew Gardens, the 
mechanics of the story are still Darwinian.  The artificier here is not God but evolution and the 
attendant evolutionary mechanisms that time affords adaptation by means of natural selection.   
Chinese boxes, one of the favorite imported curios of the late 19th and early 20th century, open up 
one inside the other so that the smallest, most precious of them replicates the largest and 
originates the pattern—hence, its common literary usage as a metaphor for the metafictive story 
within the story or play within the play.   That they are “a vast nest” only enhances Woolf’s 
vision of artifice and nature, nature and art.    Here is where the final turns of phrase evocatively 
bind the structure of the story to its Darwinian narrative, subtly connecting the smallest volute at 
the center of the story to the grand mechanisms of time and evolution. 
 The snail, of course—that has inhabited the center of the oval flowerbed, whose volute 
shape, not to mention marine classification, originates and duplicates the volutions of geometry, 
architecture and art—houses in its slowly but finely turning structure the structure of the story.  
From it the story emanates.  The word volute, in its etymology and derivations, carries not only 
the root of evolution but the evolution of its meaning.  Whether the volute of the Ionic order of 
column, later incorporated into Corinthian and composite capitals, was inspired by the volutions 
of the snail; or the ovule common to the Greek clover; or the volute leaves of the Egyptian lotus; 
or the volute of a ram’s horn; or simply the abstractions of geometry, that spiraling scroll shape 
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found in nature is replicated in classical architecture.165  Euclid’s Elements also houses the 
mathematics behind the shape that Renaissance architects and artists brought back into favor in 
the 1500s.166  Was it in preparation for writing the character of Katharine in Night and Day, 
Woolf’s closeted amateur mathematician, that Woolf came upon the symbolic resonance of 
spirals, the involutes and evolutes of geometry?  Katharine has her Night and Day visions in 
“algebraic symbols,” and when at Kew the botantical life became to her “symbols of the vast 
external world….”167  Perhaps it was through Bertrand Russell, or Roger Fry’s appreciation for 
geometric forms in art, or simply her formative tour of Greece a decade earlier.168  
 The most likely of influences, which incorporates something akin to all of the above, is 
D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson’s groundbreaking, seminal work On Growth and Form (1917), 
the first edition published and disseminated right when Woolf was writing “Kew Gardens,” “The 
Mark on the Wall,” and Night and Day. Thompson is another Cambridge Apostle who 
maintained a close association with Alfred North Whitehead and company, and his radical 
approach to evolution and form were well known among Woolf’s intellectual circles.169 Aspects 
of Thompson’s premise in On Growth and Form resonate throughout Woolf’s descriptions in 
“Kew” and elsewhere: 
The waves of the sea, the little ripples on the shore, the sweeping curve of the 
sandy bay between the headlands…all these are so many riddles of form, so many 
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 75 
problems of morphology…the physicist can more or less easily read and 
adequately solve…by reference to their antecedent phenomena, in the material 
system of mechanical forces to which they belong…. Nor is it otherwise with the 
material forms of living things.  Cell and tissue, shell and bone, leaf and flower, 
are so many portions of matter, and it is in obedience to the laws of physics that 
their particles have been moved, moulded and conformed.”170 
Thinking that the vogue of evolutionary theory had turned the study of biological form 
(morphology) into a search for descent and teleology, Thompson searches instead for the 
mathematical principles and equations applicable to organic and inorganic matter alike: 
…mechanism and teleology are interwoven together, and we must not cleave to 
the one nor despise the other; for their union is rooted in the very nature of 
totality…. In our own day the philosopher neither minimizes nor unduly 
magnifies the mechanical aspect of the Cosmos; nor need the naturalist either 
exaggerate or belittle the mechanical phenomena which are profoundly associated 
with Life, and inseparable from our understanding of Growth and Form.171 
 If this sounds like a return to a Cartesian or even more precisely a Platonic or Pythagorean 
approach to solving the riddles of existence, it should. 
 Thompson does not conceal that his emphasis is upon mathematics as a determination of 
form—“problems of form are in the first instance mathematical problems”—172and his focus 
could only emanate from a mind as steeped in classical studies as it was in natural history. A 
polymath among a generation of polymaths, Thompson’s publications on the classics, including 
a definitive translation of Aristotle’s Historia Animalium and a glossary of ancient Greek birds 
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and fish, rival his work in zoology and mathematics. As Stephen Jay Gould succinctly puts it, 
“D’Arcy Thompson was a Greek mathematician with 20th century material and insights,”173 and 
On Growth and Form is a synthesis of these two pursuits. Indeed, Thompson aligns his colossal 
study to the idea (“as old as Plato, as old as Pythagorus,”) commonly dubbed Plato’s aphorism: 
“the book of Nature is written in the characters of Geometry.”174 
This assertion is why Gould sees not Aristotle, though Aristotle was the classical 
naturalist Thompson most wrote about, but Plato as the intellectual force behind On Growth and 
Form.  The math is difficult but the geometric shapes elegant and so simple to recreate that all 
you need is a string wound about an oval or a circular point, or a close, considered gaze at the 
shell of a snail: “The names evolute and involute allude to the simplest way of demonstrating the 
curves: the end of a stretched thread unwound from a fixed point on the evolute will trace one of 
its involutes.”175 The end of the taut string that unwinds from176 the “eye” or center of the volute 
forms its involute.  Conversely, the curvature that envelops the involute, the original curve, is the 
evolute.  The most famous and discussed geometric evolute of the early twentieth century, the 
one most replicated, was the evolute of the oval, whose intersecting lines form a four-pointed 
diamond, dubbed as a consequence the “four-vertex theorem.”177 Diagrammed, it bears an 
uncanny resemblance: 
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178 
In Woolf’s story, the four human groupings make their turn past the oval flowerbed—and are 
enveloped “in layer after layer” as they pass through. By instinct, by adaptive mechanism long in 
the making, do any of the variety of snails house themselves in either the geometry of the 
Archimedean or Cartesian logarithmic spiral.179 So too does Woolf’s embedded snail. The circle 
that begins the snail shell is the evolute, the origin of its involutions.  The gear wheels of the city 
make their own analogous involutions.  The spinning propellers of the aeroplane that sound the 
“fierce soul” of the summer in Woolf’s story, the turning wheel and changing gears of the motor 
omnibuses, are busy employing the same mathematical intricacies at work in the slow involution 
of the snail, but in this manifestation to maximize contact points of gear teeth.  Where the gears 
meet is the involute of the circle.  The mechanisms of the volute, in essence, turn the city of 
London.  Woolf’s meditative abstraction on evolution indeed replicates itself like a vast nest of 
Chinese boxes ceaselessly turning.  From that minute, diminutive spiraling organism at the 
center the whole story unfolds, unrolls its scroll, which was the original meaning of evolving 
before it became Darwin’s evolving origins. 
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 While the intricacies of Woolf’s knowledge and research into the evolutions and 
involutions of her story’s structure remain admittedly speculative in nature, the usage and 
association of the story’s volutions with the volutions of the snail do not.  In Jacob’s Room, the 
novel Woolf herself envisioned as growing out of “Kew Gardens” et al., Woolf replicates this 
image at the end of “Kew” and expands upon it: 
…and if there is such a thing as a shell secreted by man to fit man himself here we 
find it, on the banks of the Thames, where the great streets join and St. Paul’s 
Cathedral, like the volute on the top of the snail shell, finishes it off.  Jacob, 
getting off his omnibus, loitered up the steps, consulted his watch, and finally 
made up his mind to go in.180 
Woolf likens Christopher Wren’s famous dome atop St. Paul’s to the volute of the snail shell, 
and imagines the city streets and the people it houses as spiraling out of the involution of the 
cathedral, “the shell secreted by man.”181  This, indeed, was precisely what Christopher Wren 
had in mind when he conceived the dome of St. Paul’s, as Thompson reviews with his readers 
when looking at "time-elements" in nature that generate the growth and determine the form of 
spirals: "In short, it is the shell which curves the snail, and not the snail which curves the 
shell….Nay more, we may go back…and find Sir Christopher Wren contemplating the 
architecture of a snail-shell, and finding in it the logarithic spiral….Wren not only conceived the 
spiral shell to be a sort of cone or pyramid coiled round a vertical axis, but also saw that on the 
magnitude of the angle of the spire depended the specific form of the shell."182  Woolf, then, 
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182 Growth and Form, 187-189. 
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extends the organic architecture of the shell to the shell secreted by man in the growth and 
formation of the city. The shapeliness of the metaphor is repeated in the arbitrary figures riding 
atop the omnibuses turning in traffic, all of them and their pasts “shut in him like the leaves of a 
book known to him by heart.  One of them “took the chance to swing down the staircase,…and 
so dodging a zigzag course between the wheels…and was soon out of sight—for ever.”183  
 Here again is that individual life zigzagging past the narrator and just as soon gone.  The 
“forevers” accumulate: Inside St. Paul’s, the organ “for ever” chants to the white marble ghosts, 
the sounds “for ever requieum—repose,” and even the sewers beneath it that pour out “for ever 
conveyed them this way and that.”  Like the “Chinese boxes” simile in “Kew,” the scene is a 
mise en abyme. The narrative completely detaches itself from a personal view of the city, and 
instead observes the patterned integrity of it, as if the shape of human history viewed from a 
distance were the shape of London viewed from above and nearly eternally present: “Home they 
went.  The grey church spires received them; …One behind another, round or pointed, piercing 
the sky or massing themselves, like sailing ships, like granite cliffs, spires and offices, wharves 
and factories crowd the bank; eternally the pilgrims trudge.”184  To follow a day in Jacob’s 
young adult life is to see every other life participating and in relation.  The naturalist perspective 
that Woolf duplicates here observes a phase in life, the present moment as an era or period rather 
than an individual perspective.  The narrator must take it in collectively, systematically: “In 
short, the observer is choked with observations.  Only to prevent us from being submerged by 
chaos, nature and society between them have arranged a system of classification which is 
simplicity itself.”185 (68-69).  From the volute of St. Paul’s to the winding streets that lead to 
wharves and arches and homes and offices, the “spires received them….The moulds are filled 
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nightly.”186  The mechanisms of the city are shaped by human nature, which is no more or no 
less natural than the shell secreted by the snail or any other natural course of evolution. 
 
3.5: TALES OF THE SNAIL 
 There is another turn the snail makes in the summer of 1917, when it retracts back into its 
shell in “The Mark on the Wall.”  The snail moves from the public garden into the private space 
of a house’s interior, and the perspective is conspicuously inverted. Where “Kew” focuses 
precisely on the external, what moves past the observant eye of the narrator, “The Mark on the 
Wall” moves inside not just an old house but the interior space of the narrator’s thoughts.  The 
third-person “naturalistic” narration of “Kew” reverses course in the first-person narration of 
“The Mark on the Wall,” wherein the narrator does not speak but thinks (until the emergent 
“Yes?” at the very end).  Call it an interior or narrated monologue or stream of consciousness 
narrative or any other imprecise critical catchphrase—this is Woolf’s first complete foray into 
this interior region of Modernist prose. As an object of thought, the snail instead elicits the 
subjectivity of thought.  The narrative focuses upon this splotch of seeming insignificance, which 
refracts like a prism the light of so many thoughts shot through it by the perceiving narrator. 
Woolf withholds the fact that the “mark” is a snail until the final sentence of the story, the 
snail identified by the husband who comes in the room and interrupts the narrator’s reveries. 
What the mark is seems arbitrary enough.  In fact, her narrator’s inability to identify it permits 
the reveries that form the premise of the story. “How readily our thoughts swarm upon a new 
object,” the narrator muses,  
                                                           
185 JR, 68-9 
186 JR, 66-69 
 81 
lifting it a little way, as ants carry a blade of straw so feverishly, and then leave 
it…If that mark was made by a nail, it can’t have been for a picture, it must have 
been for a miniature—the miniature of a lady with white powdered curls, powder-
dusted cheeks, and lips like red carnations.  A fraud, of course, for the people who 
had this house before us would have chosen pictures in that way—an old picture 
for an old room.  That is the sort of people they were—very interesting people… 
 The mark, one might surmise, could have been anything, as the whole point is to let the mark’s 
obscurity light up the myriad obscurities of thought that the mind entertains when given an 
uninhabited room and time to internally wander.  Identification seems utterly beside the point: 
“And if I were to get up at this very moment and ascertain that the mark on the wall is really—
what shall we say?—the head of a gigantic old nail, driven in two hundred years ago…what 
should I gain?—Knowledge?…And what is knowledge?”  The objectivity of naming as knowing 
the object, in other words, is in question, and the accent falls differently when fiction “looks 
within” rather the focusing upon the “solidity” of what Woolf deems “the crudity and 
coarseness” of “materialist” fiction.187 
 Woolf’s “incessant shower” of consciousness, then, this internal stream of “myriad 
impressions,” seems to be a random exercise in associational thought, but there is a point, a 
target to Woolf’s mark; the snail is not an arbitrary, dismissive afterthought. Perhaps the most 
obvious volute Woolf traces in her two stories derives from her readings of Thomas DeQuincey, 
who remained one of her perennial favorites and was formative in Woolf’s thinking on the 
possibilities of prose structure.188  Woolf was particularly attracted to a quality in DeQuincey’s 
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autobiographical writing that transgresses the boundaries between poetry and prose, the quality 
of his work that composes scenes that “have the strange power of growing in our minds, so that it 
is always a surprise to come upon them again and see what, in the interval, our minds have done 
to alter and expand.”  Rather than facts, of which DeQuincey writes “scarcely anything,” or truth 
(“never for its truth”), Woolf instead appreciates the qualities in him that “are descriptions of 
states of mind in which, often, time is miraculously prolonged and space miraculously 
expanded.”189  In Suspiria de Profundis, DeQuincey has his own word for these states of mind—
involutes—and Woolf generously quotes the entire passage in the concluding section of her essay 
“Dequincey’s Autobiography”: 
And, recollecting it, I am struck with the truth, that far more of our deepest 
thoughts and feelings pass to us through perplexed combinations of CONCRETE 
objects, pass to us as INVOLUTES (if I may coin that word) in compound 
experiences incapable of being disentangled, than ever reach us DIRECTLY and in 
their own abstract shapes. . . . (emphasis his and Woolf’s)190 
Woolf’s focus upon a perceiving and mediating consciousness as the narrative itself indeed 
creates an involute description of the state of mind DeQuincey here defines.  The mark is 
indubitably a concrete object on the wall, but the labyrinthine assembly of thoughts and 
sensations that pass through the narrator prevent any direct experience of the object in its own 
abstract shape.  Conscious experience is in this sense an involute, incapable of being unraveled, 
and the seeming inconsequence of the mark being a snail instead reveals Woolf’s whimsical 
                                                           
published in The Second Common Reader, considers all his writing as autobiographical, and praises his ability to suggest an 
emotion rather than state it through the writing itself that builds up wave upon wave until it becomes complete. DeQuincey is also 
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189 “Impassioned Prose,” Selected Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. by David Bradshaw (New York: Oxford UP, 2008) 60-61. 
190 Qtd in The Second Common Reader (New York: Harcourt, 1932) 138. 
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usage of the very mark that evokes so many involutes.   The mark on the wall is after all a volute, 
a life-form whose shell is secreted by its own marked, signature involutions. 
 The second passage that Woolf quotes from DeQuincey, fused to the first with an ellipsis, 
further suggests the structure and idea behind “The Mark on the Wall” and indeed “Kew 
Gardens.”  Woolf’s ellipsis leaves out an extensive passage in Suspiria de Profundis because the 
two abstract thoughts that border it, that serve as book-ends to it, are as philosophically acute 
about subjective experience and consciousness as any passage in William James or Edmund 
Husserl:191 
Man is doubtless ONE by some subtle NEXUS, some system of links, that we 
cannot perceive, extending from the new-born infant to the superannuated dotard: 
but, as regards many affections and passions incident to his nature at different 
stages, he is NOT one, but an intermitting creature, ending and beginning anew; 
the unity of man, in this respect, is co-extensive only with the particular stage to 
which the passion belongs. (emphasis his and Woolf’s)192 
Once “The Mark on the Wall” is paired up and read alongside “Kew Gardens,”193 a greater 
pattern emerges.  The narrative of “Kew” takes a larger, more detached view of humanity, which 
is indeed one by some subtle nexus, some system of links that we cannot perceive, as in the 
system of linked beings turning in the volutions of “Kew Gardens,” extending from the young to 
the old.  They are also the “intermitting creature” and co-extensive from the vantage the narrator 
creates of the oval flowerbed.  With “The Mark on the Wall” and the narrative turning inward 
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192 CR2, 138. Woolf quotes a few more sentences on revisiting childhood memories. 
193 Indeed, this seems to be Woolf’s intention not just because she wrote the two stories successively but because she pairs them 
together at the very end of her first published collection of short stories Monday or Tuesday. 
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and becoming singular, the one is oneself, the narrator herself, but her thoughts vary so randomly 
and aimlessly that the self does in essence end and begin anew with each new paragraph.  
Indeed, one of her passing thoughts captures the narrative pursuit underway: “And the novelists 
in the future will realize more and more the importance of these reflections, for of course there is 
not one reflection but an almost infinite number; those are the depths they will explore, those the 
phantoms they will pursue, leaving the description of reality more and more out of their 
stories…”194 Woolf’s two tales of the snail offer the vision of Woolf’s future designs, “Kew” the 
evolutions and “Mark” the involutions of thought.  Rather than move her stories through their 
plots, Woolf plots two distinct movements in narrative structure. 
 
3.6: FROM EVOLUTIONS TO INVOLUTIONS OF TIME AND NARRATIVE 
Implicit in both of these stories is how Woolf’s experimentation with narrative form, both 
externalized and internalized in perspective, must reconfigure at once how the narrators 
experience time, and then how time is narrated.  This is where the temporal dimensions of 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory most directly impact the shape Woolf’s stories take.  “Kew 
Gardens” sees the natural world inhumanly to develop a sense of a larger pattern at work.  It is a 
sketch of the dizzy present, with all of the present moment’s lives in procession, but observed 
with a studied naturalistic detachment that records every impression, with characterization 
limited to the span of time each person takes to cross the path before the oval flowerbed.  
Without developing her characters, the narrator quickly relates how each subject’s thoughts 
pertain to their perambulations past the flowerbed.   The narrative studies only what might be 
immediately deduced from the appearance, speech, and behavior of the passersby in the time that 
it takes them to pass by.   
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Structurally, the interludes of the snail alter the perspective of Woolf’s narration and 
afford a vision of life, including human life, at the level of natural history.  But they also alter the 
tempo of the narrative and offer the starkest, most explicit contrast to the ephemeral presence of 
humanity in the story. The time of evolution is indeed embodied in the snail, perhaps the greatest 
insight that Woolf’s “Kew Gardens” affords. The whole story is awash in movement, with the 
stillest point, the most gradual direction of movement, belonging to the snail.  Its presence 
represents a temporal process external to human will, an expanded time which slows existence to 
a snail’s pace that has been in existence in all organic forms for millions of years. Vegetative life 
and its unselfconscious existence are given a place entirely outside of a Katharine Hilbery’s 
contemplation or any characters’ thoughts and sensations, taking on a life of its own in the 
narrative, as it were. The scale of the snail is the scale of evolution.  Its slow, methodical, 
ponderously limited vision becomes the grand vision of nature, the mechanics of its structure a 
mimetic configuration of evolutionary mechanism. 
In this manner, Woolf comes to represent her two conceptions of time in narrative, what 
Paul Ricoeur so presciently described as “monumental” (cosmic) time and “lived” 
(phenomenological) time in Mrs. Dalloway.  In “Kew Gardens,” the butterfly’s flight of 
humanity, the rapidity with which her human groupings speed past the garden, is Woolf’s 
configuration of the time of living.  Conversely, the representation of the snail is the grand 
design of evolution; the narrative’s temporal configuration slows down to the pace and 
movement of a snail on a microcosmic scale that then projects the vast mechanism of time and 
evolution “turning ceaselessly” on the largest scale.  In Ricoeur’s parlance, borrowed from the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, this is the cosmic dimension of time.  But with Woolf, this 
is also the time of evolution, and it exists independently of our awareness or apperception of it.  
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Ricoeur comes to understand the essential relation between time and narrative by how a narrative 
plots or configures its temporal course and becomes human as it temporalizes.  The great fissure 
in Woolf, indeed in Ricoeur’s entire analysis of Modern fiction, is the discordance between 
human time and cosmic time as her characters come to experience it and her novel comes to 
configure it.  But here, in this early, formative example is the overarching aporia created by 
representing human time on an evolutionary scale, what Ricoeur later on defines as the 
incommensurability between human time and the time of nature.  Ricoeur’s great task is to 
reconcile the Augustinian discordance (between the instant and eternity) with the Aristotelian 
discordance between muthos and mimesis. Woolf has already thought through these temporal 
categories and translated them to the two times of Darwin, evident in all of Darwin’s major 
works and beautifully rendered by Adam Gopnik: 
In Darwin’s work, time moves at two speeds: there is the vast abyss of time in 
which generations change and animals mutate and evolve; and then there is the gnat’s-
breath, hummingbird-heart time of creaturely existence, where our children are born and 
grow and, sometimes, die before us…The space between the tiny but heartfelt time of 
human life and the limitless time of Nature became Darwin’s implicit subject….The 
human challenge that Darwin felt, and that his work still presents, is to see both times 
truly—not to attempt to humanize deep time, or to dismiss quick time, but to make 
enough of both without overlooking either.195 
Woolf’s radical perspective in “Kew Gardens” is to give the “gnat’s breath” of creaturely 
existence as human time, to see the life of the human figures as relatively insignificant and 
aimless—“so quick, so quick”—as they flutter through the narrative.  There is, however, no 
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gesture towards eternity. The stillest point still moves. The deep time of Darwin is embedded 
there among the roots of her story, attempting to circumnavigate a dead leaf. 
This is why the snail’s presence in “The Mark on the Wall” is of the utmost significance. 
Whereas the small scale of evolution recapitulates the large mechanisms of evolution in “Kew,” 
the spiral reverses course and turns the configurations of time inward in “The Mark on the Wall.”  
By moving from “Kew’s” external, evolutionary view of time to “Mark’s” internal, 
phenomenological view of human time, the two times of Darwin are inverted.  Like “Kew 
Gardens,” the snail in “The Mark on the Wall” is the stillest point, but upon it thought is 
projected at the speed of consciousness. The original dynamic that secreted the external shell, 
creating its history like the chambers of a nautilus, now houses the past in the present; allowing 
an inward turn that “revisits by glimpses,” to use DeQuincey’s phrase for the involute of memory 
and time.  The ponderously slow movement of the snail creates a nearly still life that occupies 
the narrator’s consciousness.  Its presence playfully questions the object of narration, which is 
not an inanimate object of thought or an abstract thought but a mobile, oozing, living, evolving 
organism. As the narrator’s reveries attempt to fix a date and a beginning to the mark, the 
internal flow of her consciousness moves rapidly and freely over an associational sequence of 
thought, even as the momentary thoughts comment upon the rapidity of thought and life, likening 
it among other things to “being blown through the Tube at fifty miles an hour” (84). The 
ceaseless churning and turning of time, what the narrative describes as “the perpetual waste and 
repair; all so casual, all so haphazard,”196 is just as quickly and as haphazardly recalled. 
And yet, this flight of the mind that is Woolf’s narrated consciousness still traverses vast 
stretches of time, and the instantaneousness of thought is counterpoised by the temporal expanse 
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of vision.  The narrative form and the content it narrates stretch a few moments of thought 
through several pages and several ages.  It is uncanny how often these flights of the mind turn 
towards the mind’s own bodily descent and origins.  Within each involution of thought, 
evolution is immanent.  Woolf’s figure muses, “what an accidental affair this living is after all 
our civilization,” a quick attribution to the happenstance of human history and prehistory. 
Woolf’s narrator then moves in no pre-existing order from the dust that covered Troy and the 
mantelpiece to seeds sown in the reign of Charles the First, to barrows on the South downs of 
prehistoric man to learned men who are “descendents of witches and hermits crouched in caves.” 
There are antiquarians collecting arrowheads and pieces of pottery, arguing over where they 
originate and what they might mean.  The flight of the mind by necessity involves descent into 
time—the past—and not simply the narrator’s past but a whole cultural prehistory.  Woolf 
replaces much of this plot with the quick movements of thought, and much of the thought 
processes involve the sluggish procession of evolution. 
In fact, the awareness of evolution generates a hyperconsciousness of its ramifications.  
This is what generates different levels of consciousness in the narrative, even as the narrative 
mode is a free-flowing stream of ideas.  At crucial moments, the narrative breaks free of 
awareness to paradoxically embody the state of being that opposes the narrative flight of time.  If 
the rapidity of present thoughts mimics how these quick glimpses into the past are fleeting, like 
being “torn asunder” from the views of humanity “as one rushes past in the train,” there is 
another contemplative representation of the present moment. It gives a deeper, more somnolent 
sense of time and history that Woolf imagines as an unconscious, posthumous, vegetative 
existence: 
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The slow pulling down of thick green stalks so that the cup of the flower, as it 
turns over, deluges one with purple and red light.  Why, after all, should one not 
be born there as one is born here, helpless, speechless, unable to focus one’s 
eyesight, groping at the roots of the grass, at the toes of the Giants?  As for saying 
which are trees, and which are men and women, or whether there are such things, 
that one won’t be in a condition to do for fifty years or so.  There will be nothing 
but spaces of light and dark, intersected by thick stalks, and rather higher up 
perhaps, rose-shaped blots of an indistinct colour—dim pinks and blues—which 
will, as time goes on, become more definite, become—I don’t know what.197 
This passage could, without much of a shift in shape or form, find its way into the “Kew 
Gardens” interludes of the snail.  It offers the same slow, vegetable time and perspective, and 
creates the same fusion between human and varied organic beings, the same deep sense of 
evolutionary time.  This deeper form of reverie—wherin the narrator almost embodies her 
reveries of organic life—occurs on two more occasions.  What begins as simile becomes 
perspective, almost an ontology of nature: 
Yes, one could imagine a very pleasant world.  A quiet, spacious world, with the 
flowers so red and blue in the open fields…a world which one could slice with 
one’s thought as a fish slices the water with his fin, grazing the stems of the 
water-lilies, hanging suspended over nests of white sea eggs…How peaceful it is 
down here, rooted in the centre of the world and gazing up through grey waters, 
with their sudden gleams of light and their reflections….198 
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In each of these deeper reveries, the narrative has dipped into that Katharine Hilbery 
contemplative region that “entirely lacked self-consciousness.” Likewise, the act of 
contemplation dehumanizes in the sense that the ability to embody the impersonal affords the 
greatest feeling of liberation, perhaps also the greatest narrative freedom.  In all of these 
moments, as it is in “Kew Gardens,” nature is what is envisioned; more precisely, a vision of 
organic or naturalistic life takes hold. 
 
 3.7: THE TREE OF LIFE 
The narrator even wishes for this vision, wills it so when she thinks, “The tree outside the 
window taps very gently on the pane…I want to think quietly, calmly, spaciously, never to be 
interrupted, never to have to rise from my chair, to slip easily from one thing to another, without 
any sense of hostility or obstacle.  I want to sink deeper and deeper, away from the surface, with 
its hard separate facts.”199  The tree, in fact, grows in significance as the story breaks the surface, 
unfurls and floats atop this immense sea of thought that recedes and seeks out solidity—Woolf’s 
reveries finally all congregate around the last, protracted vision of the story: Woolf’s tree of life.  
It is worth quoting the passage fully: 
Indeed, now that I have fixed my eyes upon it, I feel that I have grasped a plank in 
the sea[…]Here is something definite, something real. Thus, waking from a 
midnight dream of horror, one hastily turns on the light and lies quiescent, 
worshipping the chest of drawers, worshipping solidity, worshipping reality, 
worshipping the impersonal world which is a proof of some existence other than 
ours. That is what one wants to be sure of…Wood is a pleasant thing to think 
about. It comes from a tree; and trees grow, and we don't know how they grow. 
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For years and years they grow, without paying any attention to us, in meadows, in 
forests, and by the side of rivers--all things one likes to think about. The cows 
swish their tails beneath them on hot afternoons; they paint rivers so green that 
when a moorhen dives one expects to see its feathers all green when it comes up 
again. I like to think of the fish balanced against the stream like flags blown out; 
and of water-beetles slowly raiding domes of mud upon the bed of the river. I like 
to think of the tree itself:—first the close dry sensation of being wood; then the 
grinding of the storm; then the slow, delicious ooze of sap. I like to think of it, 
too, on winter's nights standing in the empty field with all leaves close-furled, 
nothing tender exposed to the iron bullets of the moon, a naked mast upon an 
earth that goes tumbling, tumbling, all night long. The song of birds must sound 
very loud and strange in June; and how cold the feet of insects must feel upon it, 
as they make laborious progresses up the creases of the bark, or sun themselves 
upon the thin green awning of the leaves, and look straight in front of them with 
diamond-cut red eyes. . .One by one the fibres snap beneath the immense cold 
pressure of the earth, then the last storm comes and, falling, the highest branches 
drive deep into the ground again. Even so, life isn't done with; there are a million 
patient, watchful lives still for a tree, all over the world, in bedrooms, in ships, on 
the pavement, lining rooms, where men and women sit after tea, smoking 
cigarettes. It is full of peaceful thoughts, happy thoughts, this tree. (88-89) 
Here is where Woolf’s reverie grows most evolutionary, where the quick time of thought and 
living expand to replicate the deep time of evolution and seem to hang suspended in a moment’s 
thought.  The less self-conscious the narrator (and narrative) becomes, the more it partakes of 
                                                           
199 Ibid. 84-5 
 92 
this naturalistic perspective.  As a narrative representation, it processes from a stated desire to 
become one with nature to the narrative becoming nature.  The series of “I like to think of”s” 
disappear, and a direct transmission of thought—as if what it is, were itself thinking—ensues.  
The narrator begins by reflecting on how nice it is to turn from the social encumbrances that 
govern a life to the pleasant thought of “worshipping the impersonal world” where there is “a 
proof of some existence other than ours.”  This is nearly identical to Katharine Hilbury’s wish 
for unconsciousness and evolutionary contemplation in Night and Day, but then the thought itself 
becomes the daydream, and Woolf’s narrator imagines herself the tree, the dry sensation of being 
wood: the song of birds in its branches, the cold feet of insects upon it, standing “like some mast 
upon an earth that goes tumbling.”   
In the midst of all these associations and felt sensations, the tree’s slow growth takes on a 
resonance larger than a pleasant, soothing vision of Romantic nature. Woolf’s tree of life in 
essence provides the illusion of solidity and continuity in a human lifetime that zooms so rapidly 
past.   But its symbolic suggestiveness, like the snail’s of slow growth and gradual development, 
opposes the selfsame narrative representation of the rapidity of thought as the rapidity of life.  
The solidity of our lives—these discernible marks, this solid wooden furniture with which we 
crowd our interior spaces to give them some semblance of stability and order—after all comes 
from trees.  Woolf’s narrator sits comfortably, presumably in her wooden chair, gazing 
contemplatively at the mark on the wall. And when trees die, when “the highest branches drive 
deep into the ground again,” Woolf continues, “Even so, life isn’t done with; there are a million 
patient, watchful lives still for a tree…in bedrooms, in ships, on the pavement, lining rooms” 
(88-89). Like the mechanisms of the city that surround Kew Gardens, the slow, organic growth 
of the tree, tapping at the window pane, furnishes the domesticated space of this narrative 
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interior as well as the ships of expeditions and the decaying houses of “a million patient, 
watchful lives” living out their own individual lives.  That is the human relation to the tree, an 
organism in itself that partakes of this tree of life, even in the continuity of death. Natural time 
indeed becomes cosmic and human, the earthly revolutions also a stellar revolution of our 
perception of time.  The narrative modes that part with convention in these two stories of 
evolution are the two times of Darwinian thought.  In such a manner does Woolf’s form become 
evolutionary form.  
Evolutionary form, because ultimately this is the very figure—the tree of life—that 
became the most representative figure of evolution, the metaphor Darwin made famous in his 
Origin of Species.  It is the thought that constructs a destiny independent of human beings, and 
the form itself the evidence of an impersonal world whose existence is proof of all existence 
under the same impersonal mechanisms of nature.  Almost ten years later, Woolf would 
elaborate on what she was exploring with her narrative breaks and departures, and quite 
explicitly state its relation to evolution and evolutionary time: 
“The mind is full of monstrous, hybrid, unmanageable emotions.  That the age of 
the earth is 3,000,000,000 years; that human life lasts but a second; that the 
capacity of the human mind is nevertheless boundless; that life is infinitely 
beautiful yet repulsive; that one’s fellow creatures are adorable but disgusting; 
that science and religion have between them destroyed belief; that all bonds of 
union seem broken, yet some control must exist—it is in this atmosphere of doubt 
and conflict that writers have now to create, and the fine fabric of a lyric is no 
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more fitted to contain this point of view than the rose leaf to envelop the rugged 
immensity of a rock.”200 
Paul Ricoeur, a great reader of Woolf’s obsessions with time and narrative, could not have 
channeled her contradictory emotions better when he comments, “The length of time of a human 
life, compared to the range of cosmic time-spans, appears insignificant, whereas it is the very 
place from which every question of significance arises.”201  The two times give rise to a whole 
string of contradictory thoughts and associations.  “Kew Gardens” and “The Mark on the Wall” 
give the two times a narrative form: the one imagining the snail looking out of its evolutionary 
garden; the other inside imagining an evolutionary tree while looking at a real snail. 
 
 3.8: TRANSITIONS—THE SOLIDITY OF TREES: NARRATIVE CONTINUITY 
AND INTERRUPTION 
Woolf, then, has created out of “The Mark on the Wall” and “Kew Gardens” her first 
great departures in conventional narrative form.   These transformations to narrative not only 
alter perspective but the relation of that perspective to evolution and evolutionary time.  Previous 
to “Mark” and “Kew,” the characters themselves had to discover their own connections to 
evolution and the immensity of time, plotting a course through social convention and 
adventurous expeditions. The characters experience the great crises and the ensuing moments of 
epiphany by experiencing the plotlines of conventional fiction. The Kew Gardens scene of Night 
and Day already offers a preview of what was to be the necessary link between the relation of 
evolution to time––a temporal awareness that would alter Woolf’s conception of the novel and 
ultimately the techniques with which she devised the temporal framework of the fiction to come.  
In questioning the plot of the Victorian novel, even while adhering to it in the conventional 
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construction of Night and Day, Woolf uses this garden scene as a means to consider how 
evolutionary contemplation might take the shape of evolution.  Julia Briggs notes that “Kew 
Gardens provides the setting for desire to bring about a reconciliation and a symbolic re-entry 
into Eden”,202 but this is decidedly an evolutionary garden that marks Woolf’s first dedicated 
gestures towards a movement from evolutionary plotting to evolutionary form.  Night and Day’s 
mergence of the social and visionary bodies, of the “life of society” (Woolf’s figurative day) and 
the “life of solitude” (night), still needed to include one more dualistic pairing: the correspondent 
timeframes of Darwin’s time of living and the deep time of nature.  Woolf’s ambition is no less 
than a synthesis of the two times.  Ricoeur refers to the mature example of Mrs. Dalloway, but 
the two times are first worked out explicitly and early.  The Kew Gardens scenes give not just 
the expanse of vision through the evolutionary botany that Ralph discusses, but the expanse of 
temporality that evolutionary theory radically lengthens.  
Take Ralph’s leonine pose while waiting for Katharine to show at Kew Gardens, where 
we are given the quick purview of the timekeeping that Woolf will employ in her own break with 
fictional conventions as she moves from evolutionary discourse to evolutionary form.  Ten 
minutes elapse in two paragraphs as Ralph waits for Katharine.  He simultaneously charts the 
progression of hands on his timepiece even as he experiences this monumental moment whereby 
all his past frustrations and future aspirations coalesce in this felt life of an eager love: 
At a quarter-past three in the afternoon of the following Saturday Ralph Denham 
sat on the bank of the lake in Kew Gardens, dividing the dial plate of his watch 
into sections with his forefinger.  The just and inexorable nature of time itself was 
reflected in his face.  He might have been composing a hymn to the unhasting and 
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unresting march of divinity.  He seemed to greet the lapse of minute after minute 
with stern acquiescence in the inevitable order.  His expression was so severe, so 
serene, so immobile, that it seemed obvious that for him at least there was a 
grandeur in the departing hour which no petty irritation on his part was to mar, 
although the wasting time wasted also high private hopes of his own."203 
What Ralph reads into the watch is his own future: “The world, he assured himself, since 
Katharine Hilbery was half an hour behind her time, offers no happiness, no rest from struggle, 
no certainty.”204  But there is no outward expression of worry, no spat of nervous fidgeting; 
instead, Woolf presents Ralph as supremely stoic, passively accepting the judgment of time and 
the unfolding consequence of events.  There is still “grandeur in the departing hour” and the way 
time lays to account, even lays waste to what counts to Ralph Denham. 
Ralph takes the long view, which is also inevitably the tragic view of deep time: 
“Looking at his watch, he seemed to look deep into the springs of human existence, and by the 
light of what he saw there altered his course towards the north and the midnight…Yes, one’s 
voyage must be made absolutely without companions through ice and black water—towards 
what goal?”  Yet, when Katharine appears, Ralph’s obsessive timekeeping ceases, as does his 
reverie.  The time of romance becomes the time of nature. This reification of time through the 
watch’s dial and reading into it an augury of the character’s own direction in life represents well 
the dialectic that would come more and more to frame the temporal form Woolf’s fiction was 
taking.  The mechanisms of clock-time would conflict considerably with the mechanisms of 
nature.  A schism opens up radically after Darwin unhinges the comforting vestiges of a divine 
watchmaker—William Paley’s famous metaphor of the watch found in the middle of the heath, 
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meant to be analogous to the mechanisms of nature and pointing toward a supernatural artificier.  
That metaphor became extinct, defunct.205 “There cannot be design without a designer,” Paley 
argues, but design post-Darwin comes in the ruthless, remorseless, impersonal mechanism of 
adaptation by means of natural selection given the vast timeframes of geological time.  There is 
no divine winding in Darwin’s mechanism.  Ralph’s watch is not Paley’s time, and Darwin 
winds the clock back to its natural timesetting.  “Kew Gardens” and “The Mark on the Wall” 
additionally return the the watch’s representative hands on the dial to the natural turns of the sun 
dividing day from night. 
The need for the same development and representation of character in the manner that 
Woolf constructs a Ralph gives way to a narrative form that would take over the work of plot and 
character by containing it in the temporal dimensions of narrative representation. In discussing 
this departure in form, it would be irresponsible to not acknowledge the tremendous relation of 
Woolf’s narrative form to the corresponding departures in the visual arts, especially considering 
her close relationships and kinships within Bloomsbury.  Many critics have looked to “Mark” 
and moreso to “Kew” for the influence of Roger Fry and Vanessa Bell, or Cezanne and Post-
Impressionism more generally due to the vivid use of color in her description that eyes so 
carefully the surface of this garden scene. Comparison to the visual arts is indeed fruitful here, 
and Fry’s formalist example of his revered Cezanne bringing “design” to Impressionist “vision” 
can be seen in the way that Woolf’s impressions are vividly described but structurally contained 
by the hard geometry of the oval frame that circumscribes the entire sketch, or the seemingly 
solid object upon which the narrative draws its images.  But Woolf’s design is naturally a 
narrative design, and Woolf’s fascination with space does not forestall movement; when Woolf 
traces her figures with colors and the variegated light patterns, the intensity emanates from what 
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moves through this one particular plot of Kew or what moves through the mind bent on the one 
particular mark on the wall.  By remaining intent upon this one spot of story, “Kew Gardens” 
and “The Mark on the Wall” quite consciously explore what would be the more limiting 
dimensions of the painter’s canvas: movement and temporality.206  The mark that hangs the 
narrator’s moving images and frames her objects of thought is not a nail but a living snail. 
This is not to say that Woolf devalues the still frames of the artist or the feeling of 
solidity, the equipoise of the solid and the shifting.  She wants the craft of fiction to be the 
reader’s, the emotion that the form instills and not the structure that is seen.  Woolf’s reader is 
meant to feel, in “The Mark on the Wall” for instance, how the fluidity of thought mimics the 
rapidity of life.   This is what a story about time, conscious of how the narrative itself conveys it, 
contributes to a phenomenology of reading.  Even then, Woolf at this early stage is 
experimenting with how she can accomplish through narrative this feeling of the newfound 
instability of time without eschewing structure altogether.  Paradoxically, the consciousness of 
this unsettling dimension of time—Darwin’s deep time, that lies vastly across the billions of 
years and creates the millisecond of human significance without the compensatory gathering into 
either the artifice or the artificier of eternity—is precisely the feeling, working almost 
unconsciously, that Woolf wants her form to convey.  At the deepest intimations of deep time, 
the long perspective of natural history gives Woolf’s new form its narrative structure.   
What Woolf, at the completion of “Mark” and Kew,” had not worked through was how 
this temporal dimension to life, whereby these thoughts once embodied in a narrative mode, 
could additionally arrest time and forge some formal stability.  The involuted/internal and 
evoluted/external movements of both time structures had not yet “joined hands,” as Woolf put it.   
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Both needed to be present in Woolf’s vision of a fiction that would contain some balance 
between the solid and the shifting aspects of life that Woolf equally felt authentic and legitimate 
sources of experiencing the world.  Of one model for her, DeQuincey, she would write that no 
author after him “could maintain that the whole truth of life can be told without ‘piercing the 
haze’” which so often envelops one’s own “secret springs of action and reserve.”207  Yet, Woolf 
continues, “external events also have their importance.”  The writer must “devise some means by 
which the two levels of existence can be recorded—the rapid passage of events and actions; the 
slow opening up of single and solemn moments of concentrated emotion.”208  Woolf had indeed 
attempted her own piercing of the haze enveloping consciousness of character by devising 
“Mark” to mimetically represent the two levels internally and “Kew” to mimetically represent 
the two levels externally.  Read together, they fulfill Woolf’s vision of capturing “an ordinary 
mind on an ordinary day”209 but offer two different visions of it in the public garden and the 
private space. 
 There was the other quality she admired in DeQuincey’s written involutes, where the 
moment miraculously protracts time and expands space, where “one moment may transcend in 
value fifty years.”210  By detaching narrative from the intimate investments of character and plot, 
Woolf had created for herself a new version of impersonality in narrative form, a naturalist’s 
perspective that observes the subjectivity of thought externalized upon a garden or internalized 
through a mark.  “To sit check by jowl with our fellows cramped up together is distasteful, 
indeed repulsive,” Woolf writes. “But draw a little apart, see people in groups, as outlines, and 
they become at once memorable and full of beauty.  Then it is not the actual sight or sound itself 
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that matters, but the reverberations that it makes as it travels through our minds.”211  Great 
investment had been made in viewing humanity at this remove and to see beauty in movement of 
time and consciousness, a Darwinian time seen inhumanly, and a human time seen from the 
viewpoint of evolution.  Even so, it had not resolved for Woolf that value of human time 
humanly felt.  An ordinary mind on an ordinary day can also include some extraordinarily 
significant moments.  In weighing the consequences of Darwin’s writing, Gopnick muses, “The 
tragedy of life is not that there is no God but that the generations through which it progresses are 
too tiny to count very much.  There isn’t a special providence in the fall of a sparrow, but try 
telling that to the sparrows.”  Even so, “The hardest Darwinian view of all is still roomy enough 
for ordinary love to breathe in.”212  At this juncture, Woolf was already enamoured of Joseph 
Conrad and Thomas Hardy’s use and application of “moments of vision” in their works.213  She 
had fully digested Walter Pater, but she had not transformed her own personal experiences into 
DeQuincey’s autobiographical involute, transformed “moments of vision” into “moments of 
being” or found a form for fiction that would capture how those moments of being arise out of 
the vastly dominant and consuming “moments of non-being.” 
 For an essential problem in Darwin, as it became the problem for Woolf, is that time does 
not stand still, whether it be the long stretch of evolutionary time or the quick moment of 
individual living.  How can the present moment be but a moving instant in time, when time is 
accepted as the long perspective of evolution?  How can the moment made precious be anything 
but sentimental—or a Wordsworthian spot of time that found so much romance in nature still 
resonant with transcendence—after nature was so thoroughly realized as Darwinian?  In The 
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Voyage Out, Rachel has many “exultations” of the present moment, none perhaps more 
memorable than her own tree of life: 
But filled with one of those unreasonable exultations which start generally from 
an unknown cause, and sweep whole countries and skies into their embrace, she 
walked without seeing[…].  The constraint of being among strangers in a long silk 
dress made it unusually exciting to stride thus alone […].  So she might have 
walked until she had lost all knowledge of her way, had it not been for the 
interruption of a tree, which, although it did not grow across her path, stopped her 
as effectively as if the branches had struck her in the face. It was an ordinary tree, 
but to her it appeared so strange that it might have been the only tree in the world. 
Dark was the trunk in the middle, and the branches sprang here and there, leaving 
jagged intervals of light between them as distinctly as if it had but that second 
risen from the ground. Having seen a sight that would last her for a lifetime, and 
for a lifetime would preserve that second, the tree once more sank into the 
ordinary ranks of trees, and she was able to seat herself in its shade and to pick the 
red flowers with the thin green leaves which were growing beneath it.214 
In this case, the tree “interrupts” Rachel’s own reverie, her “walking without seeing” in a blissful 
unawareness of her surroundings. The tree stops Rachel in her tracks “as if the branches had 
struck her in the face.”  It somehow, mysteriously makes the moment whole, “would last for a 
lifetime, and for a lifetime would preserve that second.”  Everything about why the tree does so 
and accomplishes so much remains vague, mysterious, ethereal. All we know is that the 
possibility of the moment happens when Rachel enjoys a rare space of time to herself.  In “The 
Mark on the Wall,” the momentous reverie of the tree is not interrupting but interrupted.  The 
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narrative tries to capture the clash of the interrupted moment: “Everything’s moving, falling, 
slipping, vanishing…There is a vast upheaval of matter.  Someone is standing over me and 
saying— / “I’m going out to buy a newspaper.”215   
Indeed, from Woolf’s earliest fiction to her final works, the moment of importance is 
incessantly interrupted.  The late critic Lucio Ruotolo’s fine summation of this quality in her 
work, his titling of it The Interrupted Moment, captures well its consistency and its importance in 
an assessment of her process.216  As many gestures as Woolf makes towards the flow of thought 
and the rapid flights of time, that narrative receives its share of ruptured, fragmented, broken 
moments.  Throughout “The Mark on the Wall,” even until the last reverie of the tree, the 
narrator is interrupted out of some serenity or somnolence associated with the organic, nature-
induced springs of consciousness.  The present moment includes “Whitaker’s Almanack” of the 
“tables of precedency” and generals who administer wars: “I feel a satisfying sense of reality 
which at once turns the two Archbishops and the Lord High Chancellor to the shadows of 
shades….How peaceful it is down here…--if it were not for Whitaker’s Almanack.”217  Thoughts 
interrupt other thoughts, particularly for Woolf’s female narrators whose thoughts are always 
encroached upon by “the masculine point of view which governs our lives,”218 and the self grows 
fragmented, disoriented, and incomplete.  Again and again, this wish for the solitary reverie 
unimpeded emerges in Woolf’s experiments with a new form for fiction.  The “pleasant world” 
is one “without professors or specialists” but rather with one’s thought “hanging suspended over 
nests of white sea eggs.”219  In “An Unwritten Novel,” the narrative travels precariously fast as 
the narrator herself travels by train.  The world in “Mark on the Wall” likened to being “blown 
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through the tube at fifty miles an hour” and being “torn asunder” from the strangers outside the 
train windows is “An Unwritten Novel’s” fictional setting, where the narrator, an aspiring 
novelist, imagines an entire life out of the stranger sitting across from her.  At every stop of the 
train, every noise, every entrance and exit and gesture of a passenger, there is an interruption.  
Even the face of the stranger being read and rewritten is 
a break—a division—so that when you’ve grasped the stem the butterfly’s off—
the moth that hangs in the evening over the yellow flower—move, raise your 
hand, off, high, away.  I won’t raise my hand.  Hang still, then, quiver, life, soul, 
spirit, whatever you are of Minnie Marsh--I, too, on my flower--the hawk over the 
down—alone—or what were the worth of life?  To rise; hang still in the evening, 
in the midday; hang still over the down.220 
Hang Still: Paradoxically, what Woolf was working towards was how the interruption of the 
moment could strike her scenes into stability, how a break in the unity of design could 
nonetheless create its completed vision.  The internal flow of time and consciousness so 
evidently at play in these first experimental works always receives a rude intrusion that is 
ultimately formative.  The ensuing chapter explores how these early narrative departures lead to 
narrative rupture.  The striking interludes of “Kew Gardens” and the series of interruptions in 
“The Mark on the Wall” point towards Woolf’s complete rupture of form, a movement that is 
essentially creative in character.  A Darwinian gradualism and continuity of time surprisingly 
meets a Darwinian fate.  And yet fate is Greek… And the interruption is almost always of 
women… 
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Chapter Four  
Prefiguring the past before “Reading”: The Entomological Society and the 
Origins of Evolutionary Form in Woolf’s Narrative 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTORY “READING”  
A difficult but essential essay is Woolf’s “Reading,” which was written in 1919 among the 
cluster of essays and short stories from 1917-1920 that show Woolf in the act of working out her 
narrative principles for a Modernist fiction.  “Modern Novels” from the same year I have already 
cited several times for the explicit, manifest assertions it contains, which is why it draws so much 
critical attention here and elsewhere, but “Reading” is arguably just as important, if not more so.  
Hermione Lee, in fact, links it with “Modern Novels” and “An Unwritten Novel” as the three 
pieces from this time period of transition between Night and Day and Jacob’s Room when Woolf  
“evolved a way of writing about her reading somewhere between notebook, diary, fiction, 
criticism”—the reading and re-reading of this period arguably “as important to her life-story as 
any of her relationships.”221 “Reading” is Woolf’s first attempt in fiction or non-fiction to plot 
the literary history of England from the vantage point of the more obscure English writers of 
memoirs, voyage journals, and letters.  Woolf’s narrator sits in the library of a manor house, 
dusky with Victorian accumulations, and peruses the shelves for quick sketches of the past. On 
the bookshelves are “Homer and Euripides; Chaucer, then Shakespeare; and the 
Elizabethans…and so down to our time or very near it, Cowper, Burns, Scott, Wordsworth and 
the rest.”222  The narrator reads the past into these books, but the books also speak to the present, 
both personal and collective.  “Writing is with them, as it can no longer be with us, making; 
making something that will endure,” she muses after reading a few letters from Elizabethans. 
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“Horace Walpole, Jane Carlyle, Edward Fitzgerald are ghosts on the very outskirts of time.  Thus 
these ancestors of ours, though stately and fair to look upon, are silent; they move through 
galleries and parks in the midst of a little oasis of silence which holds the intruding modern spirit 
at bay.”223  The Elizabethan sentence almost speaks of a different species. 
“Reading” must be the origin in many respects of The Common Reader (1925), not in the 
least because Woolf mines the style, content and many choice passages from “Reading” for 
several of the essays that appear for the first time in her landmark essay collection.224  It likewise 
anticipates A Room of One’s Own and Orlando, even Between the Acts, in its historical scope and 
subject matter, though it is more personal in style and does not address explicitly any feminist 
issue.  Some of its passages will be transposed in large swaths into Jacob's Room. It also 
anticipates Woolf’s original conception for The Pargiters, before Woolf’s “essay-novel” divided 
into The Years and Three Guineas.  As with “An Unwritten Novel,” one is more comfortable 
calling it a sketch or a “piece” than an essay or a short story, as genres and narrative techniques 
are blurred and merged. Woolf never published the essay, but it contains the germ of many 
publications to follow. 
 Equally compelling is how “Reading” incorporates ideas and influences that not only 
anticipate where Woolf was to go in her fictional experiments but also return to where she had 
already been.  At this transitional phase between the conventional novel-writing evident in The 
Voyage Out and Night and Day, and including the experimental short stories and radical novels 
of the 1920s, there is this intermediary phase that “Reading” represents.  It incorporates material 
from a few of Woolf’s own recently published essays for the Times Literary Supplement, 
including “The House of Lyme” (1917) and “Trafficks and Discoveries” (1918), as well as large 
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chunks of her own early diary sketches, all employed to “evolve” a way of writing that links the 
critical, fictional, and autobiographical.  In exploring how English literature has changed over the 
centuries, Woolf asks how the reader herself has changed.  The reader’s perspective, not only 
what but how she sees, is of telling importance for Woolf.  Formal questions about structure and 
literature become evolutionary; style evolves and language adapts.  What Woolf attempts in 
“Reading” is an exegesis of literature that applies the theory of evolution not to the human body 
but to the narrative voice embodied by form.  The result is a representative piece of writing that 
charts another branch of Woolf’s own evolution in narrative form. 
 The largest aspect of “Reading” that makes the essay conspicuous and important is its 
narrative structure.  There are two days of reading divided by a strange, jarringly peculiar 
interlude.  This interlude, in fact, interrupts the narrative progression of Woolf’s argument, 
breaks up the unity of her design and complicates a reading of it that simply notes the 
evolutionary arc that Woolf traces over several centuries of literature.  Woolf had already begun 
to experiment in her short stories with shifts in narrative perspective and time. In “Kew Gardens” 
there are interludes and representations of nature that exist independently of the human 
characters who share the same space.  In “The Mark on the Wall,” multiple reveries of the 
narrator imagining a natural world altogether free of human intrusion are altered by thoughts 
about the very conventions that the narrative structure undermines.  Woolf takes a slightly 
different but significant approach to the problems of time and narrative in “Reading.”  I would 
like to explore how this rupture in “Reading” binds the structure and the narrative technique of 
the essay to its evolutionary argument.  The content of the interlude itself, its autobiographical 
nature, is especially important.  The structural and contextual resemblance to To the Lighthouse 
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and the interludes in The Waves is not coincidental.  Woolf breaks the conventional narrative 
progression, via evolutionary theory, with an imposition of the natural world. 
 
 4.2 “READING” THE PAST 
The evolutionary progression and the focus upon literary descent in “Reading” seem 
obvious enough.  The first day begins with the narrator reading the Elizabethans, imagining 
herself going “back through the long corridor of sunny mornings,” boring her way “through 
hundreds of Augusts,” noting in these books the annals of transformation.  From the narrative 
present, the remote language of the past emerges through a “slow process” whereby a rough, 
rustic people’s language receives domestication through all the new words used to signify “soft 
pillows, easy chairs, silver forks, private room.”  Thinking about Elizabethan English and the 
modern present, Woolf’s reader muses, “…easy chairs it may be were the death of English 
prose.”  These ancestral houses held generation after generation of families, like the “Leghs” of 
Lyme, barbaric and drunk and dumb, recording only the killing of a fox and “a Bowle of Hott 
Punch with ye Fox’s foot stew’d in it” afterwards.  But if these “little fortresses of civilization” 
had not survived and the “swamp withheld,” how would “our more delicate spirits have fared—
our writers, thinkers, musicians, artists—without a wall to shelter under, or flowers upon which 
to sun their wings?”225  Woolf reads into these sentences not simply a different form of writing 
than modern English, but a different way of being.   Language is a seismograph of ontological 
shifts. The whole progress of civilization, the furnishing of rooms, the paving of roads and riding 
in good carriages, necessitates “ruptures” in language that communicate the changes, changes 
that are even “needed to break up the splendid [Elizabethan] sentences.”226  Language and dialect 
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are as evolutionary as the bodies who speak them: “One can see in fancy the face itself changing, 
and the manner of father to son, mother to daughter, losing what must have been their 
tremendous formality.”227   
Much of what Woolf registers here, measuring the distance between an Elizabethan 
sentence and a modern one, is the movement and migration from exploration and conquest of the 
external world to the voyage inward of a civilization that can now harbor much of its past on the 
shelves of a well-furnished library.  
“Reading” begins the same narrative trope and continues the same evolutionary plotting 
as The Voyage Out, but the external journey, the Elizabethan voyages of the past, all occur in the 
mind of the reader. The plot is read and imagined rather than retold and enacted.  Woolf allows 
the adventure to remain in the Elizabethan past, where it may be read into the present.  The 
evolution of English literature happens, in other words, at the level of the sentence, where the 
mental make-up of the past finds its present trace expression.  Woolf makes much of Elizabethan 
formality as a convention analogous to a mental fortress, a representative configuration of a 
people expressing the rigors of the external world. They bear that formality wherever they go, 
indeed perhaps because of their exposure and vulnerability.   At the same time, when these 
Elizabethan voyages are logged in Hakluyt and Froude, two of Woolf’s favorite writers from her 
own childhood, the narrator discovers “It is their youth” that distinguishes the Elizabethans from 
us.  Their minds are “still unwritten over and capable of such enormous designs as the American 
forests cast upon them, or the Spanish ships, or the savages, or the soul of man.”  They assume 
the “romantic proportions” of the small vessels that traveled the vast oceans, the sea then “larger 
and freer and with bigger waves upon it than the sea of our time.”228  Their imagination was 
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impressionable and fluid and credulous—in other words, childlike in its enthusiasm and 
analogous to the most popular of tropes that makes the past at once more naïve and more 
glamorous.  Woolf performs cultural anthropology upon the surface of these texts.  The growth 
of the English empire is enveloped in a halo of anecdote and romance, as the early explorers, 
returning with a “black stone, veined with gold, or an ivory tusk, or a lamp of silver” become 
“little groups of merchant men settled here and there on the borders of the unexplored, and 
through their fingers the precious stream of coloured and rare and curious things begins slowly 
and precariously to flow towards London.”229  The English merchant is the “vanguard of 
civilization,” and Woolf’s reader sees in their accounts an unconscious, eager, inquisitive naivety 
unavailable to the Conradian voyager settled in the late Victorian outposts of progress. The 
Elizabethan merchants are ignorant of the colonial consequences, unaware and therefore freer.  
Their imagination is fluid, but the formal, gilded sentence holds their mental spoils like the 
vaulted arches of St. Paul’s cathedral. 
 What most piques the curiosity of Woolf’s narrator is the way in which this focus upon 
the far reaches of the external world coincides with an absence of self-consciousness in the 
writing.  “Strange must have been their thoughts; strange the sense of the unknown; and of 
themselves, the isolated English, burning on the very rim of the dark, and the dark full of unseen 
splendours.”230  This is particularly evident in human interactions and relations.  Among the 
“beasts and plants” imported, including the “seeds of all our roses,” are an explorer’s accounts of 
a savage caught “somewhere off the coast of Labrador, taken to England and shown about like a 
wild beast.”  When they catch a woman the next year and keep her on board as his primitive Eve, 
the two “blush profoundly” at first sight of each other. For Woolf, this is the blush of self-
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awareness, the recognition of oneself as another, the presence of consciousness.  Profound here 
is the turn inward that it symbolizes.  “We seem to be able to guess why they blushed,” Woolf’s 
reader suggests; “the Elizabethans would notice it, but it has waited over three hundred years for 
us to interpret it.”231  In fact, for the modern reader the pages of Hakluyt fail to keep her attention 
from wandering for the lack of blushes, something they have no need of because “they make no 
mention of oneself; seem altogether oblivious to such an organism.”232  This makes the 
Elizabethans almost as remote to the contemporary Englishman as the Greeks, both of whom 
Woolf reads as so intriguing and mysterious to the moderns precisely because we tend to 
“impute to the dead the qualities we find lacking in ourselves,”233 just as we impute to the young 
the virtues and vices we feel we have lost. 
 
 4.3 “READING”: DAY TWO  
So goes the first day of reading in “Reading.”   To find the blush of modernity, Woolf’s 
reader returns the next day to Sir Thomas Browne, a writer who emerges from the Elizabethan 
era with all the collective accumulations of his immediate predecessors, but with a dark skin 
“constantly suffused with blushes.”  What makes him the modern specimen? “In that dark world, 
he was one of the first explorers; the first to talk of himself,” one of the “first of our writers to be 
definitely himself.”234  Where the Elizabethan explorers wrote of travels to unknown continents, 
and their merchants recorded the ceremonies of Russian emperors or savage traders, Browne 
does not: “’The world that I regard is myself; it is the microcosm of my own frame that I cast 
mine eye on; for the other I use it but like my globe, and turn it round sometimes for my 
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recreation.’”235  What Woolf discovers is the origin of the English author as subject, the self as 
self-knowledge, awareness as self-consciousness. Browne gives to English literature “the health 
of his interest in himself….I, I, I….the form of a human being.. . . For upon this sublime prospect 
of time and eternity the cloudy vapours which his imagination conjures up, there is cast the 
figure of the author.”236   Of Shakespeare we know next to nothing; of the Greeks we know even 
less because the egotism of the writer “scarcely presents itself at all” in their case.237  The 
Elizabethan sailor does not know why a savage would blush at his captivity because he does not 
see himself in the savage. 
Browne, on the other hand, compares the inner world to the outer world.  He explores 
himself, and the self as subject becomes an object of thought. Even when the subjects are 
ostensibly animals, plants and the like, there is the figure of Browne at the center of his 
observations. The author of Vulgar Errors devotes chapters to the English misconceptions about 
the blood of pelicans, the joints of elephants, the seeds of plants, the premonitions of death in 
insect noises, but they all appeal to the reader in the same way a Renaissance woodcut of these 
animals displays a “queer facial likeness to human beings.”238  From Browne, Woolf’s reader can 
discern what is to come, what is contemporary, can ruminate over Thomas Hardy and measure 
the distance but see in it a likeness of the self.  Where gradations between the Elizabethans and 
the modernist reader were hard to discover, traces of the human form seen in Browne are evident 
in Hardy and especially in Hardy’s reader. 
 
 4.4: THE INTERLUDE 
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This is also the argument of Woolf’s essay “The Elizabethan Lumber Room,” because it 
is for the most part Woolf’s revision of “Reading” for inclusion in The Common Reader six years 
later.  But what is conspicuously missing in the later essay is the middle section of “Reading,” 
where Woolf’s reader, through a curious departure from reading, bridges the Elizabethan 
explorer of the wide world with Browne’s exploratory introspection.  She shuts her books and 
looks out the window toward the approaching evening, which deepens and darkens the books 
themselves, the “Travels, histories, memoirs, the fruit of innumerable lives.”239  From these texts, 
Woolf’s reader fathoms the past teeming in the present and even flooding the future: “Truly, a 
deep sea, the past, a tide which will overtake and overflow us.”  She observes some tennis 
players walking up the path to the manor house who already “looked half transparent.”  The 
woman stoops over to smell “a pallid rose,” perhaps a specimen brought back by one of 
Hakluyt’s explorers of the sixteenth century.  This is what follows: 
Then, as [the tennis players] passed inside, the moths came out, the swift grey moths of 
the dusk, that only visit flowers for second…It was, I supposed, nearly time to go into the 
woods. 
About an hour previously, several pieces of flannel soaked in rum and sugar had 
been pinned to a number of trees.  The business of dinner now engrossing the grown-up 
people we made ready our lantern, our poison jar, and took our butterfly nets in our 
hands.  The road that skirted the wood was so pale that its hardness grated upon our boots 
unexpectedly.  It was the last strip of reality, however, off which we stepped into the 
gloom of the unknown.  The lantern shoved its wedge of light through the dark, as though 
the air were a fine bank of snow piling itself up in banks on either side of the yellow 
beam.  The direction of the trees was known to the leader of the party, who walked ahead, 
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and seemed to draw us, unheeding darkness or fear, further and further into the unknown 
world.  Not only has the dark the power to extinguish light, but it also buries under it a 
great part of the human spirit.240 
There have been fanciful digressions in the essay previous to this interlude of moth-hunting, 
where she wanders in and out of the book she is reading, but no reference is made to literature 
here—the books are shut.  Woolf then goes on to describe, in vivid detail, the eventual capture of 
a huge, rare specimen of moth, a Red Underwing, the largest of all nocturnal moths indigenous 
to Great Britain.   
Why is this here?  Many things about it are peculiar, not the least being the 
transformation of the narrator, who had seemed a mature, incredibly erudite woman very much 
in the likeness of Woolf herself.  Now she presents herself as a child.  The grown-ups are 
“occupied with dinner” while she goes off with the unnamed “leader” to hunt moths.  There is 
the sense that the child is mother of the woman, that the youth of Woolf’s reader approaches 
some symbolic equivalence with the “youth” of the Elizabethan imagination.  It is a literary 
evolution—a private ontogeny of sorts that recapitulates a former manifestation of English 
civilization.  The Elizabethan voyages to the dark, unknown places of the uncivilized earth are 
replicated in this voyage through an “unknown world” shrunk to the proportions of a child’s 
imagination.  The dark woods here are within short walking distance of the manor house, but 
they are as vast and as imaginatively extensive as the wide world.  The distance, in short, 
between the Elizabethans and the reader, may be contracted from an historical timeline of 
centuries to the years of an individual’s lifespan, a moment’s thought retrieved from a personal 
past. 
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It is also preparation for a second day of reading, which is much more introspective.  That 
same year, Woolf discusses the modern novel’s exploration of the “dark regions of 
psychology.”241  The moth anecdote becomes available to Freudian dream analysis.  Woolf’s 
discussion of English literary history gives way to an unconscious nocturne, traveling “further 
and further into the unknown world” that has been buried by the light of day.  The 
relinquishment of her essay’s narrative to the moths, however, is not simply a Freudian insertion 
of unconscious associations; there is a chronology to this story, a narrative thread that is 
controlled and told, not dreamt and released.  But the reader’s psyche does become her own 
subject, and the scene anticipates the ruminations of Sir Thomas Browne.  The sound of a falling 
tree breaks the somnolence, and Woolf’s narrator poses her own analysis of the scene with the 
approach of morning and that second day of reading, which serves as Woolf’s transition to Sir 
Thomas Browne and blushes and Thomas Hardy and contemporary sensibilities.  Hermione Lee, 
one of the only critics I have found to have addressed this section of the essay, simply writes: “It 
becomes harder than ever to decide whether this is an essay on reading—or dreaming—or an 
autobiographical reminiscence.”242   
Lee refers in part to the autobiographical sketch Woolf refashions, largely about her 
brother Thoby Stephen, but leaves the reading of “Reading” ambiguous.  What I would like to 
suggest is that, peculiar as this interlude remains, its reference to Woolf’s own autobiographical 
experience provides a crucial clue to her later configuration of a Modern narrative form.  The 
moths of “Reading” hover over Woolf’s childhood, and the essay’s conflation of personal 
anecdote and literary history has a purpose. Its departure from the narrative of reading interrupts 
the smooth trajectory of narrative progression, creates a narrative time independent of the 
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temporal framework of the narrative.  The interlude breaks up the unity of the narrative, even as 
it extends a corridor from the Elizabethan past to the modernist present.  Support for this premise 
requires its own prehistory, its own interlude back into Woolf’s prenarrative field of experience. 
 
 4.5: LARVA GROOM AND LANTERN BEARER 
The moths dividing Woolf’s “Reading” into Elizabethan and Modernist eras were not the 
first specimens she collected. As a child with her brother Thoby, Virginia Stephen learned to 
“sugar trees,” the amateur naturalist’s practice of soaking flannel with a mixture of rum and 
treacle and then tacking it to trees. At night, the sugar would attract, intoxicate, and facilitate the 
capture of moth specimens.  John Waller ‘Jack’ Hills—the suitor and eventual husband of 
Virginia’s stepsister Stella Duckworth—first taught the Stephen children this practice.  In 
“Sketch,” Woolf writes that Jack Hills “stands in my mind’s picture gallery for a type—and a 
desirable type; the English country gentleman type.” Of his many qualities, Woolf continually 
returns to this aspect of him: “he brought…country life into our distinguished literary, book-
loving world….He was a real [countryman] too; not a fake; a passionate countryman.”243  While 
visiting Stella and the family at their idyllic summerhouse in St. Ives, Jack Hills “gave us a copy 
of Morris’s Butterflies and Moths, over which I spent many hours, hunting up our catches among 
all those pictures of hearts and darts and setaceous Hebrew characters.”244 Their enthusiasm was 
such that when Leslie and Julia Stephen discovered them collecting insects in “tooth powder 
jars,” they recognized their children’s “mania; and put it on a legal basis; bought us nets and 
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setting boards; and indeed [Mother] went with Walter Headlam down to the St Ives public house 
and bought us rum [for the sugaring treacle mixture]”.245   
This is how the “Entomological Society” of the Stephen household was founded.  
Prominent in all of Virginia Woolf’s abiding nostalgia for Talland House summers in St. Ives is 
their ‘bug-hunting,’ especially of butterflies by day and moths by night.  Even in the winters, 
when the weather was inhospitable for the young lepidopterists, the Entomological Society met 
to discuss and read about natural history.  In the very first preserved diary entry of Virginia 
Woolf, a fourteen-year-old Virginia Stephen records Thoby reading a paper to the family on the 
“History of the Club.”246  A playful diary entry from December of 1897 actually lists the rank 
and position of each Entomological Society member:  Leslie Stephen was president, George 
Duckworth the librarian, Thoby the “Larva Groom,” and Virginia herself both the “Secretary 
Chairman & Treasurer.”  The hapless Adrian Stephen, the youngest of the Stephen siblings, was 
present for the meeting but—as dutifully recorded by Secretary Chairman Virginia—is “not on 
the Committee.”247  Adrian is often playfully ridiculed by the young Virginia for his inept 
bugging prowess, “a supernumerary amateur” only “proficient in the art of obscuring the lamp at 
critical moments” and about as important to one sugaring expedition in 1899 as “Gurth the 
Dog.”248  But Woolf also remembers in her memoir that as the “name finder” of the 
Entomological Society, she herself was “scolded severely by Thoby…for slackness.”249 
More than Larva Groom, Thoby was the most passionate member of the club.  All of the 
Stephen children participated, but it was Thoby whom Virginia Stephen describes as its leader.250   
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Throughout Woolf’s earliest diaries, when summer activities in the country are noted, Thoby is 
“out bugging,” often with Virginia and the others in tow, but sometimes by himself. “It is very 
funny that he should have developed this thirst for natural history,” Leslie Stephen wrote, 
“considering how little encouragement he has had.”251 The country naturalist, however, is one of 
the enduring images Woolf creates of her brother.  One of the final portraits Virginia Woolf 
sketches of Thoby closely resembles the country gentleman type she associates with Jack Hills: 
“for always round him, like the dew that collects in beads on a rough coat, there hangs the 
country; butterflies; birds; muddy roads; muddy boots; horses.”252 
Moth hunting was especially prolific on summer family vacations to St. Ives or other 
country settings, such as Painswick in 1897 and Warboys in 1899.253  On August 13, 1899, 
Virginia Stephen jots down a lengthy and incredibly vivid description of “sugaring.” It is an 
important enough passage to dwell on, because this is the setting and circumstance Woolf 
rewrites into the interlude of “Reading.”  With Thoby set to begin at Trinity College, Cambridge 
that fall, there is a commemorative and self-conscious tone to writing about the topic that is 
absent from her earlier diary entries, an awareness that this would be the last time they would 
sugar together.  Save Thoby, they already had outgrown it: “Tonight & last we began our Sugar 
campaign—Thoby rather, the rest of us have rather departed from that profession. Sugaring must 
be explained,” she continues, and goes on to give minute details of the ingredients in the sugar 
“decoction” and the precise method of pinning the flannel to the trees.254   The usual nocturnal 
procession of insect and human follows with an air of lighthearted romance and mock adventure, 
especially in her sketch of Thoby among the moths:  
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The moth roaming melancholy thro’ the woods suddenly snuffs a strange & 
delicious odor: rum! He follows it & reaches the fountain head, where perhaps 
he finds a dozen of his cronies already seated.  He promptly folds his wings & 
settles on one of the veins of precious liquid, his proboscis in a second is 
imbedded in a rich drop, & in a few minutes he is imbibing like an opium 
eater.  This is from the moths point of view—man, the hunter, starts forth in 
the following procession.  Firstly of course the leader of the expedition, the 
renowned J[ulian] T[hoby] S[tephen].  He wears a large felt hat, & muffled 
round him is a huge brown plaid, which makes his figure striding in the dark 
most picturesque & brigand like.  In his hand he carries a glass jar. (141) 
Virginia herself is the “lantern bearer” who “lights the paths fitfully with a Bicycle lamp of 
brilliant but uncertain powers of illumination” (141).  The children advance in the dark checking 
all of the sugared trees.  “Then the leader calls out—Advance slowly—& the lantern bearer 
brings the light to bear gradually on the tree to be examined….The leader, should one of his 
guests strike his fancy, uncorks his poison pot, gently taps the specimen on the nose—the cork is 
shut—& the moth, his brain dazed with the delicious fumes of liquor, sinks into an all embracing 
arm.”  The narrative concludes with a sighting of a rare Red Underwing that gets away: 
By the faint glow we could see the huge moth—his wings open, as though 
in ecstasy, so that the splendid crimson of the underwing could be seen—
his eyes burning red, his proboscis plunged into a flowing stream of 
treacle.  We gazed one moment on his splendour, & then uncorked the 
bottle.  I think the whole procession felt some unprofessional regret when, 
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with a last gleam of scarlet eye & scarlet wing, the grand old moth 
vanished” (142). 
In “Reading,” the Red Underwing’s escape is described as a lost “possession of infinite value,” 
but there is a further encroachment into the woods, a second attempt that results in its capture: 
“The glory of the moment was great.  Our boldness in coming so far was rewarded, and at the 
same time it seemed as though we had proved our skill against the hostile and alien force.”255  
The capture in Woolf’s essay serves a particular revisionary purpose, a symbolic gesture of 
aesthetic completion, the evanescent stuff of reality momentarily circumscribed and sealed in 
fictional version.  But the scene fulfills a greater need and has stronger reverberations than mere 
poetic license.  If Woolf’s first memory of the waves crashing on the shore at St. Ives is her most 
abiding memory, this summoning of the moths of her childhood rivals it as her most evocative.  
Moths—butterflies, too, though not as abundantly—are everywhere in Virginia Woolf’s writing, 
and there is an amateur naturalist’s enthusiasm, an observational precision and theoretical 
assertion behind their suggestive, symbolic resonance. 
 
 4.6: DARWIN AMONG THE MOTHS 
The historical prototype of the country gentleman naturalist is, of course, that of Charles 
Darwin, whose amateur enthusiasm for entomology led to a voyage of discovery that his 
Elizabethan predecessors could not have fathomed and many of his Victorian contemporaries 
would not accept.   Janet Browne’s landmark biography of Darwin makes clear how this “idle 
sporting man,” more prone to catching beetles and shooting birds than devoting time to his 
medical studies or his Cambridge exams, made his way into a culture of amateur naturalists who 
networked and communicated their findings all across England.  It was a part of what Browne 
 120 
defines as the “gentlemanly ethos of a free exchange of scientific information.”256   The 
Darwinian revolution in science depended upon retired generals, admiralty officers, spinsters, 
county parsons, and many of the other characters of the leisure classes who inhabited the English 
countryside and the pages of Victorian literature.   As early as the 1820s and 30s, natural history 
periodicals sprouted up all over England, documenting the growing number of insects contained 
in specimen boxes. Darwin would recall in his autobiography: “No poet ever felt more delight at 
seeing his first poem published than I did at seeing in Stephens’ Illustrations of British Insects 
the magic words, ;captured by c. Darwin, Esq.”257   This society that bred Darwin and cultivated 
his natural history interests would likewise continue to contribute to Darwin’s studies when he 
returned home from the voyage of the H.M.S. Beagle.  Darwin complained about the 
extraordinary amount of letters he fielded every day from amateur local collectors and 
enthusiasts, but he depended upon their expertise as much as he did on the university-trained 
specialists to collect, to classify, and even to theorize.  The legend of Darwin and the number of 
people who could claim some stake or role in his work created even more enthusiasm for the 
localized hobby and pursuit.  There were Jack Hills and amateur entomological societies all 
across England. 
 The Stephen family’s “Entomological Society,” in all of its playfulness, pays homage to 
what David Allen Elliston describes as the “Early Victorian invention,” which was to “bring 
more benefits” and have a “more far-reaching influence” than any other social development of 
natural history: the “field club.”258  Modeled on philosophical and intellectual societies that had 
been established in the late eighteenth century—such as the the Linnean Society of London, 
where Darwin and Wallace first announced their theory of evolution—these small, provincial 
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organizations met to discuss, announce, and publish the newest specimen discoveries and the 
most advanced specimen-collecting techniques.  It was not in the great intellectual halls of 
London, but on the property of a grocer in 1832, that two brothers noticed that moths were 
attracted to some canisters of dark brown West Indies sugar.  “Taking the hint, they proceeded to 
experiment by placing several of these…in open places in the neighborhood…they caught by 
this means no fewer than 69 species, some of them quite uncommon.”  A note on the success was 
published in Newman’s Entomological Magazine; but it was not until 1844, after the 
experiments of the Northumberland squire, and sometime ornithologist, P. J. Selby, that a 
feasible and easily duplicated “treacle” formula “spread up and down the country, in no time at 
all effecting a veritable revolution in the range of species represented in the average collector’s 
cabinet.”259  Selby and others recognized that the technique had potential greater than the wealth 
of personal collections, providing “an excellent means of studying the seasonal duration of 
different species as well as the fluctuating ratio of the sexes.”260  Such notes in the provincial 
entomological club magazines and correspondence among enthusiasts resulted in a huge 
profusion of known varieties of insect species and more accurate scientific fieldwork. 
 Perhaps the most famous result of this synergy between amateur naturalists, scientific 
theorists, and grassroots fieldwork innovations is the textbook case of evolutionary theory: the 
peppered moth.  The first black mutation of the peppered moth was sighted in 1848 in 
Manchester, England, but by 1864 R. S. Edleston recorded that the black variety was the “more 
common morph” in his garden.  This report, just five years after the publication of The Origin of 
Species, began immediately to be read in light of evolutionary theory.  By 1895, the black variety 
constituted ninety-eight percent of the species observed in Manchester, England.  Lepidopterist 
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James William Tutt theorized that the dramatic change in the species was not only natural 
selection in play but the result of the industrialization of England.  The sulfur dioxide from coal 
plants had killed the lichen on surrounding trees of industrialized areas, leaving the bark 
blackened by soot and rendering the lighter variety of the peppered moth easy prey for birds, a 
clear example of evolution at work and the impact of environmental changes brought about by 
humans.261  Such a close observation and tally of varying transformations of a species of moth 
over a span of decades would not have been possible if it were not for these entomological 
societies. 
Though subscriptions to many of these societies were so expensive that only the affluent 
could afford membership, there were also many botanical and natural history clubs among the 
working class, often in the districts where industrialization was greatest, including Lancashire, 
Cheshire, and Yorkshire.262  Many of these clubs were exclusively manual laborers, “factory 
operatives or jobbing gardeners.”  While Darwin’s idiosyncratic or eccentric entomological 
preoccupations have been widely celebrated, they should not be viewed as isolated:  
He and his entomological friends stood on the threshold of the great explosion of 
interest in popular natural history that characterized the early Victorian period: the 
period when seashells, ferns, minerals, insects, flowering plants, seaweeds, 
fossils, birds, and all conceivable natural curiosities were collected for 
pleasure…and when amateurs and experts operated on a single scale as yet barely 
subdivided by professional qualifications.263 
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It was a subject and a hobby available to all, not yet a branch of knowledge requiring specialized 
degrees or years of university training.  Darwin himself employed uneducated collectors to find 
specimens while in Edinburgh and Cambridge, collectors who had found a new profession as 
field guides and specimen collectors for wealthy students and eager professors.  The hobby was 
still young and open enough for women to gain access and fame and expertise, outside of the 
rigid patriarchal strictures of Victorian England: 
It was as feasible for Mary Anning, the daughter of a shopkeeper in Lyme Regis, 
to collect and recognize an entirely new fossilized creature (eventually named 
Ichthyosaurus) in 1811 as it was for George Eliot, Philip Henry Gosse, Charles 
Kingsley, and the Duchess of Portland to seek out attractive sea anemones and 
shells, or for trained university personnel like Grant and Jameson to sail round the 
Firth of Forth gathering sponges to dissect.264 
How many other intellectual fields of interest were there available to a George Eliot?  Perhaps 
one, if she used a pseudonym.  The social barriers remained, but the science was not yet a 
department available only to the male educated class of England.  
 Natural history fieldwork, in fact, often occupied the entire family, male and female.  
Darwin famously employed his children in all aspects of his study, as well as his gardeners and 
servants.  Joseph Dalton Hooker’s wife illustrated many of his botanical specimens and worked 
closely with him.265  One of the most prominent entomologists of late Victorian England was 
Eleanor Ormerod, whom Woolf admired greatly and featured in her Common Reader essay, 
“The Lives of the Obscure” (1925).  Ormerod had to wait for her father’s death before she could 
pursue her passion for entomology.  She never married.  Her autobiography and correspondence 
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were published in 1904, revealing Ormerod’s struggle with male scientists who “won’t take a 
woman’s word,”266 as well as her correspondence with farmers struggling with insects that 
destroyed their crops.  Ormerod accomplished more than any other entomologist of her day in 
the practical application of fieldwork observation to the prevention of crop infestation; and for 
her work, she was awarded several honorary degrees from male institutions.  One can see her as 
a prominent if unnamed figure standing behind A Room of One’s Own, a Jane Ellen Harrison of 
the scientific world.  This is a Victorian pursuit that Woolf not only inherited but also cherished. 
 
4.7: LEPIDOPTERA WOOLFIANA 
 
Woolf’s entomological interest and childhood enthusiasm are certainly behind the 
inspiration of The Waves, whose origin lies in a story her sister Vanessa told her of being beset 
by moths while vacationing in Cassis, France. Vanessa had described in her letter how one huge 
moth kept tapping at the windowpane, prompting her to kill it at the children’s bidding.   Then 
Vanessa remembers the research of moths done by French entomologist Jean Henri Fabre, the 
first scientist to discover pheromones in insects in his seminal study Social Life in the Insect 
World (1913): “Then I remembered—didn’t Fabre try experiments with this same creature and 
attract all the males in the neighbourhood by shutting up one female in the room?  Just what we 
have done.  So probably soon the house will be full of them….write a book about the maternal 
instinct,” Vanessa continued, “which is one of the worst of the passions, animal and 
remorseless.”267  Julia Briggs astutely reconstructs how Vanessa had “focused on two primal 
urges that link human behaviour to the world of nature—the sexual instinct and the maternal 
instinct,” and how Woolf allowed her own experiences with moth-hunting to coalesce into her 
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drafts of The Waves.268  The working title of The Waves was in fact ‘The Moths’; Woolf 
originally imagined them inundating her plot at the novel’s intersections, as the sun and ocean 
now do in the interludes of The Waves.  Woolf envisioned that the moths would flutter through a 
window in a room with a lamp and a flowerpot, thus registering the time of day.  Their central 
organizing presence in the novel disappears for one crucial, simple reason: “Moths, I suddenly 
remember, don’t fly by day,” Woolf jots down in her diary.269 
A moth that does is memorialized in Woolf’s late, haunting essay, “The Death of the 
Moth,” wherein this hay-colored, zig-zagging “bead of pure life” and energy batters helplessly 
against her window-pane until it succumbs to death in a diminutive yet epic struggle.  When 
Virginia Woolf refers to the “living, quivering thing” in her fiction, that aspect of reality she 
associates with the transitive but vibrant “life” of consciousness, it is often a moth or a butterfly 
that completes the metaphor for her.  This is why Harvena Richter has argued that moths in 
Virginia Woolf are symbolic of the creative imagination.270  
But the moth’s life is short-lived, its moment indeed a metonymn for life, though Woolf’s 
association has at least as much to do with the force of death as with life: “The struggle was over.  
The insignificant creature now knew death.  As I looked at the dead moth, this minute wayside 
triumph of so great a force over so mean an antagonist filled me with wonder….Oh yes, he 
seemed to say, death is stronger than I am.”271  In every language, the butterfly resonates with an 
etymology of life—the papilio a Latin ‘soul’ and the ‘psyche’ a Greek mind, for instance.  But 
the Old English word for our modern ‘moth’ can be traced to the Scandinavian word for 
‘maggot.’  Butterflies spring with spring and flutter through the summer, but the prime moth 
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season is late summer to autumn, and Woolf’s essay takes place on a mid-September day.  
Butterflies are perennial symbols of regeneration and rebirth, transformation and metamorphosis, 
but their cousins of the night have darker associations.   This is why she begins the essay by 
stating, “Moths that fly by day are not properly to be called moths.”  The greater force here is 
death, but the associations were multiform.  Moths were a central part of her childhood 
remembrances. 
It is not coincidence or fancy, then, that Woolf lands upon the following metaphor in her 
memoir to describe the shock of the two successive deaths of her mother and her step-sister 
Stella Duckworth, in 1895 and 1897 respectively:  
But I was thinking, feeling, living…the muffled intensity, which a butterfly or moth feels 
when with its sticky tremulous legs and antennae it pushes out of the chrysalis and 
emerges and sits quivering beside the broken case for a moment; its wings still creased; 
its eyes dazzled, incapable of flight…. I remember saying to myself after [Stella] died: 
‘But this is impossible; things aren’t, can’t be, like this’—the blow, the second blow of 
death, struck on me; tremulous, filmy eyed as I was, with my wings still creased, sitting 
there on the edge of my broken chrysalis.272 
Woolf describes the death of her mother as “a latent sorrow” that she could not master at 
thirteen, but the ensuing death of Stella “fell on a different substance; a mind stuff and being 
stuff that was extraordinarily unprotected, unformed, unshielded, apprehensive, receptive, 
anticipatory.”273   Larva, pupa, chrysalis, adulthood—instead of stage succeeding stage to the 
inevitable triumph of a thing with wings, the stuff of children’s narratives, Woolf’s metaphor 
expresses the moment’s intense fragility, a lack of development, an incompleteness— 
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“unprotected, unformed, unshielded.”  Her emergence stresses the cocoon torn open, the blow, 
the body on edge and receptive, the folded wings incapable of flight, an image that does not offer 
a chance for survival. 
 The broken chrysalis might be Virginia’s, but it was Stella’s emergence from the gloom 
of grieving over their mother, her release from discharging their mother’s duties as the eldest 
female in Leslie Stephen’s antiquated Victorian household, that Woolf lingers over in her 
autobiographical sketches. Stella’s promise ended when her second life had just begun.  She had 
been married a few months to Jack Hills, the “countryman” who taught the Stephens to “bug,” 
when she died.  Her long courtship to Jack began at St. Ives, where there “were long summer 
evenings with white moths abroad,” and after two secessions, it finally matured into a passionate 
romance after their mother’s death.  In her earliest autobiographical sketch, “Reminiscences” 
(1908), Woolf recalls their engagement vividly: “Stella left the room with him…and decisively 
shut the door.  We…followed them soon with a lantern, for we were then in the habit of catching 
moths after dinner.  Once or twice we saw them, always hasting round a corner…But the moon 
was bright, and there were no moths; Stella and Jack had gone in.”  They all gathered in Thoby’s 
room to hear the news.  Leslie Stephen had lost his surrogate angel and described the damage as 
“irreparable,” little Adrian Stephen wept at the announcement (another mother lost), but Woolf 
recalls the “exquisite tremor of life once more alight in Stella…She had come to stand by herself, 
with a painful footing upon real life, and her love now had as little dependence in it as may 
be.”274  It was Woolf’s first vision “—so intense, so exciting, so rapturous was it that the word 
vision applies—my first vision then of love between man and woman…It was bodiless; a light; 
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an ecstasy.  But also extraordinarily enduring.”275  Eventually, the children all shared in it.  The 
grief had made them “unnaturally responsive to Stella’s happiness, and the promise it held for 
her and for us to escape from that gloom.”276  For the young Virginia Stephen, “It was beautiful; 
it was, once more, a flight of unfurled wings into the upper air.”277  It also made the second blow, 
at the edge of a broken chrysalis, so traumatic. 
 These complementary anecdotes capture Virginia Woolf at different stages of 
remembrance and recollection, when the moths had clearly become representative both of her 
“unhappy years”278 and of her transition from childhood to adulthood.  To open Woolf’s earliest 
diaries, begun in 1897 when all of the children decided to keep one, is to read more immediately 
how closely bound to entomology the entire family had become, how interwoven Woolf’s first 
conception of romantic love was to the nightly sugaring campaigns, and how therapeutic the 
continuation of the amateur naturalist activities were after the deaths of Woolf’s mother and the 
step-sister who replaced her.   At the meeting of the Stephen Entomological Society where 
Thoby reads his history of the club and a “retrospect” of the club’s activities from the previous 
year, the other order of business is to send a letter of congratulations to the newly married Stella 
and Jack Hills.  When Stella dies and the family retreats for a month to the pastoral setting at 
Painswick a week afterward, Thoby immediately goes “bugging,” with Virginia often in tow.  
“Marbled whites” are set, the “mythical commas” pursued, and Virginia “botanises” in the 
garden with her father.279   Such activities had become routine and ritual, at once escape and 
remembrance.280 
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 The 1899 summer at Warboys, which included that final “sugaring campaign,” is the last 
of the summer before their exposure to the Cambridge personages who would become the social 
heart of Bloomsbury.  The Thoby of Bloomsbury was short-lived, however, and his unexpected 
death from Typhoid Fever in 1906, at the heels of her father’s death in 1904, became a loss of 
the male figures in the family that ran a parallel course to the maternal losses of 1895 and 1897.  
Thoby’s death, in fact, seems to usher Virginia Stephen’s entrance into fiction, to sever the 
Virginia Stephen who was the daughter of Leslie Stephen, sister of Thoby Stephen, from the 
Virginia Stephen who would become Virginia Woolf, the writer.   The previous deaths were 
what drew Thoby and Virginia closer, even with the tension that it produced in their intellectual 
quibbling: “It seems to me therefore that our relation (Thoby’s and mine) was more serious than 
it would have been without those deaths…It was behind our arguments,” Woolf writes in her 
memoir.”281   She describes herself drawing closer to something apart from the usual portrayals 
of grief and human relations: “I would see (after Thoby’s death) two great grindstones (as I 
walked round Gordon Square) and myself between them….So I came to think of life as 
something of extreme reality. And this of course increased my sense of my own importance.  Not 
in relation to human beings; in relation to the force which had respected me sufficiently to make 
me feel myself ground between grindstones.”282 
 As vague an abstraction that “force” remains here, it is a word freighted with meaning in 
Woolf’s formulation of her childhood.  It resonates with the same force opposing the moth that 
batters against the windowpane in “The Death of a Moth,” and it recalls the “violent shocks” 
Woolf famously uses to distinguish her “moments of being” from the non-descript quotidian of 
“non-being.” She cites the instance of a fight with Thoby, where they pummel each other until 
                                                           
281 Moments of Being, p. 137-8. 
282 Ibid. 137. 
 130 
she feels “why hurt another person?” and lowers her guard and allows him to beat her.  This 
results in a state of despair, but there are other shocks whose intensity bring about satisfaction, 
and here is where Woolf transforms experience into something that might be interpreted as the 
source of her art.  When looking at a plant with leaves, it “seemed suddenly plain that the flower 
itself was part of the earth; that a ring enclosed what was the flower; and that was the real flower; 
part earth; part flower.”283  Both, whether in despair or satisfaction, are “discoveries,” and in 
time, they become valuable because “a shock is at once in my case followed by the desire to 
explain it.”284 
 Woolf calls these revelations in other instances “ecstasies or raptures,” sudden shocks of 
despair or satisfaction.  She describes the childhood years before the death of her mother as that 
“space of time which lasted from 1882 to 1895,” punctuated by “several violent moments of 
being, always including a circle of the scene which they cut out.”  She likens her early years to 
“a great hall” or later “that great Cathedral space which was childhood,” but in retrospect shows 
dissatisfaction in the stasis and permanence these images imply: 
But somehow into that picture must be brought, too, the sense of movement and change.  
Nothing remained stable long.  One must get the feeling of everything passing at different 
rates of speed past the little creature; one must get the feeling that made her press on, the 
little creature driven on as she was by growth of her legs and arms, driven without her 
being able to stop it, or to change it, driven as a plant is driven up out of the earth, up 
until the stalk grows, the leaf grows, buds swell.  That is what is indescribable, that is 
what makes all images too static, for no sooner has one said this was so, than it was past 
and altered.  How immense must be the force of life which turns a baby, who can just 
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distinguish a great blot of blue and purple on a black background, into the child who 
thirteen years later can feel all that I felt…when my mother died.285 
Growth and transformation happen without bidding, as organically as the sprout bursting from 
the seed or the moth from the chrysalis.  Woolf’s wonder—at the seeming permanence of those 
sudden moments of intensity that are just as soon vanquished—is almost inexhaustible.  There is 
no permanence or a fully conceived stability in Woolf, but there is the permanent conflict 
between feelings of stasis and feelings of transformation in her writing.  Even in this cocoon of 
her childhood, this sealed enclosure that Woolf makes of the years before her mother’s death, the 
force, both of death and of life, imposes and impresses a destiny independent of the self’s own 
constructions.  This is the development of an identity and a mother at the center of the great, vast 
space that seemed her youth.   
The entirety of “A Sketch of the Past,” in fact, has this organic feeling, this bursting 
through the chrysalis that is forestalled by a lingering nostalgia.  So many of Woolf’s portraits of 
her childhood hang suspended, as they do in her first memory of hearing the waves crashing on 
the shore through her nursery window at Talland house, half-awake, half-asleep, a memory 
which Woolf likens to “lying in a grape and seeing through a film of semi-transparent yellow.”286  
In Woolf’s renderings, sights and sounds come through with a muffled intensity, curved like a 
“petal or leaf,” all “globular; semitransparent.”  Nothing is sharp or distinct in this “elastic, 
gummy air.”  All these memories “hang together at St. Ives….all seemed to press voluptuously 
against some membrane; not to burst it.”287 Woolf’s “moments of being” and “non-being” have 
the same configuration.  The reader is meant to elicit that these “separate moments of being” are 
“embedded in many more moments of non-being,” which Woolf goes on to figure as  “a kind of 
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nondescript cotton wool”—288Woolf’s threaded chrysalis of non-being, in other words, through 
which the moments of being lay bare and emerge.  Something in all of this recalls Shakespeare’s 
elegiac lines in Cymbeline, which she thought the most beautiful in all his work, in “almost in 
any play I should think,” beautiful enough for her to rewrite them in a letter to Thoby when he 
left her for Cambridge: “Imogen says—Think that you are upon a rock, and now throw me 
again! And Posthumous answers--Hang there like fruit, my Soul, till the tree die.”289  In Jacob’s 
Room, Woolf has Jacob Flanders, her first fictional portrait of Thoby, repeat these lines with a 
drinking buddy en route to Greece, just before the outbreak of war.  Woolf wrote “Reading” in 
the months when she was contemplating how to write Jacob’s Room, where the room and its 
accumulations remain suspended in time but are emptied of Jacob. 
 
4.8: RE-“READING”—THWARTED METAMORPHOSIS AND NARRATIVE RUPTURE 
This lengthy interruption of reading “Reading” could simply be viewed as biographical 
lore of a cursory interest, a suggestive allusion or two that works its way back into Woolf’s 
essays and fiction, if Woolf did not give these personal reverberations of the childhood moths 
such emphasis.   Woolf’s multiple, associative metaphors of the broken chrysalis of her 
childhood break ground for a new narrative form embedded like a seed in the moth-hunting 
scene of “Reading.”  Given the manner that the personal and the historical are interwoven in 
Woolf’s writing, it becomes apparent that the autobiomorphic290 process of her narrative 
technique requires in its configurations some violence, some rupture of the closed forms.  In a 
summation of her private losses towards the end of “A Sketch of the Past,” Virginia Woolf asks 
whether it would have been better “To be family surrounded; to go on exploring and adventuring 
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privately while all the while the family as a whole continued its prosaic, rumbling progress; 
would this not have been better than to have had that protection removed; to have been tumbled 
out of the family shelter; to have had it cracked and gashed…”  This crack or gash is also 
precisely analogous to what Woolf calls her “shock-receiving capacity” that she asserts later is 
what makes her a writer.291  Her scenes derived from exceptional moments, shocking in the 
“satisfaction or despair …. are not altogether a literary device….Is this ability of mine to scene 
receiving the origin of my writing impulse?”292  She goes on: 
But whatever the reason may be, I find that scene making is my natural way of marking 
the past.  A scene always comes to the top; arranged; representative.  This confirms me in 
my instinctive notion—it is irrational; it will not stand argument—that we are sealed 
vessels afloat upon what it is convenient to call reality; at some moments, without a 
reason, without an effort, the sealing matter cracks; in floods reality—for they would not 
survive so many ruinous years unless they were made of something permanent; that is a 
proof of their “reality”.293 
Woolf’s earlier scenes portrayed as “moments of being” suggest that in writing her memoir, she 
notices for the first time the profound difference between moments of despair and satisfaction; 
but compare the above to the following passage from “Reading.”  Woolf uses the same shock-
value to offer analysis of the night’s moth-hunting between the two days of reading: 
And then, standing there with the moth safely in our hands, suddenly a volley of shot 
rang out, a hollow rattle of sound in the deep silence of the wood which had I know not 
what of mournful and ominous about it.  It waned and spread through the forest; it died 
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away, then another of those deep sighs arose.  An enormous silence succeeded.  “A tree,” 
we said at last.  A tree had fallen. 
 What is it that happens between the hour of midnight and dawn, the little shock, 
the queer uneasy moment, as of eyes half open to the light, after which sleep is never so 
sound again?  Is it experience, perhaps—repeated shocks, each unfelt at the time, 
suddenly loosening the fabric?  Breaking something away?  Only this image suggests 
collapse and disintegration, whereas the process I have in mind is just the opposite.  It is 
not destructive whatever it may be, one might say that it was rather of a creative 
character.294 
The repeated shocks described in both passages are presented as the source and the process of 
her creative capacities as writer.  Irrational?  Yes, in the sense that in both the “cracking” of the 
sealing matter and the “loosening” of the fabric, the images suggest collapse and disintegration.  
The “sealed vessels” are flooded and ruined.  Woolf inverts the logical conclusion of the conceit 
by transforming the destructive imagery into a “creative character” that survives the “ruinous 
years.”  The foray of her characters into the woods becomes in essence the intrusion of nature 
into the inner world of her characters.  In “Reading,” the crack of the tree and the crack of dawn 
restore order: “one wakes, after heaven knows what internal process, with a sense of 
mastery…Through the tremor and vibration of daily custom one discerns bone and form, 
endurance and permanence.  Sorrow will have the power to effect this sudden arrest of the 
fluidity of life, and joy will have the same power.”295  This is why Woolf afterward as a writer 
always “welcomes” these sudden shocks.  An image that at first reads as a thwarted 
metamorphosis receives a second transformation: “I feel that I have had a blow; but it is not, as I 
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thought as a child, simply a blow from an enemy hidden behind the cotton wool.”  The process 
of scene-making actually creates a new form, “a great delight” in putting “the severed parts 
together”…”making a scene come right; making a character come together.”  From it, Woolf 
famously espouses the closest thing she claims to own as her own philosophy:  
At any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; 
that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a 
work of art; that we are parts of the work of art.  Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the 
truth about the vast mass that we call the world.  But there is no Shakespeare, there is no 
Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the 
music; we are the thing itself.  And I see this when I have a shock.296 
Many, many critics have responded to this conception of Woolf’s art, but what goes unnoticed is 
how organic Woolf’s conception is when taken in its totality, and how closely bound it remains 
to naturalistic settings.  One of Mark Hussey’s central arguments in The Singing of the Real 
World is that Woolf’s abstraction of reality in her works, that tendency towards the ecstatic 
rapture of mystic heights, is “distinguished from mysticism by its rootedness in lived 
experience.”297 She, like Conrad, did not need to imagine a supernatural world; there was enough 
wonder in the natural.  The enclosed vessel burst open, the earlier scene of the moth and the 
cracking of the tree, are regenerative and organic in a manner that is meant to suggest that the 
images of the seed and the broken chrysalis partake of a natural process.  Finding her form for 
the novel, for any work of art, replicates this pattern. 
 
 4.9: TRANSITIONS— HANG THERE LIKE FRUIT, MY SOUL, TIL THE TREE DIE 
                                                           
296 MOB 72 
 136 
When Woolf’s shock of despair or satisfaction, this pattern-making organic process 
embodied in the narrative experience of “Reading,” is conjoined with the sequence of 
experimentations happening in her short stories beginning with “Kew” and “Mark,” the larger, 
inaugural pattern of Woolf’s mature writing process emerges as well.  As argued in Chapter 
Three, the interruptions of thought in “The Mark on the Wall” and the interludes of the snail in 
“Kew Gardens” have a Darwinian resonance and temporal framework.  In “Reading,” the 
unexpected digression into moth-hunting serves as both interruption and interlude, at once a 
disruption of the narrative mode and its connective tissue that binds the first day of reading to the 
second, the Elizabethan past to the more recognizable authors of the present.  In the stories, a 
vegetative life spreads and an insect presence crawls out of the woodwork of civilization as the 
stories move into the more provincial woods of house and garden.   The insects traverse the 
stalks and the butterflies flutter through the arbors of Kew.   The narrator’s reverie over trees at 
the end of “Mark” includes the cold feet of insects making “laborious progresses up the creases 
of the bark” and sunning themselves “upon the green awning” of the leaves: even after the fibres 
snap and the branches break, “there are a million patient watchful lives still for a tree,” she 
muses.298  Not the tree of knowledge in a Biblical Eden, this is Darwin’s evolutionary tree of life.  
Nature’s presence in the dead of night is even more pronounced in the interlude of  
“Reading.”  The insects appear animatedly under the trees where the moths are being hunted: 
“there emerged here a grasshopper, there a beetle, and here again a daddy longlegs,” awkwardly 
heading for the light in a manner that “made one think of sea creatures crawling on the floor of 
the sea” and “scrambling from all quarters” (166).   The darkness “buries under it a great part of 
the human spirit” and “these evidences of unseen lives” seem hostile and alien because the 
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woods are evidently “preoccupied with matters in which human beings could have no part” (165-
168).    In “Reading,” too, as in “Mark,” the tree dies, the “fibres snap,” and the sound of the tree 
falling like “a volley of shot” rings out and breaks the reveries.  The tree breaks just after the Red 
Underwing moth is safely captured and secured in its poison pot: “There was a flash of scarlet 
within the glass.  Then he composed himself with folded wings.  He did not move again.” (168).  
When the Red Underwing was still alive, astride the tree and “drinking deep,” “he was almost 
still…so  immobile.” (167).   As argued here, the intrusion of nature that interrupts the narrative 
has a formative, creative capacity. 
But the death of the moth and the death of the tree are also a heightened awareness of 
finality, and the lantern that cuts through the darkness, that illuminates these unseen lives with no 
stake in humanity, serves to illuminate the small stake of reality that humanity bears.  For all of 
Woolf’s abeyance of closure in her works, death is immanent.  Gillian Beer argues that 
prehistory is “contiguous, continuous, a part of ordinary present-day life” in Woolf, and 
evolutionary prehistory is also “time without narrative, its only story a conclusion.  That story is 
extinction.”299  Like the “waters of annihilation” in To the Lighthouse and The Waves, 
comforting one moment and menacing the next, the darkness threatens to engulf the human 
presences.  In Mrs. Dalloway, Peter envisions the evening as “ominous,” as if “some august fate, 
known to them, awaited without fear, were about to sweep them into complete annihilation.”   
Clarissa has “a perpetual sense…that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day.”  But 
“did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely? But that somehow in the 
streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived 
in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; […] of being laid out like a 
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mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees 
lift the mist.”300  This was to come.  In “Reading,” the force of life—“we were surrounded by 
life, innumerable creatures were stirring among the trees”—is also the force of death on its 
evolutionary branches. Woolf’s recurrent images remain rooted in the natural world and the 
deep, cosmic time of evolution.  Mark Hussey notices that  in Woolf, “Abstract, impersonal 
beauty resides in the natural world.”  He argues that “the uncivilized earth is invariably an 
emblem of timelessness in the novels,”301 but it is the deep fullness of time evident in the natural 
world void of humans that creates its beauty.  Impersonal beauty can be perceived, Hussey 
continues, “by those who recognize emptiness at the heart of life,” but Woolf does not complete 
the circle of being cut out of non-being.  Rather, the cut in time is individual, like consciousness 
itself, quick like the individual life and the moment, a mere interval in the perpetuity of all 
existence. “Hang there like fruit, my soul,/ Till the tree dies” embraces the reverberations of both 
the chrysalis and the Darwinian tree in Woolf’s imagery.  The continual growth, the organic 
presence, and still there is death on the tree, perhaps of the tree itself. 
The severance of the tree, then, like the emergence from the chrysalis and eventually the 
capture of the moth in “Reading,” all come to symbolize the precariousness of the moment (the 
moment a metonym for the rapidity of life itself).  So, too, its beauty: those lines from Cymbeline 
that haunt Woolf from the early age she read it and wrote it to Thoby, and that resonate with her 
own vision of childhood hanging still in her memory, capture this duality of experience. The 
moment—the fruit, the membrane, chrysalis, the semi-transparent envelope—hangs suspended 
there until the tree (in its slow, continuous evolutions of growth and rings and branchings) dies.  
Substitute the tree with water, and it becomes rhythmic, continuous, and soothing before it 
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engulfs and annihilates.  The urge to hang suspended, to hang still, to float, to forestall time and 
movement, swells in Woolf’s narratives, but they all at some point break, crack, sever, flood.  
Death is also Woolf’s mother of beauty.302  The structure of the narrative itself comes to 
recapitulate this pattern.   
But the order that is restored by such sudden arrests in life has a mimetic correlative in 
the sudden arrests of Woolf’s narrative. The moth that is captured after resuming its flight falls 
into its jar, the shape that contains it.  Its death a still life, the Red Underwing now permanently 
evokes in the narrator the narrative of its flight and capture. When Woolf writes that sorrow and 
joy will have the “power to effect this sudden arrest of the fluidity of life,” she follows it with 
this observation: “or [the sudden arrest] may come without apparent cause, imperceptibly, much 
as some bud feels a sudden release in the night and is found in the morning with all its petals 
shaken free.”303  The enigmatic ending of the essay, a meditation on “the region of beauty,” only 
makes sense when rejoined with the night interlude of moth hunting: “…perhaps one of the 
invariable properties of beauty is that it leaves in the mind a desire to impart.  Some offering we 
must make; some act we must dedicate, if only to move across the room and turn the rose in the 
jar, which, by the way, has dropped its petals.”304  As order is restored after the interlude, what 
Woolf likens to the organic bursting forth of the flower-bud, an apprehension of beauty like the 
flower’s, (or the tree’s, or the moth’s), requires a correspondent shock or violence.  The rose in 
the jar at the end is, well, in the jar, (like the moth in its poison pot), a cut flower arranged and 
composed for the narrator’s and our aesthetic appreciation.  The tree, however, dies without our 
bidding, equally a shock that propels the readers’ need (ours and the narrator’s) for order.  The 
rose composed, in the last words, “has dropped its petals.” Form that has been severed from an 
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organic whole, (Woolf’s moment of being when she thinks for the first time “part-earth, part 
flower, that is the whole”), is arranged into something beautiful.  That aesthetic completion is a 
kind of death. 
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 4.10: SOLID SHIFTINGS AND SHIFTING SOLIDS—EVOLUTIONARY PLATONISM 
AND AESTHETIC DARWINISM 
There is another overlapping pattern—the Greek--that suggests overlapping origins, and 
the tension between the Greek and Darwinian will be the remaining focus. In the novels after the 
early short stories, there is always the interval that cuts into the narrative time, and the 
interruptive cut is some discernment of the pattern.  In Between the Acts, the final fictional 
culmination of Woolf’s scene-making, the structure is plain enough in the play whose acts 
mimetically represent the mise en abyme of the novel.  In the scene that makes the transition 
from the Victorian age to the present, when it was time to go “home,” one of the audience 
members thinks this in the interval: 
…why had it perished? Time went on like the hands of the kitchen clock…If they 
had met with no resistance, she mused, nothing wrong, they’d still be going round 
and round and round.  The Home would have remained; and Papa’s beard, she 
thought, would have grown and grown; and Mama’s knitting—what did she do 
with all her knitting?—Change had to come, she said to herself, or there’d have 
been yards and yards of Papa’s beard, of Mama’s knitting […].change had to 
come, unless things were perfect; in which case she supposed they resisted Time. 
Something must act and cut into the perpetual growth, and modernity itself cuts away from the 
Victorian past—“Nowadays,” Mrs. Lynn Jones remembers, “her son-in-law was clean shaven.”  
Ann Banfield argues that “The cut is the rejection of duration; there is no change without it.  
Papa’s beard and Mama’s knitting, like Mrs. Ramsay’s brown stocking, symbols of endless 
becoming, meet a Greek fate that gives them the form of physical time.”305  The Greek ideal as it 
is cut and sculpted by Woolf is her great resistant to time.  While it is clear in Woolf’s 
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formulations that Greek fate also meets a Darwinian fate (more on this to come), it is a thought 
that catches at its origin the dynamic between the solid and the shifting in Woolf. 
Woolf’s voluminous early and continuously steady reading of Greek, Plato in particular, 
brings to mind this pattern of permanence emanating from nature.  As early as 1903, Woolf 
suggests this when she writes, “I think I see for a moment how our minds are all threaded 
together—how any live mind today is of the very same stuff as Plato’s and Euripides.  It is only a 
continuation & development of the same thing.  It is this common mind that binds the whole 
world together; & all the world is mind.”306  This, Woolf continues, feels as though she has 
“grasped the central meaning of the world,” but it only takes a “speck of dust” in the “machine” 
before the essential grasping of form disintegrates: “I open my Greek book next morning, & feel 
worlds away from it all—worse than that—the writing is entirely indifferent to me.”307  The 
solidity of any insight gained, the pattern revealed, is momentary, but in Plato, the ideal forms 
are the original patterns, and the natural world a vast array of multi-form copies made in the 
image of the originals.308  To get at truth or beauty or the good in Plato is to find what is eternal, 
universal.  It is the opposite of evolutionary theory, where pattern in nature, the replicating 
process, invariably means variety and mutability, where forms in nature are never “moving 
image[s] of eternity.”309  And yet, the value Woolf derives from not just Plato but what might 
best be described as the “Greek ideal”  proves as significant, just as multiform and varied as her 
use of Darwinian theory in her early narrative development and experimentation. There is an 
element of Platonic form, what one might call Platonic pattern, in Woolf’s evolutionary narrative 
form. Some guise of it can be found in nearly all of Woolf’s novels.  If this aspect of Platonism 
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contradicts the tenets of evolution on an empirical basis, even seems “irrational” to Woolf in her 
own self-assessment of its usefulness, it makes perfect aesthetic sense in Woolf’s formation of a 
dynamic movement between moments of being and non-being, design and vision.    
Woolf, indeed, at one level defines the “Greeks” themselves as a kind of Platonic type, as 
“the originals”: “the stable, the permanent, the original human being is to be found there.”310  In 
“Reading,” as argued in the previous chapter, the evolution of English literature moves from the 
unconscious and impersonal manner of the Elizabethans to the self-conscious blushes of 
Modernity, not only in the shapes the sentences take but in the rapid emergence and insistence 
upon the personal intrusion of the “I” in literature.  “Sir Thomas Browne brings in the whole 
question, which is afterwards to become of such importance, of knowing one’s author.  
Somewhere, everywhere, now hidden, now apparent in whatever is written down is the form of a 
human being” (175).  Shifting the context slightly to compare the modern literary mind to the 
Greek, Browne’s most famous work, Vulgar Errors, in fact sets out to correct many of the 
assumptions made about the natural sciences since the time of Aristotle.  Of the Elizabethans, 
Woolf’s narrator reads no self-consciousness in their use of the personal pronoun, and with the 
Greeks, Woolf notes, “It scarcely presents itself at all.”311  This is why Woolf suggests in “On 
Not Knowing Greek” that Greek literature is the impersonal literature: “Those few hundred years 
that separate John Paston from Plato, Norwich from Athens, make a chasm which the vast tide of 
European chatter can never succeed in crossing.”  Woolf can read Chaucer and be “floated up 
insensibly on the current of our ancestors’ lives,” just as she can dimly chart the transformations 
from the early Elizabethans to the Edwardians, but “the Greeks remain in a fastness of their 
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own.”312  It is in this sense Woolf maintains that the Greeks are  “the originals, Chaucer’s the 
variety of the human species.”313  To be natural is to be unself-conscious in Woolf, and the great 
writers, beginning with the Greeks, “have this large way with them, nature’s way; which we who 
are further from nature call cruel, since we suffer more from the effects of cruelty, or at any rate 
judge our suffering of greater importance, than they did.”314  This is often the ideal Woolf creates 
out of Greek character and literature when she “wants what is timeless and contemporary,” when 
she wants to “anchor” her mind in Greek. 
The idea of “Greek,” as Woolf comes to employ it structurally, becomes symbolic in 
Woolf of an ideal type of artistic form—those aspects of experience that square with Woolf’s 
feeling for Platonic philosophy and Greek literature, a “cut and clarified” sensibility and 
aesthetic that “hardens” in the manner that Woolf describes how a dialogue in Plato “intensifies 
into truth.”315  There is no vagueness, no clouds in its vision:  the Greeks are as “logical as the 
sun,” to use Woolf’s phrasing in A Room of One’s Own. Throughout Woolf’s diaries, novels, and 
essays, “Greek” resonates with the feeling of solidity anchored in the shifting tendencies of a 
time bent on change and transformations: “…it is to the Greeks that we turn when we are sick of 
the vagueness, of the confusion,” Woolf writes.316  It is an intriguing dynamic of thought in 
Woolf, where a pattern that might best be defined as Platonic in form emanates from the broken 
seals, fragments, cracked casings, and vessels that sever the moment from an otherwise 
continuous flux of sensations and trivialities that Woolf dubs “non-being.”  Where much of life 
is lived unconsciously, involuntarily, the moment of being shocks Woolf into an awareness of 
the pattern hidden behind the cotton wool of existence.  The paradox—that this awareness at 
                                                           
312 CR, 23. 
313 CR, 27. 
314 “Reading,” 178-9. 
315 CR, 32 
316 CR, 38. 
 145 
once supplies an apprehension of the beautiful even as it interrupts the reverie that comes closest 
to the feeling of the beautiful.   
This is the difference between a moment of vision and a moment of being in Woolf.   
Change comes in the finality of the moment that cannot be sustained.  It is where quick time and 
deep time intersect, where Ricoeur’s cosmic time and lived time stitch their most vulnerable 
seam in narrative configuration.  These moments of being must be transmuted to moments of 
vision.  Both vision and being are subsumed by non-being, a quickening awareness of beauty and 
of nothingness.  If awareness of vision strikes into stability the Platonic, intelligible forms, 
awareness of being accepts in its post-Darwinian knowledge that the moment passes and is no 
more. The moment of vision stays the irreversibility of dying, though it cannot reverse it.  Such 
ultimately in the final chapters will be the focus— of how Woolf’s early Greek studies intersect 
with her reading of Darwin and evolution, and how the two of them inform one of the great 
intellectual debates of Modernity that Woolf’s writing internalizes and structurally represents. 
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Chapter Five  
The Victorian Inheritance of the Greek Ideal in Early Woolf: Dialogue and 
Gender  in “Pentelicus” and “Phyllis & Rosamond” 
 
 
 5.1: A GREEK OF HER OWN:  
Greek is more than an idea of fixed forms or ideals of truth impervious to time in Woolf’s 
fictional universe. To review, Woolf saw early on that the evolutionary aspects of time and 
change had inherent affinities with narrative and character. I have argued that much of Woolf’s 
early writing grapples thematically with the particular problems and challenges Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory poses after its impact had been absorbed and gradually accepted or 
domesticated into myth.  Gillian Beer’s excellent essay, “Virginia Woolf and Prehistory,” 
examines just how closely Woolf read Darwin, especially The Voyage of the Beagle, from which 
Beer finds many allusions to and correspondences with Woolf’s own Voyage.317  The previous 
chapters aver that Woolf’s growing subversion of conventional plot as a narrative structure, the 
kind of conventional structure which sustained her first two novels, has Darwin as a principle 
origin.  It is one of Woolf’s great manifestic assertions that narration in her time had indeed 
become a problem, writing in 1919 that  “…we go on perseveringly, conscientiously, 
constructing our thirty-two chapters after a design which more and more ceases to resemble the 
vision in our minds.”318  Convention dictated the old Aristotelian unities and the Platonic notion 
of internal logic and artistic form, but if “one were free and could set down what one chose, there 
would be no plot, little probability, and a vague general confusion….”319   
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Woolf, in doing so, did not simply shirk off Platonic or Victorian notions of artistic unity 
in embracing Darwin’s temporal upheaval.  The ancient Greeks in general, and Plato specifically, 
come to represent major aspects of Victorian England in Woolf’s fiction, particularly the 
patriarchal structures of English education and power that considered the acquisition and mastery 
of Greek as a prominent indication of distinction, gender, class, and accomplishment.  Greek 
(and Latin) assured the English public schoolboy his rightful place as inheritor of British 
colonialism and empire.  For Woolf, Queen Victoria notwithstanding, there were no heiresses 
vouchsafed a Greek education or pride in the empire.  Nothing bears this out more than Woolf’s 
own childhood and educational experience.  Learning Greek was a compulsory course of study 
but also a right that her brothers acquired through public schools and Cambridge, while Virginia 
Stephen as a woman did not.  This male assumption to the glory that was Greece is often noted in 
Woolf, nowhere more satirically and succinctly than in her early Platonic sketch “A Dialogue 
upon Mount Pentelicus” (1906).  A group of young Englishmen descending the mountain agree 
upon this sentiment: “For to call a man a tourist when you meet him abroad is to define not only 
his circumstance but his soul…Germans are tourists and Frenchmen are tourists but Englishmen 
are Greeks.”320  Later, they not only share wine with “the escort of dirty Greek peasant boys but 
condescended so far as to address them in their own tongue as Plato would have spoken it had 
Plato learned Greek at Harrow” (64). 
And yet patriarchy and its engendered exclusions did not prevent Woolf from assiduously 
learning Greek on her own, beginning at the age of 15, or from reading and assimilating the ideas 
of Darwin on her own.   Plato and Darwin, Greek literature and natural history were fields of 
study essential to Woolf’s intellectual and aesthetic development, and they become essential to 
her development of a feminist literature.  Out of these dual and shifting engagements, what I will 
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ultimately establish in the ensuing chapters is that Woolf’s departures from conventional plot and 
narrative, her distinctive shaping of a modern poetics, significantly evolves from her acquisition 
and transformation of these two male university pursuits for the uses and advantages of women. 
In order to do so, it is important to also admit and acknowledge how, in agreement with Pamela 
Caughie and many of Woolf’s most astute critics, Woolf’s writings offer “a dynamic model for 
narrative rather than a dualistic one.”321  Woolf’s ambivalent, indeterminate, and sometimes 
contradictory figuration and use of Greek underlies her ambivalence over any set, determined 
structure to writing.  Her valuing of process over conclusions and any straightforward 
methodology requires multiple and multiform associations and meaning in regard to the “Greek” 
to be explored and related to her Darwinian narrative. There are many iterations of Hellenism in 
Woolf’s great passion and contemplation of the Grecian past and the social currency it occupies 
in British culture by the turn of the century, especially the private and public exchange of the 
Greek ideal that Woolf employs. 
 Two of her first four completed stories in particular— “A Dialogue upon Mount 
Pentelicus” and “Phyllis and Rosamond” both written in 1906—illustrate the formative role 
Greek would come to found in her fiction and her personal life. They establish how Woolf is 
beginning to think about the difference gender makes in the acquisition of learning Greek, and 
perhaps more importantly how appropriating her own idea (if not ideal) of Greek literature and 
antiquity required a necessary departure not just from the Greek past but the Victorian. This is 
what the most thoroughgoing scholar of Woolf’s Greek studies, Theodore Koulouris, has come 
to view as Woolf’s “Greekness” that early on merges the personal, the educational, and the 
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socio-cultural.322  At play always is the serious, often satirical juxtaposition of classical Greece 
and contemporary England as Woolf came to know it though her own Greek studies and the 
exposure to this Cambridge Apostolic sect. The early works from the summer to fall of 1906, 
from which all of her very earliest unpublished forays at fiction begin appearing in her 
notebooks, anticipate and ultimately include the seminal September voyage to Greece. She 
would mine her travel journal entries from this trip for many stories to come, including most 
famously Jacob’s Room and The Waves.  “A Dialogue upon Mount Pentelicus” and “Phyllis and 
Rosamond” are the early fruits of these labors—the former a richly textured and deeply informed 
satire that lays bare the masculine Greek ideal as it had been derived from all the educational and 
cultural accumulations of Victorian England; and the latter a fictional exposition on how a 
version of that Greek ideal could come home to England in the open exchange of ideas between 
men and women through dialogue, and how this might be applicable to women (and men) in the 
new century. 
 
5.2: CAMBRIDGE SYMPOSIUMS—THE EARLIEST FICTIONS 
 
A familiar narrative in Woolfian lore recalls the significance of her exposure to Thoby 
Stephen’s Cambridge friends shortly after her father’s death in 1904, and the subsequent move of 
the Stephen siblings to 46 Gordon Square in Bloomsbury.  The importance of this event is 
emphasized for good reason, not least because of Woolf’s own account in her Memoir Club 
reading, “Old Bloomsbury.”323  The dusky, dark furniture and cramped atmosphere of 22 Hyde 
Park Gate were replaced by open, airy spaces and white walls simply adorned.  Voluble but 
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sidelong and mannered Victorian tea table conversations gave way to the coffee and whiskey of 
Thursday evening parties.  Conversations languished, manners were eschewed, but dialogues and 
debates over the nature of good or beauty or reality lasted until two or three in the morning.324  
These gatherings of the Stephen sisters and Thoby’s Cambridge friends ultimately resulted in 
both Vanessa and Virginia’s marriages—to Clive Bell and Leonard Woolf, respectively—and 
many of Virginia Woolf’s most lasting personal, intellectual, and literary friendships were 
formed with the likes of Roger Fry, Lytton Strachey, John Maynard Keynes, Saxon Sidney-
Turner, and E. M. Forster.  It was, in short, the early years of what the literary world now calls 
Bloomsbury. 
Part of this narrative is, of course, the emergence of Virginia Woolf the writer.  Out of 
her father’s long shadow and into the light of these aesthetic and philosophical discussions, 
Woolf begins penning her first essays and reviews in 1904, with her earliest attempts to publish 
fiction soon to follow.  Those young Cambridge men also brought along with them their Greek 
literature and classicist degrees, their ideas of the Cambridge philosophers, and their bible—
Cambridge Don G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, just published in 1903.   Moore, they felt, was 
their Socrates, and by following his philosophical model, they thought themselves the modern 
embodiment of the Greek ideal.  The effect upon Virginia Woolf, by her own estimate, was 
profound.  Despite the awkwardness and the naïve, cloistered idealism of these young men, the 
intellectual stimulation and, above all, the social, mental, and moral freedom Virginia Stephen 
enjoyed during this time cannot be overemphasized or much exaggerated. 
But Virginia Woolf’s exposure to Thoby’s public school culture and her emergence as a 
writer on and student of Greek literature have a longer history than early Bloomsbury.  When 
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reminiscing about Thoby in “A Sketch of the Past,” Woolf mentions that her brother’s “Latin and 
Greek were very rough…Yet it was through him that I first heard about the Greeks.” Woolf 
vividly recalls the day Thoby came home from Evelyn’s grammar school and how he paced up 
and down the stairs telling her for the first time the stories of Hector and Troy.325  In October of 
1897, three months after the death of her maternal stepsister Stella Duckworth, Adeline Virginia 
Stephen began taking a short course of classes in Greek at King’s College with the distinguished 
Greek scholar Dr. G.C.W. Warr.   In fact, Greek was the young Virginia Stephen’s only 
systematic education outside her father’s library, provided by her paid tutorials from Clara Pater 
and then Janet Case from 1898 to 1903.326 Woolf recalls that during this period, every weekday 
from 10:00 am to 1:00 pm, she “settled down to read Plato, or to make out some scene in 
Euripides or Sophocles for Clara Pater, or Janet Case.”327  A year after Leslie Stephen's death 
triggers Woolf’s second bout with mental illness, she picks up her Greek studies where the 
tutorials let off: “I am glad to find that I don’t forget Greek & read Thucydides which is tough, as 
easily as I ever did.”328  In the terser, matter of fact entries of Woolf’s early diaries, hardly a 
week goes by in those first months living in Bloomsbury without some Greek reference.  She 
reads Greek, translates Greek, writes an essay on “The Magic Greek,”329 keeps a Greek 
notebook, and teaches Greek literature and history to her “working women” at Morley College. 
Of all the departures early Bloomsbury comes to represent for Woolf—the independence to write 
for a living, to leave her Victorian past for a Modernist present, to free herself from the domestic 
strictures of patriarchy, and certainly to rid herself from social outings and sexual malfeasances 
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instigated by stepbrother George Duckworth—Greek ranks among these significantly and is 
inextricably linked to the others, especially as it continues rather than severs the past. 
Her studies culminate in a trip to Greece with her sister and brothers in 1906, and the 
experience, including the ensuing death of Thoby,330 figures largely in Woolf’s fictional accounts 
of Englishmen reading or speaking Greek.  To begin with, Plato’s dialogues are the most 
prominent form of borrowed structure in many of her earliest attempts at fiction; by title alone 
we gather just how much it infuses Woolf’s earliest, often incompleted stories written before 
1917: “Phyllis and Rosamond,” “A Dialogue on a Hill,” “Theophile,” and “A Dialogue upon 
Mount Pentelicus” all either recreate a Grecian setting or employ the Socratic method of 
questions and answers, including the congenial but serious philosophical conversation that Woolf 
admired in Plato. 
  In both her journal entry on “Pentelicus” as well as the story that borrowed from the 
experience, the satirical tone captures the unbridgeable chasm of time between Woolf’s unaware, 
unattached English Cambridge graduates and their beloved classical Greece. The two major 
participants of Woolf’s dialogue, clearly based upon her male siblings and travel companions 
Thoby and Adrian Stephen, consciously appropriate Greek antiquity as their own331 while the 
story’s narrator listens in and comments from a detached distance upon their manner, discourse, 
and action—all of which belies in the young men a cultivated arrogance and assumed 
superiority. It isn’t simply that the twentieth century Greek peasants escorting Woolf’s 
Englishmen up and down the famed mountain do not understand their employers’ public 
schoolboy Greek; Woolf wants the entire scene to resonate with an historical and cultural context 
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that parodies the aspirations and assumptions to Grecian glory in these Cambridge types she had 
come to know through her brothers, especially after her move to Bloomsbury in 1904. 
 Mount Pentelicus, Woolf’s narrator notes with her Baedeker,332 is most famous as the 
marble quarry Athenian artists and architects mined for the pristine white-yellow hue of stone 
that came to ornament the sacred architecture of Athens and much of the most famous Attic 
sculpture from the Acropolis and the Parthenon; Pentelicus, in fact, was the original marble 
quarry from whence the Parthenon’s poached Elgin Marbles derived; that they arrived in 
London, even then with great notoriety beginning in 1801, while Greece was still under control 
of the Ottoman Empire, is one of the primary reasons the study of classical Greece had a 
renaissance of its own in England.  The temporal juxtaposition created from Woolf’s two cultural 
and historical contexts is striking. Woolf writes,  
 
Mount Pentelicus, as we who read Baedker know, yet bears on her side the noble scar 
that she suffered at the hands of certain Greek stone masons who had the smile and 
perhaps the curse of Pheidias as their reward of their labour. And so if you would do 
justice to her you must meditate on several separate themes and combine them as best 
you may. You must think of her not only as the outline that ran across many Greek 
casements—Plato looked up from his page on sunny mornings—but also as the workshop 
and as the living place where innumerable slaves wore out their lives. (63) 
Woolf, then, has us imagine her English travelers alongside their “escort of dirty Greek peasant 
boys” hired to steer their donkeys and carry their portage up and down the mountain, a 
foreground to this envisioned backdrop of 5th Century Greece.  Plato himself looks up from his 
writing and Phidias, the famed sculptor of antiquity and overseer of the marble selections 
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incorporated into the Parthenon, works the slaves who quarry the mountain for him and the 
citizenry of Athens.  Not lost on Woolf is how the enslaved stonemasons of Pentelicus find their 
contemporary correlative in the Greek peasants now employed by the British tourists. Even the 
donkeys are imagined ancestors of the beasts of burden stabled at Pentelicus’s grotto to carry the 
marble to Athens over two millennia before. The “crude blocks of marble” remain that didn’t 
make it to the sculptor’s workshop or chisel when Greece was glorious; among the contemporary 
Greeks that the English deem “barbarians,” a judgment they declare “Plato” himself “would have 
sanctioned,”333 a dialogue ensues. 
 Or a dialogue doesn’t ensue: “But since dialogues are even more hard to write than to 
speak, and it is doubtful whether written dialogues have ever been spoken or spoken dialogues 
have ever been written, we will only rescue such fragments as concern our story. But this we will 
say, that the talk was the finest talk in the world.”334  Just so, the story is riddled with playful jabs 
at the British tourists proclaiming, unbeknownst to them, their cultural superiority as the natural 
inheritors of Greek civilization; all the while their peripatetic speechifying follows not simply 
their descent from Pentelicus but from Plato’s lofty dialectics. Conversations are at once 
disjointed and derivative, the poetic voice of Theocritus heard in the “plaint that it made on the 
stones…” Some of the English “did so hear it, albeit the text was dusty on the shelves at 
home.”335 The echoes of the past persist, but the Greek words and works that envelop the 
present, whether dialogues or poems, cannot be refashioned for this Cambridge expedition. 
 The dialogue itself, or what there is of it, is interrupted by the unintended, intruding 
presence of a Greek monk “discharging the humble duties of the monastery nearby.” Not in the 
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sublime moment derided as a member of the same ilk or race as “the dirty Greek peasants,” this 
figure instead cuts for them the shape of an entirely bygone presence: “So they saw that he was 
large and finely made, and had the nose and brow of a Greek statue….as he stood there, 
suspended, with open eyes, a fantastic—a pathetic—hope shot through the minds of some who 
saw him that his was one of those original figures which, dipped in the crude earth, have resisted 
time, and recall the first days and the unobliterated type: there might be such a thing as Man.”336 
While it is “no longer within the power of the English mind,”  the narrator muses, to make myths 
or gods of the moment—“to see fur grow upon smooth ears and cloven hoofs where there are ten 
separate toes”—what separates them in time and significance from the original Greeks that 
brought them to the slopes of Pentelicus in the first place, seems to disappear, if only for the 
moment—“And the English could not have told at the moment at which point they stood…the 
Greeks, that is Plato and Sophocles and the rest, were close to them, as close to them as any 
friend or lover, and breathed the same air as that which kissed the cheek and stirred the 
vine…”337 While nothing but one nicety is uttered, they imagine he spoke “as a Greek to a 
Greek”! 
 Ultimately Woolf’s narration ascribes to the monk’s presence an idealization equivalent 
to its Platonic origins. In the monk’s gaze is a “force of the eye that fixed them,” that “…was lit 
by another power which survives trees and even plants them.” Whether miracle or fact, “such a 
flame as that in the monk’s eye…had been lit once at the original hearth.”338  Promethean and 
Paterian in this moment of vision—“This at least of flamelike our life has…of forces parting 
sooner or later on their ways”—339 it immediately recalls Woolf’s diary entry a few years 
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previous, already quoted in another context, where reading Plato brings to mind “How I think I 
see for a moment how our minds are all threaded together….this common mind that binds the 
whole world together; & all the world is mind.” The light in the monk’s eye grows even more 
portent and fantastical, endowed with the power to make  
 
the trees murmer and the air blow. And thousands of little creatures moved about in the 
grass, and the earth turned solid for miles and miles beneath the feet. Nor did the 
atmosphere begin and end with that day and that horizon, but it stretched like a lucid 
green river on all sides immeasurably and the world swam in its girdle of eternity. Such 
was the light in the brown monk’s eye, and to think of death or dust or destruction 
beneath its gaze was like placing a sheet of tissue paper in the fire. (67-68) 
 
 This reverie, shared by her narrator as if it were hers as well as her characters,’ is indeed 
Woolf’s first fully realized, fictionally rendered moment of vision, one that expands in 
dimension to the cosmic space and time of the universe itself and its “girdle of eternity.” A 
Platonic vision in deed, where the one and the many are, via Woolf’s narrative, contained within 
the one moment, where the vision of the monk creates not just an ideal type but a temporary 
unity of being. We see the monk, and time seems arrested, but sight is multiplied and nearly 
omniscient—living organisms abound and move in the arrested moment and time stretches to 
encompass the vastness of time (“And thousands of little creatures moved about in the grass, and 
the earth turned solid for miles beneath the feet…”) The vision and all that lights it, however, are 
curtailed by the astonishingly prosaic “good evening” greeting of the monk and the quotidian 
need expressed by the story’s final phrase whereby the logos that lit eternity becomes the 
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“lights” that were “opening in the streets of Athens and the talk was of supper and a bed.”340  The 
gaze that “pierced through much, and went like an arrow drawing a golden chain through ages 
and races…and stretched like a solid and continuous avenue from one end of time to the other” 
dims once again to the all too natural power of “the dusk that cuts short the Grecian day…like a 
knife across the sky.” By such approximations does Woolf draw down the moment, severed from 
time and then severed by time and the natural world. The moment sets and dissolves like the 
Greek ideal itself in the prosaic, natural, quotidian interests of night, supper, and bed. 
 What’s remarkable in this context, then, is how augmented the moment becomes to the 
undeserving, idealizing recipients, an illusory good fortune through an assumed inheritance and 
belief in themselves that cannot be said to have arisen from a good dialogue, at least in the 
Platonic formulation of a dialogue that the story’s title would indicate and is meant to suggest. 
And this is the point. It playfully partakes of Plato’s ideal form in such a thing as an unwitting 
monk, an otherwise occupied man standing before the travelers, if only because the monk has the 
semblance of Greek statuary, the imagined brow of a togaed philosopher. In a dialogue that 
never quite happens, where the scene and the conversation taper off before any conclusions can 
be drawn or any truths deduced or refined beyond the airing of opinions, the Cambridge set still 
has had their vision of Greece. Woolf’s interweaving of narrative voice and perspective with that 
of her Cambridge men, (an early glimpse at what would be more developed as a technique in the 
experimental brilliance of the fiction to come), provides our vision of her male siblings and 
Cambridge friends translated to fiction.  
 
5.3: A SYMPOSIUM OF HER OWN—CONVERSATIONS AND DIALOGUES 
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 The same epiphanic moment or philosophic inquiry is not allotted the two title characters 
in “Phyllis and Rosamond,” Woolf’s first completed short story dated both in her notebook and 
in the story itself as “20th June, 1906,” a few months before her actual expedition to Greece and 
therefore predating “A Dialogue upon Mt. Pentelicus” by a few months. It nonetheless gives us 
Woolf’s first impressions of early Bloomsbury from a female’s perspective, with the 
Bloomsbury men this time in the backdrop, and the gender difference is, not surprisingly, 
essential. “Phyllis and Rosamond” is not a Platonic dialogue in form or in title, the pairing and 
ostensible “outline” of these two young women “drawn with no skill but veracity,” the narrator 
claims at the outset, though the tracing of a day in their life may still “possibly have some value,” 
because “such portraits as we have are almost invariably of the male sex….”341 Rather than a 
satirical juxtaposition of the Cambridge youth and their Greek contemporaries and predecessors, 
Woolf instead contrasts two fictional versions of herself with either Victorian stock figures or 
Apostolic men in the background.  The male assumptions become female encumbrances to the 
Greek ideal for the title characters. The narration, which presents her picture-making as akin to 
an historian’s or a biographer’s, is in so many respects an addition to Woolf’s autobiographical 
writings; the “little group” of characters given indeed provide two sides of Woolf’s own looking 
glass—the one refracting back just a few years previous when she was still ensconced in a 
Victorian house under the patriarchal wing of Leslie Stephen; and the other reflecting the woman 
and writer Woolf was becoming after nearly two liberating years living with her sister in 
Bloomsbury post-Leslie Stephen’s death in 1904. Phyllis and Rosamond Hibbert may as well be 
Vanessa and Virginia Stephen living at 22 Hyde Park Gate circa 1903, and Woolf makes clear 
that these ladies, “indigenous to the drawing room,” inhabit the Hyde Park, Kensington 
neighborhood of London as well, where they must play out their trade in their “professional 
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arena” as “daughters at home” whose occupation is to land a gentleman and become wives at 
another landed home. Phyllis puts it bluntly enough: “We are daughters, until we become 
married women.”342  
 Woolf’s present image in the looking glass, at least as she saw herself and Vanessa in 
June of 1906, can be found in the Tristram sisters residing in “the unfashionable quarter” of 
Bloomsbury. The older Tristram sister, Vanessa’s surrogate, is described not surprisingly as “a 
young woman of great beauty, and an artist of real promise,” whereas Sylvia Tristram, the 
younger sister, indeed resembles Virginia Stephen settling into her fictional house of mirrors: 
“Sylvia who wrote and had a literary delight in seeing herself reflected in strange looking 
glasses, and of holding up her own mirror to the lives of others, settled herself to the task” of 
seeing the Hibbert sisters as “human beings” rather than “‘young ladies.’”343  
 The contrast between the two mirrored images, between these two pairs of sisters, could 
not be starker. Phyllis and Rosamond embody the lives of young, upper middle class women in 
the early 20th Century still shackled to the traditions and conventions of Victorian England. They 
function squarely within the parlors, evening parties, and distinguished gatherings that, in 
practice, differ not at all from the Victorian patriarchal system and cultural framework that 
would have received these young women half a century before. Their day begins by dressing 
appropriately for breakfast and receiving a perfunctory kiss from their father before he 
disappears to read the paper and head to work. Then it is to mom’s room, where they “receive 
her orders for the day,” including the arrangement of flowers and of lunch and dinner with the 
cook.  A small respite is interrupted when their father calculatingly invites two men home for 
lunch, one of them a marrying prospect, which means all their faculties must be employed in the 
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ascertainment of his worth and, if necessary, the first stages of his procurement for the elder 
sister Phyllis. Sewing and errands and a proper changing of clothes ensue in preparation for the 
lunch, a success save that Phyllis finds their guest “not a bad little man,” (i.e., I don’t want to 
marry him), which compels Lady Hibbert to instruct her daughter in being “a little less 
selfish.”344 The next hour is a debriefing between sisters of their marrying prospects before it is 
time to “pay calls” with Lady Hibbert—“driving solemnly to one house after another where they 
had dined or hoped to dine…” before becoming a part of the carriage procession that circles 
around the statue of Achilles at Hyde Park before returning home. While they escape 
entertaining an elderly cousin in the parlor, Phyllis must join her parents at a dinner party of a 
distinguished judge by 8pm.  After dinner, Phyllis has a rare late night escape from her life, 
receiving permission from Lady Hibbert (albeit with a pursed, disapproving frown!) to meet her 
sister Rosamond at the Tristrams. 
 No wonder, then, that Phyllis herself describes her own appearance and entrance into the 
Bloomsbury party as “like that of ladies whom Romney painted” a century before. It represents 
not just a different manner of dress, but an entirely different timeframe and era. By traversing 
London, Rosamond and the reader gain entrance into the Edwardian, if not yet Modernist world 
that Bloomsbury will come to represent—of “great tranquil squares” and “room” and “freedom” 
to “grow up as one liked.”345 She and her sister stand before the Bloomsbury artists and 
intellectuals as anachronisms: Phyllis wears white silk with cherry ribbons on her dress while her 
Bloomsbury host wears a hunting jacket. People sit on the floor in the smokey room engaged in 
debate about art, religion, literature, and love. Though Phyllis had seen the artwork in question, 
she “knew her platitudes would never stand the test of question and criticism.” All is heated and 
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serious but reasoned, and “no one of the combatants wished to be tripped by illogical devices.” 
Even after the hotly contested debate concludes, no one “apologizes” for the concentrated 
character and intense tenor, a shock to the system for Phyllis. Worse, the general conversation 
was “scornful of the commonplace” and the Hibbert sisters could not help but beat themselves up 
for an “instinctive disapproval” of the Tristram sisters uttering lightly (and jesting 
wholeheartedly) about some element of Christianity—“their education” through Lady Hibbert’s 
training and their station in life, Woolf suggests, “had stuck to them.” When Phyllis finally does 
find entrance into the conversation regarding literature, “she was surprised to find that her most 
profound discoveries were taken as the starting point of further investigations.”346  The moment 
that most amazes the Hibberts is when their “own department of business” (marriage) is 
discussed with such “freedom and frankness” between Miss Tristram (Vanessa’s character) and 
an interlocutor gentleman “who might easily, as far as one could judge, have a personal interest 
in the question.” Woolf conspicuously and discretely leaves the content of the conversation out 
of the narrative, but it does “put the whole thing in a new and sufficiently startling light.”347  That 
a woman would talk so freely and openly about love and marriage shifts the emotional response 
of the evening for the Hibberts from discomfort to silence. They stop speaking, unconsciously, 
and feel “condemned” to their own lives, incapable after “long captivity” to live and think freely 
themselves.348  
 And this is the point, or at least the point where the mirror cracks. Woolf’s two looking 
glass likenesses to her own life would always form a powerful dichotomy within her fiction and 
life writings. On or about December, 1910 might be the date Woolf famously declared human 
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character changed,349 but October, 1904 initiates that change in Virginia Stephen.  As a young 
woman writing in 1906, a few years out of her self-described Victorian captivity, the side that 
held her Bloomsbury image and identity was ideal (and idealized). The Victorian ladies 
embodied in the Hibberts, though given here a glimpse of what freedom could resemble and 
mean if reconstituted as the Tristram sisters, cannot escape their upbringing and education. The 
Phyllis and Rosamond world is indeed the one Virginia and Vanessa occupied at 22 Hyde Park 
Gate before October of 1904, but much more grotesquely with their molesting, overbearing, 
emotionally overwrought and status-seeking half-brother George Duckworth playing the part of 
Lady Hibbert.  Woolf makes this quite explicit in her autobiographical pieces “22 Hyde Park 
Gate” and “Old Bloomsbury” (1920-22) presented to the Memoir Club during the formal 
reinstitution of Bloomsbury conversations and gatherings after the war in 1920.350  Whereas 
Hyde Park meant convention, Bloomsbury meant intellect. “In the world of the Booths and the 
Maxses we were not asked to use our brains much. Here we used nothing else,” Woolf writes in 
“Old Bloomsbury.”  She goes on, 
 
The young men I have named had no manners in the Hyde Park Gate sense. They 
criticized our arguments as severely as their own. They never seemed to notice how we 
were dressed or if we were nice looking or not. All that tremendous encumbrance of 
appearance and behavior which George [Duckworth] had piled upon our first years 
vanished completely. (Moments of Being, 190-91, brackets mine.) 
 
                                                           
349 from “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown.” 
350 See Moments of Being, pps. 161-201. The many critical readings of these two autobiographical pieces are too numerous to 
rehearse here, as they are the first and most explicit references Woolf makes regarding the incestuous and molesting advances of 
her step-brothers. 
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Woolf might satirize and lightly mock the earnestness and unconscious arrogance of her male 
siblings and Cambridge graduates as conquering tourists sitting atop Pentelicus and planting a 
British intellectual flag upon the ruins of classical Greece, but they at the least have the privilege 
of philosophical inquiry and a learned model of dialogue available to them.  
 For Phyllis, the question of love cannot be abstracted into an argument, or the whole 
contingent premise of marriage questioned beyond the gentleman most suitable to marry. When 
Phyllis and Sylvia do openly discuss marriage, not to argue or debate the merits of it but simply 
to gain an understanding of Phyllis’s predicament, Phyllis lets go of what convention she can 
long enough to admit what marriage is to her versus what she imagines it ought to be. This 
Phyllis confides to Sylvia after the elder Tristram sister has openly debated the question with a 
gentleman: “‘It should be for love, and all the rest of it. But,’ continued Phyllis, desperately 
speaking the truth, ‘we can’t think of it that way….It is always mixed up with so much else. It 
means freedom and friends and a house of your own, and oh all the things you have already!”351  
Naively, Sylvia replies that perhaps Phyllis should take up writing.  If Woolf will argue two 
decades later that such freedom for a woman writer requires 500 pounds and a room of one’s 
own,352 here her Edwardian Sylvia has not yet analyzed why a Victorian Phyllis could not write 
under these conditions even if she were intellectually inclined to do so. Phyllis, at twenty-eight, 
already knows better, responding that even if she and her sister had the “brains” to write, “we 
couldn’t use them.”353  Therein lies the paradox, one Kafka might describe as a cage in search of 
a bird, a way out of father’s prison by choosing a prison of one’s own in the man who owns you; 
either way, the patriarchy has you. 
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 More to this point, with Woolf’s Greek studies and explorations as a backdrop, what both 
early stories begin to communicate is the difference between conversation and intellectual 
debate, forming dialogue for characters versus dialogue as character formation; that is, the 
Platonic idea of dialogue, an open dialogue, is a privileged, learned form of liberty available to 
men via their education (but not to women save those lucky enough to be liberated from their 
fathers and husbands, as in the fictional Tristrams or the actual Stephens from 1904-1906). That 
open exchange of ideas could be cultivated at university or men’s intellectual societies, but the 
same freedoms could not transpire between two women or a man and woman without a major 
breach of convention and etiquette.  
 Woolf discusses this conversational difference most explicitly and reflectively in her 
memoir when revisiting the patriarchal conventions of her “Victorian” childhood that dictated 
social interaction and exchange between men and women.  Here, it is teatime in Leslie Stephen’s 
house, and the servant’s bell has rung: “For then instantaneously we become young ladies 
possessed of a certain manner…..We should have first to make conversation. It was not 
argument, it was not gossip. It was a concoction, a confection; light; ceremonious; and of course 
unbroken. Silence was a breach of convention.”354 Personally and socially, to argue, to formulate 
an educated inquiry out of any question, much less the concentrated questions requiring 
abstractions and daring—in the instance of “Phyllis and Rosamond” the question of love— was 
indeed a breach of convention, and the Hibbert sisters’ lapse into silence simply indicates then 
the inability of the conventions inculcated in them to address and answer the conventions, 
Edwardian for Victorian, cultivated in the young men of Bloomsbury newly shot out of 
Cambridge. While Woolf holds the mirror up to her two natures, the one Hyde Park and the other 
Gordon Square—the divide is not bridged by the candid conversation, and by story’s end the 
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Hibberts restlessly return with relief to the previous century that holds them. That gap in time 
and culture, from Victorian to Edwardian (or ultimately Modern) in so many guises, shapes, and 
literary manifestations, is one of Woolf’s most consistent and persistent writing forays, her 
narratives in fiction and non-fiction always essaying to bridge, translate, transgress, embody 
what the times meant. 
 Are we far from the writer of Mrs. Dalloway who will envelop that instant—the 
Victorian past and the Modern present—with a tunneling process that allows her to swim and 
mine freely between the past and present? In “Phyllis and Rosamond” they could only be 
embodied by two sets of sisters looking at each other, in congress, rather than within the 
narrative mode and structure of her fiction that could gather such incongruities, dichotomies, and 
continuities within one character. Woolf’s childhood itself, both the family structure and the 
cultural dynamic of familial roles, provides her an extraordinarily personal insight into social 
shifts as temporal constructs worth exploring and ultimately telling: 
 
But from my present distance of time I see too what we could not then see—the gulf 
between us that was cut by our difference in age. Two different ages confronted each 
other in the drawing room at Hyde Park Gate. The Victorian Age and the Edwardian age. 
We were not his children; we were his grandchildren. There should have been a 
generation between us to cushion the contact…..Explorers and revolutionists as we 
[Virginia and Vanessa] were by nature, we lived under the sway of a society that was 
about fifty years too old for us. It was this curious fact that made our struggle so bitter 
and so violent. For the society in which we lived was still the Victorian society. Father 
himself was a typical Victorian. George and Gerald were consenting and approving 
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Victorians. So that we had two quarrels to wage; two fights to fight; one with them 
individually; and one with them socially. We were living say in 1910; they were living in 
1860. (MOB, 147, brackets mine) 
This was made all the more vivid by the unusual gaps in age that in Woolf’s instance exposed 
gaps in time, a present and a future extraordinarily quickened and intensified by the temporal and 
familial divisions. This personal dichotomy parallels the cultural and social dichotomy for 
Woolf, the looking glass she holds up to her own nature and British society’s. 
 Never did Woolf personally come to understand and know that distinction between 
Victorian conversation versus open dialogue or argument more explicitly and disturbingly than 
when George Duckworth took her to dinner at the Dowager Countess of Carnarvon’s house. 
While the passage in Woolf’s piece for the Memoir Club is infamous for the final scene of 
molestation and comical in its retelling for the memoir club, the actual dinner scene reminds us 
why Woolf’s relation to Greek is exceedingly personal, complex, and complicated:  
 
The conversation was mild and kindly. Indeed I soon felt that I could not only reply to 
their questions….but could initiate remarks of my own. Heaven knows what devil 
prompted me—or why to Lady Carnarvon and Mrs Popham of Littlecote of all people in 
the world I, a chit of eighteen, should have chosen to discourse upon the need of 
expressing the emotions! That, I said, was the great lack of modern life. The ancients, I 
said, discussed everything in common. Had Lady Carnarvon ever read the dialogues of 
Plato? “We—both men and women—“ once launched it was difficult to stop, nor was I 
sure that my audacity was not holding them spell-bound with admiration. I felt that I was 
earning George’s gratitude for ever. Suddenly a twitch, a shiver, a convulsion of amazing 
expressiveness, shook the Countess by my side; her diamonds, of which she wore a 
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chaste selection, flashed in my eyes; and stopping, I saw George Duckworth blushing 
crimson on the other side of the table. I realized that I had committed some unspeakable 
impropriety….and directly dinner was over George, pretending to help me on with my 
cloak, whispered in my ear in a voice of agony, “They’re not used to young women 
saying anything—” (Moments of Being, 174) 
 
If Greek was Woolf’s model of open dialogue, particularly between a man and a woman, the 
grand old Victorian ladies did not concur, and therefore neither did her step-brother. The “seven 
unhappy years”355 between the loss of her stepsister Stella in 1897 and the death of her father 
in1904, and that include these outings and private intrusions right through the thick of Woolf’s 
adolescence and sexual maturity into a young woman, are irrevocably associated with her study 
of Greek. Before George Duckworth crept in and flung himself on Virginia Stephen’s bed, 
Woolf was falling asleep to the thought of opening up her Greek dictionary the next morning to 
“go on spelling out the dialogues of Plato with Miss Case…”356 Woolf indeed claims that while 
she was recovering from her second psychotic break, “the illness that was not unnaturally the 
result of all these emotions and complications,” she was “convinced the birds were singing 
Greek choruses and that King Edward was using the foulest language possible among Ozzie 
Dickinson’s azaleas.”  The foul language of patriarchy is indeed the King’s English, but the 
Greek language, inaccessible to women precisely because the course of study at Oxbridge was 
unavailable to Woolf, has acquired its own psychological connotations and associations in Woolf 
accessing the forbidding texts. While we will never know the degree or severity of exactly what 
transpired between George Duckworth and Virginia Stephen, in enduring George Duckworth, 
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Virginia Woolf came to know that sex, gender, and Victorian patriarchal authority are imbricated 
in language. To discuss the open exchange of ideas between men and women evidenced in 
Plato’s dialogues, to showcase one’s learning and acquisition of Greek, was to be unnaturally 
silenced. In Victorian conversation, George knows, young women are not supposed to actually 
say anything.  By the time Virginia Stephen recovered, her sister had set up house for both of 
them in Bloomsbury. 
 No wonder that when Thoby, Vanessa, and Virginia first gathered both men and women 
for a new kind of dinner party at Gordon Square, the ones they deemed the “Thursday Evening 
Society” that were modeled upon the Cambridge Apostle “Conversazione Society” the majority 
of the young Bloomsbury men enjoyed as undergraduates,357 the difference came not only as a 
revelation but a revolution to Woolf.  At first she would attempt the Victorian manner and 
more—“None of our old conversational openings seemed to do…..The conversation languished 
in a way that would have been impossible in the drawing room at Hyde Park Gate. Yet the 
silence was difficult, not dull. It seemed as if the standard of what was worth saying had risen so 
that it was better not to break it unworthily.”358 Only when Vanessa “incautiously” uses the word 
“beauty” to describe a picture show did the silence transform Hyde Park conversation into 
Gordon Square dialogue.  At that, one of the young men would lift his head slowly and say, ‘It 
depends upon what you mean by beauty.’ ….It was as if the bull had at last been turned into the 
ring. The bull might be ‘beauty,” might be ‘good,’ might be ‘reality’. Whatever it was, it was 
some abstract question that now drew out all our forces…..The argument, whether it was about 
atmosphere or the nature of truth, was always tossed into the middle of the party….It had been 
proved that beauty was—or beauty was not—for I have never been quite sure which—part of a 
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picture.”359  In such a manner did conversation transform into dialogue in a year for Vanessa and 
Virginia Stephen, and the value of the Cambridge education is revealed to Woolf in a positively 
transcendent light, one that could allow Woolf to transform conversation into well-considered 
concepts and ideas as a burgeoning essayist and writer of fiction. “From such discussions 
Vanessa and I got probably much the same pleasure that undergraduates get,” Woolf continues, 
and even more revelatory is that these young Cambridge men “criticized our arguments as 
severely as their own….All that tremendous encumbrance of appearance and behavior which 
George had piled upon our first years vanished completely.” 360 By taking their arguments and 
points seriously, as seriously as their own, Woolf has her first glimpse at what it could be to be 
treated as an intellectual equal among men. 
 We can only imagine what, at this early phase of Woolf’s fiction writing, would have 
become of the incomplete story fragment entitled “A Dialogue on a Hill” written within the same 
two year span as the very first recorded stories from 1906-1908.  It not only begins by Woolf 
describing the Cornish moors and hills of her beloved Cornwall as surpassing those imagined by 
Homer’s “Lotus Isles.” Woolf’s envisioned dialogue has us imagining two English travelers, a 
man and a women—befittingly named Charmides and Eugenia given the Greek, Platonic 
subtext,—setting out to climb one of the loftiest moors in the region.  Woolf goes on, “…and the 
fact that the last named was a woman, gave its flavour of course to the dialogue; for it is 
surprising how much difference there is, even in this age, between a man’s view of the world and 
a woman’s view.”361 Woolf makes clear that their interest in each other is “Platonic” rather than 
in the colloquial sense of its usage, which allows them to talk freely but also to highlight the 
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difference, “….even in this age, between a man’s view of the world and a woman’s view.”362 
Perhaps most significantly, Woolf makes a point of indicating they are possessed of an “equal, 
and sufficiently high level of intelligence.”363 This is the ideal Woolf was groping towards in her 
fiction, an imagined English countryside reminiscent of the reimagined Greek islands where 
women taught Socrates or argued freely, without fear of censure or impropriety. 
 Conversation, then, and the model of the Greeks, particularly Plato’s dialogues, is more 
than conversation in the early writings of Woolf.  When Woolf inveighs against the 
“materialists” like Galsworthy, Bennett, or Wells by the time she was writing Jacob’s Room, she 
explicitly shifts the whole notion of “solidity” from a “well-constructed and solid” novel, the 
mode of realist fiction, to the Platonic manner and Socratic mode of speech, a dialogue and 
engagement of character and consciousness, and ultimately even a pattern and form of novel-
writing that, at least in shape, “hardens and intensifies into truth.”364   Woolf conspicuously has 
Rosamond reading Walter Pater’s Greek Studies the one moment in the morning she has free in 
the schoolroom before the men coming home to lunch intrude upon her serenity. She is just as 
soon conspicuously interrupted, her Greek studies unavailable even as a dalliance or pastime.  
The shape of a Platonic dialogue informs the conversation also unavailable to Phyllis but 
nonetheless observed by her in “Phyllis and Rosamond.” That ardent conversation, not 
schoolboys debating but a man and a woman engaged in dialogue that is at once abstract and 
frank, full of theories yet candid and practical enough concerning matrimony to be “startling” to 
Phyllis, is described by Woolf’s narrator as something that would crack and strip all the 
trappings of Victorian convention found in the Hibbert parlor. There, it would not be allowed. 
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Here, “Love…was a robust, ingenuous thing which stood out in the daylight, naked and solid, to 
be tapped and scrutinized as you thought best.”365  This was the Greek ideal reincarnated as 
Modern dialogue.  
 This is also why Woolf’s interlocutors in “A Dialogue upon Mount Pentelicus” both 
eschew Victorian ornamentation, sentiment and vestiges that “obscured the outline and destroyed 
the substance” in favor of “a Greek shape.”366  The setting is meant to suggest what Woolf would 
later describe as the Greeks inhabiting that “fastness all their own.” When the monk interrupts 
the dialogue and evokes from the Englishmen a reverie that “was lit by another power which 
survives trees and even plants them,” we are reading the kind of Platonic shape or pattern Woolf 
is making from the moment even in one of her earliest pieces of fiction that has survived. It 
returns similarly in the form that Woolf describes in “Modern Fiction” when she battles against a 
misplaced labor that obscures or blots out the “light of the conception,” her luminous halo to be 
traced by the author. That Greek relation to their language, the Greek character itself as 
manifested in their writings, is one that will “lead us from youth to age, groping through our 
island fogs and barbarities towards that unattainable perfection….We hear the voice of men 
whose outlook on life was perfectly direct and unclouded.”367  Always in these early pieces, one 
feels the Greek ideal set against how it played out not only in Woolf’s life but in the lives of her 
earliest characters and characterizations. 
 
 5.4: GREEK SOLIDS—MATTHEW ARNOLD AND THE MASCULINE LINEAGE IN 
WOOLF 
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 Pitting these two early short stories of 1906 against each other from this earliest 
formative phase of Woolf’s fictional writing and narrative exploration also exposes a faultline 
between the masculine and feminine “inheritances” of Greek that Woolf’s fiction willfully 
negotiates and, as it came to the male inheritance, often transgresses. Imbedded in these two 
early stories is how the Greek ideal erected by Victorian sages is then undermined by the tangled 
bank of Darwinian influence, including the late 19th century emergence of historical and 
anthropological study influenced by natural history that brought prehistory back to the edifice of 
a fully formed 5th century B.C. Greek ideal; there was more to the archeological ruins and 
classical texts than just the solidifying vision of Greece provided by certain imminent Victorians. 
If the present that Woolf stood upon in 1906 included the sway of the young Cambridge 
Apostles, especially the manners and mores of George Moore and his philosophy, there was also 
the Victorian scholarship that preceded it.  And with this male lineage of a Greek inheritance in 
Woolf, there was also a female lineage—one that in some fashion can be traced back not just to 
the great Greek heroines like Antigone or the poet Sappho or Socrates’ tutor Aspasia, but more 
heroically to the scholarship and model of Newnham College anthropologist Jane Ellen Harrison. 
1903 saw the publication of Moore’s Principia Ethica, but it also included Harrison’s 
Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, which revolutionized ways of seeing Greek 
antiquity beyond the patriarchal deification of Greek culture embodied on Mt. Olympus. The 
Greek gods and goddesses, as well as the Grecians who worshipped them, also had origin and 
descent with modifications. Moore and Harrison present two opposing figures of the Greek 
influence as it was present to Woolf at the turn of the century, but behind them is the scholarship 
and lineage of Victorian heritage—as Frank Turner succinctly puts it, there was not a “Greek 
tyranny over Victorians, but Victorian tyranny over Greece.”368 From Matthew Arnold to Walter 
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Pater to so many other mid and late Victorian luminaries, this sphere of influence impacted 
Greek studies for Woolf, in no small part because their circles intersected with Leslie Stephen 
and all things Cambridge. There was this other aspect of Virginia Woolf’s Victorian childhood 
through which she had to filter her own study and signification of Greece. 
 When "Phyllis and Rosamond"'s titular characters fictionally reoccupy the past of 
Virginia Stephen and her own sister Vanessa, the quintessential Victorian household as they 
experienced it; and then when the two unnamed interlocutors in “A Dialogue upon Mount 
Pentelicus,” clearly based upon Thoby and Adrian Stephen, ascend the mountain that made 
Periclean Athens marmoreal and envision it as their cultural moment—what did these two very 
different gendered perspectives on a Greek inheritance mean to the author who penned them 
both?  Just what is it that Virginia Stephen, the student of Greek, creates out of not just the male 
and female experience, but the male and female lineage of her Greek studies?  Critic Theodore 
Koulouris attempts to negotiate the complexity, even the contradictory aspects of Woolf’s 
personal, social, and cultural kinships to her own Hellenism: 
What the reader should keep in mind is that Woolf’s ‘Greekness’, awkwardly and 
sometimes painfully vacillating between the predominantly philological approach of the 
‘male’ line of British Hellenism and the newly-institutionalized ‘female’ scholarship in 
Greek, is emblematic of her own solitary study in the field and, more importantly, of her 
unease as a ‘female amateur’ in the socio-cultural co-ordinates of Hellenism.369 
What “Such were the Greeks!”370 means to the Virginia Stephen just emerging as an author has 
behind it, as a referent, what an entire English acquisition of Grecian antiquity meant to a 
Victorian culture transitioning to a Modern era Woolf actively engages and participates in, one 
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that Woolf registers differently not just for different characters but for herself writing at different 
phases of her career. The Greek ideal in Woolf has many manifestations, and they do not always 
cohere, not even for the student of Woolf. 
 What Koulouris’ exploration of Woolf’s “Greekness” bridges is also the critical studies 
of Woolf that are unavailable to ambiguity in utilizing Greek as a locus or logos of influence, 
whereby the Bloomsbury male homosocial and homosexual peers of Woolf must become a boon 
or a bogey to Woolf’s development as a writer. Or whereby the “female line” alluded to by 
Koulouris, specifically the prominent figure of Jane Ellen Harrison, becomes Woolf’s only 
positive acquisition of Greek and Greek literature. That the formative years of Woolf studying 
Greek also become significant in the losses she endures and the abuse she experiences create 
even more difficulties in sorting out a “homogenous force of influence.”371 Deciphering these 
two lineages of her Greekness, with a different emphasis than Koulouris for the purpose of 
delineating the solid and shifting influences of Woolf that includes the naturalist perspective, 
provides its own perspective. How this plays out in Woolf’s absorption of it and ultimately her 
application of it in her fiction creates its own dynamic between the solid and shifting polarities 
within the very question of “Greek” permeating the educated class of the British Empire. 
 Indeed, the “male line” of British Hellenism has its own ambiguities, dichotomies, and 
vacillations that form their own debates and differences within the ‘Oxbridge’ educated Britain 
from Victoria’s England up to Virginia’s, and what ideal Woolf does make of Plato and Greek 
literature more generally, regardless of the other significations and allusions Greek literature 
holds within the storehouse of Woolf’s canon, has this multifacted cultural history behind it. 
Woolf will title her most famous and explicit essay on Greek antiquity “On Not Knowing 
Greek,” a position of the “common reader” that Woolf herself utilizes to disarm the host of 
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Greek scholars and enthusiasts who’ve asserted that they do know and own Greek: “For it is vain 
and foolish to talk of knowing Greek, since in our ignorance we should be at the bottom of any 
class of schoolboys, since we do not know how the words sounded, or where precisely we ought 
to laugh, or how the actors acted, and between this foreign people and ourselves there is not only 
difference of race and tongue but a tremendous breach of tradition.”372 The tradition, though—
the male line that the line “Such were the Greeks!” is meant to parody in “Pentelicus”—compels 
its Oxbridge alumni to feel as if they have bridged that chasm of time.  
 The work that wielded the greatest influence and most emulated cultural adaptation of the 
Greek ideal in England belonged to Matthew Arnold, whose Culture and Anarchy (1869) 
became the text that made iconic this notion of Greek perfection for several generations of 
writers to come, Woolf included.373 His is the most predominant example of the male 
philological line of Victorian Hellenism. Simply juxtaposing its history and argument alongside 
Woolf’s allusions to Greece in “Pentelicus,” not to mention her essays “The Perfect Language” 
and “On Not Knowing Greek,” remind the reader just how closely connected Woolf was to so 
many seminal figures of Victorian classical scholarship. Culture and Anarchy  was first 
published serially between 1867-1868 in Cornhill Magazine, the same magazine first edited by 
William Makepeace Thackeray and taken over by his son-in-law Leslie Stephen in 1871.374 
Woolf’s father indeed swam in the same academic, familial circles with Arnold. When Woolf’s 
Cambridge men call the Greek escorts “barbarians” in “Pentelicus,” it is indeed not simply 
Plato’s usage but Matthew Arnold’s famous use of the term, along with the term “Philistines” to 
describe the upper and middle classes of England, respectively, to which the young Englishmen 
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make reference.375 Even at the turn of the century, Culture and Anarchy had become 
anthologized and taken as the definitive statement on Hellenism as it related to Victorian culture. 
“Arnold’s exposition of the character of  Hellenism…,” writes Frank Turner, “set the tone for 
discussions of Greek virtues for the next fifty years. Although humanistic appreciation for 
Greece did not begin with Arnold’s essay, many late-Victorian readers within and without the 
scholarly community were attracted to Greek civilization because of its alleged embodiment of 
the values that Arnold had championed.”376 While the Victorian scholarship on Greek religion, 
culture, and literature was quite varied, it is Arnold’s vision of a smooth, polished Greek 
perfection that became the definitive voice, the one you can hear behind the Apostolic ardor as 
well as Woolf’s own essays and sentiments that not only suggest but state that the “stable, the 
permanent, the original human being is to be found there” in Greek antiquity.377  
 Pitted against Hebraism as one of the two great civilizing impulses in Western culture, 
the former providing “right acting” with the latter providing “right thinking,” Matthew Arnold 
averred that the English had suffered more than just about any culture from a dearth of 
Hellenistic “ease, clearness, and radiancy”—Arnold’s most famous summative phrase for it 
Grecian “sweetness and light.”378 With a nod to Hegelian historical process, Arnold posited that 
Hebraism (under Christianity) had taken hold of European cultures by the fourth century A.D., 
but whereas Hellenism had returned to the forefront with the Renaissance in Italy and most of 
Europe, that foothold in England had been usurped by Puritanical fervor and the Protestant 
Reformation. Hebraism and its attendant zealous nature of moral reform and action had owned 
England and its ruling classes. Between the two “rival” forces, “dividing the empire of the world 
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between them,” there is never equilibrium, and what England above all needs in Arnold’s 1869 is 
the aiming towards perfection that Hellenism offers: 
 
But the true grace and serenity is that of which Greece and Greek art suggest the 
admirable ideals of perfection,—a serenity which comes from having made order among 
ideas and harmonized them; whereas the serenity of aristocracies, at least the peculiar 
serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin, appears to come from their never having had 
any ideas to trouble them.379 
Arnold makes light of the English aristocracy to the degree that he wonders whether “upon the 
whole earth there is anything so unintelligent, so unapt to perceive how the world is really going, 
as an ordinary young Englishman of our upper class.”380 What might save these brows 
unfurrowed by thought, as well as the rest of England, are the times themselves with the British 
Empire on the move—“and the essence of an epoch of expansion is a movement of ideas, and the 
one salvation of an epoch of expansion is a harmony of ideas. The very principle of the authority 
which we are seeking as a defense against anarchy is right reason, ideas, light.”381  That is, the 
idealized light of 5th century Periclean Greece.  Arnold’s synthesizing refinement that removed 
virtually all turbulence and conflict from ancient Greek history, provided the Greek “An 
unclouded clearness of mind, an unimpeded play of thought,” and will find the same atmosphere 
and temperament in Woolf’s thinking on Greek culture and literature. It stands in contrast to the 
clouded English countryside in all its correspondent vagueness and confusion.382 
 Never mind that Arnold’s Hebrews are in actuality his designated contemporaries and 
intellectual foils—English “Protestant Nonconformists” and other threats to culture that represent 
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overzealous individualism, commercialism, philosophies of subjectivity and mechanism, and 
other cultural signposts of anarchist tendencies and a disdain for authority—or that his notion of 
Hellenism derives not just from a broad reading of the classics as both an Oxford undergraduate 
and professor but more profoundly from the late eighteenth German critics of Hellene aesthetics 
and history.383 Arnold had fully internalized, for his own purposes, Coleridge’s famous 
delineation between the debased commercialism of industrialized Britain and “old England, the 
spiritual, Platonic old England.”384 What couldn’t be clearer to Arnold is the need for a Platonic 
return to England.    
 When Woolf also parodies the young Englishmen at Pentelicus claiming their Greek 
heritage, even speaking to the monk as “a Greek to a Greek,” behind this, too, is the emergent 
ethnological beliefs in racial “stocks” that Arnold alludes to in the “Hebraism and Hellenism” 
chapter of Culture and Anarchy. “Science has now made visible to everybody the great and 
pregnant elements of difference which lie in race,” Arnold writes,  
 
and in how signal a manner they make the genius and history of an Indo-European people vary from those 
of a Semitic people. Hellenism is of Indo-European growth, Hebraism is of Semitic growth, and we 
English, a nation of Indo-European stock, seem to belong naturally to the movement of Hellenism.385 
Matthew Arnold paired this belief with a Viconian-influenced cycle of history, borrowed from 
his father Thomas Arnold, that saw parallels of national development and progress at their apex 
with 5th century B.C. Greece and 19th century England respectively. Matthew Arnold’s famous 
and multiform assertions that sought a bulwark against the onslaught of the new, not just 
poetically against a receding “sea of faith” but against the flux of modernity, crucially juxtaposes 
the end of the 5th century of Greece with the present mid-century in England. In both eras and 
nations when there were signals of the end of the era, Arnold famously claims in his “Preface” of 
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1853, “the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems have presented 
themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement, of Hamlet and of 
Faust.”386 It is also why his father could write that “The period to which the work of Thucydides 
refers belongs properly to modern and not ancient history,” why, as Frank Turner summarizes it, 
“Thomas Arnold went so far as to claim that two civilizations standing thousands of years apart 
in time might have far more in common than ones separated by a few centuries.”387  Matthew 
Arnold's Athens of Pericles, noticeably without the more skeptical vision of Euripides and other 
nonconformists, could edify an England of Victoria because both cultures stood atop the 
precipice of progress, and the more perfected vision of Greece could provide that needed “agent 
of intellectual deliverance,”388 thereby passing the torch of sweet enlightenment to dear old 
England before it teetered over into anarchy.  
 That Arnold refined out of existence any impediments to the Greek ideal so that it could 
shine brightly for England did not escape Virginia Woolf, but neither did it prevent her from 
waxing poetic about the Greeks in the same vein. This Arnoldian line of thinking, the most 
predominant of the male Victorian lineage, remained steadfast in Woolf and informs her own 
reading of the Greeks. Woolf, too, idealized Greek literature and philosophy as much as any 
Victorian or Oxbridge graduate. To read passages from her 1917 essay “The Perfect 
Language”—Greek, of course— is to hear the Victorian echoes of Arnold: 
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Here we have the peculiar magic, the lure that will lead us from youth to age, groping 
through our island fogs and barbarities towards that unattainable perfection….It scarcely 
seems the right word for that extremely individual and definite spirit which is the flame 
of the Greek character….These lines, in the first place, seem to be written neither in the 
infancy nor in the old age of the world, but in its maturity. There is no prettiness as there 
is no mysticism in them. We hear the voice of men whose outlook on life was perfectly 
direct and unclouded….One is inclined to think of their literature, too, as a succession of 
complete and perfect utterances….Greek literature is not so much literature as the type of 
literature, the supreme example of what can be done with words.389 
 
Arnold could not have written his sentiments better himself, or the Apostolic crowd who read 
him, too, for that matter.  When Woolf concludes her more famous essay “On Not Knowing 
Greek” from the Common Reader (1925) with the plangent lines “and it is to the Greeks that we 
turn when we are sick of the vagueness, of the confusion, of the Christianity and its consolations, 
of our own age,” she has fully digested Arnold’s delineation between the Christian Hebraism of 
England and the needed relief and deliverance back to the supreme example of Hellenism. No 
wonder, in a short review of the Victorian critic’s unpublished letters, Woolf begins, “Even in 
these few letters Matthew Arnold stands out like a bust of the best Greek period, restrained, dear 
cut, aristocratic.”390  
 Still, the strength of Woolf's own idealization of Greek, even waxing panegyric with 
Plato at times, does not render her oblivious to the appropriation and acquisition of Greek as a 
male measuring stick.  When Greek language became English possession, Woolf exposed the 
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differences. She satirized, countermanded, and grew to oppose the social and cultural acquisition 
of Hellenism for empire, war, and country. This is also why juxtaposing Arnold alongside “A 
Dialogue upon Mount Pentelicus” renders the story not only satire but nearly pitch-perfect 
parody of Arnold’s Victorian Hellenism as it had been appropriated by Woolf’s male 
counterparts.  There they are, the six public school educated men, claiming themselves the heirs 
of Periclean Greece by their references and allusions, marching astride their statuesque 
equestrian donkeys and deeming all others barbarians in the solid belief that “Englishmen are 
Greeks.”  Plato is present, affirming their Greek ideal and alluded to four times as a dialogue is 
attempted on the famous slopes of the mountain, and like Plato, at a significant juncture a myth 
or a narrative that verges on poetry arises in the telling. But what cuts most deeply into Arnold's 
cultural argument is the final presence of the monk. It isn’t simply the Platonic ideal and the 
mythological reverie the six Englishmen make out of the monk, but the fact that the monk is, 
well, a monk.  The whole final sequence lightly satirizes Arnold’s rivaling cultural attachments. 
Arnold’s lectures to his countrymen on the Hebraic and Hellenistic find unlikely synthesis and 
cohesion in this figure of the monk simply fulfilling his responsibilities for the monastery 
nearby.391   Here is your consolation of Christianity, and although “brown” in complexion rather 
than the white of marble, he has the brow and physique that could have stood for the famous 
Greek sculptor who cut and chiseled the human form divine from the stones of Pentelicus. This 
hapless Christian meets a Greek fate in the eyes of his beholders, a satirical yet unifying symbol 
of Arnold's iconography. The way the Englishmen see him has everything to do with how they 
were taught to see in the 19th century. 
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 5.5: STATUES OF STATUTES FROM LORD ELGIN TO THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON 
 What makes the satire all the more comprehensive is how “Pentelicus” and its marble 
make their way into Woolf sharing and ultimately shattering the Victorian Hellenistic ideal as it 
manifested itself through sculpture as culture, Grecian statues as English statutes and status. 
Rather than the dialogue in Athens or another inhabited Grecian city where Plato would have 
presided, the mountain itself provides origins, and the Englishmen must “stumble painfully 
among the crude blocks of marble….It was salutary, because in Greece it is possible to forget 
that statues are made of marble, and it is wholesome to see that marble opposes itself, solid and 
sharp and perverse to the sculptor’s chisel.”392 Each Englishman at this point imagines himself 
Phidias or at the least Praxiteles, and you “would have supposed that each speaker had some 
personal conquest to celebrate and was the generous victor of the stone himself. He had forced it 
to yield its Heres or its Apollo once with his own hand.”393  
 Behind this imagined possession of Greek mastery by the Englishmen is indeed the 
English possession of Greek masterpieces. Woolf reminds us that the mountain “bears on her 
side the noble scar” suffered at the hands of Phidias and his stonemasons, and then has each 
Englishman imagining and virtually believing they'd sculpted masterpieces themselves. That 
same marble that went into the edifice of the Parthenon is of course the Elgin Marbles housed in 
England since Lord Elgin’s acquisition of them and placement in London’s British Museum. 
While it is not necessary (or possible) to discover all that the possessed marble meant in terms of 
influence upon English aesthetics and culture in the 19th century, the reappropriation of 
Pentelicus marble by Woolf’s travelers resonates with the impact back home. 
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 Part of this allusion to sculpture is buried in passing reference when the travel group falls 
short of correctly quoting Thomas Love Peacock in the attempt to deride English philistinism. 
Peacock’s Crotchet Caste (1831), as S.P. Rosenbaum convincingly argues, is a major influence 
on the tone, content, and style of Woolf’s own narrated dialogue.394 Largely bypassing the 
topical issues of Greek independence and politics, the major point of discussion comes to rest on 
“what it was that the Greeks had been, and what it is that they are no longer.”395 This is not to 
say that the Cambridge companions don’t also allude to their disdain for their own common 
English sect and how far they fall short of the classical Greek measuring stick, schooled as these 
young men are on both Matthew Arnold’s brand of Hellenism as well as Peacock’s satire of the 
Victorian intellectual debate over Hellenism.  One of the funniest passages in “Pentelicus” has 
Woolf’s most vocal polemicist attempting to quote Peacock’s famous lines from Crotchet's 
Castle but unable to do so.  Asking for his travel copy of Peacock to recall the line, he 
remembers it “had been left with certain socks and a tin of tobacco, the bitterest loss of all, in the 
ruins of Olympia.”396 There’s the greater lament of the lost tobacco over Peacock’s lost novel, 
and so the exact quotation and the haze of a good smoke, if not the clarity of the past, are lost to 
the travelers as well.  
 Woolf’s interlocutor only manages to pull out Peacock’s first line as a referent to his 
idealization of classical Greece, but the content of those lost lines carry a larger subtext for 
Woolf than the speaker can speak or see. Woolf’s tourist turns nostalgic:  
 
such a people were as sudden as the dawn, and died as the day dies here in Greece, 
completely. Ignorant of all that should be ignored—of charity, religion, domestic life, 
learning, and science—they fixed their minds upon the beautiful and the good, and found 
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them sufficient not for this world only but for an infinite number of worlds to come. 
“Where the Greeks had modesty—” but to finish the quotation, for he must read what 
none now could speak….  (65) 
The lost lines come from Mr. Crochet himself in Peacock’s novel, worth quoting at length to 
land Woolf’s point:  
 
Mr. Crotchet— “But where the Greeks had modesty, we have cant; where they had 
poetry, we have cant; where they had patriotism, we have cant; where they had any thing 
that exalts, delights, or adorns humanity, we have nothing but cant, cant, cant. And, sir, to 
show my contempt for cant in all its shapes, I have adorned my house with the Greek 
Venus, in all her shapes, and am ready to fight her battle against all the societies that ever 
were instituted for the suppression of truth and beauty."397  
 
Mr. Crotchett’s argument is with the good Reverend Doctor Folliott, who cannot stomach a room 
full of nude sculptures, much less discussion of English maidens turned wives that should even 
consider posing nude (or being nude).  The modest example and meaning the Rev. Dr. Folliott 
espouses to counter Greek nudity is the ideal 19th century woman, one Woolf would later 
describe as the Victorian "angel of the household" who in Peacock “stays home and looks after 
her husband’s dinner.”398 Mr. Crotchet indeed had filled his house with every nude sculpture of 
Venus his money could buy in defiance of a recent edict from London that “no plaster of paris 
Venus should appear in the streets without petticoats.”399 That the selfsame Venuses that Mr. 
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Crotchett points out were realized from “the finest imaginings of Plato” cause in the Rev./Dr. a 
conundrum—“disposed as he was, that whatever had been in Greece was right,” the English 
worship of all things classically Greek comes into direct conflict with English modesty and 
propriety and a woman’s place in society, something Rev. Dr. Folliott finally is able to qualify 
by remembering the more limited and rightful place of Plato in the pantheon of Greek study and 
worship at the English universities: “I am aware, sir, that Plato, in his Symposium, discourseth 
very eloquently touching the Uranian and Pandemian Venus; but you must remember that, in our 
Universities, Plato is held to be little better than a misleader of youth; and they have shown their 
contempt for him, not only by never reading him…but even by never printing a complete edition 
of him.”400  To only the limited number of English personages who had read Plato’s Symposium 
would Folliott show these nude statues, whereas Crotchet would show all to learn a radically new 
(because radically old and Greek) modesty. The debate concludes magnificently with Mr. 
Crotchet saying hypothetically he would allow “Miss Crotchet to sit for a model to Canova,” a 
sentiment that so overcomes the Reverend Doctor’s sense of propriety that he physically 
“overbalanced his chair, and laid himself on the carpet in a right angle, of which his back was the 
base.”401 That the good Reverend Doctor’s moral rectitude and backside come to model a 
Pythagorean geometry all its own provides one of the richest, most hilarious scenes in all of 
Peacock. 
 So it is that Woolf, via Peacock and Arnold, counters a perceived moral philistinism with 
an idealized philhellenism, but, in both Peacock’s chapter and Woolf’s allusion to it through her 
Englishman in Greece, the satire cuts both ways. Mr. Crochet has read just enough of the Greeks, 
furnished in his library by the good Reverend Doctor himself, to be dangerous. Just so, Woolf’s 
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young man begins to quote Peacock and can’t, but it doesn’t prevent him from then creating out 
of his oratory a Platonic form of the ideal human generalized to all Greeks of Greek antiquity. As 
they allude to the statuary cut from the mountain’s marble two millennia previously, part of the 
distance measured in the descent of Pentelicus, from the Greek to the English, is indeed what is 
lost in time. Woolf’s first speaker, her Adrian Stephen character, recapitulates Mr. Crotchett’s 
argument when he postulates that the Greeks, “by paring down the superfluous had revealed at 
last the perfect statue, or the sufficient stanza, just as we obversely by cloaking them in our rags 
of sentiment and imagination had obscured the outline and destroyed the substance,” a point he 
argues to the ultimate conclusion—that there isn’t any room left “for any later form of beauty to 
creep in,” that “nothing is left for us but to worship in silence” their accomplishments. To this 
the Thoby figure, already guilty of a heresy, Woolf’s narrator says, by voting as a masters 
graduate to remove the compulsory study of Greek at Cambridge— (“that Greek should cease as 
he put it, ‘to whip stupid boys into good behaviour’”)402—reminds his companion that, not only 
did he only “take a third in [his] tripos,”  but that he was speaking as a “sentimentalist” who 
makes of the Greeks “all that is best in yourself” and “which can mean in short all that we do not 
know and as in your case all that we dream and desire.”403 Rather, this second interlocutor avers 
that in the “words of Milton” and other English writers can still be found a beauty that measures 
up to the Greek ideal. The Thoby character might not take the Greek idealization as far as his 
brother in theory, but he comes off as even more arrogant and condescending; the gist of his 
argument actually aligns Plato and Sophocles with himself—“So, while you read your Greek on 
the slopes of Pentelicus, you deny that her children exist any longer. But for us scholars404—” 
Their debate rests not upon how ideal and superior the Greeks of antiquity remain, but upon 
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whether or not the Englishmen have access to it in their own superiority over the barbarity of 
contemporary Greece—and the rest of England and Europe, for that matter. 
 And this is Woolf’s engendered difference as, quite consciously, a female Hellenist. It is 
conspicuous that the Virginia Stephen who made that same trek up Pentelicus with her brothers 
and sisters and Violet Dickinson in the fall of 1906 does not include a female interlocutor or 
presence in the story save, perhaps, the narrator herself.  Instead, to provide the female 
experience of Greek statuary and the male English inheritance and appropriation of it, the stone 
edifices, like Elgin’s Marbles, come to England.  Again, Peacock gives us a context: In the same 
chapter of Crotchet's Castle, “The Sleeping Venus,” Mr. Crotchet fully lays out his preference 
for the Athenian women of antiquity “who would not have made any scruple about sitting as 
models to Praxiteles,” that his woman should be modeled after Aspasia or Lais rather than the 
Good Reverend’s insipid examples of the Athenian virgins (I.e., English maids) who grew up 
into wives who stayed at home. “Well, sir, the Greeks,” Crotchet continues:  
 
why do we call the Elgin marbles inestimable? Simply because they are true to nature. 
And why are they so superior in that point to all modern works, with all our greater 
knowledge of anatomy? Why, sir, but because the Greeks, having no cant, had better 
opportunities of studying models.405 
 
Crotchet additionally references contemporary modest women in Italy, a countess no less, who 
would sit for Canova, disrobing all arguments for Victorian-style modesty and the controversy 
then surrounding nudity in stone. As Crotchet argues that his Venuses are the very model of the 
                                                           
403 Shorter Fiction, 66. The “tripos” of course refers to the undergraduate Classical Tripos at Cambridge, upon which Adrian had 
only earned a 3rd, his Greek knowledge and translation skills not measuring up to the exemplary 1st or more accomplished 2nd. 
404 Ibid., 68. 
405 Works of Peacock, 126-27. 
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natural, his guffawing foil responds, “It is too natural: too natural, sir.”406 A century later, 
Woolf’s Englishmen are still debating Victorian modesty and Victorian cant. 
 There was more at stake than whether or not the Greek ideal of beauty was natural or not. 
With the Elgin Marbles then on display in the British Museum, the whole question of modesty 
and the Greek ideal as represented by Phidian sculpture arrived home with cannons and fanfare. 
In June of 1822, the Statue of Achilles was erected, part of the Wellington Monument in Hyde 
Park, becoming London’s first display of a public nude sculpture since antiquity. Pericles had 
commissioned the building of the Parthenon to pay homage to Athena in delivering Athen’s 
victory over the Persians; so, too, would the English honor General Wellesley’s victory over 
Napoleon by commissioning Richard Westmacott to sculpt the Statue of Achilles out of the 
French cannons melted down after recent victories in the Napoleonic Wars.407 This, the same 
Westmacott who studied under Italian artist Antonio Canova alluded to by Peacock, and whose 
father “had testified in favor of purchasing the Elgin Marbles on the grounds of their affinity 
with natural beauty.”408 That Westmacott added a caressing fig leaf over the loins of Achilles did 
not truncate or diminish the controversy, the dispute all the more ironic since the funds for the 
statue had been collected by a league of English women. This, indeed, is the neoclassical 
controversy Peacock’s chapter alludes to, as Crotchet furnishes his house with nude Venuses 
after reading in the papers about the newest edicts regarding resolutions to the nude statutes that 
“no plaster-of-Paris Venus should appear in the streets without petticoats.” (The paper Crotchet 
read had a cheesemonger hitting his brother, a street vendor, over the head with one such plaster 
Venus he was selling as part of his wares.)   
                                                           
406 Peacock, 122 
407 See University of Southampton’s online course, Wellington and The Battle of Waterloo, “Achilles and the Ladies 
of England.” Online, https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/wellington-and-waterloo/1/steps/35648 
408 Turner, 46-47. 
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 Canova is also topical to Peacock’s novel and Woolf's story given that Canova’s "Nude 
of Napoleon as Mars the Peacemaker"(1802)  had just arrived in England before the erection of 
the Achilles sculpture.  The piece was commissioned by Napoleon but given to the Duke of 
Wellington as war loot. When Napoleon first saw the eight foot marble sculpture that presented 
him magnificently Greek and deified (and therefore completely naked), he purportedly 
responded, "trop athlétique" and hid it from public display.  Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, 
however, proudly displayed the Canova like a war trophy in front of his banister at his private 
residence in Hyde Park, Apsley House409, steps from the entrance whereby the public monument 
to him and his embodiment as the English Achilles were to stand.  
 There, then, are Phyllis and Rosamond in their Victorian drawing room that is the model 
of propriety. In the few moments they have between morning errands and lunch guests, 
Rosamond casually picks up a copy of Pater’s Greek Studies, and before their uncanny encounter 
with the liberated Tristram sisters—the very modern models of an Aspasia and Lais, one might 
imagine, liberated from a reverend/doctor who would have them naturally virginal, insipid, and 
at home preparing dinner—Lady Hibbert concludes the young ladies’ afternoon of calls with 
“the slow passage through the Park, making one of the procession of gay carriages which travel 
at a foot’s pace at that hour round the statue of Achilles.”410 Nearly the same scene plays out in 
Jacob’s Room with more explicit irony. Clara Durrant, with Jacob on her mind, walks past the 
Wellington Monument: 
 
The loop of the railing beneath the statue of Achilles was full of parasols and waistcoats; 
chains and bangles; of ladies and gentlemen, lounging elegantly, lightly observant. 
                                                           
409 See full story of Canova’s nude: http://rijksmuseumamsterdam.blogspot.cz/2012/10/met-antonio-canova-napoleon-as-
mars.html 
410 Complete Shorter Fiction, 23 
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 ‘This statue was erected by the women of England…’” Clara read out with a foolish 
little laugh.411 
 
In the same series of vignettes, Jacob draws “a plan of the Parthenon in the dust in Hyde Park” 
soon after his return to Greece. In anticipation of that trip, a newly educated man from 
Cambridge, Jacob reads Plato’s Phaedrus in view of the British Museum he’d just visited,  
 
And there the Elgin Marbles lie, all night long, old Jones’s [the museum security guard’s] 
lantern sometimes recalling Ulysses…and Jacob, was reading the Phaedrus, heard…the 
woman battering at the door and crying, ‘Let me in!’ as if a coal had dropped from the 
fire, or a fly, falling from the ceiling, had lain on its back, too weak to run over.”412 
 
If the statues of Venus in Crotchet’s Castle are to be covered with petticoats so that the men of 
England aren’t immodestly aroused, the statue of Achilles stands in homage to the British 
patriarchy, the spoils of war secured for the British Empire and the ensuing prosperity of 
Victoria's England. There stands the war hero of Homer’s Iliad, modeled on the Pentelican 
marble from Phidias and the Parthenon, signifying the transfer of martial authority from 
Periclean Athens to Wellington’s England. Whether a male or female nude, a symbol of Love or 
War (and the physical Greek ideal of both), they are in possession of the patriarchy. A woman 
might scream “let me in!” at the foot of the British Museum, but the erection of the Greek ideal, 
and the triumphal passage of it from Plato to young men admitted to the museum’s reading 
room,  remains Jacob’s, the 'Oxbridge' male's prerogative.  
 
                                                           
411 Complete Works of Virginia Woolf,  ebook, Loc 15411. 
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 5.6: FROM GREEK SOLIDS TO LIQUIDS—THE FEMININE LINEAGE IN WOOLF 
  What Matthew Arnold did to idealize the literature and state of ancient Greece borrowed 
in part from the larger, burgeoning tradition of art criticism in England in the 19th century. 
Hegel’s historic idealism had taken hold in England in the latter half of the century, but it was 
the Johann J. Winckelmann’s essays on Grecian art that popularized the notion of the ideal 
Hellene whose sun-drenched climate contributed to a culture where man (and the artist sculpting 
him) can stand in relation to nature as a prelapsarian ideal—an Adam walking naked without 
need of a Hebraic narrative (as in Arnold) that will clothe him in original sin by myth’s end.413 
“Too natural,” retorts the Doctor Reverend in Peacock, but for the most influential Victorian art 
historian John Ruskin, that nudity and sensuality, in the hands of the Greeks, possessed a natural 
childlike innocence that had been repressed by Christian culture. The Greek ideal was more 
perfected because it was closer to nature, not further removed from it. In Modern Painters 
Ruskin famously asserts that “The Greek lived, in all things, a healthy, and in a certain degree, a 
perfect life. He had no morbid or sickly feeling of any kind.”414 Sir Joshua Reynold's Discourses 
(1790), influenced by Winckelmann, had certainly impacted Ruskin and others.  The most 
dominant artistic voice in England before Ruskin, Reynolds aspired  to search for a Platonic kind 
of ideal beauty in the art object, to turn not just to natural form but to the works of the great 
masters to find the moral tincture and form necessary for perfection.415 To Winckelmann, 
ultimately, can we attribute both Arnold’s and Woolf’s turn to the climates of Greece and 
England to define the unclouded and clear vision of the Greeks versus the obfuscating haze and 
                                                           
412 Complete Works, loc 14591. 
413 Again, see Turner, pages 40-48. 
414 The Works of John Ruskin, 39 vols., ed. by E.T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (London: George Allen, 1903-1912), 
5:230. 
415 See Reynold’s Discourses Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy, ed. Roger Fry (London: Seeley and Co., 1905). As 
a prime example: “The Art which we profess has beauty for its object; this it is our business to discover and to express; the 
beauty of which we are in quest is general and intellectual; it is an idea that subsists only in the individual; the sight never beheld 
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emotional thickets of English artistry. The English, in this view of artistic temperament,  lived in 
the cave of Plato's Republic, whereas the severe, southern climate of Greece gave it the greater 
power of the sun's clear-skyed illumination.  
 This aggregate formation of the Greek ideal had become commonplace, promulgated by 
authors as varied as the German Hellenists translated into English, then by the prime examples of 
Ruskin and Arnold, and additionally the Victorian mid-century popularizes of Plato—Richard 
Nettleship and Benjamin Jowett at Oxford in particular416.  Whatever England lacked or aspired 
to, there was this ideal available to fill it. The male line, Theodore Koulouris succinctly 
summarizes, was "characterized by serenity, clarity, reason, restraint, grandeur, and 
collectedness (as exalted in the proportionate lines and shapes of classical sculpture and 
architecture)."417   
 Such a collection of Greek statuary and sculpture in England gave archeologists and 
anthropologists much to work with, and such an idealized version of Hellenism was originally 
shared by Jane Ellen Harrison as well. Her early work Introductory Studies in Greek Art (1885) 
put the vision of the ideal perhaps most explicitly in her introductory remarks, espousing that her 
goal would be accomplished "…if, by the help of the wisdom of Plato,…I can show any of the 
citizens of our state why…they may nurture their souls on the fair sights and pure visions of 
Ideal art.”418 Plato’s thoughts on the universality of forms and the ideal types had indeed been 
generalized by Harrison, early on, as the universal thoughts of all ancient Greece. Though they 
had “every opportunity for the development of realism,”  [‘Realism’ in contemporary English art 
being Harrison’s straw man for the supremacy of Grecian art], “the Greek deliberately and 
                                                           
it, nor has the hand expressed it….and conducting the thoughts through successive stages of excellence, till that contemplation of 
universal rectitude and harmony which began by Taste, may, as it is exalted and refined, conclude in Virtue.” p. 264. 
416 for the role of Nettleship and Jowett, see “The Victorian Platonic Revival” in Turner’s Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain, 
369-446. 
417 Hellenism and Loss in the Works of Virginia Woolf. p. 40. 
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consciously rejects it.” Even in a votive statue, “We see here the promptings of that instinct for 
generalization, that rising from the particular to the universal, which for the Greek issued 
ultimately in the highest idealism.419"  In order to discover the sweetness and light of Greek art, 
England had to come out of the cave of its contemporary art scene, Harrison suggests. 
 Such conventional statements on Grecian art that both Ruskin and Arnold would approve 
and recognize come as Harrison’s own self-critique when she introduces her thesis in 
Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion almost twenty years later. By this time, her work 
alongside that of her fellow Cambridge Ritualists and J.G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890), 
had subjected the Greek ideal to evolutionary time and prehistory. Quoting Ruskin as a foil 
instead of borrowing his ideas, Harrison writes, 
 
In characterizing the genius of the Greeks, Mr. Ruskin says: “there is no dread in their 
hearts; pensiveness, amazement, often deepest grief and desolation, but terror never. 
Everlasting calm in the presence of all Fate, and joy such as they might win, not indeed 
from perfect beauty, but from beauty at perfect rest.” 
She then proceeds to articulate how the highest achievements in Greek literature and sculpture—
achievements Ruskin, Arnold, and others had idealized as "beauty at perfect rest"—is not the 
same as ritual, the more primal and therefore primordial aspect of religion wherein origins, the 
irrational, and indeed fear can be found.  By "viewing Greek religion exclusively through the 
medium of Greek literature," Harrison argues that we mistake a culminating work like Homer's 
for a timeless statement—"The Olympians of Homer are no more primitive than his hexameters. 
Beneath this splendid surface lies a stratum of religious conceptions, ideas of evil, of 
purification, of atonement…It is this substratum of religious conceptions, at once more primitive 
                                                           
418 London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1885, p. vii. 
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and more permanent, that I am concerned to investigate."420 Whereas Arnold and the idealists 
had given us only Olympia, Harrison gives us the Chtonic, the ecstatic, the primitive, and she 
inverts the whole notion of permanence as the surface serenity that gazing too long at the solidity 
of marble had illusively provided.  
 While Harrison is not alone by 1903 in attending to this darker side of Greek culture, not 
merely her fellow Cambridge Ritualists421 but significantly Freidrich Nietzsche and James Frazer 
in such seminal works as The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and The Golden Bough (1890),422 it was 
Harrison's greater attention to gender that reveals a correlating pattern in Woolf. Especially in the 
companion work Themis: A Study of the Social Origins in Greek Religion (1911), Harrison 
interprets the serene, dispassionate states of the Greek contemplating his gods in relation to his 
world with what such a veneer represses. Rather than the "patrilinear culture" that the Olympians 
came to represent, Harrison found the older, more vital and grounded "matrilinear society" in the 
earliest evidence of the "women's festivals," the mysteries in the worship of Dionysis, Orpheus 
and most significantly in the newly discovered "Hymn of the Kouretes."  Grecian life was not 
ultimately the form seen, but the emotion felt, whether it be dread or fear or ecstasy, and those 
works that seem emblems of ideal order and eternal stability instead symbolize the expurgation 
of those emotions. These sacred rituals embody what was alive in Greek culture, and if you were 
to find what endures in the Greek ideal, you find what is most human and collective. Rather than 
beauty at perfect rest, hers was a Grecian world alive and vibrant in flux and transformation. 
                                                           
419 Ibid., 189. 
420 Prolegomena, 1-2. 
421 Usually included in this list along with Harrison are William Robertson Smith, anthropologists  F.M. Cornford, Gilbert 
Murray (at Oxford), and A.B. Cook. By most accounts, including Robert Ackerman’s definitive study on the Cambridge 
Ritualists, Harrison is at the very center of the group and the most passionate, forceful contributor. 
422 see The Myth and Ritual School: J. G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists by Robert Ackerman. (New York: Rutledge, 
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 Not surprisingly, this is why Frank Turner, Robert Ackerman, and other scholars who 
have studied Harrison's impact in the field of anthropology agree with Turner's assessment of her 
as one of the most influential "Evolutionary Humanistic Hellenists."423 Her appeal is obvious to 
feminist studies of Woolf, which have solidified the significant ways her example, scholarship, 
and indeed relationship became important to Woolf.424 Harrison was that rare woman who had 
knocked down the door when the "Beadles" of A Room of Ones Own stood in the way, protecting 
their male homosocial culture and preventing entrance. She not only studied at the British 
Museum; she worked there under the mentorship of Charles Newton. One of the early graduates 
of Newnham College then became its most preeminent professor and scholar, the alluded to and 
sometimes unnamed female figure in many of Woolf's works.425 What remains to be discovered 
is how Harrison's ecstatic embrace of evolutionary theory, as well as philosophers and thinkers 
equally impacted by Darwin such as Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and William James, transformed 
this female lineage of Hellenism to an evolutionary Hellenistic lineage. Together with these 
                                                           
423 Frank Turner’s term for the Hellenistic movement of the latter half of the 19th century that turned to Darwin’s theory as the 
impetus to discover origins in the field. 
424 See, for starters, Patricia Malka, Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts and Jane Harrison’s Con/Spiracy. Studies in Modern 
Literature (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1987); Jane Marcus, “Taking the Bull by the Udders: Sexual Difference in 
Virginia Woolf—A Conspiracy Theory.” Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1988). 
425 Woolf famously alludes to her in A Room of Ones Own in the first chapter, the culminating scene of her reverie traipsing 
through Fernham on beautiful Spring evening before the reality of October and an insipid serving of soup interrupts the fantasy: 
 
….but in this light they were phantoms only, half guessed, half seen…then on the terrace, as if popping out to breathe 
the air, to glance at the garden, came a bent figure, formidable yet humble, with her great forehead and her shabby 
dress—could it be the famous scholar, could it be J— H— herself? (17) 
 
The Woolf's Hogarth Press had just published Harrison's autobiography, Reminiscences of a Student's Life (1925) a few years 
previous to the publication of Room, and Woolf's acquaintance and friendship, not to mention her influence upon Woolf's 
feminism, is well documented during Woolf's mature work from To the Lighthouse to The Waves, but the shadow of Jane Ellen 
Harrison also makes an earlier guest appearance in Jacob's Room:  
 
Miss Umphelby sings him melodiously enough, accurately too, …and then, taking her way up the avenue towards 
Newnham, she lets her fancy play upon other details of men's meeting with women which have never got into print. 
Her lectures, therefore, are not half so well attended as those of Cowen, and the thing she might have said in elucidation 
of the text for ever left out. In short, face a teacher with the image of the taught and the mirror breaks. (42) 
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figures emerges the influence of Walter Pater, another key aesthetic influence on Woolf who is 
surprisingly one of the foremost 'Evolutionary Hellenists.'  His application of Platonic idealism 
as a centripetal force anchoring itself atop the Heraclitean stream allows Woolf, with the 
stimulating ideas of Harrison, to dynamically strike the balance between the Greek moments of 
vision and the Darwinian moments of being. 
 Arguing as much also reinforces why clean, linear timelines that delineate 'influence' with 
Woolf are not nearly as successful as discovering what resonates with Woolf and her fiction. 
And why the "male lineage" of the Greek ideal in Woolf, as clearly present as it is, acts more like 
a complex, ambivalent, contradictory sphere. Woolf absolutely thrilled in her autonomous and 
voracious study of Greek language, literature and philosophy, and to be a voracious reader of 
Victorian literature was also to engage in the atmosphere of the writers who tapped most into her 
favorite early disciplines of Greek and natural history as they manifested themselves in fiction 
and non-fiction. The Greek ideal, just as it had been for Matthew Arnold, became a working 
metaphor for Woolf.   
 But though she could and would borrow much conceptually from Arnold and other 
representatives of the male line in her formulation of Greek "solidity," his version of Greekness 
also represents "paid for culture," as she memorably puts the question of education years later in 
Three Guineas (1938). There, in Chapter 3 (her third guinea to pay), Woolf's interlocutor is a 
letter from a young, educated man soliciting her counsel to avoid war and, in so doing, asking 
her to pledge with him "to protect culture and intellectual liberty."426 Woolf and all the 
"daughters of educated men" have paid and paid for that culture, the one Arnold and his ilk so 
passionately espoused, "from 1262 to 1870.” Woolf writes:  
 
                                                           
426 Three Guineas, “Three,” (New York: Harcourt, 1938), p. 85 
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The question which concerns us is what possible help we can give you in protecting 
culture and intellectual liberty—we, who have been shut out from the universities so 
repeatedly, and are only now admitted so restrictedly; we who have received no paid-for 
education whatsoever, or so little that we can only read our own tongue and write our 
own language…. 
 And now, clearly, some further definition of 'culture and intellectual liberty' would be 
useful…We need not consult Milton, Goethe, or Matthew Arnold; for their definition 
would apply to paid-for culture.427 
Matthew Arnold as the author of Culture and Anarchy cannot answer to the irrationalism that 
brought about WWI and what Woolf could clearly see as the onset of WWII and the spread of 
militant fascism. The Arnold brand of Hellenism, by obfuscating all aspects of it that didn't agree 
with a serene Hellene, left a dialogue with itself incomplete. Frank Turner's assessment of 
Matthew Arnold's deficiency is worth giving the last word:  
 
Their Hellenism almost denied the existence of the nonrational, aggressive, and self-
destructive  impulses in humankind. Arnoldian Hellenism promised that an embracing of 
the secular and finite would carry no significant social or psychological cost. As a 
consequence, while the voices of that mode of Hellenism and of humanism have been 
unfailingly eloquent and nobly intentioned, their thought and their prescriptions for 
modern culture have been rendered impotent by the larger events of this century.428 
 
 In "A Dialogue Upon Mount Pentelicus," the Thoby Stephen character remains 
permanently etched in the ascent and descent Woolf memorialized in one of her last shared 
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428 Greek Heritage, 36. 
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experiences with her brother.  Jacob's Room allows her brother to come home from his Greek 
journeys, heroic and solidified in his ideas of his own emerging identity as a Cambridge man 
among the the rulers of the British Empire. Instead of Thoby’s death from Typhoid Fever,  Jacob 
falls "In Flanders Fields" where "the poppies grow / Between the crosses, row on row.”429 There 
Woolf's satire is thoroughly ironized and elegiac. While nothing would be so charming and 
profoundly liberating to Woolf as the presence beginning in 1904 of the Cambridge 
Bloomsburies, their paid for culture could not completely pave the way for hers. Phyllis and 
Rosamond and her Victorian past she was no longer, but the younger Hibbert sister Doris is 
studying to go to college, we are told in the same story. It is Doris's copy of Walter Pater's Greek 
Studies, we might assume, that Phyllis borrows. 
                                                           
429 Woolf derives the surname of Jacob Flanders from Flanders Field, one of the bloodiest battlefields of WWI. John McCrae’s 
patriotic poem “In Flanders Fields” became the most famous jingoistic call to continue the fight of the dead soldiers. See Paul 
Fussell’s seminal The Great War and Modern Memory for an excellent exegesis of this poem in the context of WWI poetry. 
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Chapter Six   
The Moment behind Virginia Woolf’s Being: A Brief Stretch in Darwinian 
Time and Platonic Form from Pater to Woolf 
 
 
SOME VERSIONS OF THE TEMPORAL 
Transitioning from the Victorian heritage of Greek thought to the Modern assimilation of 
it, I begin where Chapter Five ended, with Jane Ellen Harrison. Her establishment of a 
matrilinear example for Greek studies, based as it is on evolutionary principle, finds kinship with 
Woolf's emerging fictional aesthetic and incorporation of Greek imagery and thought into that 
aesthetic.  It is then necessary to depart Cambridge and explore the writings of that obscure 
Oxford don, Walter Pater. His assimilation of the pre-Socratic philosophy of Heraclitus to 
Darwin will be treated in some length here, because it gives specificity to the convergence of the 
impact of evolutionary theory with the great passion for the backward glance of history, 
especially Hellenism. The emergent intersections of both preoccupations provoke some of the 
more prevalent dialogues and disagreements in Modern philosophy and art.  Many of the ideals 
that have Greek thought as their foundation were subjected to both an historical reading and an 
evolutionary process. The Greek ideal is indeed often personified in the figure of Plato, on the 
polar end of Darwin’s argument against immutability and fixed forms, and he becomes the other, 
ancient immensity that tips over or weighs down a position, depending upon where each poises 
the fulcrum of his arguments and beliefs. So Friedrich Nietzsche will make Dionysus and not 
Heraclitus or Plato his philosophical contemporary, and still try to rid the world of its historical 
disease, the influx of an evolutionary plague infecting an Hegelian “world process.” As an 
alternative, Nietzsche will value “becoming” an overman rather than becoming an evolutionary 
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“has-been.”  Henri Bergson, quite comfortable at his presupposed topmost branch of evolution, 
will find the temporal the right place for consciousness and creativity, his “real duration” an 
evolutionary time meant to correct Plato’s misshapen, spatial logic.  William James will agree 
with Bergson, and see consciousness as a stream we habitually travel.  To free that stream of 
“absolute” debris—so that pragmatism may relieve individual beliefs after Darwin renders truths 
as mutable as species—will be the partial and provisional truths James may claim for us.  The 
most vigilant response to James, Bergson, and Nietzsche is Bertrand Russell’s, whose logical 
empiricism will not take Darwin’s temporal upheaval as a possible valuative term, no matter 
what the terms. His and G. E. Moore’s example were the strongest for the male members of 
Bloomsbury, but the Cambridge connection does not mean Woolf merely appropriated their 
position when she sought to develop a new aesthetics for fiction. The "moment" in Woolf's 
fictional experimentations in temporality; her own readings of Darwin and the writers who 
responded to him; her complex, feminist perspective created out of these altering positions 
generates a narrative process that was protean in shape but singularly dynamic in its engagement 
with evolutionary theory and classical form.  This chapter’s argumentative destination will lead 
us up to Woolf’s inheritance of these dilemmas that came to inform her aesthetics. Ultimately, 
using Harrison's assimilation of the thinkers and philosophers here provides us a new way of 
seeing Woolf in relation to them. With this we may draw some insight into the dialectic formed 
from the striking stability of the Platonic moment of vision dissolved and subsumed into the 
Darwinian moments of being, Woolf's abiding image and working metaphor for her culmination 
of these ideas the "semi-transparent envelope."  Together it offers a more complete 
"prefiguration," to borrow Ricoeur's parlance, to Woolf's narrative configuration. This 
destination has many routes through the currents of Modernist thought. 
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 6. 2: EVOLUTIONARY HELLENISM—JANE ELLEN HARRISON'S GREEK 
DARWINIAN WOMEN 
 There have been many important studies of Woolf's kinship and indebtedness to 
Harrison, particularly in two profound ways. First, Harrison provides Woolf with models of 
female scholarship and intellect to counter the misogynistic, sexist arguments she anticipates and 
indeed answers in such seminal essays and works as A Room of One's Own (1928), "The 
Intellectual Status of Women" (1929), and Three Guineas (1938). Harrison stood as Woolf's 
perfect rebuttal to the remarks, even of longstanding friend and Cambridge Apostle Desmond 
McCarthy, who under his pseudonym "Affable Hawk" agreed with Arnold Bennett's statement in 
The New Statesman that "women are inferior to men" and "no amount of education and liberty of 
action will sensibly alter it." Woolf revisits A Room of One's Own and her study of women, 
profession, and fiction through the centuries, offering this reply: "When I compare the Duchess 
of Newcastle with Jane Austen, the matchless Orinda with Emily Bronte, Jane Grey with Jane 
Harrison, the advance in intellectual power seems to me not only sensible but immense…and the 
effects of education and liberty scarcely to be overrated."430 She is, in short, Woolf's iconic 
symbol and model of female scholarship and intellectual capacity. That kinship and resonance 
are especially powerful since Harrison's primary and most significant works in the field of 
anthropology concentrate on Grecian antiquity, which we have established as an essential 
influence and abiding passion in Woolf.   
 Second—and arguably just as importantly, though the two remain in Woolf 
intertextually, culturally, and personally related—Harrison's research into "matrilinear society" 
in Greek religion, ritual, and literature provides Woolf a fecundity of metaphorical possibilities 
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and mythological overtones that Woolf then metamorphoses into a Modernist, feminist literature 
of her own.431 The Demeter/Persephone layering of the mythic element in the Mrs. Ramsay/Lily 
Briscoe characters of To the Lighthouse, for instance, unearthed by critic Tina Barr, and the 
associations of the aloof Olympian male deity in the form of Mr. Ramsay,  laid out by critic 
Martha Carpentier, both offer compelling readings of Harrison's impact on perhaps Woolf's most 
important novel. Jane Marcus first suggested the use of Harrison's thesis in Themis to see the 
charwomen of "Time Passes" in To the Lighthouse and Miss La Trobe in Between the Acts as the 
"prepatriarchal" figures who respectively restore order and preside over the rituals and 
performances of the novels.432 The Greek resonances in Woolf's fiction, the masculine ones that 
attach to her characters in description or bearing, who stand as aloof and marmoreal as the 
Olympian gods; or the feminine ones who perform rituals of purgation and mystery worthy of 
Chtonic or Eleusian ceremony, are unquestionably indebted to Harrison. 
 Indeed, Theodore Koulouris' booklength exploration of Woolf's "Greekness" locates Jane 
Ellen Harrison as the key branch of Woolf's "female lineage" in her Hellenism. This alternative 
to the one most influentially proposed by Matthew Arnold's Greek ideal of "sweetness and light" 
instead focuses attention on the "'darker' line" that "calls into question" Arnold's traditional 
designations "by focusing attention on the primitive, chtonic element of its religious 
sentiment."433 This includes, in Koulouris's synthesis, "the ritualistic and mythical element; the 
religiosity; the violence; the excess; the irrationality." While such designations and delineations 
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seem to castigate women and thrust them back into the dark ages (or perhaps even more aptly the 
stone ages), "darkness" in its application here has a positive value and originating designation as 
Harrison comes to embrace it. It is not unlike Theodor Adorno's negative dialectic that proffers a 
"negative knowledge of the actual world,”434 a knowledge that Harrison comes to embrace rather 
than repress..  
 Behind both of these important contributions to Woolf's aesthetic via Harrison is their 
shared engagement with Darwin. An intriguing thought isn't simply that, of the great writers who 
were influenced by Harrison including Joyce and Eliot, Woolf was the one most familiar and 
acquainted with both the person and her work. "She knew Harrison personally from 1904 to her 
death in 1928," writes Carpentier, "visited her in Cambridge, London, and Paris, and referred to 
her familiarly in diaries and letters as "Jane" or "dear old Jane."435 Virginia and Leonard Woolf 
not only had copies of most all of Harrison's major works, one of them even personally inscribed 
by Harrison and given to Virginia as a Christmas gift.436 Their Hogarth Press in fact published 
Harrison's memoir Reminiscences of a Student's Life (1925) as well as the translations of 
Harrison's lover, partner and most devoted student, Hope Mirrless.  When Woolf had the 
pleasure of visiting "Jane" in France in the summer 1923, she recounted to Jacques Raveret how 
much "This gallant old lady, very white, hoary, and sublime in a lace mantilla, took my fancy 
greatly" not just for her appearance but for "her superb high thinking agnostic ways." Harrison 
praised Woolf and her sister, along with her Lytton Strachey, as the only members of their 
generation she can respect because they had not, post-war, succumbed to religious dogma. 
"There are thousands of Darwins," Woolf responded. By this Woolf meant the world was still 
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safe and hospitable to agnosticism and scholars, but Harrison took the statement literally as 
Darwin's children— "traitors!" she dubs them in their conversions to orthodox beliefs: "'With 
that name!' She cried, 'that inheritance! That magnificent record in the past!'"437  
 Harrison's engagement with Charles Darwin is undoubtedly profound, and this is why 
Robert Ackerman deems her one of the most prominent evolutionary anthropologists of the era, 
perhaps the most prominent since at the center of Cambridge Ritualists and, alongside James 
Frazer,  accorded the most prestige by her contemporaries.438 While Frazer gets much of the 
attention, rightfully so for The Golden Bough's influential, erudite, and comprehensive 
contribution in comparative evolutionary anthropology,  it is Harrison who remains faithful to 
the evolutionary tenets of Frazer's religious and cultural studies.439 The third aspect of Harrison's 
importance for Woolf, I suggest, is how Harrison's evolutionary anthropology transitions from an 
epistemological to an ontological study of Greek art and religion. By incorporating Henri 
Bergson's premise in Creative Evolution of "dure'e" or "concrete duration,"  Harrison reevaluates 
the role of the irrational and ritualistic vestiges in Greek antiquity by embracing the collective, 
unifying principles of a Grecian matrilinear society behind the male Olympian remoteness of the 
5th century BC.  In other words, ways of seeing the Athens of Pericles evolved from the 
ritualistic, cultural procession of Greek life, one deeply conscious of the pre-Socratic and 
prehistorical, an analysis that binds the Greek ideal to evolutionary process. The experience of 
reading much of Woolf's vacillations between the solid and shifting revisits Harrison's own 
movements in scholarship; Woolf's moments of vision metamorphose into moments of being in a 
process that perpetually fuses the Greek and evolutionary vacillations into the structure of her 
writing. 
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 Harrison offers her most explicit appreciation of Charles Darwin, as well as his impact 
and influence upon her and other anthropologists, in her contribution to Charles Seward's 
compendium of Darwin and Modern Science (1909). In this collection gathered in celebration of 
the centennial of Darwin's birth and the fiftieth anniversary of The Origin of Species, Harrison 
begins, "The title of my paper might well have been 'the creation by Darwinism of the scientific 
study of Religions,' but that I feared to mar my tribute to a great name by any shadow of 
exaggeration."440 In broad but precise strokes, Harrison uses the canvas of evolutionary theory to 
explain how the study of religion became grounds for scientific study after Darwin, something 
that would have been anathema and improbable before him and without him. Harrison compares 
the "normal attitude" towards religion previous to The Origin of Species and The Descent of 
Man, and then makes "manifest that it is the doctrine of evolution that has made this [new] 
outlook possible and even necessary."441 She argues that Darwin's vision at the end of The Origin 
of Species where, "In the future I see open fields for far more important researches," including 
psychology, laid the groundwork for looking to "the necessary acquirement of each mental 
power and capacity by gradation."442  By not only arguing but showing (and thereby proving) 
through a protracted, carefully crafted excess of example and evidence, Darwin brought to 
biology the gradualist principles of geology whereby nature does not make leaps; the "continuity 
of life" is a process of gradation like the sediments on the tangled bank where Darwin's endless 
forms are evolving.  Thus, for the students of both "the classics and religion,"—Harrision points 
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out "the most conservative of subjects,"—the call to apply Darwin's "creative ferment was slow 
indeed to work."443 
 As Harrison saw early on, when The Origin of Species hypothesizes that "Light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history,"444 this illumination after The Descent of Man had 
to include, in spite of the heretical thoughts it induced, both the religions of "primitive" culture as 
well as current religious practice in dear old Platonic England. With dogma and the "revelatory" 
nature of religious doctrine, "the teleological scheme" was "complete and 
unalterable….Religion, so conceived, left no place for development."445 A religious dogma is a 
thing learned but not critically examined--that is to say in Harrison's vernacular not yet examined 
from the perspective of evolutionary origins and function. Harrison enjoys here contemplating 
the Judeo-Christian beliefs taken as doctrinal fact that sound as implausible as any "primitive" 
myth or religion, from the snake in the garden to anthropomorphic gods to virgin births being 
translated and transmitted by missionaries from England to the "savages." As Edward Tylor was 
first to explore and expose in Primitive Culture (1871), evolutionary theory applied to religious 
study and the field of anthropology could produce significant results and shed the light Darwin 
had predicted.446  Just like man is not above or beyond the mechanism of natural selection and 
evolution, neither is the Anglican Christian exempt from a study of religious origins and what is 
"primitive." 
 After reading and absorbing Darwin and Tylor, Harrison's scholarship ceased to seek the 
ideal or the perfect Greek, or in a Ruskin or Arnold fashion actively repress that which did not 
cohere with such idealization. She instead brought time and process to bear on her investigations 
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and scholarly excavations of Grecian art, ritual, and religion. Vestiges of origin and descent were 
to be found everywhere, from the birth of tragedy not just as Nietzsche philosophized and the 
ancients reported, but as the artifacts on the Elgin Parthenon frieze recreated.  There were the 
original primitive effigies and provincial daemon spirits informing  the rituals surrounding the 
anthropomorphic deities of the Homeric hymns. Religion in Harrison becomes primal, a thing 
enacted and not simply (or originally) contemplated in a text: "But man has ritual as well as 
mythology; that is, he feels and acts as well as thinks; nay more he probably feels and acts long 
before he definitely thinks."447  Before the mythological becomes theological in Harrison's 
estimation, the story or sculpture was a thing done for a collective, cultural reason. In 
Prolegomena, she mentions that "We are so possessed by a set of conceptions based on Periclean 
Athens, by ideas of law and order and reason and limit, that we are apt to dismiss as 
'mythological' whatever does not fit into our stereotyped picture."448 After Darwin's impact, the 
6th century of Greece, as well as all before it, became more profoundly important, because less 
understood, than the 5th century.  Harrison rephrases this Darwinian notion more broadly in her 
memoir when she writes, "A thing has little charm for me unless it has on it the patina of age. 
Great things in literature, Greek plays for example, I most enjoy when behind their bright 
splendours I see moving darker and older shapes."449 Origins are everywhere. 
 With religion and its rituals now operating under the same naturalistic principles of 
descent and evolution, Harrison, without guise of impartiality, begins to prefer the earthly, the 
Chtonic, and even the irrational tendencies behind Greek worship, the Dionysian over the 
Apollonian, to use Nietzche's valuative terms that Harrison, too, voraciously digested. At this 
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point of contemplating Darwin's influence, Harrison was well underway in her sequel to 
Prolegomena, the equally important Themis, where she will make Darwinian evolutionary 
principles the key instruments of exegesis and anthropological excavation: "No one now thinks 
he can have an adequate knowledge of Greek art without the study of the Mycenean and Minoan 
periods," Harrison writes, "and since the roots of religion strike as deep as or deeper than the 
roots of art, no one now will approach the study of the Olympian Zeus without seeking for the 
origin of the god in his reputed birth-place."450 Her writing exudes a barely contained elation, 
that the material now being studied and unearthed is "so primitive that we seem at last to get 
back to the very beginnings of Greek religion….It lets us see myth as well as ritual in the 
making, it will even disclose certain elements that lie deep embedded in early Greek 
philosophy."451  
 This was the "Hymn of the Kouretes," an archeological discovery at Palaikastro 
unearthed at the temple of the Diktaean Zeus; this delighted Harrison because it "embodied this 
very group-thinking, or rather group-emotion towards life, which I had begun to see must 
underlie all primitive religious representations."452 For Harrison, the Hymn fulfills a theory born 
from her study that the Olympian deities were a late, not an early flowering of religion, that these 
"Olympians were not only non-primitive, but positively in a sense non-religious." Her 
"Introduction" to Themis still reads with an élan and conviction and a delightful partisanship that 
brought Harrison her critics, but how forceful today still reads the invocational lines:  
 
The Olympian gods—that is, the anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Pheidias and the 
mythographers—seemed to me like a bouquet of cut-flowers whose bloom is brief, 
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because they have been severed from their roots. To find those roots we must burrow 
deep into a lower stratum of thought, into those chthonic cults which underly their life 
and from which sprang all their brilliant blossoming.453 
Harrison's instincts, she says, were to "condemn" the Olympians as products of art and religion 
rather than the felt life of actual, primitive Hellenistic ritual, but the discovery of the Hymn gave 
her an even more profound insight—that Zeus and the other Olympians of patrilinear descent 
evolved from an earlier social structure that was matrilinear. 
 Borrowing from Frazer but imaginatively extending what might be inferred from the 
origins of deities in agriculture and vegetation, Harrison avers that when the Olympians are 
divested of their plant or animal form, the result is "strangely, significantly negative." In this 
"process of extrusion from nature," the Olympians lost their "Enaitus-daimon," Harrison's own 
term for the natural waxing and waning yearly "world process of decay, death, renewal." It is 
telling that Harrison gives agency to the Olympians in their aloofness, remarking that "The 
Greek Gods, in their triumphant humanity, kicked down that ladder from earth to heaven by 
which they rose." They ascended to the clouds of Olympus, cut flowers indeed, and this shift of 
attention and religious focus "from Earth to Sky, tended to remove the gods from man; they were 
purged but at the price of remoteness." Harrison continues, 
 
It is characteristic of an Olympian, as contrasted with a mystery-god like Dionysos, that 
his form is rigidly fixed and always human. The Zeus of Pheidias or of Homer cannot 
readily shift his shape and become a bird, a bull, a snake, a tree. The Olympian has come 
out from the natural facts that begot him, and has become 'idealized."….He must have 
human form and the most beautiful human form; human intellect and the highest human 
                                                           
453 Ibid. 
 210 
intellect. He must not suffer and fail and die; he must be ever blessed, ageless and 
deathless. It is only a step further to the conscious philosophy which will deny to God 
any human frailties, any emotions, any wrath or jealousy, and ultimately any character 
whatever except dead, unmeaning perfection, incapable of movement or change.454 
Here, in other words, is Arnold's Greek ideal of sweetness and light inverted so that its example 
is a negation of life, not a vital contribution to culture, and in its ideal human perfection, eternal 
rather than temporal, a form divorced from humanity and incapable of movement and change.  
 Severed as such from their origins, these Olympians are abstractions, things thought 
rather than things done, to use one of Harrison's favorite distinctions, and in arriving at 
tendencies of the patrilinear and matrilinear religious practices, "these Olympians represent that 
tendency in thought which is towards reflection, differentiation, clearness, while the Eniautos-
Daimon [the matrilinear] represents that other tendency in religion towards emotion, union, 
indivisibility. It might almost be said that the Olympians stand for articulate consciousness, the 
Eniautos-Daimon for the sub-conscious."455 Harrison makes her reading quite explicit that the 
social structure at play within her study of ancient art and ritual pairs the Olympians with "the 
same as the modern family, it is patrilinear." Dionysos is the one adapting Olympian whose 
relation to his mother and the Maenads refer back to the earlier matrilinear social structure, but 
they all originate from the primal, collective, unifying matrilineage. 
 And this is crucial, as what unifies both "lineages" is this figure of "Themis" derived 
from the Hymn of the Kouretes—"Above the gods, supreme, eternally dominant, stands the 
figure of Themis. She is social ordinance, the collective conscience projected, the Law or 
Custom that is Right." Harrison endows Themis with such power and animism that she 
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represents that aspect of totem religions whereby "man and nature form one indivisible 
whole….behind Gaia the Mother, and above even Zeus the Father, stands always the figure of 
Themis."456 Harrison's radical reading of not only the Hymn but of the entire effigy of the Greek 
ideal proposes that the hard, chiseled artifice of Periclean Greece comes at the cost of its 
religious value—that is to say ritualistic and therefore human value, one derived from the 
maternal impulses that are collective, undiffereniated, natural, and unifying.  
 Already the inferences one can make regarding Woolf's own exegesis of Harrison's text 
for her fiction and nonfiction are multiform and significant—the revision and grounding of the 
Greek ideal in its matrilineal rather than patrilinear (ergo patriarchal) origin; the search for a 
collective, common, undifferentiated voice that can animate her fiction and the narration of it 
like the dithyrambic undulations of the chorus both Woolf and Harrison admired; the kinship 
with Darwin that brings grandeur to this view of life where time and evolution and gradation 
might take away the consolation of immutable form but still provide the recompense of wonder 
and transformation. These are all important, and save the Darwinian aspect well-reviewed by 
feminist scholars of Woolf and Harrison. 
  But what makes Harrison's work resonate with Woolf's, less apparently but still 
profoundly, is how much Harrison's study of antiquity and religious ritual is located in a 
vitalistic, irrationalistic celebration of the present moment, what Woolf, we must repeat, terms in 
her own description of a private philosophy as "moments of being." The difference between the 
Harrison even of Prolegomena and the writer concurrently of "The Influence of 
Darwinism"(1909) and  Themis (1912) is her eager absorption of Friedrich Nietzsche, Emile 
Durkheim, William James, and most significantly Henri Bergson.  She quotes all of them 
enthusiastically in both works and then in the ensuing Ancient Art and Ritual (1913), especially 
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Henri Bergson whose Matter and Memory (1896) and Creative Evolution (1907) were 
immediately utilized and applied to her reading of religion and ritual. Harrison is quick to point 
out, regarding Darwin's influence, that "the very word 'Creator' has nowadays passed into the 
region of mythology. Instead we have 'L'Evolution Creatrice,’” later on in this essay calling 
Bergson one of the contemporary "masters." Likewise, Harrison early on and often alludes to 
Bergson in Themis, writing within the first several paragraphs of the Introduction that to France 
she owes a "debt, indirect but profound, and first and foremost to Professor Henri Bergson": 
 
It is no part of Professor Bergson's present programme, so far as I understand it, to 
analyse and define the nature and function of religion. But when, four years ago, I first 
read his L'Evolution Creatrice, I saw dimly at first, but with ever increasing clearness, 
how deep was the gulf between Dionysos the mystery-god and that Olympos he might 
never really enter. I knew the reason of my own profound discontent. I saw in a word that 
Dionysos, with every other mystery-god, was an instinctive attempt to express what 
Professor Bergson calls dure'e, that life which is one, indivisible and yet ceaselessly 
changing. I saw on the other hand that the Olympians, amid all their atmosphere of 
romance and all their redeeming vices, were really creations of what Professor William 
James called 'monarchical deism.' Such deities are not an instinctive expression, but a late 
and conscious representation, a work of analysis, of reflection and intelligence.457 
When Harrison added Durkheim's thought that primitive religion in practice, 
phenomenologically, "reflects collective feeling and collective thinking," she had found her 
thesis for Themis. Bergson's invective against intellectualism, as embodied by Platonism and its 
contemporary manifestations, is uncritically, panegyrically, holistically applied by Harrison to 
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her reading, thinking, and writing on the Greeks. The Plato of Parmenides and other dialogues 
who will explicate "that queer thing, the instant" will find its modern expression and rebuttal in 
Bergson. The insight is revelatory to a scholar who does not believe in revelations: "What we 
think about Greek religion affects what we think about everything else…I have come to see in 
the religious impulse a new value. It is, I believe, an attempt, instinctive and unconscious, to do 
what Professor Bergson bids modern philosophy do consciously and with the whole apparatus of 
science behind it, namely to apprehend life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and 
change."458 
 This common ground found through contemporary philosophy, ironically, opened 
Harrison up to sharp criticism and even discredited her as a practicing anthropologist459. That 
Harrison is a famous female scholar of antiquity on or about 1910, the most prominent and 
influential of the Cambridge Ritualists, is important to Woolf, regardless. (Roger Fry in 1909, 
Woolf amusingly notes in her biography of Fry, gave Harrison the supreme compliment of 
remarking that she had a "truly Apostolic mind.")460 But by situating the study of antiquity in the 
present—not as a literary or artistic form to idealize but as a ritualistic, connected, collective 
energy with a female force at its center to experience and feel—Harrison gave to Woolf an 
anthropological model that might very well serve as a literary model. "The only intelligible 
meaning that ritual has for me, is the keeping open of the individual soul--" Harrison poses, "that 
bit of the general life which life itself has fenced in by a separate organism—to other souls, other 
separate lives, and to the apprehension of other forms of life. The avenues are never closed. Life 
itself, physical and spiritual, is the keeping of them open."461   It is in the moment, experienced 
individually and collectively, where ritual and process partakes of the movement and process of 
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evolution, that Woolf, following Harrison, will form a very important aspect of her aesthetics of 
semi-transparency. This temporal open-endedness and shift from religion and culture, as an 
object of study to phenomenological experience, binds Woolf not just to Harrison but to James, 
Bergson, and Walter Pater, to whom we turn to next. 
 
 6.3: PATER’S CREATOR—HERACLITUS AS DARWIN 
Walter Pater, an enigmatic figure in life as in Virginia Woolf’s work, has nonetheless 
been labeled, in Perry Meisel’s The Absent Father, as Woolf’s largest literary influence.462 This 
book-length study fully examines the influence of Walter Pater’s aesthetic on Virginia Woolf; 
but we do not need Harold Bloom’s anxious Freudian paradigms and Meisel’s assertion that 
Pater is Woolf’s unacknowledged literary father to make comparisons or connections. To do so, 
Meisel must see every aesthetic principle of Woolf’s through that gem-like crystallization of 
Pater’s perceptions, downplaying Woolf’s numerously acknowledged aesthetic influences.  For 
our purposes, Meisel ignores not only the use Pater makes of Darwin, but also Woolf’s reading 
of Darwin and the Greeks independent of Pater.  His sister Clara did teach Woolf Greek (as 
mentioned in the previous chapter), Woolf owned and read much of his collected works at a 
young age, and Woolf does write in Orlando, among a list of several other authors, that “no one 
can read or write without being perpetually in the debt of…Walter Pater,”463 a gratitude that 
makes sense in Woolf’s fantastical pseudo-biography of a gender-bending, time-traveling 
aristocrat. But where Woolf’s Orlando begins life in the English Renaissance, Pater rarely writes 
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of figures historically past the Renaissance, more comfortable in the Hellenic past than any other 
period.464 
 His “Conclusion” to the Renaissance (1873), in fact, begins with an epigraph of Plato 
quoting Socrates quoting Heraclitus, who says “All things are in motion and nothing at rest.”465    
This is the same epigraph Pater translated in Plato and Platonism as “all things give way; 
Nothing remaineth.”—466putting the idea in the starkest terms imaginable.  If we remember 
Pater’s counsel in his “Conclusion,” that “our one chance lies in expanding that interval” of the 
moment in art and song, we should also remember he sets artistic vision against this “continual 
vanishing away” of ourselves in time:  “Experience dwindles down” impressions to “a single 
moment, gone while we apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased 
to be than that it is.”467   This “ceased to be” is Heraclitus’s theory of perpetual flux set forth in 
Pater, and the idea has in an era spanning what we loosely call Modernism its myriad variations 
and negotiated responses—William James’s “stream of consciousness” and Henri Bergson’s 
“real duration,” Hardy and Conrad’s “moments of vision,” Joyce’s “epiphany,” and Woolf’s 
“moments of being,” to name only a few.  Rescuing the moment from conventional notions of 
time becomes the substance of philosophical and literary works, announcing almost ubiquitously 
a Modern aesthetic, perplexed by an increasingly troubled vision of temporality.468   
But before giving the age away to Heraclitus, we should also note how Pater makes 
Heraclitus his contemporary: 
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The theory of perpetual flux was indeed an apprehension of which the full scope 
was only to be realized by a later age, in alliance with a larger knowledge of the 
natural world, a closer observation of the phenomena of mind, than was possible, 
even for Heraclitus, at that early day.  So, the seeds of almost all scientific ideas 
might seem to have been dimly enfolded in the mind of antiquity; but fecundated, 
admitted to their full working prerogative, one by one, in after ages, by good 
favour of the special intellectual conditions belonging to a particular generation, 
which, on a sudden, finds itself preoccupied by a formula, not so much new, as 
renovated by new application…The entire modern theory of ‘development,’ in all 
its various phases, proved or unprovable,--what is it but old Heracliteanism awake 
once more in a new world, and grown to full proportions? (Plato and Platonism, 
18-19) 
How Pater reacts to this modern Heracliteanism—his peculiar rescue of the moment from the 
flux of time—demonstrates an early and important example of an aesthetic that took the “modern 
theory of ‘development’” and translated it into an artistic sensibility. The seeds of Heraclitus, 
Pater argues, embedded underneath Plato’s “fixed ideas,” are only now expressing their full 
germinating power through this “formula, not so much new, as renovated by new application”: 
those theories of development that have as their strongest branch Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
In his essay on “Style” (1888), Pater explicitly offers his vision of a future literature that 
will have as its enterprise, “for many years to come […] the naturalisation of the vocabulary of 
science, so only it be under the eye of a sensitive scholarship.”469  This was certainly one of 
Pater’s prerogatives, his own assimilation of evolutionary theory. His biographer Michael Levey 
notes Pater  “lived to write coolly, almost uncontroversially, that evidence for the Darwinian 
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theory […] was constantly increasing.”470  And Billy Andrew Inman has exhaustively researched 
and cataloged Pater’s readings of and about evolutionary theory (among other things) that came 
to inform his writing the Renaissance “Conclusion,” including Darwin, Herbert Spencer, George 
Henry Lewes, and Thomas Huxley.471  
 Pater’s most explicit elucidation of evolutionary thought is in Plato and Platonism 
(1893).  In that work, Pater continually evokes Darwin’s theory as a contemporary context from 
which to view the historical sensibility that Plato inherited from his philosophical predecessors, a 
useful scope of the present from which to view the past.  Inman muses that Pater’s reading of 
Plato must have been an awakening experience. “Here, in this ancient text, he found concepts 
that he had thought to be modern: such as, relativity, the perpetual flux, and the subjectivity of 
knowledge.”472 Plato’s dialogues had at each bend damned the currents of philosophical thought 
that argued perpetual change and the indeterminacy of knowledge, but the stronger, more current 
counterarguments once again overflowed Platonism’s banks through Darwin’s massive wake.  
The revelation in Pater’s chapter on “Plato and the Doctrine of Motion” is that Plato’s types or 
ideal forms are established against Heraclitean flux, and after twenty-three centuries of stony 
sleep, “Darwin and Darwinism” answers back  “‘type’ itself properly is not but is only always 
becoming.”473  The “long argument” of The Origin of Species, which early on announces 
Darwin’s claim “that species are not immutable,”474 arranges about it example after example of 
the slippage between organic forms, if perceived through time, so that type indeed opens up to a 
transitional and continuous becoming. Only always becoming because evolution, if understood 
through Darwin’s lapses of geological time and the slow, graduating steps of natural selection, 
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“implies,” in Darwin’s words, “the continual supplanting and extinction of preceding and 
intermediate gradations” (OS, 166).  So Pater comments that “the eye and the sun it lives by 
reveal themselves, after all, as Heraclitus had declared (scarcely serious, he seemed to those 
around him) as literally in constant extinction and renewal.” A few passages later we read “the 
Darwinian theory—that ‘species,’ the identifying forms of animal and vegetable life, immutable 
though they seem now, as of old in the Garden of Eden, are fashioned by slow development, 
while perhaps millions of years go by: well! every month is adding to its evidence” (20). Hence, 
Pater transforms a few allusive fragments of Heraclitus into a Darwinian figure of “full 
proportions.”  
Such investment crucially reveals how Darwin’s descent leads Pater, and then Woolf, 
among so many contemporaries and heirs, to believe we are not assured the hard outline of final 
form in either life or art. Especially malleable becomes the human form, now not divine though 
by adaptive necessity always refining and refining. How differently Pater’s most regarded 
passage on La Giaconda reads, his own “symbol of the modern idea” an aesthetic of 
evolutionary characteristics.475 To break Pater’s Lady Lisa up rudely to foreground the point, she 
is: “older than the rocks among which she sits.”; “expressive of what in the ways of a thousand 
years men had come to desire”; “the deposit, little cell by little cell, of strange thoughts and 
fantastic reveries and exquisite passions”; “all the thoughts and experience of the world…in that 
which they have of power to refine and make expressive the outward form”476  Pater’s 
hyperbolic language, at first simply setting her for a moment beside Greek statuary, passes her 
through time with increasing intensity and extension,  “dead many times, […]a diver in deep 
seas,” until Pater brings her to  modern philosophy’s conception of “humanity as wrought upon 
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by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought and life, ” that idea of perpetual motion, we 
are reminded, “an old one.”477  Those “changing lineaments” of her form, which so inspired 
Yeats when he read Pater’s prose, embody the dynamics through which Pater writes, again and 
again, the moment’s impression down even as it becomes, adds to, disappears into the past.   
Woolf does not have her one emblematic Mona Lisa; she has many La Giocandas in 
regard to the passage of time, but they are not mute, and Woolf concerns herself much less with 
the ways that men had come to desire them.   They are, in Woolf, the person to whom things 
happen. They may be framed, as Mrs. Ramsay is in her window, and the amateur post-
impressionist Lily Briscoe might draw her as a triangle in To the Lighthouse, but it is where the 
lines blur and intersect between a Mrs. Ramsay and the other characters that most draw Woolf’s 
attention. Outlines soften to the mutability of form, and the hard lines in Woolf are often drawn 
in a sand saturated with Darwin.  Among the “leaden circles that dissolve,” or the 
“unsubstantiated territories” and the “cracked sealing matter,” the numerous images and 
metaphors in Woolf that might testify to mutability through time, the most well-worn image 
concerning Woolf’s aesthetic should also be seen in this light:  Woolf asks if it is not the “chief 
task of the novelist” to convey “the incessant shower of innumerable atoms” pressed upon the 
mind, what Woolf calls “life itself,” and figures as “the semi-transparent envelope, or luminous 
halo, surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.”478  Woolf leaves her 
circles permeable, the matter of what passes through one mind to and from an external world, to 
and from consciousness, never fully circumscribed.   Or, in Pater’s words, worth phrasing 
alongside Woolf in her Darwinian tenor: “That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an 
image of ours, under which we group them—a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass 
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out beyond it. This at least of flame-like our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from 
moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways.”479  
Pater’s “moment” in art becomes significant to Woolf and other Modernists not simply 
because life is significantly short, but also because time under Darwin’s tutelage is now 
expanded to inconceivable lengths. Darwinism creates of the present a transitory state in the 
Modernist aesthetic.  Pater will spend it “getting as many pulsations as possible into the given 
time.”480  Woolf will too, but with crucial differences. 
 
 6.4: “ALREADY THE PAST”—MOMENTS LOST IN DARWIN’S ALMOST ETERNITY 
 That Darwin replaces the idea of eternity with nearly as vast a stretch of time did not 
relieve the burden of those after him who did their own grappling with time.  To use To the 
Lighthouse once again, Woolf has Mrs. Ramsay derive that satisfaction as she looks 
triumphantly over her successful dinner party: “It partook, she felt…of eternity…Of such 
moments, she thought, the thing is made that endures” (105).  But what feels permanent in Woolf 
grows all the more susceptible to time, as Mrs. Ramsay stands on the threshold of this moment 
“in a scene which was vanishing even as she looked…; it had become, she knew, giving one last 
look at it over her shoulder, already the past” (111).  A crucial component  in Woolf’s moments 
are their very transience, the privilege that is so soon taken away, the present that is already 
becoming the past as soon as it comes to being, indeed already written by the narrator in the past 
tense.   
A similar issue in Pater is this yearning towards the “privileged moment” that might be 
satisfied in the present.  His reverie over the Mona Lisa derives that satisfaction, as does Marius 
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the Epicurean when an unexpected delay in travel prolonged the moment, the scene before him 
and within him becoming a “still turning to reverie”:  
And might not the intellectual frame also […] be a moment only, an impulse or 
series of impulses, a single process, in an intellectual or spiritual system external 
to it, diffused through all time and place—that great stream of spiritual energy, of 
which his own imperfect thoughts, yesterday or to-day, would be but the remote, 
and therefore imperfect pulsations? [….] It was easier to conceive of the material 
fabric of things as but an element in a world of thought—as a thought in a mind, 
than of mind as an element, or accident, or passing condition in a world of matter 
[….] How he had longed, sometimes, that there were indeed one to whose 
boundless power of memory he could commit his own most fortunate 
moments…481 
In Pater’s transformed admixture of fiction and non-fiction, Marius begins to renounce both 
Heraclitus and Darwin in favor of the Christian ideal, to which Marius will commit his most 
fortunate moments as well as his “burthens.”  As if Marius were weary of evolutionary theory 
without being privy to its “evidence,” Pater leads him through various and competing hypotheses 
that suggest “one’s own actual ignorance of the origin and tendency of our being,” to finally let 
him rest “easier” in the feeling that there are certain beliefs and principles “one could not do 
without.”  One of Marius’s most serviceable philosophical lessons is that if one has the will to 
believe, if “‘tis in thy power to think as thou wilt,” then “Might the will itself be an organ of 
knowledge, of vision?” (208-9). Christian belief becomes a system of knowledge, something 
akin to a Platonic form.  These the passages from the same writer of the Renaissance who 
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omitted his “Conclusion” from the second edition for fear “it might possibly mislead some of 
those young men into whose hands it might fall,” directing his third edition readers to Marius the 
Epicurean, where he had “dealt more fully” with “the thoughts suggested by it.”482 
 In this context, Pater’s lessons in Marius also becomes serviceable to reading the 
tendencies of writers post-Darwin who bargained between the acceptance of evolutionary theory 
and a morality founded upon beliefs and principles that were increasingly susceptible to the same 
processes of mutability.  Such fundamental inclusion of Darwinian theory into any aesthetic of 
the moment underlies the dilemma of aesthetic bases on the moral assumptions and dogmas that 
evolutionary theory in large part subverted. In many responses, intimations of eternity and its 
personal manifestation of immortality were often refashioned with a few necessary alterations 
into the capacious vestments of an eternal now.  The idea of eternity is, of course, a metaphysical 
assumption not only to logic, but also to creation; and the Cartesian logic that could give us an 
argument from design of a sudden lost its designer and the comfort of a rational creator. Natural 
theology buckled on its Enlightenment foundations when reason became the byproduct, not the 
producer, of nature.  Freud famously asserts that the universal narcissism of mankind had 
suffered its second great blow when Darwin and his supporters showed that man biologically 
was not separate from other animals in the organic scheme of evolution; but less emphasized is 
its correspondent shock to morality.483 Margot Norris argues in Beasts of the Modern 
Imagination that when evolutionary theory initiated the collapse of the cardinal distinctions 
between animals and humans, the intellectual, cultural, and moral distinctions became matters, as 
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Darwin memorably states it in The Descent of Man, “of degree, not of kind”.484  Darwin’s 
revolution, though, was as much Copernican or even Einsteinian as it was Darwinian.  The realm 
of the eternal, safeguarded in the house of logic and mathematics, had also become susceptible to 
natural ruin and decay.  What permeates the philosophical thinking after Darwin, and what 
clouds the temporal atmosphere of fiction as well, is a natural world still available to moments of 
comfort, even to romance, but those spots of time now have a correspondent shock of time that 
leaves a more pronounced feeling of inconsequence. For Pater in temperament, and for Woolf 
especially, the moment is not in the hands of a creator, much less the creator of a moral universe. 
 
 6.5: DISCIPLINING THE MOMENT 
  It was Pater’s misfortune to have articulated in the “Conclusion” a passionate and 
eloquent appeal to “the love of art for its own sake” without so much as a nod to morality and 
conscience, not because such a position might be wholly insupportable, but because it shook the 
already unsteadied morals of those who could cause him professional harm.  If his inclusion of 
the “decadent” French theorists of art for art’s sake was enough to brand him an immoralist, the 
exclusion of the prerequisite Christian tradition of Oxford would be enough to cost him a sure 
appointment to a university proctorship.485  After The Renaissance, “Pater’s name was suspect 
for more than a decade,” writes Lawrence Evans, “and the hostility of powerful elements in the 
University made itself strongly felt.”486 Even Woolf’s father, an agnostic who fell into disbelief 
after reading Darwin, vilifies this position of the “indolent Epicurean” in his essay “Art and 
Morality” (1875), which suppresses Pater’s name but leaves little doubt who should first receive 
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the critic’s “lash with the full strength of his arm.  The harder he hits and the deeper he cuts, the 
better for the world.”487  For those who found Pater dangerous, or even “poisonous,” to quote 
George Eliot’s letter to Blackwood’s Magazine,488 this was the proper critical reaction.  Any 
reading of the biography of Pater and the contemporary reviews of The Renaissance lead one to 
suspect that Marius’s conversion to Christianity has as much of this inquisitorial history behind it 
as it did Pater’s fictional representation of a Christian era being born among its martyrs to the 
Roman Empire. 
But if the critical and professional backlash against Pater explains the impetus behind 
certain inclusions in his later work, it does not explain away the ideas behind Pater’s twinborn 
expansion of the “Conclusion” in the fictional form of Marius and the historical form of Plato 
and Platonism.  Pater, Hellenist that he was, certainly meant for his “Conclusion”’s footnote to 
allude to Plato’s account of Socrates’s martyrdom, the charge of misleading youth a bitter 
draught that Pater too had tasted, though not fatally.  Plato and Platonism shares this kinship 
with Marius, its sense of a more mature conclusion to his preliminary “Conclusion.”  Socrates—
in Aristotle and Pater alike—is credited with the formation of “universal ideas” that stabilize the 
flux of sensations and time registered in the Heraclitus of Plato and Platonism.  It is a strange 
transformation to notice in Pater, nowhere more peculiarly than in his parable of the “layman” 
and the “naturalist” collecting seashells along the shore, relayed as an introduction to the impact 
of Socratic thought. The layman  
is in fact still but a child; and the shell, its colours and convolution, no more than 
a dainty, very easily destructible toy to him.  Let him become a schoolboy about 
it, so to speak.  The toy he puts aside; his mind is drilled perforce, to learn about 
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it; and thereby is exercised, he may think, with everything except just the thing 
itself, as he cares for it; with other shells, with some general laws of life […]. (PP, 
157-8) 
By stern discipline of study, the necessary ascetic of aesthetics that Pater defines often as acsêsis, 
the mental drilling and exercise informs the man the schoolboy has become; and with the general 
ideas learned, the particular shell might be held in the hand once again by “a kind of short-hand 
now, and as if in a single moment of vision, all that, which only a long experience, moving 
patiently from part to part, could exhaust, its manifold alliance with the entire world of nature” 
(158).  Compare this to the Pater who writes in “Conclusion” that “not the fruit of experience, 
but experience itself, is the end,” or that “our failure is to form habits” of attention, and we can 
detect the marked differences. 
Meisel notes that in Pater’s work “there is no sphere of existence that cannot be viewed 
through, and elucidated by, the interrelated figures of fusion and ascesis, denoting as they do the 
necessary preconditions for the production of perfect work in art and life alike” (AF, 59).  What 
Pater’s figures further suggest, however, is not merely this structural consistency of ascesis and 
fusion present in all his work, but the process of growth or development that Pater’s figures are 
meant to convey.  The “moment of vision” does coalesce into crystal, that “hard, gem-like 
flame,” but what Pater emphasizes is the process itself that the refined product of “Platonic 
aesthetics” comes to exemplify. This, we may surmise, is why Pater includes “carbon” in his 
allusion to Platonic doctrine, which through long process evolves from the material “charcoal” 
and turns into “diamond,” just as the “naturalist” has derived from his shell a “moment of vision” 
that has behind it the rough materials of childhood enthusiasms (PP, 160-162). 
 
                                                           
488 The Letters of George Eliot, V. Ed. Gordon S. Haight, (New Haven, 1955) 455. 
 226 
 6.6: THE DISCIPLINED MOMENT AND THE PROCESSION OF PLATONIC FORM 
Indeed, the entire historical sensibility and structural emphasis of Plato and Platonism 
may be considered figuratively as an enlargement of this process of carbon in the hands of the 
naturalist, “when it has come to include both charcoal and the diamond” (162).  This historic 
method, Pater’s critical preference, “bids us replace the [preconceived] doctrine, or the system, 
we are busy with” and see a work or a philosophy “in the group of conditions, intellectual, social, 
material, amid which it was actually produced, if we would really understand it” (8-9).  By 
cultivating this “historic sense,” an underestimated characteristic of Pater’s work as a whole, a 
figure like Plato may be seen as “mental process” in the same way a product of “the organic 
world” may be determined by its “environment”.  As he further states:  “To put Plato into his 
natural place, as a result from antecedent and contemporary movements of Greek speculation, of 
Greek life generally: such is the proper aim of the historic, that is to say, of the really critical 
study of him” (10-11).  Given that Pater, largely perhaps due to Yeats’s “The Tragic 
Generation,” is often described pejoratively as an aesthete, as was Virginia Woolf in whose 
company she often found herself.  Though Pater is one of the authors most championed by 
Harold Bloom in preference to his “Schools of Resentment,” it is enlightening to see this 
principle of criticism carried on by Frederic Jameson and Stephen Greenblatt.  They, too, follow 
his dictum to “always historicize.”489 
There is even in Pater an original sense of the political unconscious and the New 
Historicist tendency to utilize the rarer texts as a means of expanding corroboration.  By 
assessing Plato against his philosophical precursors— Heraclitus, the Eleatic school, and 
Pythagorus, (not to mention “the unconscious social aggregate” of Egypt, Syria, Scythia)—the 
political upheaval and mutability of Empire and thought in Greek life comes into critical 
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existence, whereby Pater derives from these few fragmentary texts and allusions a sketch of a 
society in turmoil and transformation that Plato shocks into stability.  Plato’s ideals create a 
future Republic, for instance, by imagining an alternative utopia to the actual conditions in which 
he lived.  Plato will come to believe in the fixed forms, the universal principles exhibited in 
convivial Socratic dialogue, by necessity in an age of “intellectual chaos” and “insubordinate 
youth” that the spirit of Heraclitus’s doctrine exemplified (PP, 14). Pater reminds us of Plato’s 
own figure from Cratylus, where the intellect uses “general law” so that Heraclitus’s “fluid 
matter may be retained in vessels, not indeed of unbaked clay, but of alabaster or bronze” (159).  
Plato’s doctrine of rest, everywhere present in his dialogues, prominently in Parmenides and 
Cratylus, set against the doctrine of Heraclitean motion, insists on a kind of order that Greek 
society might develop into an ideal state, if only approximately.  This is the Plato who was born 
after the imminent threat of the Persian Empire against Athens, only to live through the incessant 
civil wars between Greek empires, most notably the belligerent oligarchy of Sparta and the 
sometimes-corrupt democracy of Athens, whose citizens voted to execute Socrates. Motion, even 
the motion of words, implies instability of statehood as well as of thought.   
In an argument that anticipates Mikhail Bakhtin, Pater reads into “the centrifugal 
tendency” of Greek thought before the “centripetal” force of Platonic cohesion.  The “fitness,” 
yes, the ascêsis of Plato’s “intellectual gymnastics,” will conduct Plato to his great insight, his 
ultimate concept of universals, “the one and the many,” partly from the “queer thing, the 
instant”: 
 
Parmenides: And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing 
really exist? 
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Aristoteles: What thing? 
Parmenides: The moment.  For the moment seems to imply a something out of 
which change takes place, into either of two states; for the change is not from the 
state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious 
nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any 
time […]. 
 Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation 
to itself and to other things.490 
 
Parmenides does not, in the end, render a way out of the paradox of the “one and the many,” so 
much as it presents ways of thinking about it.  Plato gives as example the moment, a thing lying 
between rest and motion, and therefore universal (“the one is all things”) and nothing (“not being 
in any time”).  While Meisel wants the moment in Woolf to be primarily Pater’s, Brenda Lyons 
astutely observes how Perry Meisel overlooks Platonism as the strongest link between both 
Pater’s formal considerations  and Woolf’s, depriving Woolf of her primary readings of the 
Greeks..491  Pater’s crystallized moments receive all the critical attention, but the greatest 
connection to the authors who share his emphasis upon the moment is perhaps not simply the 
gem-like flame of Pater’s aesthetic ends, but the long accumulation of the past that it comes to 
include.  In Pater’s discussion of “The Doctrine of Plato,” for example, Plato’s abstraction of 
thought is not of importance: “[…] even of abstract truths it is not so much what he thinks as the 
person who is thinking, that after all really tells” (155).  The thinking person partakes of Pater’s 
historic process, informed by the encounter with the grander ideas, and the “great literary 
monument” that is Plato can be said, like Pater says of “Political constitutions,” to be a thing we 
see “grow” into what it makes  (11, 21). 
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Pater’s heroes, then, his fictional Marius and his historic Plato, are studies of the stability 
of ideas enacted against a perpetual flux that continually undercuts the will to “rest easier” or 
think wholly, even as the process informs who they become and what they come to represent: the 
achievement of experience or knowledge so wholly transforming that it cuts into time.  Theirs is 
the aesthetic that finds a sensibility conducive to their respective temperaments in a time of 
instability, which in Pater is synonymous with what he came to see as the instability of time 
itself.  But it must be said, as much as Plato is treated as an intellectual hero, or Marius the 
Epicurean lends itself to a reading of self-studied heroism, they do not, in principle, share Pater’s 
temperament.  We might better read them as antithetical creations of Pater in the manner of the 
later Yeats’s anti-self, and see Heraclitus—cum Darwin—the stronger identity.  For in both 
works, Heraclitus rises like the dark angel or prophet of a Darwinian age, the greater force and 
unwitting hero that Pater’s Romantic forebears saw in the Satan of Milton’s Paradise Lost.  A 
reader of Pater never quite loses the greater rhythm of his thought as something passing, the 
moment indeterminate, the conclusion that “we have an interval, and then our place knows us no 
more” (TMT, 220). 
 
 6.7: THE USES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PREHISTORY IN NARRATIVE 
 
 Pater’s aesthetics and the historical procession of his Hellenism should be set in contrast 
to the evolutionary divergences of his contemporaries in philosophy who also broke free from 
Victorian notions of the Greek ideal.  One way of seeing the convergence of Darwin and 
historical process is to assess Darwin’s continuing importance when other evolutionary theories 
and their offshoots became obsolete. Of course, Darwin’s evolutionary theory was not the only 
one competing for attention and acceptance; as the “developmental theory,” “transformisme,” or 
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“transmutation,”it had many names but was “among the commonest of nineteenth-century 
heresies.”492 The most often cited—J. B. Lamarck’s Zoological Philosophy (1809) and Herbert 
Spencer’s emergent principles of evolution—493were just two of the more prevalent and 
influential among many that set out to argue for the mutability of species before Darwin’s 
Origin.  Darwin’s uniqueness begins with observational abundance, his profusion of examples 
for the minute varieties of transformation among species that make a case though overwhelming 
evidence.  Both the geologist Charles Lyell and Darwin find Lamarck’s theory untenable due to 
its lack of methodology: Lyell writes, “There were no examples to be found” in Lamarck’s 
theoretical progression up the “ladder of life” to ever more complex species.494  Lamarck’s most 
famous example of the “laws of nature” is the adult giraffe whose neck incrementally lengthens 
in a single life span by virtue of will or intent so that it might reach the higher tree. Thus, 
habitual intention may be “preserved by reproduction to the new individuals which arise”495  
Lamarck’s theory has the charm of fable about it but no methodology from which to test the 
hypothesis: the transformations are invisible.  In the same manner, Spencer’s reading of upward 
progress in evolution, from “amoeba to human, from savage to Homo britannicus,”496 ends in the 
final achievement of “impassible limit,” a state of “equilibration” that not only places civilized 
humanity in a comfortably familiar and Lamarckian position—the top—but also gives us the 
moral comfort that “The ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain […] Progress, 
therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity.”497  
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Lamarck and Spencer use scientific hypothesis (however obsolete) for the reading of 
history, but their failure is not simply an arriving at a faulty hypothesis: they fail to see history as 
a part of scientific inquiry, what Edward H. Carr succinctly takes as “the real importance of 
Darwinian revolution. Darwin, completing what Lyell had already begun, brought history into 
science.”498  That is, Darwin brought time to bear on the study of science and the relations of 
species in the same manner that the processes of history, analyzed through time, bear upon the 
study of past cultures and their relations to each other.  By doing so, the history of civilization 
becomes a mere moment of time when conceived in light of a natural history of life, not only 
bringing history to science but prehistory to traditional history. His methodology must work with 
the “lapses of years” in the historical record of fossils and the present homology evident in the 
links between species. “The historical process, in other words, becomes the thread that ties all 
results together causally,” writes Gould.499   This thread forms the historical narrative of the 
Origin, the story Darwin tells.   
Darwin’s modest attribution to his achievement, that half his work came out of his friend 
and mentor Charles Lyell’s brain, does merit attention, as Woolf’s proclivity to “tunnel” her way 
into the past shares the same methodology that Darwin attributes to Lyell.  It is not simply a 
matter of biographical coincidence that Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830-33) was one of the 
few texts that Darwin took on his voyage of The HMS Beagle.  Lyell’s insistent premise in 
Principles of Geology, to quote Gould again, “—that a historical scientist must work with 
observable, gradual, small-scale changes and extrapolate their effects through immense time to 
encompass the grand phenomena of history—won Darwin’s allegiance, with a central 
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commitment for its transfer, in toto, to biological realms.”500 This is Lyell’s methodology of 
uniformitarianism, sometimes deemed gradualism, which insists upon studying the small, 
observable changes in the present, such as soil erosion or the fossil record, in order to understand 
the same processes occurring over a vast time-scale.  Geological and then evolutionary changes 
continue in the present, though the changes are so slow, so gradual, that they require the widest 
imaginable latitude of vision. Lyell himself marks this necessary vantage of geological time by 
musing over an historical event, usually measured by a hundred years of “romance time,” 
glanced at with two thousand years of “historical time”:  
Such a portion of history would immediately assume the air of romance; the 
events would seem devoid of credibility, and inconsistent with the present course 
of human affairs.  A crowd of incidents would follow each other in thick 
succession.  Armies and fleets would appear to be assembled only to be 
destroyed, and cities built merely to fall into ruins.501 
But by applying Lyell’s geological time scale to evolutionary theory, Darwin treats humanity to 
the same historical processes of time as continental drift or the simplest organism, an application 
so devoid of romance that even Lyell only gradually accepted its import.   These sensibilities of 
the past, the romantic and the geological, compete and even coincide in the fictional writers who 
push furthest into the metaphors of time.  Certainly Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, and Virginia 
Woolf find this convergence, even this incongruity, worthy of their fictional attention.  Given 
this sense of historical process, we can understand why Lamarck and Spencer’s versions still 
continually reappear as the more popularly accepted and misread conceptions of evolution, as 
they were immediately after The Origin: “Faced with so absent a beginning and so bleak and 
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prodigious an extension of time it is not surprising that many of Darwin’s first readers favoured 
the counter-form of evolutionary myth: that of growth, ascent, and development towards 
complexity” (DP, 119-120).  Spencer’s evolution, which took much of Lamarck as its basis, was 
at least as accepted as Darwin’s late into the 1880s, in America much longer after that.502 
 The advantage to believing in a Spencer or a Lamarck derives from historical process 
becoming evolutionary progress, and the great relief of progress lies in an assured direction to 
this development.  It assures the past, too, gives the past its air of romance, and Woolf, like 
Hardy and Conrad before her, reads into this “hereditary game” an almost willful ignorance of 
evolutionary implications.  In an early 1908 review of Continental writers upon the English 
character, Woolf pays particular attention to the ancestor worship that goes into the formation of 
“the true English word—‘Gentleman’.  Centuries have gone to produce this excellent specimen, 
endowing him finally with an atmosphere almost of romance.”503  Like a finch isolated on one of 
the Galapagos islands, the English point of view, evidenced in their art and literature, almost 
seems another species of thought, immune to the incursions of foreign ideas and aesthetics.  
Woolf writes,  “While Tolstoy, Ibsen, and Nietzsche sent waves of fresh thought across the 
Continent, the English slept undisturbed or did not raise their eyes from their own affairs” (203).  
This is written before James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, or Virginia Woolf herself has entered the 
English aesthetic consciousness, but Woolf plays with some of the ideas slowly disturbing 
English sentiment towards the past and future. 
 
6.8: NIETZSCHE’S UNTIMELY INTERRUPTION OF THE PROCESSION 
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No philosopher was more concerned with the future of his backward glances than 
Friedrich Nietzsche. “‘In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without 
augmenting or directly invigorating my activity,’” writes Goethe, which Friedrich Nietzsche uses 
as his introduction to “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History” (1873), his second 
contribution to Untimely Meditations.504  As a contemporaneous piece to the “Conclusion” of 
Pater, Nietzsche’s strong, uproarious invective against the “pupil of Heraclitus” serves as an 
invigorating counterpoint when placed in dialogue with Pater, evolution, and historical process.  
Inveighing against what Nietzsche views as the “striking symptoms of our age” that indicate a 
“consuming fever of history,” he prescribes us “to serve history only to the extent that history 
serves life” (UT, 59-60).  A classicist, especially of the Hellenic, Nietzsche still thinks historical 
process needs an injection of the untimely. “For I do not know what meaning classical studies 
could have for our time if they were not untimely—that is to say, acting counter to our time and 
thereby acting on our time, and let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come” (60).  Nietzsche 
emphasizes that such a history acting on our time should benefit the future, but not in the 
zeitgeist of the Hegelian who would have our belated but fully conscious awareness of the 
“world process” a realization that equates “his miserable condition” to “the completion of world-
history” (104). 
 The full force of Nietzsche’s irony comes in the final consummation of an historical man 
who would totally surrender personality to this world process under the guidance of evolution:  
Heirs of the Greeks and Romans? Of Christianity? To these cynics that seems 
nothing; but heirs of the world-process! Summit and target of the world-process!  
Meaning and solution of all the riddles of evolution come to light in modern man, 
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the ripest fruit of the tree of knowledge!—that I call an ecstatic feeling of pride 
[…]. Contemplation of history has never flown so far, not even in dreams; for 
now the history of mankind is only the continuation of the history of animals and 
plants; even in the profoundest depths of the sea the universal historian still finds 
traces of himself as living slime […]. He stands high and proud upon the pyramid 
of the world-process; as he lays the keystone of his knowledge at the top of it he 
seems to call out to nature all around him; ‘We have reached the goal, we are the 
goal, we are nature perfected.’ (107-8) 
 
Nietzsche has Von Hartman’s Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) in his ironic crosshairs, its 
attempts to unify Schopenhauer’s unconscious will with a social ideal that has Hegel’s eternal 
mind as its result.  Nietzsche thinks it so absurd, so unwittingly ironic a position to surrender 
yourself to “world-process” for “world-redemption,” that he champions Von Hartmann as the 
parodist par excellence of world-history.  But it serves equally well for any evolutionary 
application that sees homo sapiens as the summit of evolution—for Nietzsche grants us the full 
impact of evolutionary theory, that every branch of species it climbs is also a descent into chaos: 
“the ground sinks away from you into the unknown; there is no longer any support for your life, 
only spider’s threads which every new grasp of knowledge tears apart” (108). Pater’s sense of 
Darwinism as an “only always becoming” finds a new context in Nietzsche’s axe sharpened for a 
felling of evolution’s newly planted tree of knowledge and life.  Almost, as it were, aping Pater’s 
words, “a continual evolving that flows ceaselessly away” becomes the joke on becoming: 
“whoever is not enlightened by it as to the nature of becoming, not inwardly cleared out and set 
in order, indeed, in regard to that matter, is truly ripe and ready for becoming a has-been” (108). 
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 The substance of Nietzsche’s parody of the position, however, does not concern the 
verity of evolution but the use of it as instruction; “becoming, fluidity of all concepts, types and 
species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animal,” Nietzsche considers 
“true but deadly” (112).  Such instruction in progress carries in it Nietzsche’s all too fulfilling 
prophecy that another generation of it would lead to systems of “individualist egoism, 
brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of the non-brothers.”  Nietzsche’s concern is to give 
history a future, to transform the truth that being human is “only an uninterrupted has-been” into 
a being capable of acting unhistorically, to feel an animal happiness in the ability to forget.  His 
famous dictum that “forgetting is essential to action of any kind” counters those “thus 
condemned to see everywhere a state of becoming,” no longer believing in themselves and lost in 
this stream of flux “like a true pupil of Heraclitus,” incapable of raising one finger against the 
historical sense (62).  The healthy “historical men,” if they are not the rare suprahistorical souls 
of near omniscience, balance their forgetting with what amounts to the same thing: a 
preoccupation with history that offers the beneficial illusion that history stands only in the 
service of their life. 
 
6.9: NIETZSCHE AND PATER—BECOMING ZARATHUSTRAN OR HERACLITEAN 
 In this, we discover the uncanny and seemingly outrageous concurrence of thought in 
Pater and Nietzsche.  Not only does the becoming of Heraclitus find its recurrence in Darwinian 
evolution, but also Nietzsche’s untimely creed to act “unhistorically” has as its aesthetic kin the 
moment made “whole” in Pater.  For Nietzsche’s introduction of the unhistorical sensibility, 
which has us enviously view the grazing cattle, is not fortuitous coincidence when the argument 
later picks up the process of evolution.  “The animal lives unhistorically: for it is contained in the 
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present, like a number without any awkward fraction left over; it […] at every instant appears 
wholly as what it is; it can never be anything but honest” (60-61).  Our human state of existence, 
fundamentally “an imperfect tense,” is the existence Pater wishes to counter with the moment in 
art and life that, in Nietzsche’s words, exists as a matter of wonder in the envious man who looks 
with cursed remembrance upon the cows “for whom every moment really dies” (ibid). 
Here, the confluence of ideas parts ways, for Pater’s victory of the moment over the flux 
of time remains partial.  Nietzsche’s does not, because his is a philosophy that finds the 
momentary joy an insufficient creed: “The smallest happiness, if only it is present 
uninterruptedly and makes happy, is incomparably more happiness than the greatest happiness 
that comes only as an episode, as it were a piece of waywardness or folly, in a continuum of 
joylessness, desire and privation” (61-62). Pater’s present moment, the need to prolong it but the 
inability to sustain it, has a smaller claim on the future in comparison, and the gay science of 
Nietzsche will not stand for partial victories.  
By the writing of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1892), Nietzsche had transformed this 
moment and its Darwinian “only always becoming” into the capitalized “Moment” of eternal 
return.  Zarathustra tells the parable of the two eternal paths that meet at a gateway inscribed 
with “Moment”: 
“Behold…this moment!  From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads 
backward; behind us lies an eternity.  Must not whatever can walk have walked 
on this lane before?  Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been 
done, have passed by before?…And are not all things knotted together so firmly 
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that this moment draws after it all that is to come?… –must we not eternally 
return?”505 
Plato’s moment in Parmenides, his “queer thing, the instant,” exists paradoxically outside of 
time and in it, whereas Nietzsche’s moment partakes of time and history, but this endless process 
of becoming is trumped by the eternal return of the moment.  Zarathustra, “the teacher of eternal 
recurrence” (220), must teach that “becoming” is cyclical, recurs eternally again and again: “—
not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame 
life…to proclaim the overman again to men” (221).  Much has been made of Nietzsche’s belief 
in “eternal recurrence,” most of it overly defensive or quickly dismissive, but the gist of it 
remains constant in Nietzsche.  If history is to have any value, if becoming is to have moral value 
greater than the “true but deadly” teachings of evolution, the future must been seen as possible 
ascent as well as descent.  It is foolish to believe in a better or a new life in evolutionary terms, 
but it might not be foolish to will oneself to betterment in this “selfsame” life if one believes it is 
the only life.  This said, Nietzsche creates a future where history is in the service of life, and 
evolutionary truths are simply a given. Pater’s view of life as always becoming is Nietzsche’s 
possibly becoming what you will. 
 
6.10: NIETZSCHE’S DIONYSIS AND THE ANTI-SOCRATIC TRAGIC 
Thus, we come to understand why the later Yeats turns to Nietzsche and not Pater for the 
sense that amid the procession of time, even the tragic vision of history can bring joy into action.  
In the same manner, the Dionysian ecstasy in The Birth of Tragedy was not to be an episode, just 
as Nietzschean joy was not Pater’s chastened flame.  But there is, in a larger sense, some 
agreement between Pater and the earlier Nietzsche in their readings of Socrates and Plato as a 
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stabilizing reaction to the Greek temper that had, in its early drama as in its pre-Socratic 
philosophy, an exuberant, if destructive, life force.  To rehash briefly Nietzsche’s famous fusion 
of the Dionysian and the Apollinian: the Dionysian is the aesthetic condition that originates the 
pure strains of music and its intoxicating release of the “wilder emotions,” the Apollinian light 
reigns over the plastic arts.  Their reconciliation delivers Nietzsche’s “birth of tragedy,” when the 
primordial spirit of Dionysus, in its agony or ecstasy, is touched by the laurels of Apollo, which 
deliver the emotions over to the contemplative powers of the image and the lyre: “We must 
understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus which ever anew discharges itself in an 
Apollinian world of images.”506  While the Apollinian gives art its necessary shape and form, 
what Matthew Arnold reduces to the “sweetness and light” of all Hellenism, it is the Dionysian 
that Nietzsche focuses on, its emanation of the deeper primordial rhythm and movement, its 
unbridled creative and destructive force, even its bestial communion, which creates the feeling of 
“oneness” with nature by its release from Apollinian “individuation.”  The early Satyric chorus 
embodies the Dionysian element in Greek tragedy, gives it suasion over the “profound Hellene” 
who “comforts himself, having looked boldly right into the terrible destructiveness of so-called 
world history as well as the cruelty of nature, and being in danger of longing for a Buddhistic 
negation of the will.  Art saves him, and through art—life” (BT, 59).  The Greeks, Nietzsche 
avers, embraced the half-man, half-beast satyr as their own longing for the primitive, natural 
world, which had been deified in Dionysus. 
It is through this logic that Nietzsche reads Dionysus as the hero of all Greek tragedy—
Prometheus and even Oedipus masks of the original hero—until Euripides comes and ruins it all. 
An unjust treatment of Euripides, perhaps, but Nietzsche will have none of this “Greek 
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cheerfulness” that kills any semblance of the Dionysian impulse, and with it tragedy, everything 
ideal and deep and immortal that Hellenism should represent, instead of this invidious surface of 
cheerfulness: “as if there had never been a sixth century with its birth of tragedy, its mysteries, 
its Pythagorus and Heraclitus, as if the works of art of the great period simply did not exist, 
though these phenomena can hardly be explained as having originated in any such senile and 
slavish pleasure in existence and cheerfulness…” (78-79). Behind this “un-Dionysian art, 
morality, and world view” of Euripides we should not be surprised to find Socrates and Plato, 
Nietzsche’s sparring partners for several books to come.  Euripides was “only a mask” for the 
deity of “an altogether newborn demon, called Socrates” (82).   
This “aesthetic socratism” delivers beauty over to rationalism and conscious 
knowledge—“everything must be intelligible” or “everything must be conscious” following the 
Socratic dictum that “knowledge is virtue.”  And the good pupil Plato will follow his master by 
burning his poems, transforming his dramatic gifts into the dialogues that “create an art form that 
was related to those forms of art which he repudiated” (90).  Socrates becomes Plato’s hero, and 
the anti-Dionysus reigns in Nietzschean revelation. The slouching beast of The Birth of Tragedy 
is none other than Nietzsche’s mytho-poetic Socrates, the deity who gives form to the birth of 
science. The later Nietzsche will think himself his own anti-Christ, returning to dismember the 
rationalism of science and the morality of Christianity by tearing Dionysus limb from limb. 
 The Nietzschean narrative is worth retelling, not simply because it so forcefully 
dramatizes the saving grace of art and a tragic aesthetic, but because it anticipates and permeates 
the atmosphere of the generation preceding Woolf, which finds in logic and the intelligible – an 
“aesthetic socratism” – an incomplete aesthetics.   Woolf’s fiction and essays certainly record 
this difference, despite a large sect of the English, she notes, “who slept undisturbed.”  
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Nietzsche’s response to such complacency is his “Madman” in the marketplace of The Gay 
Science who explains to a bemused audience the ways science and rationalism have killed God; 
but he soon realizes his listeners have not considered the consequences:  “This deed is still more 
distant from them than most distant stars---and yet they have done it themselves.”507 Darwin, the 
scientist, had done the Dionysian thing of returning humanity to the primordial origins that 
Nietzsche believes are the great force of Greek tragedy (Freud, to be sure, is not far behind).  
Darwin was a strong enough presence, Margot Norris argues, to break Nietzsche of his “dual 
Metaphysics of Dionysus and Apollo.”508  Nietzsche’s will to power was his answer to Darwin, 
placing the will above survival as the primary force. “August, 1877: The influence of ‘external 
conditions’ is ridiculously overestimated by Darwin: the essence of the life process is precisely 
the monstrously formative, from the inside creative power, that uses and exploits external 
circumstances.”509 In Nietzschean fashion, Heraclitus’s philosophy of becoming that Darwin 
reincarnated, the same sense of becoming in Untimely Meditations that was in jeopardy of 
becoming a “has-been” to the whims of world process, only needs a Zarathustran will to power.  
Whereas Pater gave to aesthetics the “will as vision,” Nietzsche gave will a superhuman value.  
By returning the will to this primary position, Nietzsche hoped to redeem humanity from the 
mechanistic determinism he sees in Darwin, and give his own art the capacity of self-generation. 
Ceaselessly active and mutating in Nietzsche, the will to power organizes and disperses in a 
struggle with the forces of nature.  The child of historical process could yet defeat time by acting 
unhistorically, actively forgetting he lived in a time that seemed defeated by the evolutionary 
process that held history captive.  “Form counts as something permanent and therefore more 
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valuable, but form is merely invented by us,” writes Nietzsche.510  Only Nietzschean rhetoric 
could deconstruct the intellectual fabric behind Platonic form and then see the monstrously 
formative power of the individual will as the answer to Darwin’s forms, which are merely the 
by-product of natural selection.  It is a riddle Nietzsche held on to as if he yearned for his own 
Oedipus to return and answer it for him. 
 
6.11: BERGSON, JAMES, RUSSELL, WOOLF 
 Nietzsche’s attack on Platonic thought, and the birth of science it engenders with his 
vision of history, must counter the effects of evolutionary process. But there is still another 
philosophy of thought that finds Darwin’s temporal upheaval a part of the answer rather than part 
of the problem. From it emerges the continuing dialogue in Modernist criticism over whether 
much of its literature may best be described as a spatial or a temporal form.  I refer not just to the 
sporadic resurgence of discussion emerging from Joseph Frank’s essay “The Idea of Spatial 
Form in Modern Literature” (1945) and Frank Kermode’s response in The Sense of an Ending 
(1965), but what seem the more pertinent studies of temporality in which the debate is rooted.  
Nietzsche and Pater come to exemplify the crossing anti-currents of popular nineteenth century 
studies in Hellenism, particularly on the philosophy of Plato, as opposed to the gradual 
acceptance of evolutionary theory. It is a query they themselves attempt to answer in their own 
works, as we have attempted to assess, but the more commonplace approach was to find Platonic 
forms and Darwinian theory irreconcilable.  At issue for us are the ethical questions asked of 
formal considerations, the intellectual and aesthetic milieu Woolf inherits.  Lines were drawn 
well into the twentieth century, no more interestingly than in the debates of the Cambridge 
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philosophers led by Bertrand Russell, who argue against the pragmatism of William James and 
the philosophy of time and creative evolution in Henri Bergson. 
 Nietzsche’s attack on Platonism and the rationalism of science shares many of the 
arguments Bergson and James make against “intellectualism.” The difference lies in their moral 
outlook and their respective cultural criticism. Bergson and James, in particular, do not abandon 
the values of the society they inhabit by forsaking the “herd mentality” Nietzsche so 
demonstrably loathed.  Nietzsche’s was always a perspective (and he was clear that his was a 
perspective, not a system of logic) that saw the intellectual giants speaking to each other above 
the slavish herd.  Giants call to giants across the bridge of time, and his supermen do not need 
the society they overcome so much as they need to create a new one that they can inhabit and 
rule.  Much as Nietzsche took Plato to task for believing his ideal forms to be universal rather 
than self-created, they do share the belief that democracy was not the ideal of a future Republic. 
It is intellectually aristocratic and authoritarian, to be sure, where Bergson and James are 
comfortable with (though critical of) the cultures they share; they still use terms like “progress” 
post-Darwin without flinching at the relativism.  They, in other words, do the less revolutionary 
if more practical thing in taking the community with them rather than forging a new one.  While 
Woolf is sometimes criticized for her snobbishess, especially her noted ambivalence towards the 
lower classes, her sense of community and commonality, even her aesthetic that develops a 
consciousness of community, bind her in perspective if not in philosophy to Bergson and James.  
 Bergson finds fault in Spencer and Lamarck, but still makes of evolutionary process a 
story of progress.  His most important work, especially as it pertains to our subject, is Creative 
Evolution (1907), which begins:  “The history of the evolution of life, incomplete as it yet is, 
already reveals to us how the intellect has been formed, by an uninterrupted progress, along a 
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line which ascends through the vertebrate series up to man.”511  The cohesion of Bergson’s 
philosophy breaks down when he becomes a speculative naturalist, when he turns to orthogenesis 
or Spencer for corroboration.  It is the limitation of his philosophy, but it is not why Bergson 
remains valuable and it does not force us to dismiss the largely unrelated importance he would 
have for both James and the Modernist literature (Marcel Proust primarily) to which his work 
remains crucially linked.  There has been much criticism on how Woolf’s writing bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the philosophy of Bergson, so much that even she and Leonard Woolf 
were responding to critics asking if she were influenced by Bergson. (She and Leonard claimed 
she never read any of his works, or even her sister-in-law’s book on Bergson512.) She did attend 
her sister-in-law’s lecture on Bergson in 1913,513 and Michael Whitworth’s reply to the absence 
of evidence for Bergson in Woolf’s library, “that he was part of the intellectual atmosphere of 
the years 1910 to 1912,”514 seems sensible enough.  What most convincingly binds them in 
thought is their reading of Charles Darwin, and Jane Ellen Harrison's panegyric reading of 
Bergson; what distinguishes Woolf from Bergson is her reading into Darwinian theory without 
flinching at the implications. 
 
6.12: BERGSON’S NEBULOUS CLARITY—THE ANTI-INTELLECTUALIST MOMENT 
The value of Bergson for William James, why he could write – “Reading his works is 
what has made me bold,” – is Bergson’s analysis of logic, from Plato up through Spencer.  James 
sees this as Bergson’s greatest achievement: “the essential contribution of Bergson to philosophy 
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is his criticism of intellectualism.  In my opinion, he has killed intellectualism definitively and 
without hope of recovery.  I don’t see how it can ever revive again in its ancient platonizing rôle 
of claiming to be the most authentic, intimate, and exhaustive definer of the nature of reality.”515  
This is not to say that either James or Bergson dismiss the use of logic.  James makes this clear 
and Bergson articulates it such: “human intellect feels at home among inanimate objects, where 
our action finds its fulcrum and our industry its tools; that our concepts have been formed on the 
model of solids; that our logic is, pre-eminently, the logic of solids…” (CE, ix).  But Bergson 
postulates that the leap from the intellect as a tool for action to intellectualism, in James’s words, 
as “the definer of the nature of reality,” is to obviate any insights into logic’s relation to life that 
evolutionary theory has discovered: “… our thought, in its purely logical form, is incapable of 
presenting the true nature of life, the full meaning of the evolutionary movement.  Created by 
life, in definite circumstances, to act on definite things, how can it embrace life, of which it is 
only an emanation or an aspect?” (CE, ix-x).  Bergson essentially argues that a life conceived 
only through logic forces the life experienced by consciousness, his “vital process,” into a mold 
too narrow, too confined, to contain it.  The great achievement in thought would be to move 
beyond the spatialized world of a geometric intellect to the numerous, divergent paths that other 
organisms have traveled in their evolutions.  “Suppose,” writes Bergson, “these other forms of 
consciousness brought together and amalgamated with intellect: would not the result be a 
consciousness as wide as life?” (xii).  To do so, Bergson would not have us transcend our 
intellect, but acknowledge “a vague nebulosity” that remains around our conceptual, logical 
thought.  This gives consciousness “certain powers that are complementary to the understanding 
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powers of which we have only an indistinct feeling when we remain shut up in ourselves,” a 
perception of the expansion and intensification that “the evolution of nature” affords us (xii-xiii). 
 Bergson’s “vital impulse,” his “vague nebulosity,” or “concrete duration” might be 
dismissed as impressionist drivel, not a philosophy, if it weren’t for the intellectual rigor Bergson 
applies to the Platonic forms of knowledge that had left other philosophers only with their logical 
paradoxes or “dead-locks,” as Bergson describes them.  “It is a miracle, and he a real magician,” 
gushes James in a description of Bergson’s style and analysis (PU, 426).  Bergson’s most 
convincing argument against intellectualism, the one James repeats in A Pluralistic Universe, is 
his answer to the paradoxes of Parmenides and Zeno that had rendered, as far as Plato and all 
Platonists were concerned, the philosophy of Heraclitean flux an absurdity.  It is also, we might 
interject, the same paradox that Pater recounts in Plato and Platonism towards his understanding 
of Plato’s “Doctrine of Rest” and the same notion of time that Pater suggests in “Conclusion” 
when he writes that our impressions are in perpetual flight, but limited by time: “[…]as time is 
infinitely divisible, each of [our impressions] is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it 
being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it […] (TMT, 319).516  For Pater, the 
infinite divisibility of time provides the possibility of an infinite number of moments, gone even 
as they are apprehended, but allowing in theory the contraction of the “concrete moment” to the 
extent that the mind can capture, even prolong, what remains of our impressions. 
Unlike the early Pater, Bergson derives from evolution the notion that we cannot in any 
way subject organic creation “to a mathematical treatment,” that “the present moment of a living 
body does not find its explanation in the moment immediately before, that all the past of the 
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organism must be added to that moment, its heredity—in fact, the whole of a very long history” 
(CE, 20).  This is Bergson’s “concrete duration,” the position that we are creating ourselves 
continually, that each moment of life is a creation, accumulating and continuing the past, 
“always being renewed” (20-23).  Abstract time, in comparison, is merely speculation over 
artificial systems.  Bergson’s famous use of the newly invented cinematograph becomes his 
metaphor of the intellect taking successive snapshots of each moment and the logician claiming 
them as the reality of time: “The application of the cinematographical method therefore leads to 
a perpetual recommencement, during which the mind, never able to satisfy itself and never 
finding where to rest, persuades itself, no doubt, that it imitates by its instability the very 
movement of the real” (307).  But movement slips through the intervals, or leads to the absurd 
position posed by the Eleatic school of Parmenides and Zeno, Plato’s acknowledged forefathers 
for his doctrines of rest and form.  Bergson reminds us that to accept any of Zeno’s paradoxes is 
to accept movement made of immobilities, that Zeno’s arrow, for instance, is always at rest 
during every moment of its flight: “though we can divide at will the trajectory once created, we 
cannot divide its creation,” Bergson writes, “which is an act in progress and not a thing” (309). 
A mathematician will tell you Zeno’s paradoxes are logical fallacies, a way of confusing 
infinite properties with finite numbers, but they are also representative of the manner in which 
the mind makes quantitative or qualitative the progression of movement, a necessity to logic and 
physics but not to Bergson’s duration. Bergson distinguishes “qualitative becoming” and 
“evolutionary becoming” on the same principle, for instance when we classify infancy, 
adolescence, and adulthood as if they were permanent states rather than arbitrary stops along the 
passage of life.  The child does not become the man in Bergson; rather, “There is becoming from 
the child to the man” (313).  When applied to Plato’s philosophy of forms or ideas, Bergson 
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gives us the logical and erroneous basis of Plato’s premise rather than the reactionary or 
historical need that Pater and Nietzsche both read into it: 
 Such, indeed, was the sentence passed by the philosophers of the Eleatic school.  
And they passed it without any reservation whatever.  As becoming shocks the 
habits of thought and fits ill into the molds of language, they declared it unreal.  In 
spatial movement and in change in general they saw only pure illusion.  This 
conclusion could be softened down without changing the premises, by saying that 
the reality changes, but that it ought not to change.  Experience confronts us with 
becoming: that is sensible reality.  But the intelligible reality, that which ought to 
be, is more real still, and that reality does not change.  Beneath the qualitative 
becoming, beneath the evolutionary becoming, beneath the extensive becoming, 
the mind must seek that which defies change, the definable quality, the form or 
essence, the end.  Such was the fundamental principle of […] the philosophy of 
Forms, or, to use a term more akin to the Greek, the philosophy of Ideas. (314). 
The eidos of Plato, in short, is the stable view taken from the instability of things, plucking this 
snapshot of stability out of time and into the realm of eternity.  And “when we put immutable 
Ideas at the base of the moving reality, a whole physics, a whole cosmology, a whole theology 
follows necessarily” (315).  Thus, Plato’s eidos might better be translated, as Bergson does, as a 
“moment” taken for the idea of eternity. 
 But this is precisely what Bergson views as the degradation of our “real” consciousness, 
the very flux of duration an existence embraced by Bergson rather than a poor substitute for 
eternity.  The “is” and the “ought” are reevaluated: “He who installs himself in becoming sees in 
duration the very life of things, the fundamental reality.  The Forms, which the mind isolates and 
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stores up in concepts, are then only snapshots of the changing reality.  They are moments 
gathered along the course of time; and, just because we have cut the thread that binds them to 
time, they no longer endure. […]  They enter into eternity, if you will; but what is eternal in them 
is just what is unreal. (317) 
 Plato’s god in Timaeus gives us “a moving image of eternity,”517 his best approximation 
of the eternal in a world that only approximates its ideals.  Bergson gives us his version of 
evolutionary descent that endures by placing us back into the flow of time, the Heraclitean flux 
seen within the evolutionary movement.  Consciousness becomes synonymous with ceaseless 
creativity.  The moment in Bergson overflows its artificial boundaries, expands with the entirety 
of its past rather than contract into the heady solitude of Pater’s artistic creed.  He is Nietzsche’s 
man of historical process, but he is not the passive recipient of world process that Nietzsche 
ridicules.  Bergson sets his ideals upon the active participation within the evolutionary flow. 
 Brilliant as James finds Bergson’s absolute “inversion of the traditional platonic 
doctrine,” Bergson imposes limitations upon evolutionary theory, and Darwin in particular, to 
make of it positive and affirming philosophy.  Bergson gives us continuity of becoming by 
writing that the “reality which descends, endures only by its connection with that which ascends.  
But life and consciousness are this very ascension” (369).  His criticism of Darwin rests (or 
moves, as he would have it) on finding adaptation to the environment, chance happenstances and 
circumstances, an insufficient theory for the vital impetus of life’s process.  Once again we see 
the Origin of Species given moral uplift by robbing Darwin’s theory of its terrors, albeit in a 
more profound because a less predetermined interpretation than with Spencer.  Remarkably 
absent in Bergson is any thought of extinction or annihilation; all things “unmade” are 
transformed into the ceaseless creativity of evolution, as if there were no possibility that 
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consciousness could be a thing lost as well as gained, as if “wide as life” were resistant to 
oblivion. This is Woolf’s keener insight into evolution, where the correspondence diverges the 
most.  Non-being is not merely a problem of logic in Woolf. 
 
6.13: THE PRAGMATIC STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
But Bergson’s greatest insight might be that the thoroughly mechanistic or deterministic 
outlook is not Darwinian or evolutionary, as Nietzsche and others would have it, but fixed 
systems of thought derived from Plato. Freedom of thought can ensue when time is transformed 
into possibility, consciousness into freedom of choice rather than simply recognition.  Time and 
Free Will (1910) is Bergson’s struggle with the issue, but the more profound application of 
Bergsonism is James’s.  Certainly James thinks Bergson relieves him definitively of any need to 
repeat the dead-ends of certain logical questions; but more importantly, James finds in Bergson a 
philosophy already synchronized to his own temperament. 
 James had well before written The Principles of Psychology (1890), where he gives us 
not only a chapter on “The Sense of Time,” but also one where he comes up with his metaphor of 
“The Stream of Consciousness.”  Bergson claims he had not read Principles of Psychology 
before writing Matter and Memory or Creative Evolution, but the patterns of thought between 
them are present well before they meet or correspond.  That association, like all ideas discussed 
here, has evolutionary theory as a link. There is nothing more Bergsonian or Jamesian than the 
oft-quoted phrase “the stream of consciousness;” and, of course, it is also often dropped 
altogether from the context of James’s Psychology and used by literary students and critics alike 
to describe any novel, including Woolf’s, which breaks traditional conventions of narrative. The 
simplicity of the metaphor says much about the quality of James’s insight, for the metaphor was 
                                                           
517 Timeaus, 37 D, from which Bergson quotes, p. 318. 
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good enough to change the way we talk and therefore think about consciousness. Alfred North 
Whitehead writes that Bergson was the most characteristic philosopher of the twentieth century, 
partly because of his complete movement away “from the static materialism of the seventeenth 
century,” a feat accomplished by his “instinctive grasp of modern biology.” But Whitehead 
attributes to William James “the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy” through his 
challenges to the Cartesian ego and scientific materialism,518 challenges undertaken by the same 
thinker, Whitehead notes, because of James’s background in physiology, psychology and 
philosophy.  James’s professional shifting between the three fields, tempts us to treat each stage 
of James separately. But, as Ralph Balton Perry has argued, James the philosopher is in James 
the physiologist and psychologist, and vice-versa.519 This interconnection establishes James as 
our most consummate and relevant philosopher and psychologist of consciousness, perhaps as 
Freud and the Viennese School are of the unconscious. 
Placing James’s “stream of consciousness” into its original context affords us the 
opportunity to see through the surface of its significance:   
But whatever past states appear with those qualities [of warmth and intimacy] must 
be admitted to receive the greeting of the present mental state, to be owned by it, 
and accepted as belonging together with it in a common self.  The community of 
self is what the time-gap cannot break in twain, and is why a present thought, 
although not ignorant of the time-gap, can still regard itself as continuous with 
certain chosen portions of the past. 
 Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits.  Such words as 
‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance.  It 
                                                           
518 Science and the Modern World; Lowell Lectures, 1925, (New York: Pelicon by arrangement with Macmillan, 1948) 143-149. 
519 “Introduction” to Psychology, viii. 
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is nothing jointed; it flows.  A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is 
most naturally described.  In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of 
thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life520. 
 
Consciousness is continuous in James as it is in Bergson, its only gaps the sleep that intervenes 
between “Peter’s past” that “Peter’s present” claims as his own when waking (158).  The only 
way for James to describe this “community of self” that “the time-gap cannot break in twain” is 
an individual ownership or possession of self that has a “warmth and intimacy” about it. Whose 
thoughts are these that James feels he owns? Much as Freud and the psychoanalysts who follow 
him will question the autonomy of the self, especially by the interpretation of dreams that James 
peaceably sleeps through, it is worth noting that James never fixes upon a spatial construction of 
the self or ego that returns us to a stabilizing form or an allegorical determination of symbolic 
order.  James rids us of the notion that consciousness is a Cartesian “entity” or an “original idea” 
by knowing it through its function. When James refers to “states” of mind, it is only to see the 
stream of consciousness moving at a varied pace, his “Substantive” and “Transitive” states of 
mind likened to a bird’s alternate flights and perchings (160).  Sensationalists will linger over the 
transitive aspect while Intellectualists will insist upon the substantive, doubting, like “Zeno’s 
treatment of the advocates of motion,” that transitive states exist (161).  Moments of 
consciousness are known only by the “fringe” or “the halo of relations” that surround and escort 
them, much like Bergson’s “vague nebulosity” accompanies our intellect and Woolf’s “luminous 
halo, or semi-transparent envelope” surrounds consciousness. 
                                                           
520 Psychology (the abridged version of Principles of Psychology or what came to be known as the “Little Jimmie” of 1892), New 
York: World Publishing Co., 1948, p.  159.  Emphasis his, not mine. All future references will be cited as POP. 
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James actually graphs his sense of these neural processes by a “line of time” whereby 
each moment overlaps the next, like “overtones in music” that “blend with the fundamental note, 
suffuse it, and alter it” (166-67).  The mind only selects which notes to separate from the 
continuum, an act that has function for our thoughts but not by absolute abstraction. If we 
remember that Plato’s “general laws” in Cratylus hold Heraclitus’s “fluid matter” so that it “may 
be retained in vessels,” James avers that the “traditional psychologist” who employs neo-Platonic 
systems acts as if states of consciousness were separate entities, and not “the very smallest part 
of our minds as they actually live”: 
The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of 
nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms 
of water.  Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still 
between them the free water would continue to flow.  It is just this free water of 
consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. (165) 
Woolf’s writing, her consistent envisioning of consciousness and even reality in metaphors of 
water, seems too obvious to need mentioning.  Nevertheless, we each mould our separate pailsful 
of significance by our “habits of attention,” and no two travelers see the very same city they visit 
together, just as artists ideally select for their story or painting nothing that will not harmonize 
with the whole they envision. Woolf’s Lily Briscoe asks, “What device for becoming, like waters 
poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one with the object one adored?” (51). It is a Platonic 
question that Woolf’s aesthetics continually poses.  James’s response is that in this river of 
consciousness each individual travels alone. “No thought ever comes into direct sight of a 
thought in another personal consciousness than its own.  Absolute insulation, irreducible 
pluralism, is the law” (153). 
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6.14: A BREACH IN CONSCIOUSNESS 
 By this breach—in which all of us travel between each person’s consciousness and the 
stream of consciousness—we come to understand how Darwin fits into James’s philosophy of 
psychology and his psychology of philosophy. Consciousness, like a society of individual 
beliefs, is pluralistic.  Well before James firmly and explicitly put forth the terms “pragmatism” 
and “pluralism” as a philosophical correction or methodology, those “partial” or “provisional 
truths” were introduced in Principles of Psychology.  Treating psychology as a science is for 
James merely the same methodology these “provisional beginnings of learning we call ‘the 
Sciences’ in the plural” use to stay within their own “arbitrarily-selected problems, and […] 
ignore all others.”521  James writes in his introduction: “Incomplete statements are often 
practically necessary” for time’s sake, but also to counter the rational treatment of the soul “as an 
absolute spirit of being” without reference to either the body or the environment that we inhabit.  
“But the richer insight of modern days perceives that our inner faculties are adapted in advance 
to the features of the world in which we dwell,” James continues, “adapted, I mean, so as to 
secure our safety and prosperity in its midst.”  The prominent features of evolutionary theory, 
even the parts of Spencer that James finds useful—his rejection of the mind-body split and “the 
adjustment of inner and outer relations”—lead James to argue that “mind and world in short have 
been evolved together, and in consequence are something of a mutual fit” (4).  The unfit, 
unadaptive mind James leaves to the study of psychiatry and “the study of the useless” province 
of adaptation “made over to ‘Aesthetics’” (4-5).522  This was the realm of his brother Henry and 
                                                           
521 Principles, “Chapter I, Introductory,” 1. 
522 Aesthetics indeed are not a province James often enters successfully, as his letters to Henry, which criticize the aesthetic 
principles of his later novels, amply testify. But “useless” here should be read, I think, as Roger Fry reads it in Vision and 
Design—namely, that aesthetic appreciations can be distinguished from the moral appreciations precisely by the processes of 
natural selection that force one to act in “actual life” but not “in the imaginative life.” 
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his acquaintance, Virginia Woolf.  James’s book is his working hypothesis and should not be 
taken absolutely if what can be discovered can only remain a “partial truth” (6). 
 “Fitness,” indeed, is a crucial component in all of James.  This adaptive fitness of the 
mind to the world gives James a way into evolution without ceding the ground to a material 
determinism or an absolute progression to which other evolutionary philosophers inevitably 
succumb; but his philosophy still succeeds in affirming a place for human will and ethical 
considerations inside the temporal process of consciousness and its evolutionary component. 
When James does apply such ethics to his discussion in “The Stream of Consciousness,” the 
temporal continuum does not become settled by the pattern our past habits of behavior form.  
That capacity to change, and to change by acting, using the brain’s very adaptive plasticity, frees 
us from a determined course, even if it seems by record of our entire past we have been launched 
on a false career: 
What he shall become is fixed by the conduct of this moment.  Schopenhauer, 
who enforces his determinism by the argument that with a given fixed character 
only one reaction is possible under given circumstances, forgets that, in these 
critical ethical moments, what consciously seems to be in question is the 
complexion of character itself.  The problem with the man is less what act he shall 
now resolve to do than what being he shall now choose to become. (174) 
Identity, the very notion of self in James, is accumulating to such an extent that he will later 
claim that our last thought is our best formulation of selfhood. The “I” which knows is not a 
separate physical entity but a functioning thought of self “at each moment different from that of 
the last moment,” not a transcendental ego but an appropriation that leads James to his 
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astounding claim that “the thoughts themselves are the thinkers” (215-216). Such is the capacity 
of free will and change in James, good to our thought’s last thought. 
Thus, we see the fundamental process that escorts James toward his pragmatic method. 
Mental practices and the methods of thought are our most effective adaptive mechanism. Our 
ideas should have practical promptings to actions, and those ideas should have practical 
consequences if they are to be of any value.  One of the most often quoted passages from 
Pragmatism: “The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an 
idea.  It becomes true, is made true by events.  Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process 
namely of its verifying itself”523  Process as the way towards truth is what we must ultimately 
employ, rather than a set principle or a fixed belief.  It is the lesson Woolf’s writing continuously 
develops to arrive at her aesthetics, or what might be better termed as her varieties of aesthetics 
that adapt to the needs of her project at hand. Getting rid of the intellectualism’s abstractions has 
the expedient, practicable effects that the pragmatist and the novelist desire. 
 
6.15: PRAGMATIC DARWINISTS 
Following Darwin’s evolutionary theory through the procession of history that makes our 
consciousness adaptive rather than determined does not necessarily mean, under pragmatism’s 
banner, that Darwin’s ideas should be the basis for our values.  Louis Menand’s remarkable 
study of pragmatism distinguishes James’s continual use of Darwin from most of the other 
thinkers ineluctably influenced by The Origin of Species.  “He was Darwinian, but he was not a 
Darwinist,” Menand writes. “This made him truer to Darwin than most nineteenth-century 
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be cited as P. 
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evolutionists.”524  Early on, When James reviewed Darwin’s The Variations of Animals and 
Plants under Domestication, James does not debate the question of design versus natural 
selection, but rather remarks that its “adversaries are those whose interest it is to establish the 
rigor of these descriptive laws […].”  That evolutionary theory seems a law of “Caprice” which 
accounts for all the idiosyncrasies in nature, that in fact anticipates them by the chance 
happenings of adaptation, makes it for James all the more useful. The great value of Darwin’s 
hypothesis is that it puts “naturalists to work” by “sharpening their eyes for new facts and 
relations.”525 James too is put to work by Darwin in Principles of Psychology and Pragmatism in 
attempting to account for varieties of truths as they happen upon us rather than establishing the 
one truth from the many.  We have choices, and they need to be made by the fitness of their 
results rather than by any value based on their mere survival.  Menand concurs when he writes: 
The real lesson of On the Origin of Species for James—the lesson on which he 
based his own major work, The Principles of Psychology (1890)—was that natural 
selection has produced, in human beings, organisms gifted with the capacity to 
make choices incompatible with “the survival of the fittest.”  It was our good luck 
that, somewhere along the way, we acquired minds.  They released us from the 
prison of biology. (MC, 146) 
Once more Spencer seems our bogeyman for evolutionary malpractice, for as much as James 
puts some of Spencer to good use in Principles, he disagrees with Spencer when adaptation 
itself, as interpreted by “the survival of the fittest,” becomes a basis for values. Rather, the mind 
is an instrument adapted to make choices, moral or otherwise, and thereby consciousness may 
steer a course free of its evolutionary history. 
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 This is the practicable value James explores in Pragmatism when the questions of design 
or free will, whether it be the theist’s or the absolutist’s or the naturalist’s, become questions of 
belief.  James does not abandon “concrete realities” which inform the debate: “Darwinism has 
once for all displaced design from the minds of the ‘scientific,’ theism has lost that foothold” 
(35).  But to make of Darwinism a “philosophic religion” entraps the naturalist into his own 
dogmatic materialism, and does not preclude the value of belief in an absolute – James believes 
that to be the comfort it delivers, his moral holiday:  
What do believers in the Absolute mean by saying that their belief affords them 
comfort?  They mean that since, in the Absolute finite evil is ‘overruled’ already, 
we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as if it were potentially 
the eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear 
and drop the worry of our finite responsibility.  In short, they mean that we have a 
right ever and anon to take a moral holiday […]. (emphasis added, 36) 
The question of temporality develops into the exploration of what good it does us.  It does not 
mean James has resigned himself to the Absolutists or given in to their arguments—it still 
“clashes with other truths of mine” and “entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes that are 
inacceptable […].”  James gives up the absolute and just takes his moral holidays, and though 
Darwin “opened our minds to the power of chance-happenings to bring forth ‘fit’ results if only 
they have time to add themselves together,” the debate over design or adaptation at issue matters 
little if there is still “fitness” in ourselves, “this vague confidence in the future” (52-54). 
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 What James means by this, by pragmatism more generally, is that a doctrine such as free 
will, though divested of its relations to predetermination, eternity or absolute power, still serves 
us and offers us a future:  
Free will pragmatically means novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its 
deepest elements as well as its surface phenomena, the future may not identically 
repeat and imitate the past […]. nature may be only approximately uniform; and 
persons in whom knowledge of the world’s past has bred pessimism […] may 
naturally welcome free-will as a melioristic doctrine.  It holds up improvement as 
at least possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion of 
possibility is born of human ignorance, and that necessity and impossibility 
between them rule the destinies of the world. (55) 
James never cheats Darwin of his terror, nor does he cheat Darwin of his temporal open-
endedness, for the natural history that Darwinism descends through in time leaves the furthest 
past and the nearest future unknown.  This is the temporal open-endedness Woolf translates 
wholly into her aesthetics of semi-transparency; it enables her  to play with the value of Platonic 
forms, to treat “the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal.”  Those, save Nietzsche, who 
create a future course by evolutionary law fail to realize that we cannot, through Darwin’s 
theory, predict the future.  Its truth claims are enormous for James; Darwinism rids us of a 
perfect world order—“Who could desire free will” or “freedom, in a world already perfect…?—
but allows in such a world  that things might be better just as they might be worse (56).  We can 
still take our moral holidays, have the relief of an absolute belief without conceding that an 
absolute position is the best or most truthful way to decide all matters of the future.  Or, in other 
words, James’s words at their most eloquent and worth quoting at length: 
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Free-will thus has no meaning unless it be a doctrine of relief.  As such, it takes 
its place with other religious doctrines.  Between them, they build up the old 
wastes and repair the former desolations.  Our spirit, shut within this courtyard of 
sense-experience, is always saying to the intellect upon the tower: ‘Watchman, 
tell us of the night, if it aught of promise bear,’ and the intellect gives it then these 
terms of promise. 
 Other than this practical significance, the words God, free-will, design, 
etc., have none.  Yet dark tho they be in themselves, or intellectualistically taken, 
when we bear them into life’s thicket with us the darkness there grows light about 
us.  If you stop, in dealing with such words, with their definition, thinking that to 
be an intellectual finality, where are you?  Stupidly staring at a pretentious sham! 
[…]  Pragmatism alone can read a positive meaning into it, and for that she turns 
her back upon the intellectualist point of view altogether.  (56) 
James takes all the burning promises of philosophy and religion, seemingly extinguished from a 
Darwinian worldview, and gives them a promethean existence in the individual.   These 
provisional lanterns, from the one Nietzshe’s madman extinguishes to the “vague nebulosity” of 
Bergson, the “gem-like  flame” of Pater, or to the many aesthetic equivalents in the semi-
transparent, half-lights in Hardy, Conrad, and of course Woolf, all share something of James’s 
more limited but enlightening perspective.  A temporary glow rather than an eternal radiance still 
provides moral relief, moments of vision, moments of being. 
 
6.16 RUSSELL’S REBUTTAL 
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 Not all philosophers saw the positive meaning in James’s Pragmatism, especially its 
confounding, gleeful dismissal of Logic with a capital ‘L’ and its partial accommodation of 
religious beliefs in the face of empirical facts.  And since there was no mind of his generation 
more logically trained and brilliantly empirical than Bertrand Russell’s, it is no surprise that he 
criticizes James quickly after Pragmatism was published and then successively during his long, 
productive writing life. In “William James’s Conception of Truth,” Russell admirably applies his 
skills as a logician to dissect and parse many of James’s phrases, particularly his account of 
pragmatic truth.  Thus, James’s many metaphors on truth needing a “cash value”—that is, they 
must pay to be believed—leads Russell to test that value with “belief in the Roman Catholic 
Faith.”526  The consequences of the belief may be good or bad, but the attempt to classify them as 
on the whole good or bad is “practicably” useless because so disputable.  “It is far easier,” 
Russell writes, “to settle the plain question of fact: ‘Have Popes been always infallible?’ than to 
settle the question whether the effects of thinking them infallible are on the whole good” (118-
119).  What Russell argues is that Pragmatism confuses meaning of truth with criterion, which is 
not even useful because “it is usually harder to discover whether a belief is useful than whether it 
is true” (129). And then Russell displays the logician’s tools at their sharpest—“since no a priori 
reason is shown why truth and utility should always go together, utility can only be shown to be 
a criterion at all by showing inductively that it accompanies truth in all known instances, which 
requires that we should already know in many instances what things are true.  Finally, therefore, 
the pragmatist theory of truth must be condemned on the ground that it does not ‘work’” (130). 
 This unwittingly plays right into James’s criticism of taking logic too absolutely, and he 
makes easy work of it in his response.  James defends himself plainly on the one count by 
writing: “Good consequences are not proposed by us merely as a sure sign, mark, or criterion, by 
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which truth’s presence is habitually ascertained, though they may indeed serve on occasion as 
such a sign; they are proposed rather as the lurking motive inside every truth claim, whether the 
‘trower’ be conscious of such motive, or whether he obey it blindly.”527  In the example of 
Roman Catholicism, for example, Russell jumps straight from the individual believer to the truth 
of a belief—“Have all popes been infallible”—forgetting that pragmatism works individually: 
“[…] truth in human life,” James responds, “can only be used relatively to some particular 
trower” (963). Russell’s other accounts all fall under more of that “vicious abstractionism,” the 
attempt to affix pure logic and mathematical formula without admitting that these terms do not 
translate that in human terms: “When one argues by substituting definition for definition, one 
needs to stay in the same universe” (966); James’s pluralistic universe is not, in other words, 
designed upon the universal truth claims.  Pragmatism, James avers, can at the very least save us 
from the “diseased abstractionism” so wholly divorced from the reality of problems that 
pragmatism seeks to answer. 
 The nuances of both arguments are finer than these few examples show, but of more 
interest than such displays of a supreme logician debating a supreme pragmatist are the origins 
and consequences Russell reads into his criticism of Pragmatism and its like companions.  A 
year later, before Russell had the opportunity of reading James’s response to his criticism, he 
published an anonymous review entitled “Pragmatism” (1909) that delves far deeper into a 
political reading of the pragmatic method and its concurrent historical ramifications.  Here, the 
“lurking motive” of good consequences that James finds every “trower” attempting to ascertain is 
precisely what Russell questions.  Consider Russell’s usual grouping of pragmatism, particularly 
James’s Pragmatism, with Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche, a happy convergence of the 
philosophers discussed here, but also indicative of how Russell reads into this grouping a 
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dangerous evolutionary tendency of thought that pragmatism most pervasively represents.  A few 
passages should exemplify Russell’s position:  
The philosophy of evolution has also had its share in generating the pragmatic 
tone of mind. It has led people to regard everything as fluid and in process of 
development, everything as passing by imperceptible gradations into everything 
else […] Hence it has come to be felt that all sharp antitheses, such as that as true 
and false, must be blurred, and all finality must be avoided. […] And between 
different claimants for truth, we must provide a struggle for existence, leading to 
the survival of the strongest.  All this is admirably effected by the pragmatic 
theory of truth.  M. Bergson, whom pragmatists claim as an ally, may be regarded 
as embodying this tendency.528 
And, 
The habit of mind which believes that there are no essential impossibilities has 
been fostered by the doctrine of evolution, with its literary corollary of the 
Uebermensch. [….] In the absence of any standard of truth other than success, it 
seems evident that the familiar methods of the struggle for existence must be 
applied to the elucidation of difficult questions, and that ironclads and Maxim 
guns must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth. (108-9) 
A close scrutiny of James, Bergson, and Nietzsche do not bear many of the 
generalizations Russell equates with pragmatism.  The Uebermensch, as this chapter articulates, 
was Nietzsche’s antithetical answer to the doctrine of evolution, though a will to power does 
share an inevitable corollary to force and struggle, a conflation Nietzsche attempts, in his saner 
moments, to downplay, but that nevertheless has some drastic consequences when appropriated 
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by the misprision of those who seek power through will.  Russell conflates Nietzsche with 
pragmatism and Bergsonism in their favorable appreciations of the will and subjectivity in a time 
of metaphysical uncertainty. But he also conflates any positive application of evolutionary 
thinking as a Spencerian struggle, a characterization from which James works hard to distance 
himself.  In this sense, the will to believe and the will to power hardly seem to share anything but 
a verbal kinship, which Russell somewhat acknowledges before condemning both of them on the 
grounds that they lead to the same consequences: “The worship of force, as we find it in 
Nietzsche, is not to be found in the same form in William James, who, though he lauds the will 
and the life of action, does not wish action to be bellicose.  Nevertheless, the excessive 
individualism of the pragmatic theory of truth is inherently connected with the appeal to force” 
(109).  If there are no standards of an abstract, “non-human truth” to which disputants may 
appeal, Russell argues that the pragmatic reconciliation of competing truths, shorn from absolute 
judgment, have no recourse but to “ironclads and Maxim guns,” when powers of the state are 
controlled by individual wills.  James’s individualistic principles become adaptive to “democracy 
at home and to imperialism abroad,” a fitting formula for the next “Napoleonic domination” 
(110-111).  This is the Russell whose pacifism already felt threatened by a Bismarck in Germany 
arming his country for imperialistic expansion; and we need only jump ahead to Alfred 
Rosenberg’s claimed sources of James, Dewey, and Schiller for Myth of the Twentieth Century to 
realize that a partial understanding of pragmatism’s partial truths could be employed toward the 
unpragmatic ends of the Third Reich. 
Surely pragmatism, in the form James gives us, pleads innocent to this misapplication, as 
much as Russell’s devoted study of physics and mathematics remains innocent to the 
development of atomic bombs. If we believe something, we find our truths and await our proofs, 
                                                           
528 “Pragmatism,” Philosophical Essays, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968) 105-106. 
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as some characters in Beckett are still waiting for their Godot.  James insists that any claims 
derived from them must be as provisional as the reasons we went looking for them. The 
sweeping generalizations and intemperance of Russell’s criticism were enough to provoke the 
unusually temperate, fellow pragmatist John Dewey to say, “You know, he gets me sore.”529 
When linking pragmatic origins to pragmatic consequences, perhaps because of the generational 
and the Atlantic divide, Russell fails to consider how much James’s pragmatism has a strong 
historical precedent in the American Civil War, a position ably demonstrated in R. W. B. 
Lewis’s family biography of The Jameses and expanded in Menand’s The Metaphysical Club.  
For if the pragmatist’s position takes from evolutionary theory that ideas, like species, are not 
immutable, that their survival and value depends on their adaptability, it was also a position that 
held dissenting or competing truths to be tolerable, and that tolerance in fact was necessary to 
avoid another war.  This is Menand’s argument, that under pragmatic tenets, “the moral 
justification for our actions comes from the tolerance we have shown to other ways of being in 
the world, other ways of considering the case.  The alternative is force.  Pragmatism was 
designed to make it harder for people to be driven to violence by their beliefs” (MC, 440).  
Russell wished to keep the peace by an infallibly logical universe that renders a justice 
independent of our human fallibilities and the perverted rationalizations which individuals use to 
justify war; James believed that beliefs in truths needed to be divorced from any absolute law, 
even evolutionary struggle pronounced as natural law, so that the practicable effects of believing 
in something could not resort to divine rights or appeals to an eternal order as a justifications for 
war. Struggle with the ideas, enlist the facts, see the consequences of holding beliefs in relation 
                                                           
529 Qtd. From The Metaphysical Club, 375, and referenced from Dialogue on John Dewey, ed. Corliss Lamont, (New York: 
Horizon Press, 1959) 335. 
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to those that seem incompatible, and then act upon them (even in compromise) with a good, 
tolerant conscience. 
 
 Such are the debates that arise after Darwin’s temporal upheaval: between Russell versus 
James and Bergson over the consequences of holding truths to be as mutable as the individual 
who thinks them; between Nietzsche and the Hegelians over the moral value of historical process 
and becoming after Darwin; between Pater’s aesthetic translation of evolutionary theory for life 
and his critics, who condemn its moral relativism. It would be the unique, holistic absorption of 
these debates by Jane Ellen Harrison, who took sides definitively but found a compelling balance 
between the Greek ideal and evolutionary theory that found a welcome audience with Woolf.  
Harrison's regard—not just of Darwin's evolutionary theory but the philosophies of time and 
consciousness applied to classicism, ritual, art, and gender—would provide Woolf a personal 
exemplar and example as a burgeoning writer. While such a list suggests a linear passage from 
one thinker or thinkers to another, with Woolf such transmissions and applications are never 
straightforward as a logician's handbook. The voracious reader and reviewer and 
conversationalist that she was, not least regarding the Greek classics and the Darwinian texts and 
many of the figures writing and discussing them, Woolf lets her influences and the theories 
behind them wash over and through her like a sieve, catching what is necessary when it is 
necessary for the work in progress. In those formative years between 1904 and 1919, between 
her first forays into fiction and her drafting of her first experimental novel Jacob's Room, 
Woolf's formulates her aesthetics of semi-transparency.  Dynamic and fluid and adaptive, they 
originate in a belief and a working principle that allows for temporal open-endedness, to use 
James's term.  It also seeks in its narrative configuration to capture a consciousness as wide as 
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life and as extended as evolutionary time, to adopt Bergson's terms. Yet it will contain multitudes 
and contradictions. Moments do strike into stability, and Woolf envelopes her fluidity of thought 
and prose into a harder geometry, a shapened thing.  Platonic pattern, if you will, takes 
temporary shape and in the shaping attempts to bridge vision with design, the moment of vision 
capturing but subsumed by moments of being. "How to describe a world seen without a self?," 
Woolf 's scribbling character Bernard in The Waves wonders, a fictive mouthpiece of Woolf 
wishing to vanquish the egotism of the "I" in fiction, the masculine bar that looms like a tower, 
casts a cold shadow, and imposes itself on the reader. Woolf's feminine sentence would attempt 
to do the opposite. 
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Chapter Seven: Inclusive Inconclusions  
 
7.1 THE SUMMER OF 1906 
I have already discussed at length the very earliest short stories contained within Woolf's 
unpublished manuscripts that showcase her vision of Greece and the Greek ideal, as it came to be 
employed through Woolf's male and female inheritance of that ideal from her forbears and 
contemporaries of the 19th to early 20th centuries. Alongside those early Grecian tales is also "The 
Monkeys," a fragment that might be Woolf's earliest preserved piece of fiction, by appearance 
and manuscript most closely resembling those of both "Phyllis and Rosamond" and "A Vision of 
Greece" from the summer of 1906.530  “The Monkeys” is florid, impressionistic prose, some of 
the best in Woolf's early fiction. In it, she moves swiftly from imagery of melons on a Paris or 
London breakfast table consumed by "trouser"-wearing primates to a jungle with a pair of young 
monkeys she follows from morning breakfast to the following dawn. Through the maze of trees 
they swing and leap as if they were "following the curves of some swift dance" until they reach 
the highest tree in the canopy (325). She provides them a vision atop the trees—of the sun and 
landscape and all its vivid, shimmering colors under the sun's "rays of flame into which the sky 
had burst." There is little to no characterization of the monkeys, though they are given a 
knowledge of survival shared with the other forest inhabitants: "The monkeys knew of the great 
battle that was daily fought; they could not have been such swift powerful creatures had they not 
moved always in an air of fierce conflict and crisis." Naturalist observation is interspersed with 
memorable figurative language and painterly description, like the bed of glossy leaves which 
were "as cold as sheets of lawn" in the "cool ocean of shade washing above them."  Her narration 
                                                           
530 See Susan Dick’s “Notes” to the Appendices in Complete Shorter Fiction regarding the dating of “The Monkeys”, p. 339. 
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follows their trajectory from canopy to forest floor.  When night, the language that traces their 
passing moments grows cosmic in perspective, with the perpetual movements of sun and moon 
and animal in step with the same mysterious dance the narrator had imagined the monkeys 
following through the curves of the trees: "But not all slept; the dance was carried on by firefly 
and leopard, and the silver light and the red light passed mysteriously round and round and 
through and through the forest, as though they wove some magic web across their sleeping 
brothers."531 It is a world, in short, unpeopled, and though conventional in its narrative form, 
inaugurates Woolf's beloved trope of imagining a world seen without a self, at least without a 
human self and all his self-consciousness, where there is destiny constructed independent of 
human needs. Like one of Woolf's most haunting later essays, "The Sun and the Fish," the 
revolutions of stars and the evolutions of animals occupy most all of Woolf's attention. 
To juxtapose this fragment alongside Woolf's "Vision of Greece" and "Phyllis and 
Rosamond," to locate them all chronologically in that same imaginative space in June of 1906, is 
to gain a portrait of how the two juvenile enthusiasms for natural history and Greek studies begin 
their revolutions and evolutions through her writing. It is all there.  
 
7.2 THE FALL OF 1918 
The short distance, then, between this timeframe and the fall of 1918 a dozen years later, 
only offers a variation upon the theme, but at this juncture the theme would have profound 
consequences for Modern fiction. Virginia Woolf was living at Asheham house in Sussex, 
finishing Night and Day, steadily writing reviews, and intermittently taking breaks from both by 
composing the short stories eventually published in Monday or Tuesday.  “The Mark on the 
Wall” had been written the year before and became the first publication of The Hogarth Press.  
                                                           
531 Complete Shorter Fiction, 324-25 
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Women had gained the right to vote in England that February.  The success of the Allies at 
Amiens in August meant that there was talk of peace with the Germans, and Leonard Woolf had 
helped co-found The League of Nations. “Kew Gardens” was in the process of being typeset and 
would go to press in December. Woolf was reading voraciously and variously, including James 
Joyce’s Ulysses and Katherine Mansfield’s The Prelude in manuscript as a submission to 
Hogarth.532  Despite the physical rigor of living in the country, in part to avoid the prospect of 
German air raids, it was a time of great mental health, vigor and vitality for Woolf—it had been 
over three years since her last breakdown.  Her essay “Modern Novels” would in a few months 
lay out Woolf’s terms for a Modern literature of her own and reveal the principles with which 
she was experimenting in her short stories.  
A peculiar passage appears among Woolf’s expansive entries in her diaries, a teasingly 
enigmatic record of her intellectual interests and fecundity.  It begins, 
I spend the first five minutes with this book before me trying to fish two drowned 
flies out of my ink pot on the tip of my pen; but I begin to see that this is one of 
those undertakings which are quite impossible — absolutely impossible.  Not 
Darwin or Plato could do it with the tip of my pen.  And now the flies are 
increasing & dissolving; today there are three.  At Asheham I naturally bethink 
me of Darwin & Plato533 […]. 
While the image seems quaint in the twenty-first century, flies often did drown in the writer’s 
ink—pots stood open on writing desks with blotting paper nearby and the flies mistook the 
opaque, still pool for a solid object upon which to land.  Woolf could not have landed upon a 
better metaphor for Darwinian circumstance than the fly’s predicament, with the incongruities 
                                                           
532 The Prelude they did publish, but Ulysses was too long to be taken on by the Woolfs’ small press. 
533 The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vol. I: 1915-1919, ed. By Anne Olivier Bell (New York: HBJ, 1977). 192. 
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between instinct and design, adaptation and environment.  She finds in the flies a quick metaphor 
for her work, swarming thoughts and generative ideas sinking into her inkpot so that she might 
fish out some writing for the day. Darwin and Plato, Woolf’s catch, fancifully evade her and 
dissolve.534 Two days earlier, Woolf recalled “lying on the side of a hollow, waiting for 
L[eonard] to come & mushroom, & seeing a red hare loping up the side & thinking suddenly 
‘This is Earth life’.  I seemed to see how earthy it all was, & I myself an evolved kind of 
hare.”535   
 Darwin would come to mind at Woolf’s house in Sussex, with dead flies collecting at her 
desk, the vegetative and animal life abuzz, and the downs rather than Downing Street before her.   
Why Woolf then makes associations to Plato, in a setting that seems so characteristically 
Darwinian in its implications, is a question informed by her balancing of the two great 
intellectual passions she consistently poses in her fiction. She was migrating at this juncture from 
what occupied the emplotment of her characters to what she would embed in the structure of the 
writing itself.  Those early short stories explore dialogue and the limitations imposed upon it.  
The flies dissolve, but a dialogue of Plato finally “hardens and intensifies into truth,” Woolf 
writes seven years later, despite the various procession of people entering and leaving the 
conversation.  Socratic dialogue requires a setting of utmost civility and hospitality, often during 
the course of a good dinner served among friends and acquaintances: “It is Plato who reveals life 
indoors,” Woolf declares.536  These are the convivial exchanges in private enclosures that 
Darwin, the voyaging naturalist, the retiring English country gentleman scientist, the keenest 
observer of the natural world, humbly leaves and leaves open.  Darwin, in Woolf’s imagination, 
                                                           
534 Of peripheral interest are the three new “flies” that then appear in her diary: Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Milton.  They, 
unlike Darwin and Plato, are discussed directly, with ease and conviction; Milton, she states with great portent, “was the first of 
the masculinists” (190). 
535 Ibid. 190. 
536 “On Not Knowing Greek,” The Common Reader, Ed. and Intro. by Andrew McNeillie. (New York: HBJ, 1925) 32. 
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never hardens or intensifies, never secures or encloses, the truth not in the end result but in the 
process of an expansive, boundless variety. 
What transpires here appears inconsequential in the context of those extremely 
consequential years for Virginia Woolf and all affected by the current crises in European 
civilization, but Darwin and Plato are intensely present in Woolf’s writing throughout her early 
years, and indeed throughout her entire body of writing.  Woolf brings Darwin and Plato to the 
tip of her pen because they are major contrasting forces in her work, the two most representative 
figures of a philosophical and aesthetic debate that had begun shortly after Darwin’s publication 
of The Origin of Species. Darwinian theory is behind some crucial components of Woolf’s 
departure from conventional novel writing and narrative form.  The shifting stability of Plato and 
the Greek aesthetic counterpoises the Darwinian aspects to Woolf’s thinking and writing.   
 
7.3 EARLY TIME PASSAGES 
The summer of 1906 and the fall of 1918—two touchstone passages of time in Woolf's 
writing that, threaded together and pulled to the surface, catch Woolf at pivotal moments of her 
literary endeavor. They announce the conscious arrival of Virginia Stephen the writer and the 
formation of Virginia Woolf the Modernist. These preceding chapters have honed in on these 
two significant moments in her literary life to indicate how Darwin and Greece are there early 
and often, and how they are there early and often. I have attempted to also show why Woolf's 
later contemplation regarding the "solid and the shifting" aspects of life and narrative is a 
formulating thought for her there from the very beginning of her writing career, how behind that 
thought are her readings of Darwin's evolutionary theory and her studies in Greek antiquity. 
More intimately, they both also derive from Woolf's great childhood passions of "bugging" with 
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the family "Entomological Society" and of course the reading, especially from the Greek classics 
that afforded her the closest approximation to the formal male education denied her.   
In doing so, I have also argued that a Victorian inheritance of the Greek ideal, compounded 
by its acquisition and institutionalization in male public schools, offsets and complicates Woolf's 
appreciation of her actual readings and responses to Greek literature in ambivalent, contradictory 
ways, the same ways they manifested themselves in British culture and the Cambridge 
Bloomsburies who formed her closest male friendships and literary alliances. The major strain of 
Victorian Hellenism broadly understood, synthesized, and disseminated by influential 19th 
century critics like John Ruskin and Matthew Arnold, largely solidify the Greek ideal as Woolf 
came to envision it via this male lineage.  It is a Platonizing, originating formation of both 
literature and character.  The other figures of British Hellenism, however, the ones Frank Turner 
calls the "Evolutionary Hellenists" who emerge from the late 19th to the early 20th century in 
Darwin's wake, offer Woolf a profound alternative to the solidity of the Greek ideal, a female 
lineage that can be said to merge Pater's aesthetics with Harrison's scholarship. From this 
feminine lineage Woolf branches out to form a feminist aesthetic that is evolutionary as well as 
revolutionary.  In short, she draws from the Greek and the naturalist vision a dynamic process, a 
metaphor to write by that undulates between the solid and the shifting tendencies in her thought. 
It evokes and ultimately invokes a "discovery of technique" for fiction, what she famously 
sketches in her essay "Modern Fiction" as "a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope" 
surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end that the novelist must trace and 
score. Solid and shifting, engraved and evanescent, granite and rainbow…—Woolf employs an 
abundance of metaphors to describe the opposing, contradictory forces that at any given moment 
she attempts to bestow upon a moment recorded but just as soon gone while apprehended. 
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Pulling these moments out from the narrative stream and prolific outpouring that is Woolf's 
writing life also accomplishes what Bergson feared in the "Platonizing" problem of any train of 
thought, that it segments an instant of time taken for the whole, pebbles on the beach that cannot 
explain the movement of the wave that brought them there. Focusing on such broad and all-
encompassing spheres of influence as Grecian antiquity and Darwinian theory impacting Woolf 
at these key junctures does also make evident, amply, how the pull of literary relations really do 
stop nowhere, even though we, as Henry James instructed, have to draw our circle somewhere. 
What Woolf counters, in response, is that such spheres of influence and circles of inclusion are 
never fully circumscribed. They carry with them a vague nebulosity, and to enclose it wholly and 
arrive singularly at a nugget of truth is indeed a fiction. In fiction and in criticism, certainly in 
Virginia Woolf's own, those oscillations between these two big ideas and all their coterminous 
thinkers reverberate from her earliest works all the way through to her latest.  
 
7.4 THE FALL OF 1940 
There is also the fall of 1940—Beyond it and the winter to come, we know, is Woolf's 
suicide drowning in the River Ouse, but before her is the completion of Pointz Hall, what would 
come to be named Between the Acts, a fitting title for the writer whose fictional career emerged 
between the two World Wars. She was also intermittently writing entries into her memoir 
posthumously titled "A Sketch of the Past," and though incomplete undeniably one of Woolf's 
greatest achievements. That October 20th, the Woolfs returned to Tavistock Square to their 
bombed out house, and in her journal she records the ruins in a list of fragmentary impressions 
and catalogues of what remained. When she climbs through the dining room to arrive at her 
sitting room, she writes, "A wind blowing through. I began to hunt out diaries. Whad cd we 
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salvage in this little car? Darwin & the Silver, & some glass & china."537  Just the month 
previous they'd been relieved that their house had remained unscathed from that week's 
bombings, when not far away they stood by Jane Harrison's former house, "still smouldering."538  
These last two years of diary entries might more rightly be called war journals. Gruesome 
misfortune is catalogued, but also a poetic accounting—telling in the way every war story is 
telling by what an individual chooses to salvage from it. This is her Victorian inheritance, or 
what remained of it for Virginia Woolf. Her childhood surely Victorian, the silver and the china 
service that came along with the sidelong conversations that had impeded and interrupted every 
advance in her writer's life but had also in all its disadvantages given her a vantage  from which 
to write outside the patriarchal enclosures as she'd found them. Then there was the Darwin 
beside it, the works by the Victorian gentleman naturalist whose excursions in life and science 
did more to undo the structure and edifice of the Victorian heritage than any other text pulled 
from the wreckage.   
Poetically though we can read into the gathering of Darwin and the silver above anything 
else that remained, there was still a practical intention. That spring Woolf had been reading about 
apes, which gave her the thought to do a "C[ommon]. R[eader]. on Darwin" with the first section 
on his Voyage of the Beagle and the second on him settling at Downe for the remainder of his 
life to gather and theorize and accumulate the evidence for the origin of species by means of 
natural selection.539 In a sense, Woolf already had written her version of these two narratives, 
from the voyage of The Voyage Out (or even earlier "The Monkeys”) to the naturalist's 
description and structure come home to England in "Kew Gardens"; ultimately, at the last, she 
would describe this as the "naturalists" method in her writing of Between the Acts:  “I observe, as 
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a curious trifle in mental history—I shd like to take naturalists notes—human naturalists notes—
that is the rhythm of the book….The rhythm of PH [Pointz Hall] (the last chapter) became so 
obsessive that I heard it, perhaps used it, in every sentence I spoke….The rhythm of the notes is 
far freer & looser. Two days of writing in that rhythm has completely refreshed me.”540 
Over these last few months she had also been reading Greek again, intermittently, to 
"anchor her mind," she said, as a way to tap into what was solid and durable in a time of war. 
One of her best late essays on modern fiction, "The Leaning Tower," had just been written, 
which marks the final chapter in Woolf's brilliant assessment on the role of education and writing 
for women and men. In her diary the next day, awaiting the publication of "The Leaning Tower" 
in the Times Literary Supplement of November 23rd, she taps into this naturalist's methodology 
by thinking through the "Tower dwellers" of the Oxbridge educated men of her essay, but she 
reimagines and transposes the metaphor to the "queer little sand castles" of so many male 
writers:  
 
Little boys making sand castles….Each is weathertight, & gives shelter to the occupant. I 
think I can follow Read's building [the reviewer she was reading in The Spectator]; so far 
as one can follow what one cannot build. But I am the sea which demolishes these 
castles. I use this image…. his self that built the castle is to me destructive of its 
architecture…What is the value of a philosophy which has no power over life? I have the 
double vision. I mean, as I am not engrossed in the labour of making this intricate word 
structure I also see the man who makes it. I should say it is only word proof, not weather 
proof. We have to discover the natural law & live by it. We are anarchists: We take the 
leap (glory that is) from what we know to be instinctive….But of course, being a tower 
                                                           
539 Ibid., 274. 
 277 
dweller, Read walls them in, others out. Plato of course did not write reviews for The 
Spectator. I can thus endow him with a purity that is impossible….I am carrying on, 
while I read, the idea of women discovering, like the 19th century rationalists, agnostics, 
that man is no longer God….It is essential to remain outside; & realise my own beliefs; 
or rather not to accept theirs. (340, emphasis mine) 
 
Indeed, Woolf had already developed a fictional form that undulated like the sea and was attuned 
to the shifts of time and temporality. Quite deliberately, she identifies herself as an "anarchist" in 
reference to Arnold's Culture and Anarchy that would have its male tower dwellers still 
inhabiting and building upon the foundations of the Greek ideal. This ideal, too, she appreciated 
and occupied as a conceptual framework that might contain, if only in passing, the moments of 
vision that strike into stability the edifice of her fiction, especially from Jacob's Room to The 
Waves. At this vantage of time, Woolf saw clearly what her fiction had already accomplished, as 
well as the ideas that helped her accomplish it—"Plato of course did not write reviews," meaning 
she could still idealize this male writer and the ideas she had embraced, though in the 20th 
century, he too, would have been a tower dweller. Even at this last phase, Woolf is still working 
out the rhythm of thought that continuously formed and reformed in her fictional endeavors. The 
dynamic between the solid and the shifting in Woolf’s fiction emerges from these two 
formations: of the Greek ideal and the unsettling Darwinian disintegration of that ideal. 
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Chapter Eight: Coda  
 
8.1 RIP VAN WINKLES 
 A deferred dissertation, particularly one deferred almost two decades, inevitably wakes 
up to its own critical Rip Van Winkles. In 1999, when I began the research and writing for this 
thesis in earnest, to speak of Woolf’s deep engagement not just with the sciences but with 
Darwin and evolutionary theory was, if not an original lens through which to see her texts and 
ideas, one that had not been much in use. Gillian Beer, it is true, had her collection of essays on 
Woolf and science, The Common Ground (1996), which essentially opened the field for critical 
discourse pertaining to Woolf and the “hard” sciences, especially the life sciences and 
evolutionary theory. It was fortuitous indeed that Beer, while drafting and revising the essays on 
Woolf that would appear in The Common Ground, contemporaneously edited and wrote the 
“Introduction” to the Oxford World Classic’s edition of Darwin’s The Origin of Species, 
published in 1996 as well.  Her thinking for both had already been informed and enriched 
substantially by her research and writing of the groundbreaking study Darwin’s Plots (1983) 
which looked at George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, and other nineteenth century novelists who 
immediately wrote and responded to evolutionary theory in Darwin’s wake. Still, to broach the 
subject of science and Woolf, Beer had to introduce the topic by asserting “the importance of 
challenging the long-standing assumption that Woolf was ‘ignorant and uninterested in 
science.’”541   Even to argue a primary rather than secondary engagement of Woolf in philosophy 
and the sciences required some buttressing— the strong, essential feminist voice and alternative 
to the male Modernist canon had been established,  but the notion of her domesticated and effete 
aesthetic, a watered down version of James Joyce’s, still stood as a respected critical ruin. 
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 Then came Ann Banfield’s formidable, comprehensive study of Woolf, Bertrand Russell,  
Roger Fry, and the epistemology of Modernism in The Phantom Table (2000), and the field 
widened considerably more to include the great philosophical and scientific debates regarding 
temporality and physics—debates in which Woolf’s father Leslie Stephen had a strong voice 
well before the issues engaged the entire early 20th century Bloomsbury crowd and found their 
mimetic representations and experimentations in Woolf’s literature as well as Fry’s art and 
literary criticism. Slowly but surely other studies followed. When I presented a paper at the 2003 
International Virginia Woolf conference at Smith College, I was one of only three on a panel that 
focused on "Virginia Woolf and the Sciences."  Holly Henry was there to discuss and present her 
book, just released, on Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of Science: The Aesthetics of 
Astronomy (2003). My topic was "Darwin's Temporal Aesthetics” as they had been reimagined 
by Walter Pater and Woolf, the germ of what would become my sixth chapter here; Brenda 
Lyons joined us to discuss her dissertation’s thesis on Plato and Woolf. Because her topic, too, 
touched upon Pater, the three of us were paired together to represent the interest of Woolf in 
classical philosophy and science. When you thumb through the itinerary and lists of topics, that 
about covered the philosophical or scientific explorations as it pertained to Woolf as an engaged 
primary reader and interpreter of either, though there was an excellent display of Leonard and 
Virginia's botanical interests at Smith's own botanical gardens.  
 Compare this to just seven years later, at the 20th International Virginia Woolf 
Conference, when the subject was Virginia Woolf and the Natural World—papers now abound 
on Woolf, natural history, evolution, and the sciences.542 Bonnie Kime Scott’s “Keynote 
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(Cambridge UP, 2010), p. 4-5. 
542 topics archived at http://www.georgetowncollege.edu/ 
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Address” at the conference on “Ecofeminism, Holism, and the Search for Natural Order in 
Woolf” highlights what has become perhaps the largest emergent field in Woolf studies that 
pertains significantly and finds profound correspondence to the work undertaken in this thesis—
namely, the emergence of ecological criticism and its important pairings with feminist and 
phenomenological studies of Woolf, dubbed “ecofeminism” and “ecophenomenology.”  Indeed, 
critical monographs large and small in these fields have proliferated of late to include Diana 
Swanson’s closing remarks at the 20th International Conference on “Woolf and Ecofeminism,” 
Christina Alt’s Virginia Woolf and the Study of Nature (2010), Bonnie Kim Scott’s In the Hollow 
of the Wave (2012)—which was conceived in large part through her participation at the Woolf 
conference— and most recently Mark S. Morrisson’s overview of ecofeminism, Woolf, and the 
sciences in his chapter on “Life Sciences” in Modernism, Science, and Technology (2016).543 
Woolf’s numerous, even ubiquitous allusions to and passages on the natural world—from its 
moths, butterflies and plants to the dogs and horses abundantly populating her works—most 
often drew critical attention previously for their symbolic associations or sheer aesthetic 
resonance, whether that symbolism housed a semiotics of trauma or a Romantic appreciation of 
natural beauty. What has emerged more currently is a more holistic yet closer scrutiny and 
scientific survey of Woolf’s attention to nature and the sciences, a critical response that observes 
just how accurate Woolf’s use and application of science and nature was and is to her feminism 
and modernism, particularly regarding some of the contemporaneous debates involving 
evolution, the emergent fields of ecology and ethology, the academic institutionalization of the 
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life sciences, and natural history as it transformed in the early 20th century into modern 
biology.544  
 So while Wolf the dog accompanies the fictional Rip Van Winkle up to the mountain 
where he drinks and slumbers, only to wake up twenty years later to an accomplished American 
revolution and a pet who doesn’t recognize him, Virginia Woolf’s dog Flush (1933), her 
fictionalized biography of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Cocker Spaniel, has been receiving far 
more critical attention as a Darwinian, evolutionary and ecological work of feminist literature, 
alongside Woolf’s many fictional species of birds, hares, flowers, and foxes.545 This dissertation 
awakens pleasantly enough to these critical developments and evolutions, joining by affinity a 
substantial body of critical discourse underway that has discovered a veritable field of 
ecofeminist concerns in the works of Virginia Woolf.   
 Furthering the studies of Woolf and nature is the depth of recent critical attention paid to 
not just Woolf’s contemporaneous reading of Classical Greek and absorbing critique of British 
Hellenism but the figures of Jane Ellen Harrison, Walter Pater, and other classical scholars with 
whom Woolf had abiding connections. My analysis of Harrison’s “Evolutionary Hellenism” and 
its impact on Woolf benefits from what Jean Mills describes as the “transpersonal” bond between 
Harrison and Woolf as not a “…looking back, which is classicism, but a transforming forward of 
a particular version and interpretation of classicism into a feminist modernism.”546  In the works 
of Mills and others in recovering the work of Woolf’s “mentors,” a strong resonance with the 
                                                           
544 See Morrisson, Swanson, Scott, and especially Alt on this newfound critical attention. Alt’s chapters “The natural history 
tradition” and “The modern life sciences” in Virginia Woolf and the Study of Nature, (14-71), are especially thoroughgoing on 
this point. 
545 See, again, the many papers presented and published in Virginia Woolf and the Natural World, especially “Taking Her 
Fences: The Equestrian Virginia Woolf” by Beth Rigel Daugherty (61-70); “The Metaphysics of Flowers in The Waves by Laci 
Mattison (71-77); “The Woolf, the Horse, and the Fox: Recurrent Motifs in Jacob’s Room and Orlando” (108-116) by Vara 
Neverow; “‘The Bird is the Word’; Virginia Woolf and W.H. Hudson, Visionary Ornithologist” (133-142) by Diane Gillespie; 
“Evolution History, and Flush; or, The Origin of Spaniels” by Jeanne Dubino (143-150); and “‘Lappin and Lapinova’; A Woolf 
in Hare’s Clothing?” by Kathryn Simpson (151-56). 
 282 
ecofeminist approach becomes apparent. What then critically bridges these studies of nature and 
classicism in Woolf—what I have similarly framed as the evolutionary “shifting” and classical 
“solid” queries of temporality and narrative structure that preoccupy Woolf and her dynamic, 
protean narrative processes—are the contemporaneous literary studies that engage the 
Pragmatists and “process” philosophers, especially William James and Henri Bergson whose 
philosophies were most responsive and formative to the “maelstrom of modernism.”547 Their 
regard for evolutionary theory, classical notions of the ideal and the absolute, and all the 
emergent, overlapping fields of psychology, physiology, and the new sciences inform Modernist 
notions of time, consciousness, language and, as a consequence, narrative configuration. This 
coda serves to briefly review some of the more recent critical studies that pertain to these fields. 
 
8.2 FROM THE PRIMITIVE TO THE PRIMORDIAL 
 A good place to begin is with a tome that provides a general overview of Modernism and 
the more contemporary contributions to how we define the period and Woolf’s unique 
contribution to it. Framing my overall argument through Woolf’s own private musing from her 
1931 diary entry, where she posed the question, “Now is life very solid or very shifting,” without 
definitively proffering and answer, was to exemplify in broad strokes Woolf’s continuous, self-
conscious participation in the very act of what it means to be “Modernist.”  While the framing as 
such does create the appearance of a binary choice, Woolf’s responses, both immediately in the 
diary entry and throughout her personal and public writings, resisted an either/or certainty so that 
Woolf’s metaphors engage in a manner that always favors processes over conclusions.  I have 
argued that ontological and epistemological queries are both engaged in such searching images 
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and passages in Woolf, that questions of being become questions of time, and questions of time 
questions of being.   This temporal fascination (and anxiety) Woolf shares with her most 
prominently studied contemporary Modernists has enjoyed a resurgence of interest, more 
precisely an enlargement of scope beyond the mere study of form or narrative experimentation 
with the received paradigms of time and space. Indeed, the hyperawareness of time, the 
invocation of a plurality of times and time-mindedness becomes a defining principal, sensibility, 
even zeitgeist of what it means to be Modern, even more so Modernist. Hence, Vincent Sherry 
introduces the prodigious expanse of material within the Cambridge History of Modernism 
(2016) by first rooting the time in the very term that defines the times— 
 
So, modo enters into late antiquity as a most timely register of a temporality pressured by 
an immense sense of eventful change: a special present, a brink of time, a precipitous 
instant, all in all, a crisis time. These several associations move to the acutest register in 
the twentieth century through the addition of the suffix ‘ism,’ which adds a self-conscious 
awareness to this special experience of the ‘modern’ moment, turning the uncertainty of 
instantaneous time into not just a feeling but an idea, maybe even a faith or belief in this 
condition of constantly disruptive change.548 
This “just now” of modernism transforms the “imaginative experience of temporality” beyond 
“one of crisis time to one of time itself in crisis,” a sensibility so pronounced that the plurality of 
Modernist movements and “isms,” informed as they are by major developments in disparate 
fields of the sciences, psychology, philosophy, art, music and architecture, among others, share 
this preoccupation: “these movements locate the action of modernism in a signal time, a 
signature tense—a present intensified with the sense of the break it is making from the past and 
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the breakthrough it makes to a future.”549  It by this rationale that Sherry not only introduces and 
argues for the primacy of this feature of modernism, this “temporal imaginary” that “dominates 
its consciousness,” but also indeed gives primacy to the thought in The Cambridge History of 
Modernism by placing “Modernism in Time” as the first of the compendium’s four parts.550 
 And it was for these corroborating reasons that my thesis lays such stress upon 
temporality as a foundational aspect of Woolf’s interpretation of the “solid and the shifting” in 
life as in fiction, whereby her moments of vision and being become metonyms for the brevity of 
life itself—a paradox nonetheless in how an instant of time approximates eternity without the 
consolation of eternal forms, the descent long and disappearing, the ascent uncertain and 
accidental, grown existential in the Darwinian accumulation and geological expansion of time. 
To this point, Sherry’s analysis of Thomas Hardy’s well-traveled phrase “the ache of 
Modernism” is most apt: “…the feeling Tess experiences in seeing a vision of days winding 
away in to a future that is at once infinite and diminishing, an eternity that is both meaningless 
and menacing. This is a vision of time future as time indeterminate, as time unblessed and 
unbound from the covenants of eschatology….”551 Of the many chapters and contributions to 
Sherry’s History, within the “Time” section and without, two come to the forefront as essential 
to an enlargement of the arguments advanced in my thesis—one for its overview and the other 
for its more specific attentions to temporality. Tim Armstrong’s piece on the science, philosophy, 
and aesthetics of “Modernist Temporality” provides a substantial survey of the influences and 
concerns shaping Woolf’s more experimental designs for her fiction, whereas David Richards’ 
investigations of the “Primitive” in Modernism offer an entrance back into the ways Woolf’s 
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fiction marks a distinguishing difference, via gender and her Darwinian narrative gestures and 
temporal experimentations, from her masculinist contemporaries.  
 Armstrong’s look at the Modernist temporal imaginary that “includes clockwise and 
counterclockwise movements” allows him to explore both “the master narrative of advance and a 
contrarian understanding of regression.”552 Behind this are the period’s new developments and 
understandings of time and temporality derived from physics, mathematics, psychological 
investigations of a personal or human sense of time (à la James and Bergson), as well as 
advances in technology that gave us a heightened sense of mechanized time as well as the 
moving instants of the moving image. All this I’ve reviewed in this dissertation’s introductory 
chapter, but what Armstrong further establishes is how these newfound senses of time often 
conflict or compete for authorial attention: 
…Time can never easily be the abstract Newtonian continuum in the modernist text; it is 
discontinuous, interrupted, overloaded. As a result, the time of modernism is a matter of 
competing and often knotted accounts of what time is, whether we are considering 
individual temporal experience over the short or long term, or the collective shapes in 
time we call society and history.”553 
Part of this is anticipated by by Ricoeur’s analysis of time and narrative, which my dissertation 
employs and to which Armstrong also refers.  Ricoeur’s tension between “cosmic” time and 
“lived” time understands these competing temporal juxtapositions at the configuring site of 
narrative, and even the reconfiguration the reader makes in the very act of reading. But the 
plurality of times, especially the counterclockwise “regressive” as well as the the collective 
shapes of collective historical and social times, is worth considering more fully in relation to 
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Woolf. Indeed, equally important are how many competing aspects of temporality sprang 
between Modernist writers, scientists, and philosophers, the conflicting social and historical 
times defining in large part Woolf’s timeframes as Modernist and feminist. 
 Part of what the recent ecological literary criticism raises is the widening schism between 
what categorizes nature and culture during industrial and urban modernization, and with it a 
concomitant schism between a time lived and synchronized to the rhythms of nature versus the 
increasingly mechanistic nature of time measured by clocks or, more jarringly, what Woolf 
likens  to the speed of urban modernity “being blown through the Tube at fifty miles per 
hour.”554 So Bonnie Kime Scott’s study of Woolf and nature In the Hollow of the Wave finds 
inspiration in Donna Haraway’s ecofeminist coinage of the compound noun “natureculture” to 
resist, blur or even bridge the schism altogether.555 If a linguistic gimmick, it still engenders a 
nomenclature to approach one significant manner in which Woolf differs profoundly by rhetoric 
and practice from most of the modernist contemporaries most often read alongside her—
certainly any of the masculinist, militaristic tendencies of the “Men of 1914.”  
 Consider the fascination with primitivism as a modernist imperative at the turn of the 
century as at once an aesthetic alternative to Western art as well as an imperialistic, colonial 
acquisition.  David Richards explores how the “primitive,” through occidental eyes, became a 
“catchall term comprising non-Western peoples and their cultural products”—a “turning away 
from 500 years of European art and a turning toward cultural others for renewal.”556 From the 
Tahitian artifacts to the African masks that became the rage at exhibitions and world fairs across 
England and Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gaughin, Picasso, and a 
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whole host of Western artists and writers quickly inaugurated a new way of disturbing and 
renouncing the progressive teleology of Western art and bourgeois culture. Even as the 
Modernist turn towards the primitive was a “refutation of civilization’s dominate ideologies 
(capitalist, patriarchal, bourgeois),” the problem with such artistic renewal, as Richards argues, is 
an “imperialist discursive construct [that] drew upon and participated in the same assumptions 
and exotic fantasies of otherness” that rendered without distinction “an undifferentiated mass of 
peoples and cultures ranging from Africa to Oceana” in the same primitive state. The effect, in 
toto, left a multitude of cultures and civilizations “without history, cultural specificity, or 
agency”—the “loot of imperial theft” whereby “modernists mistook a colonial for a primitive 
subject.”557 
 Such cultural looting found perhaps its most influential acquisition and interpretation in 
Wilhelm Worringer’s seminal work Abstraction and Empathy (1908), quickly absorbed and 
brought to England by Imagist founder T. E. Hulme as well as Woolf’s close friend, the artist 
and art historian Roger Fry.  While such critical territory has been thoroughly traversed by 
Modernist critics558 and already alluded to in my introduction here, the attention and the 
attraction to the primitive in this relation to Woolf reminds us just how much Woolf remained 
particularly unavailable and and even averse to a primitivist aesthetic. To quickly review, 
Worringer’s “abstraction” derives from his own self-described state of “spiritual intoxication” 
after having been to the Trocadero collection of African masks in the spring of 1905. By 
abstraction, Worringer meant primitive, for the primitive artist does not hold a representative 
mirror up to nature but out of fear and terror of the natural world seeks to escape and control it—
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“In the necessity and irrefragability of geometric abstraction he could find repose”: “it was the 
only absolute form that could be conceived and attained by man.”559 
 This Worringer opposed to the empathetic Western tradition of art that progressively 
eschewed abstraction for a realism that ultimately led to a naturalization in art. “Naturalism’s 
empathy readmits space as the connectedness of all things…” and results in the “triumph of 
empathy over anguish.” It is quite clear where Worringer’s sympathies and sensibility lies, with 
primitivism achieving “this highest abstract beauty” and “purest regular art form.” The Western 
aesthetic derived from the “Greeks and other Occidentals” at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Worringer argues, “…is nothing more than a psychology of the Classical feeling for 
art.”560 
 By the time T. E. Hulme has translated and applied Worringer’s thesis for English 
literature, the binary terms were “Romanticism and Classicism,”  but with Classicism as the 
renewal of cold, hard, geometric lines and patterns Worringer and Hulme define as the primitive 
virtues, not watered down or obscured through a Romantic haze and its naturalized “psychology 
of the Classical feeling for art.” It signaled, again in Richards’ words, “a more comprehensive 
rejection of the values of rational humanism that underpinned Greek and Renaissance art.”561  It 
was on or about 1910 that Hulme lectured on “Romanticism and Classicism,” right in time for 
Fry’s first Post-Impressionist exhibit in London that gave England the Tahitian paintings of 
Gauguin, among others, and followed it not just with the second Post-Impressionist exhibit in 
1912 full of Matisses and Picassos but with his essay “The Art of the Bushmen.” Clive Bell, 
Vanessa Bell’s husband, wrote by 1914 that “…people who care much about art find that of the 
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work that moves them most the great part is what scholars call ‘Primitive’”562 With all of Fry’s, 
Hulme’s, and Worringer’s ecstatic praise for African art and contempt for traditional Western 
art, there are still the colonialist assumptions, leaving Fry curious as to why “…a people who 
produced such great artists did not produce also a culture in our sense of the word.”563 Woolf 
read Fry’s writings assiduously as well as Bell’s, close companions as they all were, and was 
certainly influenced by Fry’s theories and appraisal of art. What’s remarkable, then, is how 
limited Woolf’s appropriation of Primitivism is, the marked awareness she displays regarding the 
cultural assumptions of colonialism that Fry does not. 
 Take Hulme’s most famous delineation between classicism and romanticism in his essay 
of the same title: 
Here is the root of all romanticism: that man, the individual, is an infinite reservoir of 
possibilities; and if you can so rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order 
then these possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress….One can define the 
classical quite clearly as the exact opposite to this. Man is an extraordinarily fixed and 
limited animal whose nature is absolutely constant. It is only by tradition and 
organisation that anything decent can be got out of him.564 
What’s most always left out of any critical appraisal of Hulme’s influential categorization is the 
allusion to Darwin immediately following his two definitions, anticipating the counterargument 
that evolution as a theory refutes his claim of human nature as “fixed and limited” and 
“absolutely constant”:  
This view was a little shaken at the time of Darwin. You remember his particular 
hypothesis, that new species came into existence by the cumulative effect of small 
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variations—this seems to admit the possibility of future progress. But at the present day 
the contrary hypothesis makes headway in the shape of De Vries’s mutation theory, that 
each new species comes into existence, not gradually by the accumulation of small steps, 
but suddenly in a jump, a kind of sport, and that once in existence it remains absolutely 
fixed. This enables me to keep the classical view with an appearance of scientific 
backing. 
Hugo de Vries’ mutation theory, introduced right at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(1901-3), seemed to offer Hulme an alternative to a gradually evolving principle of species 
formation by natural selection, setting humanity in a state that while, open to leaps at the rarest 
of occasions, provides cover for an almost immutable, largely static state of species formation 
that Hulme’s “classicism” requires.565 Indeed, Hulme took mutation theory further than de Vries 
himself, claiming humanity “absolutely fixed” once the species mutated into form. More 
essential is how Hulme negotiates nature, claiming “There must be just as much contact with 
nature in an abstract art as in a realistic one,” but limiting any heightened sense of naturalism to 
the “imaginative flights” of a misguided romanticism. Telling is that Hulme’s representative 
image of what this new classicism might strive towards is a steel spring bent unnaturally, 
“…represented by a man employing all his fingers to bend the steel out of its own curve and into 
the exact curve which you want. Something different to what it would assume naturally….I 
prophesy that a period of dry, hard, classical verse is coming.”566 Taken just as technique, 
Hulme’s ideas propel “Imagisme”— Pound’s transference of Hulme becoming one of his most 
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famous lines in “A Retrospect,” that “the natural object is always the adequate symbol.” Rather 
than aiming for the celestial heavens or the infinite in poetry, poets must be direct and immediate 
in their treatment of the objects before them.567  
 The larger impact, however, was more than a stripping of romantic haze from language 
and a renewal in the primitive. For all the celebration of the primitive in the arts, and the 
Worringer thesis that to live in most direct communion to wild nature inspires a fearful, 
abstracted opposition to it, the manner in which Romantic opposition manifests itself is inspired 
by something more than the poached African masks on display at the Trocadero. There is 
mistrust in a  Romantic, or more specifically a Wordsworthian humanism that lets nature be its 
tutor, especially when that nature provides an often feminized and decadent lushness or 
spontaneous gush of feeling promising abundant recompense.  
 This is where Bonnie Kime Scott picks up and challenges this particular form of 
Classicism as it was espoused and promulgated by Hulme and his disciples—a cold, dry, 
abstract, urban, imperialist, patriarchal conception of Modernism, she will argue. Scott agrees 
that “Modernist rejection of nature came in part from the preference of classicism over 
Romanticism”: 
Wyndham Lewis, T. E. Hulme, and Ezra Pound conjure up formless, dark, decayed 
manifestations of nature to condemn what they consider inferior forms of writing; these 
they associate with decadence and the feminine. Following the lead of Baudelaire, they 
turn toward urban settings. Science and mechanics, including engines of war, furnish 
preferred masculine metaphors.568 
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In searching for control over nature rather than commune, a severe misgiving of nature as 
envisioned either by Romanticism or Darwinism takes hold. Hulme’s example of the steel spring 
bent unnaturally reinforces Scott’s point—“Hulme’s favorite texture of ‘dry hardness’ suggests 
that for him the best organism is a dead, or at least desiccated, one.”569  
  In Refiguring Modernism, Scott had already articulated how Wyndham Lewis 
overwhelmingly agrees with Hulme’s classicism but more self-consciously associates its 
opposite with not just Romanticism but a feminine decadence repulsive to men with Lewis’ 
brand of art. In Scott’s words, Lewis assigns “…masculinity and art to dry surface articulation 
and the feminine, as nature, to damp and chaotic depths of being.”570 Later, as discussed in my 
first chapter here, this becomes a “jellyish diffuseness” antithetical to Hulme’s hard, orderly 
manhandling of nature, and Lewis is not shy in attacking Fry, Woolf, and all associates of 
Bloomsbury in their “very dim Venusburg” overseen by Woolf the “introverted matriarch” and 
her “pretty salon pieces” that mean to be “brooding over a subterraneous ‘stream of 
consciousness.”571 Towards the conclusion of his review of “Virginia Woolf” in Men Without 
Art, Lewis infamously mixes a considerable amount of metaphors to skewer Woolf and her 
“values of decay,” parodying the feminine gush he associates with her standard contemporary 
Romantic decadence borne from Pater, Wilde, Swinburne, James, and Bergson: “treading upon a 
carpet of eggs,” Lewis takes “the cow by the horns” to stand erect against this “suffocating 
atmosphere” after having felt “very much a fish out of water” in his attempts to drain all the 
bogs, swamps, and marshes of the feminine antithetical to a robust, masculine classicism.572 
Such diatribes that conflate women and nature—asserting the masculine prerogative to either 
control, subdue, or conquer it—are why Scott begins her analysis with Sherry Ortner’s essay 
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title, “Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?”573 The primitive might rise to a masculine 
classical ideal, but a common, lingering critique was that the last vestiges of romanticism were 
mired by an effete feminism.  
 Ultimately, Bonnie Kime Scott finds that modernists “…also discovered the impossibility 
of rejecting the natural world,” and what makes Woolf such a powerful exemplar of the aesthetic 
“greening of Modernism” is “the satisfaction that comes with imaginative merger of human and 
nonhuman other—one of the basic tropes of ecofeminism.”574 This is indeed where recent studies 
of Woolf and nature, as well as the recent corresponding studies that pay great attention to the 
ardent debates and developments in philosophy, classical studies, and science at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, provide a new lens (or lenses) with which to see Woolf’s appropriation of 
such ideas in her aesthetic for fiction. Opposing the dry, hard surface, the marmoreal geometry 
many of her male contemporaries undertook in their modernist enterprises, Woolf instead resists 
such classifications altogether.  I stated that Woolf remained markedly unavailable to the 
“primitive” aesthetic, yet she remained markedly available to the primordial and prehistorical at 
the same time, what I have argued as her Darwinian or naturalist perspective that evolved from 
evolutionary plotting in her early works to evolutionary form in her experimentations with 
temporality and structure.  Scott’s clarification on this point is prescient:  
 
I suggest that what oppresses Lewis [in Woolf] is not the matriarch but the air of 
inversion, a queering of sexuality as well as gender, scripted as unnatural (the fish out of 
water), and classically equated with death and decay. Lewis was right in identifying 
Woolf’s interest in depth and dampness, attributes associated with both death and 
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primordial origins in her nature writing, and in her queering of both sexuality and 
expectations for the feminine.575 
 
Indeed, what makes Lewis such a compelling foil to Woolf’s aesthetic, vitriolic as it reads, is the 
very awareness of an aesthetics threatening and competing with his masculine, misogynistic 
imperatives. Scott insinuates that Lewis can be right for the most abhorrently wrong reasons, and 
it’s worth noting how perceptive Lewis remains, not just in his scathing, personal accost of 
Woolf in Men Without Art but in the earlier Time and Western Man. There, Lewis vehemently 
and incessantly brands his enemy as  the “time-cult” of the age that Lewis cleverly situates as 
evolved from the aesthete belief in “art for art’s sake” to the “jamesian” and “bergsonian” “Time-
for-Time’s-sake belief.”576  All the “time-mind” of his age he reads as one piece, and any form of 
it, especially in a writer like Woolf who seems to incorporate all of it, is worthy of his ridicule 
and disavowal.   
 
8.3 WITHDRAWAL, EVASION, TAXONOMY, ECOFEMINISM 
 Lewis’s extreme positions name so many enemies, not just to time-future and time-past but 
to the age at large, that his invectives read like a who’s who of high modernism. Indeed, as 
Martin Puchner notices, “most of his later literary and political writings were violent indictments 
of [his own] earlier modernism.577 Such “rear-guard” attacks do serve as a contrarian force that 
effectively names some of Woolf’s most significant aesthetic allies and narrative strategies. This 
is where, to move Scott’s argument forward, “the queering” of both classicism and nature, as 
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well as “jamesian” and “bergsonian” time philosophy, find their alliance with Woolf.  Lewis 
found the Hellenism of the “Naughty Nineties” and what followed an artificial hearkening back 
to the past due to the soft, “artificial” and “sexified” English reenactment: “The dialogues of 
Plato have not an alexandrian effluvia of feminine scent…The psychological composition of the 
mind of such a philosopher as Socrates, or Democritus, showed no bias whatever such as you 
inevitably find in a Wilde or a Pater—that alexandrian enervation and softening of all the male 
chastity of thought.”578 The manly, heroic model of modernism, in other words, stands erect in 
Lewis’ mind against modern decadence, even though the “Athens of Socrates was notorious, as 
his dialogues witness, for what is (for us) the most obsessing sort of sex-cult.”579   
 In Bad Modernisms, two of the essays collected in the compendium assess how both Pater 
and Woolf offer refreshing alternatives to the “heroic” version of modernism that critic Heather 
K. Love avers “has been most consistently identified with modernism itself” despite the fact that 
“it made up only a fraction of the aesthetic production in the period.”580 By inverting the 
received model of heroic, classical poise and martial action, these two essays turn the accepted 
terms on their heads and read Pater’s aesthetic detachment and Woolf’s evasive style as positive, 
even heroic qualities. “Pater’s break with the future and with the hard and fast revolutionism of 
the modernists,” Love argues, has closely linked him to the “ills of aestheticism: political 
quietism, withdrawal from the world, hermeticism, nostalgia, a slack relativism, and the 
elevation of beauty above justice.”581 This Love reads, in agreement with other critics before her, 
as the circumstance in which a gay man risked exposure and marginalization at a time that 
“witnessed the birth of homosexuality as a modern category,” a victimized fate Oscar Wilde of 
course experienced. The force of Love’s argument, however, is where she reads “withdrawal in 
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Pater not as a refusal of politics but rather as a politics of refusal….The key practices of such a 
politics—secrecy, the vaporization of the self, ascesis, and temporal delay—depart significantly 
from the modernist protocols of political intervention.”582  Getting as many pulsations as possible 
out of a time suspended, to find beauty in repose and to withdraw into aesthetic appreciations 
were strategies Pater could employ to cease the march of a time bent on a violent progression. 
Pater’s refusal to dominate subversively fights against the domineering voices who inveighed 
against his aesthetic creed. 
 So, too, does Rebecca Walkowitz invert the common criticism levied against Woolf’s 
evasiveness and indirectness as narrative strategy.  Walkowitz reminds us that  
Decentering the first-person point of view, rejecting tones of comfort or confidence, 
risking indecency; arguably these are the principal hallmarks of modernist fiction. 
Indeed, the tension between decent feelings and dissenting thought is crucial to Virginia 
Woolf’s writing and to the project of many early-twentieth-century artists who sought to 
imagine models of social critique that would resist social codification.583 
Indeed, Walkowitz follows Edward Said’s line of thought in this context to see Woolf’s evasive 
practice as a form of “critical heroism” that resisted postures of imperialism and militarism by 
attending to the marginal, the invisible, and the unseen. Woolf purposefully excludes heroic or 
significant social episodes, from war to engagement to suicide, and rather gives primary attention 
to what fictional convention would dictate as minor and insignificant.  
 Jacob’s Room, Mrs. Dalloway, and To the Lighthouse are examples of Woolf’s evasive 
strategy in action, but of particular usefulness to my work is her analysis of the suspension of 
classification and identification that dates back to one of Woolf’s very first narrative departures, 
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“The Mark on the Wall.” E. M. Forster famously reviewed Woolf’s early short story by noting 
“good critics, especially of the academic kind, may think it insignificant. It has no moral, no 
philosophy, nor has it what is usually understood by Form. It aims deliberately at 
aimlessness.”584 Walkowitz then traverses the many critics who took Woolf’s aimlessness for an 
inability to direct her attentions to the serious concerns of novel writing, politics, the war, and 
even feminism. But this is precisely Woolf’s pointless point: “Refusing to classify a mark on the 
wall, Woolf’s narrator shows how intellectual speculation, because it thwarts compliance, resists 
the passivity of wartime.”585 What forms and frames the story, in this respect, is the suspension 
not just of time through the consciousness and thought processes of the narrator but of the great 
elision, when the context of the war is withheld until the very end—“Curse this war; God damn 
this war!” As varied and diverse as the stream of thoughts contained within the consciousness of 
the narrator, this is the only interruption to the thoughts themselves that the narrative allows 
through interruption (and conversation).  
 This, Walkowitz suggests, is “a story that considers directly what evasion evades….The 
disruption of the narrator’s thoughts about the mark makes the reader notice, really for the first 
time, that the story is trying to represent the experience of wartime thinking.”586 A 1917 reader 
would notice all the signposts of thought throughout the story that war is upon the mind of the 
thinker with the random assortment of history, precedency, heroism, patriarchy, and militancy—
an assortment of thoughts one could read against the random acts that went into a war that could 
have been avoided and should have been evaded. The same can be said for the narrative of Mrs. 
Dalloway, especially at moments that inhabit the thoughts of the novel’s characters. The prime 
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example is Clarissa Dalloway’s diffusion of self when thinking through what it takes to contract 
herself into a a social being—“pointed; dart like; definite. That was her self when some effort, 
some call on her to be her self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how 
incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who 
sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point, a radiancy no doubt in some dull lives….”587 
Here are a multiplicity of perspectives that must assemble for singleness of purpose, such as a 
call to arms requires, and yet the narrative itself and the words that carry it float upon a mist and 
haze of contested meanings, the most famous metaphor of communion when Clarissa 
Dalloway’s reverie derives satisfaction in thinking herself surviving like a mist among the trees, 
“a mist between the people she know best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the 
trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself.”588   Compared to Dr. Bradshaw’s 
treatment of Septimus and his ideology of “proportion” and his quick classification not just of of 
Septimus’s symptoms but of his ultimate judgment of the suicide as “cowardly,” there is a 
politics and an aesthetic purpose to Woolf’s evasion. In Walkowitz’s words,  
evasion reflects Woolf’s commitment to the multiple, transient self, as opposed to the 
contracted, marmoreal self required by proportion, conversion, and triumphalism. Woolf 
contests the war by rejecting its models of attention; she approaches the war 
parenthetically, never erasing its violence, but not allowing violence to absorb, in the 
total attention violence demands, the partial attention that resists it. (138) 
In such a manner can we read both Pater and Woolf’s anti-heroic impulses that also share a stake 
in Modernist claims of difference, an alternative political consciousness and temporal awareness 
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that, “resisting the politics of imperialism, as well as the politics of marriage and epic 
masculinity, may involve refining or even at times rejecting some kinds of attentiveness.”589 
 This, Walkowitz binds to a “modernist cosmopolitism,” as the title of her essay suggests, 
and yet its import can be carried quite persuasively to Christina Alt’s and others’ exploration of 
Virginia Woolf and the Study of Nature. Walkowitz omits that right after the “mark” on the wall 
is classified and the attentions of the narrative redirected, the second speaker curses the war and 
then immediately identifies the mark as a snail. As my chapter on Woolf’s “Tales of the Snail” 
argues, that shell houses a whole natural history of meaning. The ecological dimension and 
Darwinian timeframe envelops the wartime attentiveness and marks the snail’s natural place in 
space.  
 Mark S. Morrison’s overview in Modernism, Science, and Technology relays how the last 
decade of criticism regarding nature study, ecocriticism, and ecofeminism works, in principle, to 
break down the a nature/culture binary that in literary studies dismisses “nature and the natural 
world” and favors studies “attuned to the mechanical and technological, the commercial and the 
urban” while neglecting how “The city, of course, does offer an environment and nature enters 
there.”590 Indeed, Morrisson suggests that Woolf has taken a central position in these studies in 
large part “because she is seen as a kind of ecofeminist avant la lettre. From the conception of 
holistic order evident in Woolf’s texts, to her interest in breaking down species barriers, even in 
Woolf’s focus on goddess figures and reappropriation of ‘classical and pagan myths to explore 
the ideas of balanced and sustainable order’, Woolf is shown as, essentially, a modernist 
ecofeminist.”591 The greater insight in Christina Alt’s work is that Woolf doesn’t need to be read 
as a “proto-ecofeminist” or her writings treated as “a prescient anticipation of late twentieth- and 
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early twenty-first-century views.”592 Prescient Woolf is, but this is better read “through reference 
to Woolf’s contemporary scientific context. Ecology emerged as a recognised scientific 
discipline in Britain during Woolf’s lifetime” a well as ethology, the study of animal behavior as 
a biological field. Along with theories that were attempting to reconcile Mendelian genetics with 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory, “the disciplines of ethology and ecology gained institutional status 
and brought about a return to fieldwork with a new focus on the observation of living organisms 
in their natural environment.”593 Especially prescient in Alt’s study, regardless, is how her close 
reading of Woolf and the taxonomic tradition of natural history parallels my own regarding 
Woolf’s Victorian childhood preoccupations with entomology and lepidoptera, but Alt carefully 
considers this in the context of the paradigm shifts underway in British science and society at 
large regarding taxonomic practice and classification. This, too, from quite different starting 
points, is where we find a significant confluence of ideas from Love and Walkowitz’s Bad 
Modernisms in the readings of a politics of evasion and withdrawal that decenter the self.  
 The new early twentieth biological studies of ecology and ethology were displacing the 
nineteenth century taxonomic tradition that derived from the international rage to name, classify 
and codify new specimens borne of the Linnean classification system. Alt’s chapter on “The 
natural history tradition” traces how the same nineteenth century “golden age of natural history 
collection,” where small collections of a hundred, or at most a few thousand species, grew to the 
millions. It is impossible to underestimate the significance of Carolus Linnaeus and how his 
system of classification was a great advance in scientific systemization, making it practicable for 
amateur naturalists and a Charles Darwin alike to survey plant and animal species with a 
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grandeur and breadth unimaginable before him.   The veritable rage and popularity of taxonomy, 
however, and such species hunting for the sake of collecting and naming, did have its detractors. 
From as early as Gilbert White, the very late eighteenth century prototype of the clergyman-
naturalist whom both Leslie Stephen and Virginia Woolf read with admiration, to William Henry 
Hudson, the early twentieth century naturalist, ornithologist, and writer whom Woolf in her essay 
“Modern Fiction” gathered in her pantheon along with Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad as the 
writers whom modern writers should give “unconditional gratitude594,” there was a strong push 
to make classification subservient to the observation of plants and animals in their natural 
environments—in short, the early ecological and ethological models. 
 What Alt carefully analyzes is how taxonomy, natural theology, and imperialism go hand 
in hand—“taxonomy was the ruling preoccupation of the period…a direct outcome of colonial 
expansion and consolidation” that emphasized stability and control, finding in the collecting and 
systemization “the existence of order and hierarchy in the natural world” most often “justified 
through reference to the doctrine of natural theology.”595 The alignment with Paley’s natural 
theology explains how the practice and science became culturally accepted, “promoted as a 
religiously orthodox and morally edifying activity” (24). What’s fascinating is how Woolf’s 
childhood pursuits, late Victorian to be sure but post-Darwinian by date, are still tracked along 
the lines of a natural history taxonomic culture, even through the books the Stephens acquired 
from Jack Hills on butterflies and moths and bugs that still, sometimes covertly, advocated 
natural theology and eschewed evolutionary theory.  Indeed, the great mid-Victorian popularizer 
of natural history, the Reverend F. O. Morris, whose books Woolf sifted through in her role as 
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specimen identifier in the Stephen Entomological Society of her youth, was adamantly opposed 
to evolution and sought to “negate the new theories [on evolution] through silence.”596 Woolf’s 
traditional Victorian upbringing then had natural history, sugaring, bugging, botanizing—a 
taxonomic classifying system as a natural by-product of Woolf’s intellectual upper class culture 
that included the Arnolds and Macauleys as well as the Hookers, the Huxleys, and the Darwins. 
 Alt then compares this Victorian taxonomic model of Woolf’s childhood to the ecological 
model she begins employing in her fiction, where the naturalist’s perspective that I have 
introduced as formative to Woolf’s early experimental works can be seen as operating quite 
scientifically under the new ecological model. Alt’s chapter on “Literary experimentation and 
scientific analogy” makes this quite explicit, looking at the same works like “Reading,” “Kew 
Gardens,” and “The Mark on the Wall” to offer this distinction. In the same manner that 
Walkowitz reads “the Mark” and other fictional instances as narrative technique that evades the 
the “contracted, marmoreal self required by proportion, conversion, and triumphalism” by 
“rejecting its models of attention,” Alt sees from the ecological lens that once the snail was 
classified in the story, the narrative comes to an end: “The story as a whole can be read as a 
deferral of classification, and conclusive categorization is presented as inimical to the creative 
process.”597  
 Instead, on numerous occasions, Woolf proffers an alternative model, her creative process 
and experimentation also evolving from this natural history, this new ecology that merged with 
her feminism. Even, say, Woolf’s most famous essay on fiction and the creative process, “Mr. 
Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” can then be seen in light of the new sciences. Mr. Bennett and other 
“materialists,” in their obsession with classifying and categorizing, treat Mrs. Brown as a 
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specimen to be caught— “My name is Brown. Catch me if you can.”  She still “escapes him” 
though the Georgians in all their forms have been in “pursuit” of Mrs. Brown.598  Rather than 
pinning down the butterflies of fiction until they dimly folds their wings and die, Woolf 
advocates observation in a natural environment, even protection and preservation.   
 
8.4 VAGUENESS, THE LINGUISTIC TURN, PRAGMATISM, AND PROCESS 
 Woolf’s radio piece “Craftsmanship,” broadcast on April 20th, 1937, becomes the 
culminating voice Alt uses to juxtapose the nineteenth century taxonomic approach to the early 
twentieth ecological approach, in this instance where words and language itself are portrayed as 
if living organisms. Not by happenstance, “Craftsmanship” becomes an important piece of 
writing for Megan Quigley’s equally fascinating study of Woolf’s importance to Modern Fiction 
and Vagueness. “Craftsmanship” is not a work I had considered in relation to my thesis 
beforehand, but studies that situate Pragmatism and the “process” philosophy squarely at the 
center of Woolf’s thinking allow me to do so. Alt recognizes the evolutionary overtones of this 
discussion of the nature of language, where Woolf “presents words as animate organisms in 
constant motion and interaction with one another,” mating and propagating, adapting and 
surviving, “living in the mind.”599  Woolf’s belief in language’s capacity for “adaptation,” Alt 
argues,  
ensures both their own survival and their ability to represent accurately the conditions of 
the time, place, and consciousness in which they exist, ‘so that they survive, so that they 
create beauty, so that they tell the truth.’ If this is the nature of words, Woolf suggests, 
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then writing is not a process of capturing, classifying, and arranging words for display but 
rather one of observing and recording the behavior of words.600 
“Craftsmanship” in this sense for Alt becomes a final working treatise of how Woolf draws upon 
evolutionary theory, ecological principals, and close naturalistic observation that suggest her 
alternative to the “taxonomic approach” of the writing process. 
 Megan Quigley’s use of the radio broadcast takes this argument into the great 
philosophical debates and queries animating the early twentieth century Pragmatists against the 
voices of  Bertrand Russell and other idealist, absolutist philosophies. Indeed, Quigley pivots 
from the ecocritical, phenomenological and scientific approaches to Woolf by noting how the 
former have convincingly “argued that Woolf consistently dissolved the boundaries between self 
and nature in her fiction.”  Gillian Beer and Louise Westling in particular have argued that 
Woolf’s “ecological humanism” indeed applied quantum physics, as well as “radical ontological 
and epistemological perspectives” because of how well accorded they are “with her own lifelong 
awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness.”601 What Quigley’s study of Modern Fiction 
and Vagueness contributes to this conversation is a query and challenge posed by Patricia 
Waugh: 
Noting that William James is the ‘key source for the current anti-Cartesian turn in 
psychology, cognitive science, philosophy of mind and social thought,’ Waugh writes, 
‘the terms and expression of Woolf’s preoccupations resonate so closely with James’s, 
that one wonders why the similarities between their two enterprises have been so 
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conspicuously ignored.’ My work aims to take up Waugh’s challenge in order to 
resuscitate Woolf’s thinking in the context of William James’s influence.602 
Indeed, not just in Quigley’s but in many recent studies, William James, Bergson (as ally), and 
other philosophers in the Pragmatist camp have come back to the forefront in relation to 
Modernism and Modernist literature, participating in the larger debate that Darwin’s theory 
inaugurated between the mutability and immobility of forms—not just in the variations of forms 
via species but language itself. Megan Quigley goes so far as to view Woolf’s famous manifestic 
image of the “semi-transparent envelope” on the same Pragmatic grounds I do, but with more 
depth and breadth of texts supporting her from both the Platonic and the Pragmatic camps.  It 
makes a compelling argument against Ann Banfield’s assertions that placed Woolf’s literary 
approach as prominently inspired by Moore and Russell, and avers that Woolf embraces the 
“Philosophy of the Vague” championed by William James, Henri Bergson, and the Pragmatists 
over the intellectualism, idealism, and absolutism of Moore, the early Wittgenstein, and Russell. 
Quigley’s argument finds further support in a profoundly innovative way via Michael North’s 
Novelty: A History of the New (2014). There, the absolutist and pragmatic debates pick up how 
evolutionary theory was the most monumental paradigm shift not just of the nineteenth but also 
the scientific studies on consciousness and language informed by it in the twentieth century.  
William James, C. S. Pierce, F.C.S. Schiller, and Henri Bergson garner attention from North for 
their focus upon the novel adaptations of consciousness and the creative, nebulous spontaneity of 
language. It is in this context that both Joan Richardson’s A Natural History of Pragmatism 
(2007) and Robert D. Richardson’s William James: In the Maelstrom of Modernism should be 
read alongside Woolf, as a bridge between the Platonic solids and the Darwinian shifts these 
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early twentieth century philosophers espoused against Platonic absolutism in all of its 
manifestations and most prominent practitioners. 
 Joan Richardson’s Natural History of Pragmatism, in fact, draws special attention to the 
Jamesian idea that thinking itself is a life form, “subject to the same processes of growth and 
change as all other life forms,” and studies how language theory was in part a model for 
Darwin’s theory, as he relays in The Origin of Species.  Darwin thought about fossils in relation 
to living species after thinking about the way “Grimm or Bopp looked at dead languages” and 
found it “hard to use an inherited language with inherited ideas to discover something 
original.”603 Darwin speculates that a classification such as performed on animal and plant 
species via natural history would, when applied to languages, give us a genealogy that is 
“…strictly natural, as it would connect together all languages, extinct and modern, by the closest 
affinities, and would give the filiation and origin of each tongue…descended from one 
species.”604  
 One important contribution Quigley, in fact, makes is how substantial the question of 
“the vague” is in philosophy not only at the turn of last century but of this century, citing Richard 
Rorty’s dubbing of it “the linguistic turn” in philosophy and ushering in “the heyday of the 
fuzzy.”605  By introducing Russell and Woolf as friendly sparring partners in letter and 
conversation and ultimately in pitting Russell’s lecture on “Vagueness” against Woolf’s 
“Craftsmanship,” Quigley brings clarity to Woolf’s hazy negotiations of semi-transparency.  As 
my chapter on “The Aesthetics of Semi-Transparency” establishes, Russell was an early and 
frequent critic of Pragmatism, in no small part because of its origins in Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory and the assault it makes on truth as a logical or intellectual proposition that in Russell’s 
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mind exists beyond the subjectivity of knowing. From responding to the question of vagueness in 
Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic in 1918 to his lecture entitled “Vagueness” in 1922,  
Russell looks to find an ideal language without vagueness, “a formal language and symbolic 
system, one that could approximate a mathematical formula.” James’s “embrace of the vague” 
and call for “the reinstatement of the vague” back into psychology and philosophy taxed Russell 
to no end, and Russell emphasized in every way possible that “The process of sound 
philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous 
things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and 
analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we started from, and is, so to speak, the real 
truth of which the vague thing is just a shadow.”606   If language fails to obey logical principles, 
it ought to, as the world still obeys his logical laws. 
 Quigley indeed suggests that Woolf’s “Craftsmanship” is a wry response to Russell’s 
attempts at creating a brand new, ideal language unavailable to the shadows of imprecise 
meaning. Russell’s language, as in any taxonomic or systematic classification of language, is a 
dead language, whereas a living language exercises a “democratic” spirit one might closely align 
not just with the Darwinian but the pragmatic. This Woolf brings home at the conclusion of 
“Craftsmanship”: 
Perhaps that is [words’] most striking peculiarity — their need of change. It is because 
the truth they try to catch is many-sided, and they convey it by being themselves many-
sided, flashing this way, then that. Thus they mean one thing to one person, another thing 
to another person; they are unintelligible to one generation, plain as a pikestaff to the 
next. And it is because of this complexity that they survive. Perhaps then one reason why 
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we have no great poet, novelist or critic writing to-day is that we refuse words their 
liberty. We pin them down to one meaning…And when words are pinned down they fold 
their wings and die.607 
We “murder to dissect,” Woolf might say as Wordsworth did before her, and what Woolf praises 
and esteems about language, where its truth value is to be had in this vague, nebulous region of 
associations, is precisely what Russell wants excised from the process to arrive at the ideal 
product.  
 Another valuable speculation Quigley makes in this respect is that Katharine Hilbery in 
Night & Day can be read as an exemplar of Bertrand Russell’s belief in the precision of 
mathematics, Woolf’s narrative suggesting it as well, almost contemporaneously when the 
question of the “vague” was at the forefront of Russell’s thoughts and writing: “How infinitely 
[Katharine] preferred the exactitude, the star-like impersonality, of figures to the confusion, 
agitations, and vagueness of the finest prose.”608 When we remember that Katharine’s 
grandfather is the eminent poet “Richard Alrdyce,” the very fictional model of Romanticism, 
Katharine’s resistance to the vague obfuscations of language and feeling comes as natural 
enough rebellion and reaction formation. Katharine hates poetry, hates novels, even hates 
Shakespeare and prefers “those abstract ideas—figures, laws, stars, facts…”609 It is indeed 
Quigley’s reading that the whole novel, in some sense, is a rant against Romanticism and its 
vagaries that then is reconciled by novel’s end when the figure of Mrs. Hilbery must reinsert the 
language of Romanticism into their romance. It is a Romanticism that must merge as well with 
the very modern idea of human communication and connection that allows for imprecision, the 
modern sensibility where words are “pieced together in a laborious and elementary fashion, 
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fragments of belief, unsoldered and separate, lacking the unity of phrases fashioned by the old 
believers.”610 In so doing, Katharine’s presence still raises many associations in Woolf’s 
narrative with classical Greece, not least her enthusiasm for the Elgin Marbles, and Quigley 
muses that “It could be Katharine, rather than Woolf, who writes in her essay ‘It is to the Greeks 
that we turn when we are sick of the vagueness, of the confusion, of the Christianity and its 
consolations, of our own age.’”611 
 In this way Quigley and the other recent readings of Woolf cited here come full circle 
back to the parameters of Classicism and Romanticism as Woolf came to engage them on her 
own terms. The allusions to “semi-transparency” in Woolf of course come from her essay 
“Modern Fiction,” where Woolf argues that life is not like a series of “gig lamps symmetrically 
arranged.” Rather, it is a “luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the 
beginning of consciousness to the end.”612 Quigley and also Lorraine Sim, in an essay that traces 
many of these patterns in Woolf’s writing as Platonic, notice that even Woolf’s symbols and 
images that would suggest permanence almost inevitably suggest this blurred edge of 
circumference. Ralph in Night and Day draws his fictional semi-transparent envelope to 
symbolize life in all its vagary: “It represented by its circumference of smudges surrounding a 
central blot all that encircling glow which for him surrounded, inexplicably, so many objects of 
life, softening their sharp outline…situations wearing a halo almost perceptible to the physical 
eye.”613 Mary Dachet, too, an uncanny mirror to Katharine in the way Septimus is to Clarissa in 
Mrs. Dalloway, carries with her a conception of some visible form, “…a conception of the 
scheme of things in which, as a human being, she must have her share. She half held a vision; the 
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vision shaped and dwindled.”614 Sim’s essay that threads together, in an equally uncanny way, 
many of the same passages I have in my exploration of the Platonic, Greek Ideal in Woolf’s 
writing, reminds us that Woolf, like Pater before her, was attracted most to the flux of sensations 
and experience in her mimetic acts of language. And yet, for the selfsame reasons, she sought out 
those moments, shocking and memorable, that seemed to strike into stability some permanence 
in memory that she would feign call clarity, a Greek clarity that nonetheless partook of 
Heraclitean flux, of William James’s stream of consciousness, Bergson’s durée, Darwin’s long 
perspective. Quigley puts it well when she notes that “Woolf’s ‘philosophy’ simultaneously 
yearns for such a reality and questions it,  just as her depictions of multiple perspectives are 
always subordinated to a distinctive style that undermines a decisively objective point of 
view.”615 Her language will not be pinned down, fold its wings and die. 
 It performs very much, in fact, the way Michael North explores “novelty” and the new in 
evolutionary terms. Evolution itself, he avers, performs like a kind of language, which is why he 
delights in the root of evolution as evolutio, the unfolding or disclosing and reading of a scroll to 
full length. Evolution, as the ultimate paradigm shift for novelty in the world, works through a 
symbiosis between recurrence and recombination, a subtle combination of Platonic recollection 
and Aristotelian recurrence.616 Darwin’s insight in this respect was that it was a newness always 
circumscribed within the limits of the old in the same manner that change and continuity lie 
closely together in twentieth century thought. What attracted a William James and a Woolf to 
evolution, in its essence, was what repulsed Hulme and others. It was what Julian Huxley 
described as “the realization of ever new possibilities,”617 whether they be for language, narrative 
                                                           
614 qtd. in Sim, “Virginia Woolf Tracing Patterns through Plato’s Forms,” p. 39. 
615 Modern Fiction and Vagueness, p. 68. 
616 See North, pg. 8, on “symbiosis between recurrence and recombination”; and then Chapter 3: “Darwin’s Renovation of the 
New,” 61-83. 
617 Ibid., 61. 
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form, or a new way of inscribing the feminine and a politics liberated from patriarchy, 
imperialism, war, and fascism.  
 This said, Darwin’s revolution, North argues, is an “open circle” where the classical 
paradigms of form and function gather but remain open to change. Species might change, but 
change requires a deep sense of an open future, of time and of history. It is “a model of change 
that tended to approach stability.”618 Woolf looked most for that type, that species of stability, in 
the Greek literature and Greek ideal that opened wide to the evolutionary principles espoused by 
her deep reading not only of Plato but of Walter Pater and Jane Ellen Harrison. These studies of 
Pragmatism remind just how much James, Dewey, Schiller, and of course Bergson, among 
others, immediately gravitated towards the ramifications of evolutionary theory for philosophy, 
and in so doing gloried in the gaps of intellectual fervor and debate over idealism and theories of 
the absolute that had as their pattern and anchor a reverence for Plato and a belief in Platonism.  
 
8.5 AN ECOFEMINIST HELLENISM 
 This, then, is the final turn I’d like to review in conclusion to this Coda— the depth of 
recent works related to Woolf’s Greek studies and critique of British Hellenism that circles back 
to the models of ecofeminism. They engage Woolf’s Hellenism in the same manner my thesis 
has suggested.  Theodore Koulouris’s well informed and researched Hellenism and Loss in the 
Works of Virginia Woolf (2011), as well as Frank Turner’s definitive, field-establishing tome on 
The Greek Heritage in Victorian England (1981), I have already employed generously in my 
fifth chapter here on “The Victorian Inheritance of the Greek Ideal” in the early works of Woolf.  
As it pertains to Plato, significant additions and missed opportunities of inclusion in my previous 
chapter include the compendium Platonism and the English Imagination (1996), which traces the 
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influence of Plato and the Neoplatonists in English literature from the Middle Ages through to 
the Twentieth Century, as well as two essays on Plato and Woolf that augment my discussion of 
Platonic form and Woolf’s Greek studies.619 Then there are the feminist studies that relate to 
Virginia Woolf’s “Greekness” and the gathering critical attention paid to Jane Ellen Harrison, 
from T. D. Olverson’s Women Writers and the Dark Side of Late Victorian Hellenism (2009) and 
Mary Beard’s biography The Invention of Jane Harrison (2002) to most recently Jean Mills’ 
Virginia Woolf, Jane Ellen Harrison, and the Spirit of Modernist Classicism (2014). The depth 
of these studies gives impetus to the idea that Woolf’s fascination with classical Greece and the 
Platonic dialogues was, as I averred,  not a passing or feint enthusiasm. When closer scrutiny is 
paid to the intricacies of Woolf’s personal relationships to classical scholars and Greek tutors, as 
these studies have in attending to not just Harrison but Janet Case (Woolf’s longest tenured 
Greek tutor but a scholar in her own right), Professor G. C. Warr (who taught Woolf in the 
Women’s Education program at King’s college), Woolf’s cousin J.K. Stephen (who acted 
alongside Harrison in Greek revival plays), and contemporary classicist scholar Eugenie Sellers, 
among others, a portrait of just how forceful, fashionable, prominent, and intense the study of 
Greek was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century in English culture and education. 
Indeed, the educational reform of the classical tripos and compulsory Greek at Cambridge and 
Oxford parallels the gradual access to Greek studies and important popular translation of Greek 
classics to women and the working classes of England. This enriches Woolf’s complex 
inheritance of the Greek ideal and incorporation of it into her fiction as a significant aspect of her 
feminist modernism. 
                                                           
618 Ibid. 73. 
619 Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. by Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge University Press, 1996); C. 
Armstrong, “Why Phaedrus? Plato in Virginia Woolf’s novel Jacob’s Room,” Nordic Journal of English Studies 11; 108-125; 
“Virginia Woolf Tracing Patterns through Plato’s Forms.” Journal of Modern Literature 28: 38-48. 
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 Most important, I would argue, are the attentions paid to Jane Ellen Harrison as mentor 
and muse to Woolf. The ecofeminist approaches to Woolf have profitably reread this 
relationship. While ecofeminism as a term dates to the 1970s, the emergence of it in literary 
criticism really dates to the publication of Ecofeminist Literary Criticism in 1998 and has only 
surfaced prominently in Woolf studies this last decade.  The issues ecofeminism raises regarding 
issues of social change—forms of oppression including sexism, racism, colonialism, and non-
humans—often run parallel and connect to the exploitation of nature. It seeks, even aspires to the 
nature of these issues as open to possibility and change, of a paradigm shift on par with the 
evolutionary principles of relations that provide it a scientific backdrop and understanding.  In 
Diane Swanson’s estimation, a broken dualistic worldview that inevitably places man in 
dominion over not just woman but nature has been a major cause of our failure to address 
ecological problems. “We have become so distanced that we must learn once again to see, hear, 
and feel the rest of nature and to imagine the nonhuman as connected to us and ourselves as part 
of the natural world.”620 In Scott’s assessment, “Ecologists and ecofeminists are most concerned 
with the ways that humans, particularly powerful ones seeking control, have manipulated natural 
conditions to favor their own perceived needs, goals, and superiority, usually to the detriment of 
non-human beings, less dominant peoples, and the female gender.”621 
 In picking up the argument of ecofeminism, my ambition is not, grand as Swanson 
charges hers to be, to use Woolf as a means to “help us today in our quest to develop the non-
anthropocentric and non-androcentric understandings of the world necessary to changing human 
behavior towards the other-than-human world.”622 Alt’s approach to read Woolf into the early 
twentieth century ecology of her times, it seems to me, is much more apt and therefore impactful 
                                                           
620 “The Real World: Woolf and Ecofeminism,” Virginia Woolf and the Natural World, 25. 
621 Virginia Woolf and the Natural World, 4. 
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in making Woolf our contemporary. The ecological and feminist lenses, however, do bring 
together these disparate fields of interest. In Chapters Five and Six, I touched upon Harrison’s 
importance for Woolf in providing an “Evolutionary Hellenism” that allowed Woolf, following 
Harrison’s own trajectory as a scholar, to move from the Platonic, Olympian, marmoreal, and 
masculine Greek ideal to the chthonic, Eleusinian, “matrilineal” and pre-Socratic idea of Greek 
myth and ritual. In Bonnie Kime Scott’s words, “Woolf reappropriated classical and pagan 
myths to explore the ideas of balanced and sustainable order. She focused on female figures, 
young and old, situated in direct relation to earth and water.”623 Woolf fascinated in evolutionary 
theory, in the Darwinian thought that constructed a destiny independent of human beings and yet 
included them without insisting upon their centrality. It and the philosophies that proposed the 
pluralities of time and the vagaries of language gave Woolf free imaginative play to the 
possibility of form and language that would help her envision a narrative less androcentric, yes, 
but sometimes even less anthropocentric in its appreciations of nature. The importance of Jane 
Ellen Harrison in this field remains that a cultural feminism persists, and rather than it somehow 
being an essentialist negative construct that equates nature with women or female deities, 
Harrison pushed Themis and a matrilineal descent as the deeper, truer Greek ideal and religion, 
because it was grounded in the ritual acts of community and nature.  Harrison’s work on 
“primitive” rituals were an important alternative to Woolf’s sense of the past, as it located that 
primitive in the Western tradition, a female one at that, rather than the English colonial present 
that more narrowly saw the British Empire as an inheritance of the glory that was Greece. 
 Wyndham Lewis, inevitably the ready contrarian to all thoughts positive to Woolf’s 
evolutionary and feminist sensibilities, nonetheless understood early and often what Woolf and 
                                                           
622 Ibid., p. 24. 
623 Ibid, 7. 
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other Modernists with feminist leanings were attempting through the influence of Jane Ellen 
Harrison and other archaeological approaches to his cherished classicism. In one of his shortest 
essays from Time and Western Man, not three pages long, he lists “The Naughty Nineties” as 
essentially “archaeological and historical” and opposed to the “‘culture’ gospel of Arnold and the 
piled up Victorian “scientific materialism” that in its place raised up the “idealism of the Greek 
World”; soon afterwards comes “Feminism…a revolution that aims at reversing the respective 
positions of the sexes, and so returning to the supposed conditions of the primitive 
Matriarchate.” Then comes “the world of science, sociology, psychology” directed at “some sort 
of return to the Past. …Freud’s teaching has resuscitated the animal past of the soul, following 
upon Darwin, and hatched a menagerie of animal, criminal and primitive “complexes” for the 
Western mind. All these approaches stress the Past, the primitive, all that is not the civilized 
Present. There is no revolutionary theory or movement that does not ultimately employ itself in 
bringing to life ghosts, and putting the Present to school with the Past.”624 This, for Lewis, was 
unacceptable because it brought the romance of the past into the present, and his classicism 
required a clean break. 
 Ultimately, what Lewis never fully appreciated in the “time-cult” of the age, especially in 
the guise of Woolf, was how Woolf utilized the present, a tunneling process backed by the past, 
to usher in a narrative whose point wasn’t a complete disruption or break from the past. Like the 
idea of evolution and its dependence upon continuity as much as change, what makes Woolf 
remarkable for her time, —for any time and for the plurality of times she imagined—is how she 
sought renewal in the primordial as much as the Platonic, embraced a time and a literature bent 
on change even as she employed patterns of unity and design that might best be aligned to the 
ideal or the Platonic. It shows a Virginia Woolf far more deeply interfused in the sciences than 
                                                           
624 from “The Return to the Primitive” in Time and the Western Man, 34-35. 
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had been previously thought or allowed, analogously similar to the studies that have 
meticulously explored Woolf reading’s of classicism and incorporation of British Hellenism for 
the uses and advantages of a feminist modernism. The past two decades of literary criticism and 
development emphasize further how the accumulation of time has only allowed for an evolution 
of thought to catch up to the changing lineaments of her form. 
 
    Let me also just add, as a parting aside, how gratifying it was to see, quite by surprise, my 
own work referenced and quoted by Bonnie Kime Scott in In the Hollow of the Wave, not from 
this dissertation that of course hadn’t been published but from that same paper at the 2003 
International Virginia Woolf Conference, where I first proposed an aesthetics of semi-
transparency that had Darwin as an origin. It is thrilling to think that the seeds of an idea, one 
that slept for nearly two decades before this dissertation came to fruition, still found soil in 
Scott’s important work further afield. Rip Van Winkle, indeed, in how my Sleepy Hollow 
became part of hers. 
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